Me too. They really only have themselves to blame for Roy Halliday's crash, as this just encourages low time pilots to get themselves killed.
The Icon stalls at 45kts (39kts with 30deg flap / report) and the investigation reveals that on impact it was doing 66kts. Prior to the left circling turn toward the west face ..turned slightly right .. a bit east first ..when at 54kts .. as if to take advantage of the available width for a maximum turning space.
As with the non fatal water-impact (shear) accident on April 1st six weeks earlier, the collison May 8 with terrain (this synopsis) is also during highest power application.
This sure seems obvious as one follows the story line ..
There's so many commenting that there is advertising which seems "encourages" meandering so close to the surfaces and sometimes with the temptation into steeper maneuvring that appears precarious; so the concern is obvious, that fearfully a higher accident-rate could be in it's infancy and only beginning to pile up.
A fact to their credit, the Icon company promotions are using flap properly and their website does advocate to adhere to "proper flying techniques". In the very first accident, flap is admittedly not used when needed in a "windshift/shear" (pilot admission / NTSB report April 1/2017). The meteorology fact determined there is prime example of something unforseen that can catch off-guard esp in distraction at low level; like that going on in wx history for this stalling event (this tread topic/ Little Portuguese Canyon) now determined to be 'insufficient turning arc/height'. Was it the first time into that Canyon, .. really ?
If an increased/increasing groundspeed (IAS bleed) of unusually stronger tailwind was truly going on past the halfway-point of this turning-circle as it arced over to the opposite/lee surface of the canyon into a southerly heading during a northwind increase (to NNW), it's easily calculable to prove exactly how significant that was when using the local/available wx history/component-data and NTSB-report's aircraft speed-data.
Pilots flying water aircraft must approach any over water or maneuvering type flying with a very different mindset than "land" pilots. There is a misconceived sense of freedom flying over the water, seemingly away from "airport" or other airspace which is overseen, allowing some freedom in maneuvering which is not there for landplane pilots - wrong! It is alarmingly easy to misjudge distance/altitude/attitude over water, or in canyon environments. 300 feet is nothing to an error in judgement, easy miss. Maneuvering an aircraft to within 300 feet of anything beyond the centerline of a runway is sadly difficult for most pilots. So a pilot who flies into a situation where his required precision for separation is 300 feet is a fool. They're already in too deep to receive the benefit of wind awareness, flap position, or stall speed awareness.
Stall speed is G dependent. A pilot who gets them self into trouble maneuvering in a tight area, or low altitude is going to pull. Pulling increases G, and stall speed. I defy a pilot to tell me the stall speed of their aircraft while they are pulling G, and not having a G meter - guesswork at best, complete unknown more likely.
It is not possible to prevent an accident by assuring that the pilot is aware and attentive to the winds, flap position, or stall speed, and yet they're ignoring the danger of their confined maneuvering environment. The pilot is going to have the accident anyway. A confined maneuvering environment may be simply low altitude, and nothing more. I do not have a table for a "safe" bank angle for 300 feet altitude, but 45 degree is not it for a low experience pilot. The fact that an aircraft manufacturer seems to normalize it does not make it safe. Enough training to begin to make a pilot safe doing this would most likely make that pilot afraid of doing it!
So, new, low experience pilots, particularly of water aircraft , do not think that you can low fly and maneuver at low altitude, and into canyons - doing that is dangerous. There are a number of accidents to prove this, and although the reports might mention winds, flap position, or stall speed, it is unlikely that these are causal factors, but low altitude ('could be because of low ceiling), confined areas, and aggressive maneuvering are often reported as factors. Pilots who survive, spend a lot of time overflying landing or maneuvering areas at altitude, and formulating safety plans. They conduct any maneuvering at a suitably high altitude, fly something like a circuit to approach for landing, and do not fly near the stall speed, much less increase it by pulling G.
There may be something like a jetski with wings, but such a machine has no business being maneuvered in three dimensions like a jetski. A pilot who flies such an aircraft as though it is a fighter is immature. If a pilot would like to fly aggressive maneuvering, there are aircraft designed for that - they don't land on the water. Pilots must make their choice: Low maneuvering, cautious at all times, careful landing on the water, of tumbling in the mirth at altitude in a plane designed to do it, with a G meter!
Pilots must make their choice: Low maneuvering, cautious at all times, careful landing on the water, of tumbling in the mirth at altitude in a plane designed to do it, with a G meter!
Or even better with an AOA indicator.
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
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veni, vidi,...... vici non fecit.
https://ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation ... 101&akey=1
This is the docket with additional info.....
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitl ... B01AEAC78A
It is interesting to note that there was a parachute onboard like the Cirrus aircraft have. That could save the day in a situation like this where a collision is unavoidable. Pull the chute. Instinct says to try to fly out of a bad situation. In my Cirrus training I have had the engine power pulled to idle and after going through the motions for a restart, I selected a field to land in at which point the instructor told me what I should be doing....pull the chute. Hadn't even thought of it. Neither did the pilot of the Icon.
From 150 feet above the water surface, where collision with terrain is immanent? I don't think a parachute will be of much use (unless you open it in front of you like an airbag!). The information in the report seems to confirm that the pilot was flying in a manner endorsed on the ICON website - low altitude, and maneuvering - without an exit plan from a blind canyon. There really has to be a "don't do that stuff" lesson in this for any wise pilot.That could save the day in a situation like this where a collision is unavoidable.
I think I'd say that the manner of death was "collision". Perhaps it was an accident, though an experienced pilot should not have got himself into this situation, was entirely accidental that this was the outcome?and the manner of death was "accident."
I would be embarrassed to admit to my colleagues that I'd been flying like that.
At some point they realized they were going to die. Pulling the chute can’t make it any worse and might just slow you down enough to survive. If it doesn’t work, nothing more is lost.PilotDAR wrote: ↑Wed Aug 22, 2018 6:46 pmFrom 150 feet above the water surface, where collision with terrain is immanent? I don't think a parachute will be of much use (unless you open it in front of you like an airbag!).That could save the day in a situation like this where a collision is unavoidable.
I suppose..... But it would be so much better if pilots flew normal category certified aircraft in such a way that a parachute was not even in their thinking as an emergency system.Pulling the chute can’t make it any worse and might just slow you down enough to survive. If it doesn’t work, nothing more is lost.