Diadem wrote:Pelmet, YGL wasn't down to 1/2SM, YGW was. YGL was 1 1/2SM and VV013. I don't have a CAP for Quebec available, but I would bet that there's an approach that meets those mins. Hell, those meet alternate mins.
First I think you need to re-read what I posted before responding. I never said YGL was 1/2 mile. I said.... "I am just going on the TSB statement that it was no longer viable to go to YGL and their filed alternate was down to one-half mile with no precision approaches available"
Diadem wrote:The TSB didn't say that it wasn't viable to go to YGL, the flight crew decided that because they didn't take the time to gather all of the info and make a decision, they just acted hastily. They could have reached YGL by using some of their reserve fuel, which is what it's there for; their legal alternate crapped out after they took off, and they were under no obligation to land with 45 minutes of usable fuel remaining. I've run into a surprising number of pilots who think that reserve is untouchable, but this is precisely the situation for which it's intended.
Second, I think you need to re-read the report. The second finding says...."Weather conditions below published landing minima for the approach at the alternate airport CYGW (Kuujjuarapik) and insufficient fuel to make CYGL (La Grande Rivière) eliminated any favourable diversion options."
Diadem wrote: YGL wasn't down to 1/2SM, YGW was. YGL was 1 1/2SM and VV013. I don't have a CAP for Quebec available, but I would bet that there's an approach that meets those mins. Hell, those meet alternate mins.
Alternates aren't there just to tick a box on a form, they need to be good enough that to use if the destination craps out.
Third, I appreciate the advice but you might want to check again to see if this is above the alternate minima for YGL?
Diadem wrote:Descending below the safe altitude on a constant descent, especially if the wind isn't exactly what you expect, is going to get pilots killed a lot more frequently than trying to find somewhere else to land, and it's irresponsible of you to endorse that. I hope you never become an instructor or training captain.
Fourth, there was nowhere else to land. Based on the report, I suspect a properly flown circling approach actually would have gotten them in but failing that, there only viable choice was a straight in approach using the GPS and descending on a 3 to 1(or slightly above) as they were familiar with the terrain and knew that it was only some downsloping terrain to fly over.
What you say about the wind doesn't make sense. They would have known their groundspeed from their GPS and their distance back as well. What is the Metro approach speed? 130 knots perhaps minus a 15 knot headwind. 115 on approach for groundspeed. A 600 fpm descent started at 8 miles back at 2400 feet AAE. Every mile a target altitude would have been checked, if above or below the descent path, an adjustment would have been made to the descent rate. PAPI's would have been picked up at 500 feet or so in this case allowing a safe landing. Radalt would have been monitored when close in. It works extremely well. Just ask the 757 pilots of the NZ Air Force who did the same under worse weather conditions. Report link on page 1.