AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

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cossack
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by cossack »

Forgive the ATC intrusion here.
Say you are on approach to YYZ 24R and the departure ahead is a little tardy getting going, ATC will, if possible, offer a sidestep to 24L to avoid an overshoot. This might occur at just inside 2 mile final, so around 500agl.
Most accept the sidestep but some do not.
Are we turning your stable approach into an unstable one and is this the reason for refusal of the sidestep?
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ahramin
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by ahramin »

At my airline we have to be stable by 500' which includes being on localizer and glideslope by 500' so unless the sidestep comes early enough to be completed by 500' we're not allowed to.

This isn't the whole story though. A sidestep, even though it's a visual maneuver that is easy to do manually (you just fly the plane over to line up with the new runway, simple) is not something that is ever practiced or taught, so many pilots I fly with would be very reluctant to accept one even if they had time to move over by 500' because it's simply not a skill in their repertoire. In addition it's something that requires active inputs by both pilots so even though I have no problem with a sidestep I'll still decline it unless I happen to be flying with someone I know can handle it without any previous briefing and discussion, a rare occasion.

Also the aircraft itself can have a lot of technology that is not designed for this. On my aircraft we can't change the ILS frequency below 700' and even above it's a 30 to 60 second process. Obviously on a visual sidestep we're not going to take time to do that so now you need to know what buttons to push to override the GPWS from going bananas when you fly the plane into the ground (from its point of view).

So while it's easy to blame it on stabilized approach criteria, it would be equally easy to include a sidestep in the criteria (I note the Emirates criteria quoted above has provisions for being stable only at 300' in specific situations, so apparently there's nothing magic about 500'). Making sure every single pilot in a large company has the skill to do it safely ... not so easy. I've only accepted 2 sidesteps in the last 10 years and the closer one at 3 miles was about as close as I could do. 2 miles I wouldn't even consider. It's interesting that you say most aircraft accept the sidestep as I've never seen a stabilized approach criteria in commercial use that would allow it. Must be part of the 97% :).

As Tigger says: Go-Arounds are Great!
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by ZBBYLW »

cossack wrote:Forgive the ATC intrusion here.
Say you are on approach to YYZ 24R and the departure ahead is a little tardy getting going, ATC will, if possible, offer a sidestep to 24L to avoid an overshoot. This might occur at just inside 2 mile final, so around 500agl.
Most accept the sidestep but some do not.
Are we turning your stable approach into an unstable one and is this the reason for refusal of the sidestep?
The reality is some pilots are more comfortable than others flying the airplane. What ever approach we are flying is almost always the one in our FMGC. The only exception is the odd time when going for 5/23 and base we ask for a last ditch "field insight any chance a visual onto one of the 24s or 06s?" Even then some will try and just put the new approach into the box. It keeps the eGPWS happy (which only recognizes the runway in the box, unless you turn it off) and provides us easy reference once the loc and g/s are up. When you're that low on the approach you're not going to be heads down punching bottoms and some feel more comfortable than others turning off the FDs, looking outside and flying the airplane.

Easier on the narrow bodies. Never flew a 777 or anything similar but in addition to lower level maneuvering, 24L/06R is a bit shorter than 24R/06L and even if they get the side step at a far enough distance that the maneuvering is not an issue, at higher weights the shorter runway may make them rather go around and recalculate what they have on final.

Only time I've side stepped at YYZ has been a bit higher up.. (700-1000 feet or so) and has never been any drama. Weight can also be a bit of a factor in a light 319 with an approach speed of 117 knots things happen much slower and more civilized. A 321 close to Max landing weight at 150 knots you eat up the distance and altitude much faster, not saying you'd say no, just saying you may be more conservative the closer you get to the runway.

As for the stable question. It's a good point. We have a 500 foot gate but also have a clause that allows for unique approaches that require maneuvering below this we are required to be established on the extended centreline by 300AGL. Without any guidance otherwise (there is none) I would argue that a side step is unique. With that being said you may not feel comfortable on any given day to do a last minute side step procedure rolling out right at 300 feet on a non briefed procedure. At a place like MEX it is very common to side step and I always made a point to brief what we will do so we are not surprised. I don't commonly brief a side step in YYZ as it's not done too frequently.
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cossack
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by cossack »

Thanks ahramin and ZBBYLW.

This sidestep has saved numerous overshoots and I have had more accept it than decline. The arrival spacing here is very tight in mixed mode (5 miles becomes 4 or less by touchdown) and all it takes is the arrival missing the first high speed exit and/or the departure being slow to roll and we're working on the alternate plan which will include the offer of a side step or "in the event of" missed approach instructions.

If the departing traffic isn't moving by the time you get to 2 miles its going to be close and we will try to brief you accordingly. Best to check in early on Tower rather than at 2 1/2 miles. Being slowed from 170 a mile earlier is often enough to make it work.

The sidestep when established on final for 05/23 to the south complex isn't often done with jets. With props we have no noise issues, but with jets the side step is supposed to be done at or above 3000 feet. From base leg that's not an issue. Often for runway loading we don't like the last minute switch for your convenience as it can inconvenience many more waiting to depart.

The best side step I saw was a CSA A310 who went from 15L to 15R (about 4 times the lateral of the south runways) inside 2 final with an A330 slow to depart 15L. He overflew K taxiway and rolled wings level over the threshold. One of the centre controllers got this pic over the Kilo hangars.

Image

Image won't preview but you can open it in a new tab and see it.

[/thread hijack]
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ahramin
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by ahramin »

Nice pic. My guess though is that if they had run that 310 off the side of the runway, the TSB's list of contributing factors would have been ATC's late offer of a sidestep. Maybe worth considering.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by ahramin »

complexintentions wrote:Maybe we're just talking about different things here. This is the actual criteria we're required to fly approaches to:
Stable Approach Criteria

Instrument approaches should be planned to arrive over FAP/FAF, or 1,500 ft AAL, whichever occurs later, in the landing configuration, on proper glide path, and at proper speed. All instrument approaches must be stabilized no lower than 1,000 ft AAL.
Visual approach should be planned to be in the landing configuration, on proper glide path (VASI, PAPI), and at proper speed by 1,000ft AAL. All visual approaches must be stabilized no lower than 500 ft AAL. However, if maneuvering is required by the published procedures in order to be established on the center line of the landing runway (i.e.: HND VOR 16, JFK VOR 13, circling approach,...etc.), the aircraft must be stabilized no lower than 300 ft AAL.

A stable approach is defined as:
• Aircraft in landing configuration (as per respective AOM/ FCOM); and
• Airspeed, not more than bug (target speed) +15 knots and not less than Vref. / VLS; and
• Maximum sink rate of 1,200 fpm; and
• Engines “spooled up”; and
• For a precision instrument approach, less than 1 dot deflection on localizer and glide slope until visual glide path reference can be maintained (VASI, PAPI, etc.);
• For non-precision approach, less than 5 degrees deviation from inbound course;
• For a visual approach / segment, less than full high or full low indication on visual approach guidance (VASI, PAPI, etc.) unless the descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers and where such a descent rate will allow touchdown to occur within TDZ of the runway of intended landing.
If the aircraft is not stabilized by 1,000 ft/500 ft/300 ft AAL, as applicable, a missed approach is mandatory. A missed approach shall also be executed if, after passing 1,000 ft AAL on approach, it becomes obvious that a safe landing cannot be made within the TDZ (the first 3,000 ft or first 1/3 of the runway, which- ever is less).
If, for any reason, approach conditions require any deviation from stable approach criteria, such deviations shall be briefed prior start of the approach.
There are no calls of "Stable" or "Unstable". You fly to these, or you go around.
Thanks for posting that. It occurred to me over the weekend that we haven't even agreed on what we are arguing about :). Your criteria is better than a lot of what I see in North America. The lack of a PM standard call with the onus on the PF to do the go-around is particularly refreshing and I'm sure it contributes to your high rate of compliance. The target 500' above the actual cutoff point is also good SOP. One glaring problem: All criteria must be met. Do you really go around on an ILS if you are at 1000' on loc and slope, on speed, and the engines haven't spooled up yet? What if the tailwind continues to 200'? Many stabilized approach criteria in the US now only mandate a go around if two criteria are not met (high and fast for example). Also when it says instrument approach, does that mean any instrument approach? Or any instrument approach in IMC? What about an ILS in VMC with the runway in sight? Is that a visual approach when it comes to stabilized approach criteria?

To me, the simple fact that there are such a variety of stabilized approach criteria with such a variety of altitudes for the mandatory go-around helps explain why it's so easy to ignore it. At my airline we now allow all unstable approaches to continue to 500' in both IMC and VMC in an effort to get our compliance numbers up. With the stroke of a pen (and not one extra go-around), we've suddenly managed to get our unstabilized approach criteria compliance rate well above 3%, bonuses all around. I'm not sure we're any safer though, as I suspect we're still having aircraft continuing unstable approaches to a landing at the same numbers as before.
complexintentions wrote:But all you keep repeating is that guys simply aren't exercising the discipline to execute a missed approach when they don't meet the criteria. And then using the fact that such a high percentage of the (fortunately) very low numbers of unstable approaches are continued to landing as proof that unstable approach criteria are ineffective. Huh? Well, yes. If we just don't do a checklist, it's pretty useless too.
I expressed myself poorly. The fact that so many unstable approaches are continued to a safe landing was meant to get people thinking about the magic numbers that we use when writing these SOPs, not justify unstable approaches. What I am repeating (or attempting to) is that if we continue to rely on stabilized approach SOPs as our main tool in preventing unstable approach accidents, we're going to continue having unstable approach accidents. Again: I have no problem with the concept or flying a stabilized approach, or going around for an unstable one. I have a huge problem with writing a stabilized approach SOP with some magic 1000' or 500' numbers thrown in there and then saying "well that's one problem solved". Then when we have our noses rubbed into it by incidents like MBJ, wringing our hands and saying "they should have gone around".
complexintentions wrote:I'm going to make a prediction here myself and say I'm fairly confident they wish they had gone around.
The point is that they didn't go around. If stabilized approach criteria could be relied on to stop these accidents, it wouldn't have happened. If you want me to admit that stabilized approach criteria has the potential to prevent accidents then yes, I agree. Although I haven't seen any data to that effect, I wouldn't be surprised if the implementing of stabilized approach SOPs has had a small but measurable effect on the number of unstable approach accidents. But I don't think small effects should be our goal here. Elimination should be the goal. That's the thing about SOPs of any description. If you are trying to reduce the number of accidents, SOPs are by far the most cost effective tool. If you are trying to eliminate accidents, SOPs are a very small part. My guess is that because there was an SOP to cover this situation, the CP feels perfectly ok ignoring the rest of the muppet show that contributed (mode confusion, FMA awareness, flying skills) to it. I think what we should be doing instead is looking at our training departments and figuring out how we have crews like this flying around.
complexintentions wrote:Is is just that it's too hard for some to put their a/c in a stable state at a specific point on the approach? That's all the stable approach criteria are. I mean really - why are you a "little high and a little fast" at 1,000 feet, if that's the SOP? Perhaps THAT's the question that needs asking? You admit guys are "modifying" things to accommodate their own way of flying the approach. What is professional about that? So now you quit going around because you were disappointed no one else was? Geezuz.
No, I think the question that need asking is what are we going to do when it DOES happen. Again I'm not sure what we're arguing about here. I have stated before that I fully support flying a stabilized approach as good airmanship. The vast majority of the time I do have the aircraft in a stable state at the specific point but sometimes it just doesn't happen, most commonly because of ATC but I'll admit that sometimes it's totally my fault and I just didn't keep in mind how heavy we were or how big the tailwind was up here. From your posts and your lack of answer to my question of how many go-arounds for unstable approaches you made last year it seems that you don't make these kind of mistakes. I admire that skill, but I don't possess it and certainly most of the pilots I know aren't anywhere near that level of perfection. Regardless of the reason, when we don't meet the stabilized approach criteria I go around. I used to think exactly the way you do and was shocked when the SOP wasn't followed but when I found out that was regular practice everywhere, I couldn't ignore it and had to sit back and rethink why this is happening. The more I looked at how arbitrary and top down the whole implementation of stabilized approach SOPs was, the more sense it made that the less disciplined and more operationally minded among us would feel perfectly ok continuing knowing they would be stable before touchdown. After all, 10% of go arounds result in an unsafe state so they aren't free in safety or money either.
complexintentions wrote:I'm sorry but I've seen very few approaches that were completely stable from 500, 1,000, or 1,500 feet (which is actually the requirement to be fully configured for an LVO approach at EK, btw), in other words the entire approach, suddenly go sideways in the last couple hundred feet. A rogue gust on a very blustery day at Heathrow, once. Push TOGA, say the words. It's REALLY not that hard.
As I said, from the data I saw half of the accidents attributed to unstable approaches were stable at 1000'. If you think all unstable approach accidents start at 1000' then I don't see how I could argue that a go-around at 1000' won't always save the day. Wish I could find the FSF magazine article. What's interesting is the 1500' stable approach requirement for LVO approaches. Again the old me would have jumped on this band wagon. Makes perfect sense right? Higher risk approach, so putting the stabilized approach gate higher must reduce that risk right? Except that when you take a step back and look at it, it's ridiculous. How on earth does 1000' of stable flight mitigate less LVO risk than 1500' of stable flight? I've got no problem going around at 1500', perfect opportunity to practice a TOGA-tap. But I'd be shocked if even 1% of North American pilots would go around on a CAT III because the engines weren't spooled at 1500' in a 20 knot tailwind.
complexintentions wrote:And if you can't meet these on a regular basis, then well, what the hell are you doing in there anyway?! If there's something in there you think is a bad idea, I'm all ears to hear what it is. I mean, I dunno, not pulling it to idle and dropping in at 2600 ft/min at 2 1/2 miles like the Asiana guys did, or coming in hot 2 or 3 flap settings behind like the AC guys did, and formalizing that as SOP, seems pretty reasonable to me.
The bad idea is putting in an SOP that catches 3% to 4% of all approaches, being surprised when it gets ignored, and thinking that it will prevent unstable approach accidents. When it comes to "pulling it to idle and dropping in at 2600 ft/min at 2 1/2 miles like the Asiana guys did, or coming in hot 2 or 3 flap settings behind like the AC guys did" we are totally in agreement that an SOP requiring a go around is perfectly reasonable. But as you stated, those two examples are a very long way away from stabilized approach criteria.
complexintentions wrote:the AC guys busted them by such a ridiculous margin that it was painful to read
Exactly, so to my mind it doesn't matter how broad you make the stabillized approach criteria margin, it is going to fail to prevent these accidents. In fact the broader you make it, the more you train crews to ignore it and the less likelyhood it will be followed when you really do have a dangerously unstable approach. We need to train crews to recognize that when things aren't going very well, the solution isn't to get fancy and keep pushing, it's to go around. The SOP isn't doing the job, but I think the right training scenarios could in time succeed.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by cossack »

ahramin wrote:Nice pic. My guess though is that if they had run that 310 off the side of the runway, the TSB's list of contributing factors would have been ATC's late offer of a sidestep. Maybe worth considering.
And how long would it take to write that report? :wink:
It is an offer only, not an instruction. I'm not surprised or offended if it is refused. I expect you to make the determination of whether it should be done. You are in the best position to decide that. I'm just going with plan B before I go to plan C.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by complexintentions »

hi aharim,

Thanks for your thorough post. As is often the case, after flogging a debate around for awhile it seems that we agree about much more than not.

Ultimately my beliefs about approaches go back to the old adage about a good landing begins with a good approach. And a good approach involves good planning - you could say a successful approach begins even before top of descent. As far as I'm concerned, the AC flight in this report began to go unstable the moment they neglected (or missed) the NOTAM about the ILS being out of service. From that point on they were behind the flight, and never really caught up again. Stable approach criteria are just a tool to crosscheck. I do not consider them the "main tool" to combat approach incidents. As I said, there were many factors in the Montego Bay approach. Basic disregard for about a million SOP's, for example. But then what procedures can solve "press-on-itis"?

The criteria I posted earlier aren't Emirates. I don't work there. But I dug up an old manual and here are EK's if you're interested:
Stable Approach Criteria

An approach is considered to be stable when all of the following conditions are met:
a. All briefings and checklists have been actioned. 

b. The aircraft is in the planned landing configuration (Note 1). 

c. The aircraft is on the correct flight path (Note 2). 

d. The aircraft speed is not more than final approach speed +10 KIAS and not less than VREF (Note 3). 

e. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration. 


Note 1: Planned landing configuration is: landing gear down and locked, landing flap set and speedbrake armed.
Note 2: An aircraft is considered to be on the correct flight path if it is within the approach path laid down in the fleet specific FCOM.
Note 3: As adjusted by minimum ground speed techniques where applicable and excluding momentary excursions (a momentary excursion is defined as a deviation lasting only a few seconds and where every indication is that it will return within the stabilised criteria).

Stable Approach Requirements

The landing gear should be down and locked, and the landing flap selected, no later than 1,500 ft AAL.
At 1,000 ft AAL: if the criteria in Stable Approach Criteria are not met then a go-around shall be flown, unless:
a. The aircraft speed does not meet the criterion but can reasonably be expected to be achieved by 500 ft AAL and the power set is appropriate to achieve this; or 

b. The aircraft is in the planned landing configuration and all landing actions have been completed but the landing checklist has not yet been completed. 


In which case the approach may be continued to not less than 500 ft AAL while these criteria are achieved.

At 500 ft AAL: If any of the criteria in Stable Approach Criteria are not met then PM shall announce “GO AROUND” and an immediate go-around shall be flown.

If a stable approach destabilises below 500 ft AAL then PM shall announce “GO AROUND” and an immediate go-around shall be flown.
If a valid “Long Landing” alert (Smart Landing-equipped aircraft) or a Runway Overrun Warning relevant to the current runway state (A380) is activated, then the PM shall announce “GO AROUND” and an immediate go-around shall be flown.

CAT II and CAT III – Stable Approach Requirements

For CAT II and CAT III approaches, the aircraft shall meet all stable approach criteria by 1,500 ft AAL.
If the approach destabilises below 1,500 ft AAL then PM shall announce “GO AROUND” and an immediate go-around shall be flown.

Stable Approach Criteria Exceptions

a. Sidestep Offset-NPA, SOIA Approaches, and RNAV Visual with RF Leg final.
i. The aircraft may continue through 1000 ft whilst achieving lateral alignment. 

ii. Wings shall be level by 300 ft AAL. 


b. Circle to Land and Visual Circuit Approaches.
i. The 1,500 ft AAL Landing Gear and Flap configuration selection requirements do not apply. 

ii. The aircraft may continue through 1000 ft whilst achieving lateral alignment. 

iii. Landing Checklist must be completed by 500 ft AAL. 

iv. Wings shall be level by 300 ft AAL. 

As you can see, they're even more proscriptive. But they follow exactly the same template: stable by 1,000. Continue to 500 with minor exceptions. Incidentally, the "300 ft wings level" requirement is not random, it's a Boeing FCTM requirement. If you're hard-banking a B777 much below 300 feet you're going to be dragging a wingtip pretty soon.
Do you really go around on an ILS if you are at 1000' on loc and slope, on speed, and the engines haven't spooled up yet?
Yes.
What if the tailwind continues to 200'?
Not sure I understand? If the approach is stable, you continue. If not, go around. Of course you have to be within a/c tailwind limitations on landing. (15knots in our case, but you better have calculated your landing performance accounting for it!)
Also when it says instrument approach, does that mean any instrument approach? Or any instrument approach in IMC?
Any instrument approach. IMC or VMC.
What about an ILS in VMC with the runway in sight? Is that a visual approach when it comes to stabilized approach criteria?
It's an ILS until you're cleared the visual approach. But you're overthinking it: if you meet the criteria at 1,000 feet, you'll meet the criteria.
From your posts and your lack of answer to my question of how many go-arounds for unstable approaches you made last year it seems that you don't make these kind of mistakes.
The two statements "how many go-arounds for unstable approaches I have made" and "don't make these kinds of mistakes" are not related. Of course I will come in a little high, or a little fast. The criteria allows for this, especially right up to the 1,000 ft point and even beyond, with conditions. But no, I have made no go-arounds for an unstable approach in over ten years. Of course this is not due to my being immune from making mistakes. It's because I'm highly aware of the criteria, and ensure I am managing the approach to achieve them. And really, they're pretty reasonable, not to mention conservative.

According to our latest Fleet Update for December 2016, unstable approaches were reduced to zero for the month. This is in a a company that tracks all QAR data religiously. So I dunno.

Some comments about the sidestepping discussion. Declining one very late (i.e. 2 miles) isn't an indication of piloting ability, it's about risk management and well, physics. Previous posters have already mentioned some of the challenges facing large, heavy aircraft which smaller, slower, more maneuverable aircraft don't have. Besides those there are factors like possible RAAS warnings, landing performance calculations, planned exit, taxi routing. And let's do this all tired, in the last two minutes of a 14 hour flight, some precise hand flying down low of a maneuver that we last did in the sim two years ago. All because either ATC was getting overly ambitious or someone's screwing the pooch on the runway. No thanks.

If I was surprised by the request, I'd decline it no question. More likely during the descent and approach preparations I'd brief that it was a possibility, run the performance numbers for both possible runways, explain exactly what I want on the FMC and if the autobrake setting will change if we accept a sidestep, brief the exit and taxi in from both runways, and then brief a point on the approach beyond which I wouldn't accept the clearance regardless. Probably something above 1,000 feet, but definitely not down around 5-600. Its just not the place to be banking a heavy aircraft. Can I do it? Of course. Do I feel the need to prove it? Nope. Why should someone else's inability to manage their affairs require me to push mine? The risk/reward makes it a no-brainer. Politely but firmly, Je Refuse.

I note that the CSA sidestep is referred to as the "best" one seen, even the posted pic has the caption "A beautiful piece of flying". And sure, it's nice and makes a pretty pic. But I would submit that there is no correlation between good flying skills and good decision-making skills. You need both, but the idea is if you possess the latter you shouldn't have to draw on the former. At least not on a bog-standard approach.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by Eric Janson »

goingnowherefast wrote:I called unstable once, and an argument ensued. Reluctantly he went around and landed on the 2nd approach. Later on, he did admit that it was the right thing to do.
The SOP at my company allows for any Pilot to call for a go-around (including the relief Pilot on the jumpseat). At this point a go-around is mandatory.

Our SOP also states that a clearance for an approach is also a clearance for a go-around.

If I had done what the Pilots at AC1804 did I would have been fired - I don't have a union protecting me.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by complexintentions »

Eric,

My company has that exact policy as well (below 1,000 AAL). Any licensed flight crew in the flight deck can call "Go-Around" and one MUST be performed.

And I, too would have been fired (and can't really argue against it) if I had conducted a "landing" like AC1804.

Ah well, accountability is so overrated, really.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by TheStig »

Eric,

Why would you think AC wanted to fire these pilots and ACPA stopped it, would they have been fired at Westjet? Every time I read anything online, the response in the comments section from the pitchfork yielding online community is predictable, "They should BE FIRED!" More crew members than you would ever believe do find them selves in front of disciplinary hearings at western airlines, but it's almost always for bad behavior, not airmanship.

Everyone can and will make mistakes, if these pilots had intentionally disregarded SOP's then they would have been disciplined, the union, as FDA 'gatekeeper', has in fact, 'outed' pilots in the past. Obviously you and others here may disagree, but the system of self reporting incidents and being indemnified for doing so allows the airline to identify risk areas before accidents happen. Yes, accidents still have and will happen, however, statistics show the safety records of airlines that operate in this manner are better than those who use discipline as a response to unintentional mistakes.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by Rookie50 »

"Unintentional mistake".

Really? I read that report, that's not my take on what happened.

Really all, what's the difference between this and the Asiana accident where everyone agreed and wanted to hang those pilots, and the airline, from the highest flagpole?

Answer:

1),not a Canadian airline, (LOL)

2). A handful of feet of asphalt.
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by Gilles Hudicourt »

cossack wrote:Forgive the ATC intrusion here.
Say you are on approach to YYZ 24R and the departure ahead is a little tardy getting going, ATC will, if possible, offer a sidestep to 24L to avoid an overshoot. This might occur at just inside 2 mile final, so around 500agl.
Most accept the sidestep but some do not.
Are we turning your stable approach into an unstable one and is this the reason for refusal of the sidestep?
This practice is common at some airports. Orlando and Marseilles come to mind.
The only time a sidestep could result in an unstable approach is if the threshold of the proposed parallel runway was closer than the one the landing had been planned on, like if one was stable for 33L and was offered 33R.
Otherwise, this should be not be a problem.

Another reason to refuse is if the proposed runway is shorter and the pilot has doubts about the stopping capability on the shorter runway. Again this should not be a problem in YYZ in dry and uncontaminated conditions......
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by complexintentions »

TheStig wrote:Eric,

Why would you think AC wanted to fire these pilots and ACPA stopped it, would they have been fired at Westjet? Every time I read anything online, the response in the comments section from the pitchfork yielding online community is predictable, "They should BE FIRED!" More crew members than you would ever believe do find them selves in front of disciplinary hearings at western airlines, but it's almost always for bad behavior, not airmanship.

Everyone can and will make mistakes, if these pilots had intentionally disregarded SOP's then they would have been disciplined, the union, as FDA 'gatekeeper', has in fact, 'outed' pilots in the past. Obviously you and others here may disagree, but the system of self reporting incidents and being indemnified for doing so allows the airline to identify risk areas before accidents happen. Yes, accidents still have and will happen, however, statistics show the safety records of airlines that operate in this manner are better than those who use discipline as a response to unintentional mistakes.
I see nowhere that Eric, or anyone stated "They should BE FIRED!". He (and I) simply stated that without recourse to the protection of a union, WE would be, if we had operated this particular flight.

I agree, punitive cultures are less safe than non-punitive ones, and poor practice - for unintentional mistakes. But I'm not sure that multiple, blatant violations of SOP's can be considered "unintentional". And if you're going to use the "everyone can and will make mistakes" defense for a pretty major eff-up, you're implying a pretty low level of competence, which is hardly less troubling. Can't have it both ways.
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TheStig
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by TheStig »

complexintentions wrote: I see nowhere that Eric, or anyone stated "They should BE FIRED!". He (and I) simply stated that without recourse to the protection of a union, WE would be, if we had operated this particular flight.

I agree, punitive cultures are less safe than non-punitive ones, and poor practice - for unintentional mistakes. But I'm not sure that multiple, blatant violations of SOP's can be considered "unintentional". And if you're going to use the "everyone can and will make mistakes" defense for a pretty major eff-up, you're implying a pretty low level of competence, which is hardly less troubling. Can't have it both ways.
Was not stating he said they should be fired, but rather it wasn't because they had union protection that they weren't.

I don't disagree with anything you've said, my intention isn't to defend these pilots or there actions but rather the system.
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cossack
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by cossack »

The CSA sidestep was nice to watch as it looked smooth and completely in control. Both turns were gentle as was the touchdown that followed. Maybe they had briefed the possibility and were ready for it when offered? Could/should crews into YYZ brief for the possibility of a sidestep?

What about JFK and the CRI VOR approach to 13L being given, not offered, 13R at CRI VOR?
Gilles Hudicourt wrote:This practice is common at some airports. Orlando and Marseilles come to mind.
The only time a sidestep could result in an unstable approach is if the threshold of the proposed parallel runway was closer than the one the landing had been planned on, like if one was stable for 33L and was offered 33R.
Otherwise, this should be not be a problem.

Another reason to refuse is if the proposed runway is shorter and the pilot has doubts about the stopping capability on the shorter runway. Again this should not be a problem in YYZ in dry and uncontaminated conditions......
Thank you for your input.
I have offered 33R to traffic on 33L when it has caught up the traffic it is following. Not an uncommon scenario. Having nothing on 33R at the time is more uncommon though so an overshoot is more often the outcome. Its about 2000' (a third of a mile) closer than 33L which would put you 100 or so feet above the glide slope.

Going from 24L to 24R for the same reason also involves a closer threshold, albeit not by much, and a slightly longer runway but with a very unforgiving overrun area..

As long as the runways are being used to the max sidesteps will be offered to avoid an overshoot. If you don't like it, say unable.

Thanks again.
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Eric Janson
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Re: AC1804 Montego Bay Report Released

Post by Eric Janson »

@TheStig

Just to clarify that my post refers only to my personal situation - I'm certainly not calling for anyone to be fired.

I see that what I wrote could be interpreted in several ways - hope this clarifies things.
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