* AvCanada's Home Page * Photo Gallery * Directory * Topsites *Weather *Enter Chat * Media Kit
It is currently Sat May 18, 2013 5:57 pm



All times are UTC [ DST ]


Who is chatting

Who is chatting
Enter Chat




Post new topic Reply to topic  [ 32 posts ]  Go to page Previous  1, 2
Author Message
PostPosted: Tue Jul 10, 2012 8:41 pm 
Offline
Rank 3
Rank 3

Joined: Tue Jan 24, 2012 2:51 pm
Posts: 177
Location: 1 mile final 24 CYSN
xysn wrote:
My own questions - answers to which may never be known:

Why does Bonin apply an initial nose up input? Was he trying to fly over the storm?


Nose up tendency could be a trim issue. Earlier, Capt and PF were actually discussing potential of a climb to get higher.

Quote:
Why does it accept two simultaneous inputs at all?


only one side in use at one time


Top
 Profile  
 
PostPosted: Wed Jul 11, 2012 5:17 am 
Offline
Rank 2
Rank 2

Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 9:49 pm
Posts: 74
More info:

Final AF447 Report Suggests Pilot Slavishly Followed Flight Director Pitch-Up Commands
http://www.ainonline.com/comment/1627

Quote:
Co-pilot Bonin kept on pulling the plane up, possibly because a faulty computer indicator was telling him to do so. The so-called Flight Director, an instrument straight in front of him, which initially failed but then came on again, told him: pull the plane up!


http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 43421.html

I guess this explains a few things?

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090 ... 601.en.pdf
Final report in English

"Section 1.16.5.4 Calculation of the flight director orders" reconstructs what the FD might have shown ... chilling. Still, why the PF felt that following the FD was a priority with all the noise going on is a mystery.


Top
 Profile  
 
PostPosted: Thu Jul 12, 2012 10:56 am 
Offline
Rank 3
Rank 3

Joined: Thu Feb 08, 2007 6:44 pm
Posts: 121
xysn wrote:
Quote:
Why, revert to basics and what you know to be true about your plane. Hold the stick full back and the magic will take care of everything. It will pitch up to the optimum AOA, reducing the sink and be at the best attitude to fly out of anything.


That's a very interesting observation. We all have fall-back thinking, but to have THAT as fall-back highlights an issue with training, I think.


This is certainly not what I was taught on my airbus training - nor is this the airbus philosophy.

Quote:
Why does the Airbus "dual input" system "average out" the inputs? Why does it accept two simultaneous inputs at all? It's not like with FBW that you need additional muscle power to overcome pressure on the control surfaces.


The two sidesticks operate independently of each other. If both are deflected simultaneously then a voice call "Dual input" will come accompanied by an arrow on the glareshield. Part of the procedure when taking over control in manual flight is to push the red button on the sidestick to lock out the other side. An aural "Priority Left/Right" call will come.

You should not have "dual input" - only one sidestick should be operated at any one time.

All of the above is covered in training.

There is more than enough information on the PFD to tell you what the aircraft is doing. The issue here is not the sidestick design or operation - it is a failure of basic flying skills.


Top
 Profile  
 
PostPosted: Thu Jul 12, 2012 5:52 pm 
Offline
Rank 3
Rank 3

Joined: Tue Jan 24, 2012 2:51 pm
Posts: 177
Location: 1 mile final 24 CYSN
The barrage of unending aural warnings start with the cavalry call (AP disconnect alarm sound). Might be too hard to find this kind of training regimen using the interior of an unexpected severe thunderstorm with just the artificial horizon. Kept it from stalling for a whole minute while also worrying about 'high speed', and looks like "I've got control" was done right until all became futile after the stall (where ice on the wings makes a recovery impossible at the increasing DVV).

The FD screen going off so briefly, then on again with all those messages. More CB detection/avoidance and systems-failure training for sure ... also fatigue (rest) management research.


Top
 Profile  
 
PostPosted: Fri Jul 13, 2012 8:50 am 
Offline
Rank 3
Rank 3

Joined: Thu Feb 08, 2007 6:44 pm
Posts: 121
Once again there is a lot of incorrect information on this thread - some of you need to read the report.

2R wrote:
Was the RADAR working ?
I would guess it was not working at 100 percent,why else would any pilot fly into a large nasty CB.
Maybe they should take a look at the RADARs on their planes as this was the second fight they lost with a CB.


Radar was working and the gain was changed from calibrated to maximum. A heading change was made to the left to avoid weather. Only light turbulence was encountered. This is not consistent with flying into a CB.

TheStig wrote:
From what I've read this flight had been filed to Madrid with CDG as an alternate. This procedure is known as In-flight re-fileing or re-dispatch. It is becoming increasingly common as commercial pressures to minimize costs mount. Unfortunately, carrying extra gas does not generate extra revenue.


The fuel figures in the report show this was not a re-dispatch flightplan. Captain took 900+ kg extra which is consistent with a requirement to avoid tropical weather enroute.

TheStig wrote:
It is a safe system, however, it places extra pressure on the pilots to cross the ocean without burning into to the fuel require to make it to their planned destination. We all know how much pressure 'get-home-itis' can put on a flight crew. I'm not trying to speculate on the cause of this crash, but don't you think the crew of AF447 would have diverted around the thunderstorms if they knew they had the fuel to do so and continue to CDG?


This is complete nonsense. I regularly fly on a re-dispatch flightplan and we certainly avoid enroute weather. Once again there is nothing in the report to suggest the crew flew into a CB.

pdw wrote:
With any ice on the wings it is also very possible there wasn't the chance to recover once the point of stall was reached near full gross weight. It says minus 40C, however before the ice shut down the pitots the copilot explains "ozone smell" and comments on the sudden heat in the cabin (CVR info).

The pitots are heated and operational very soon after but may only have been possible for attitude/speed recovery right after sudden climb from 35,000 to 38,000. Once in stall with ice it is not the same. Even clean, how many such stall recoveries are on record ?


Nothing in the report about airframe icing. The pitot tubes appear to have been blocked by ice crystals not iced over. Aircraft weight was 205T vs 232T maximum. The report states the presence of supercooled water droplets would have been unlikely.

pdw wrote:
The barrage of unending aural warnings start with the cavalry call (AP disconnect alarm sound). Might be too hard to find this kind of training regimen using the interior of an unexpected severe thunderstorm with just the artificial horizon. Kept it from stalling for a whole minute while also worrying about 'high speed', and looks like "I've got control" was done right until all became futile after the stall (where ice on the wings makes a recovery impossible at the increasing DVV).


Nothing in the report about flying through a CB or ice on the wings.

All the warnings can be cancelled using the Emergency cancel button on the ECAM Control Panel

Quote:
The FD screen going off so briefly, then on again with all those messages. More CB detection/avoidance and systems-failure training for sure ... also fatigue (rest) management research.


FD = Flight Directors. They are displayed on a screen.
All screens were working normally.


Top
 Profile  
 
PostPosted: Mon Aug 27, 2012 4:36 am 
Offline
Rank 1
Rank 1

Joined: Thu Aug 16, 2012 3:48 pm
Posts: 40
Location: Pickering
Friends of mine were over yesterday which I hadn't seen in months. We talked about this accident, and then I looked at the report
on Wiki (< taken with a grain of salt).

Wiki says the pilots had no stall recovery training:

Quote:
The pilots had not received specific training in "manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude"; this was not a standard training requirement at the time of the accident.


I find that incredible, especially knowing that stall is so easily achieved, and such a dangerous mode of aerodyanmics.

Wouldn't you have visual reference to realize that the aircraft isn't moving forward very quickly? Mushy/unreacting control surfaces?
A feeling of weightlessness (descending at incredible rates!)?

I'm just shocked that forward flight not be corrected from 38,000 feet when training requirements are to break a stall, and recover
within 200 feet (if I recall).

From the little I know, the static portion of the pitot static system should have continued to function. If not, there are alternate
ports to select. This would mean the pressure altitude, VSI, and STBY altimeter would still operate, correct?

If the pitot heaters failed, would you get a caution light on the warning panel? I know there are pitot warning lights on our sims
when the toggle switches are left in the "off" position.

Almost 11,000 FPM descent rate at impact. Wouldn't you feel something at 5,000 fpm (~ - 3g)?

Sorry about all of the questions, just thinking out loud.


Top
 Profile  
 
PostPosted: Mon Aug 27, 2012 6:05 am 
Offline
Rank Moderator
Rank Moderator

Joined: Wed Feb 18, 2004 1:21 am
Posts: 3431
Location: Vancouver
Pdw, I'd suggest you read a lot more about the A330 in general and this accident in particular before commenting.

Many here have stated that the actions of the pf are inexplicable. The reality is that it was night, there were multiple ECAM messages, horns going off, a loss of airspeed indication, and he found himself suddenly having to fly the aircraft manually. First of all just flying the aircraft manually was likely to cause a high level of stress, if not outright panic. It was probably the first time in his career that he had been in control of an aircraft at that altitude. Most airline SOPs prohibit manual flying at altitude, and this is not something that would ever be covered in sim training. The pilot probably had few hours manually flying the aircraft in his six years, and almost certainly had never done so at altitude. Add to this a screen full of error messages on the ECAM, which I doubt either pilot could make much sense of initially, and I think it's obvious that he panicked, and wasn't really flying the aircraft so much as hanging on for the ride. The initial pitch up was probably not a concious move, it's simply all he could come up with.

As others have stated here, what was needed was a calm pilot - confident with their flying abilities - to fly 2.5 degrees pitch, about 80% N1, and call 'unreliable speed checklist'.

During a similar event a few months later the fo, pnf this time, pulled back three quarters of the way on the sidestick and the aircraft climbed several thousand feet before they recovered control. During later debriefing he stated that he did not remember these inputs at all. Simply panicked.

Once AF447 got into the stall, the plane started descending rapidly and this confirmed to the panicked fo that he needed to pull back. Through 10 000 feet when he called out to the captain that no matter how much he tried to climb, the plane kept descending, the captain called 'No No, don't climb, descend!' Unfortunately too late.

Airline pilots are supposed to have received all the stall training they need by the time they are flying an airliner, and the training centers around recognizing an impending stall and recovering at the first sign of it. This accident has highlighted the problem with this paradigm and training programs are changing. Unfortunately most chief pilot departments still encourage or mandate the use of autopilot almost all the time so the lack of flying competence is not being addressed.


Top
 Profile  
 
Display posts from previous:  Sort by  
Post new topic Reply to topic  [ 32 posts ]  Go to page Previous  1, 2


All times are UTC [ DST ]


Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 19 guests


You cannot post new topics in this forum
You cannot reply to topics in this forum
You cannot edit your posts in this forum
You cannot delete your posts in this forum
You cannot post attachments in this forum

Search for:
Jump to:  
Powered by phpBB® Forum Software © phpBB Group

 
For questions/comments please send them to
webmaster@avcanada.ca


AvCanada Topsites List
AVIATION TOP 100 - www.avitop.com Avitop.com

While the administrators and moderators of this  forum will attempt to remove or edit any generally objectionable material as  quickly as possible, it is impossible to review every message. If you feel a  topic or post is inappropriate email us at support@avcanada.ca .  By reading these forums you acknowledge that  all posts made to these forums express the views and opinions of the author and  not the administrators, moderators or webmaster (except for posts by these  people) and hence will not be held liable. This website is not responsible or liable in any way for any false or misleading messages or job ads placed at our site.   

Use AvCanada's information at your own risk!

We reserve the right to remove any messages that we deem unacceptable.
  When you post a message, your IP is logged and may be provided to concerned parties where unethical or illegal  behavior is apparent. All rights reserved.