AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

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crazyaviator
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#626 Post by crazyaviator » Wed Aug 23, 2017 10:38 pm

More reality and cover-ups from people in power due to hidden and not so agendas for you my little snowflake ROCKIE ! :D

SMEAR' OR SAFETY? NAVY AVIATRIX SCARED PEERS

THIS ISSUE:
The Hidden Agenda Exposed
High Risk Affirmative Action
Kara Hultgreen The First Victim
Navy Coverup #1
Jerry Burns' Conscience
Lohrenz's "Down" Dossier
Burns in Jeopardy
What Can You Do?
Notes
"The Navy returned to flight status yesterday the female fighter pilot it grounded two years ago in the midst of a smear campaign by civilian activists and naval aviators opposed to allowing women to fly fighter aircraft." That was the lead in a news story by Dana Priest in The Washington Post on June 21, 1997. Ms. Priest reported that the pilot, Lt. Carey Lohrenz, "has been given back her right to fly land-based Navy aircraft," although she would not be permitted to return to the F-14 Tomcat or other carrier-based aircraft. Lohrenz's lawyer, Susan Barnes, called the decision a "victory," saying the Navy had done "the best they can do at this time." Barnes lamented that "resistance" among naval aviators "would be too strong against her" if Lohrenz were to return as a fighter pilot.

Priest contended that "discriminatory treatment" by other pilots and outside activists caused Lohrenz's failure. She wrote, "The campaign, which sometimes calls itself 'the Tailhook Under- ground,' after the infamous 1991 Tailhook scandal, is spearheaded by Elaine Donnelly, who heads the Center for Military Readiness."

Dana Priest's story gave the impression that Lt. Lohrenz had fallen victim to Neanderthals who oppose combat roles for women. The story is far more complex than what came through her feminist filter. It is a casebook example of how a reporter can purposely distort the facts to mold the readers' thinking-- in this case to promote the feminist agenda.

The Hidden Agenda Exposed

Priest wrote that her story was based on an "upcoming Navy Inspector General report." Ten days later, the Navy released that 239-page report, which was compiled to answer complaints by Lohrenz's parents that sexual harassment caused her failure. The report was titled, "Report of Investigation: Integration of Women into Carrier Air Wing Eleven." Priest's story about it in the Post on July 2 confirmed that she was practicing agenda journalism. Placed prominently on page A2, it covered one minor facet of the lengthy report--a charge that the Navy had failed to change the belief of the USS Lincoln's air-wing's commander, Capt. Dennis Gillespie, that women should not be put in harm's way in combat. His actions, she reported, had "created a rift between male and female pilots," the women believing they were singled out for harsh treatment and the men believing that the women were getting preferential treatment. Priest wrote, "The report found that, in general, neither statement was true."

That last statement was as close as Priest came to reporting that the IG had debunked the feminist claims that Lohrenz was victimized. Here are some things she failed to report.

--A damning conclusion by the Inspector General (IG) about Lohrenz's flying ability. It said Lt. Lohrenz made her carrier approaches so high and fast that she "consistently... scared everyone" but herself. Stress was one cited reason; hardheadedness was another. According to the IG report, "...[E]vidence suggests Lt. Lohrenz deliberately flew this way in spite of many attempts by landing signal officers [LSOs]...to correct what they believed was an extremely dangerous technique...[A] pilot who cannot, or will not, follow the directions of the LSO is inherently unsafe and must be removed from the carrier flying environment." It called her performance "unsafe, undisciplined and unpredictable."

--Evidence that Lohrenz and other women received preferential treatment, including testimony from flight instructors that a commander said bluntly that women would be pushed through training regardless of their flying ability.

--An acknowledgment that the material about Lohrenz's training record that was circulated by Elaine Donnelly was accurate, a direct refutation of Priest's charge that the flier was the subject of a "smear campaign." Although Priest interviewed Donnelly, she did not ask about the alleged "Tailhook Underground." Donnelly tells us she never heard of any such group, informal or otherwise, and that she surely was not its "spearhead," as Priest charged.

High Risk Affirmative Action

The Lohrenz affair began in 1994, when the Clinton Administration commenced its campaign to put women into combat billets. Stung by the Tailhook scandal, the Navy leaped at the opportunity to redeem itself with feminists. Carrier assignments are avidly sought by Navy aviators, and the 1994 competition was fierce, with military downsizing cutting the number of berths available for fliers. Lohrenz had completed flight school for ground-based planes, with an outstanding record. But according to the IG report, men with equal or better records had waited a year or more for carrier training. The discrimination had a cost. The IG wrote: "The decision to move females ahead of males in the training pipeline, necessary to get them to the targeted carrier/air wing before deployment, contributed to the perception that women would receive preferential treatment to satisfy political objectives, a message that hurt morale and teamwork."

Lohrenz, Lt. Kara S. Hultgreen and two other women were among the 10 pilots assigned to Fighter Squadron VF-124. The training was supposed to be "gender neutral," but according to three flight instructors interviewed by the IG, reality was another matter. By their accounts, Cmdr. Tom Sobiek, the commanding officer, convened instructors who had expressed concerns about the women's flying. Sobiek allegedly said that "the women are going to graduate regardless of how they performed." One officer summarized Sobiek as saying, "you guys don't understand, this is bigger than all of us, these women are going to graduate no matter what."

Sobiek denied making any such statement. "That is a flat **** lie," he said. "And whoever told you that, if they were under oath, should be taken to task." The IG concluded "it is more likely than not" that Sobiek said something to indicate that the women "are going to make it to the fleet."

The IG said the Navy wanted to use the women carrier pilots as symbols to counter Tailhook and that overly zealous press agents helped create a climate that led to Lohrenz's failure. They used women fliers to prove that sexual integration of the military was working. One commander told investigators that the Navy was in a race with the Air Force to get the first female fighter pilot. The IG suggested that publicists wanted fliers to earn their wings regardless of their performance: "The failure of any single female aviator would have implications (at least in the media) far greater than the concerned individual. Failure would be portrayed as a failure of the female gender."

Kara Hultgreen The First Victim

It was against this backdrop that the women entered carrier training. We shall discuss two of them, Kara Hultgreen and Carey Lohrenz, to explain how the issue became so controversial in the Naval aviation community.

According to Navy training procedures, a flier who makes a serious error is given a "down." As few as one or two downs can result in the flier being dropped from the program, depending on the severity of the glitch and overall performance. The safety of the pilot is one concern; another is that of crew members who could be killed or injured in plane crashes.

Hultgreen had earned her wings in 1989 flying the land-based A-6 bomber. She had difficulties from the outset with carrier training, commencing with exercises on a land strip simulating a carrier deck. She was repeatedly warned about landing at what the Navy calls "a high elevation"--that is, approaching the field at too high an altitude. If this is done in a carrier approach, the pilot must make a rapid descent and risk slamming into the deck in what is called a "ramp strike." The F-14 Tomcat, much heavier and more unwieldy than land-based planes, does not respond quickly to power corrections, so a proper approach is important.

Despite the warnings about her "high elevation." Hultgreen got into trouble on Oct. 29, 1993, on her third familiarization flight. She came in high and hit her brakes so aggressively that she blew out both main mount tires. She was given her first down. The second came on March 22, 1994, for failure to make power corrections to correct glide slope deviations. The third came nine days later, for "making power corrections that were erratic and unpredictable," in the words of her Landing Signal Officer [LSO], the person charged with guiding her onto the flight deck.

Despite mistakes, Hultgreen was allowed to continue training. She failed her first carrier qualification [CQ] attempt on April 12-13, 1994, with a score of 2.60, with 2.90 required for passing. She was returned to land training in preparation for another CQ. In a "pop-up" delivery maneuver with simulated bombs, she made a too-shallow dive and released her bombs so low that had the ordnance been live, the explosion would have destroyed her and her plane. After prolonged additional training not given other students, Hultgreen finally qualified as a carrier flier in late July 1994. Only three months later, on Oct. 25, 1994, she was killed while attempting to land on the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in clear daytime conditions.

Navy Coverup #1

When the Navy announced Hultgreen's death, the mantra was that mechanical failure, not pilot error, caused the crash. The cited cause was compressor failure in her left-side engine. This occurs when a pilot turns too wide on an approach and compensates by making an overly-aggressive turn back to the center line. The abrupt turn can cause the engine to stall due to the normal air flow being disrupted by being blocked by the nose of the aircraft. But pilots are put in stall situations in simulator training, so the failure does not necessarily result in engine failure.

Selective portions of Hultgreen's records were released that suggested her qualifications were above average. There were murmurs from Navy fliers that there was more to the story, sotto voce complaints which The New York Times characterized as "spurious accusations against her flight record...from disgruntled male aviators, raising questions about her flight tests." [Oct. 30, 1994]

Meanwhile, separate investigations were commenced, one by the Judge Advocate General, a panel dominated by lawyers, not fliers, and a separate Mishap Investigative Report [MIR], the work of aviation specialists. MIRs are bitingly candid confidential in-house report cards the aviation community gives itself to determine what caused a crash.

The JAG report, issued in February 1995, adopted the line that mechanics were at fault. Hultgreen's parents got an advance look at the report, and their comments set the pattern for media coverage: that "It was engine failure." A Navy press release stated, "The emergency resulting in the mishap was precipitated by a left engine malfunction at an extremely vulnerable moment as the aircraft was approaching the carrier to land." The commander of the Naval air fleet, Vice Adm. Robert J. Spane, said, "this pilot did her best to keep this aircraft flying under conditions that were all but impossible." The report mentioned pilot "inexperience" but the possibility of pilot error was not raised until the last of 29 pages.

The Navy's deception was deliberate. At a press conference where the JAG report was issued, a reporter knowledgeable about carrier training asked Rear Adm. Jay B. Yakeley, a carrier group commander, whether Hultgreen had any downs on her record. After a long pause, he replied that she had only one, when in fact her records showed she had at least four, plus the carrier qualification glitches.

Most of the media bought the Navy's explanation. Anchor Peter Jennings claimed on ABC's World News Tonight on Feb. 28 that Hultgreen was "blameless" and that persons suggesting otherwise were "vicious." He charged that "a lot of men took [the crash] as an opportunity to say that women were not up to the job." On Feb. 28, ABC's Nightline ran a program concluding that Hultgreen had been "vindicated" and "cleared of blame" for the crash. But aviators who had flown with Hultgreen knew better. One of them put his career on the line and decided to turn whistleblower, disclosing records of both the deceased Hultgreen and another woman who had trained alongside her, Lt. Carey Lohrenz.

Jerry Burns' Conscience

Lt. Patrick J. Burns, "Jerry" to his shipmates, came into the Navy as an enlisted man and rose to officer rank as a carrier pilot. He was still in his early 30s in 1994, when he became one of the instructors for the pioneer women fliers. Persons who know Burns say that he says little about integration of women into the combat military; but he is a zealot on safety. He and other instructors raised questions about Hultgreen and Lohrenz early in their cycle. Respectful of protocol, he worked through the chain of command, to the squadron's operations officer, training officer, executive officer, and finally to the CO, Sobiek, who allegedly pronounced that the women were going to graduate regardless of their records.

Burns was worried. As he would later tell the IG, "the majority of the officers felt that safety was being compromised...[they] almost universally felt that...Hultgreen was a marginal pilot at best, [who] required very close scrutiny if she was to graduate to the fleet, and that Lt. Lohrenz was a substandard pilot [who] should not graduate..." The Navy chose to push the women through to graduation anyway. As Burns testified, "I...specifically told individuals that I expected a catastrophic mishap to take place concerning one of these individuals sometime during their fleet tour." In three months, Hultgreen was dead, victim of her own error and the Navy's lowered standards for women pilots.

At this point, Burns made a calculated decision that put his career at risk. He passed copies of training records to Elaine Donnelly, who runs a watchdog group, the Center for Military Readiness. A former army officer, Donnelly served on the Defense Department task force which studied whether women should be put into combat situations, something she opposed. Her center monitors the sexual integration of the military. Burns realized he was violating the Federal Privacy Act, but he had been ignored by superiors. He explained, "If I was walking down the street and I saw somebody's house on fire and I knew there were people inside and I knew I could get them out, I wouldn't be concerned about dragging them out in their underwear because of their privacy concerns."

Donnelly took the material to the Senate Armed Services Committee, disguising Lohrenz as "Pilot B." The committee staff quizzed brass about whether preferential treatment was given the women, and whether this could have caused the death of Hultgreen. Word that the program was under attack quickly circulated among aviators.

Concurrently, someone leaked the technical report on Hultgreen's accident, putting the lie to the claim that mechanical failure caused her death. [The source of this leak remains unknown; Burns told the IG he did not release the document.] But most of the media ignored a story that would have cast doubt on the earlier lionization of Kara Hultgreen. Notable exceptions were Rowan Scarborough of The Washington Times, and Robert Caldwell of the San Diego Union; both wrote extensively about the failed coverup. A Navy Times reporter put the full document on the Internet. Nonetheless, the mainstream media would not admit that a woman aviator had failed. There were no major TV stories about the finding. Meanwhile Lohrenz continued carrier training, with the Navy now fully aware that its women-in- combat experiment was in jeopardy.

Lohrenz's "Down" Dossier

Whatever her skills as a land-based pilot, Lohrenz's problems as a carrier flier began even before she got into the cockpit of an F-14. On Oct. 27, 1993, in a flight-simulator, she landed 4,000 feet long during a simulated emergency. Rather than come around for a second pass, she "stayed on the ground, ran off the runway and into the water...and was simulated 'killed' when she failed to eject." This was Down Number One. According to records which Burns gave to Donnelly, this failure resulted in favoritism that continued until she washed out of the program months later: extra training, specialized one-on-one tutoring, and concessions denied to other pilots. During one period Lohrenz's classmates were required to "double cycle" their training: completing in a day both a tactics flight and a Field Carrier Landing Practice [FCLP] flight--i.e., on a dry land field configured like a carrier deck. Lohrenz couldn't handle both flights, so superiors permitted her to concentrate on FCLPs to enhance her chances of becoming carrier-qualified.

Down Number Two came on Nov. 15, when Lohrenz failed to secure an engine when entering a refueling area. Ground refueling is normally done through "hot pitting," with crews attaching a fuel line just forward of the engine intake while it is still running. According to Donnelly, "A pilot's failure to secure the right engine during this process, which takes place in a high- noise environment, can result in a crewman being sucked into the intake and killed." Down Number Three came on March 3, 1994, when Lohrenz was cited during an FCLP for "overshooting starts" and "finessing a low," showing her inability to follow signals given by the Landing Signal Officer. Down Number Four came on March 4, when Lohrenz got a grade of 2.85 on a tactics flight exercise. Grading criteria is that any grade below 2.90 is "unsatisfactory" and that the failure must be documented. Lohrenz's commanding officer changed the grade from "unsatisfactory" to "incomplete," and wrote on the evaluation sheet, "Count this as a warm-up."

Lohrenz made her first carrier qualification attempt on April 12-13 and couldn't get onto the deck. She was given a day grade of 2.46 and night grade of 1.25, far below the failure line: her "boarding grade" was zero. The night grade was the lowest in the squadron, excluding incomplete flights. The LSO evaluated her performance as "well below average," words he emphasized in his report.

By now, Lohrenz's instructors were losing patience. As one told the IG, "She was kind of a whiner. She had trouble accepting that she had made a mistake." On her first attempt at a night landing, an instructor said, Lohrenz came around "I forget how many times...the captain of the ship said he needed a howitzer to shoot her down because he kept seeing her going past his window..."

The landings Lohrenz made were under ideal sea conditions. What alarmed the LSOs was what might happen when she began flying in rough seas, where the flight deck was unstable. One wrote that if she tried to land, "if the deck moves, we've lost that airplane." The LSOs said she would not listen when they urged corrections. One worried, "she was going to potentially crash the airplane." In their IG testimony the instructors were emphatic in denying sexual discrimination. As one of them said, "The ramp knows no gender."

On Jan. 25, Lohrenz took four attempts to land her F-14 on the Lincoln. Her commanders convened a "human factors board" [HFB] to determine if any outside stresses were affecting performance. The warning was that unless her flying improved, she would be washed out. It was during January that Burns sent the material on Lohrenz and Hultgreen to Elaine Donnelly. Lohrenz would later claim, in a slander suit against Donnelly, that the "stress" caused by negative commentary hurt her flying ability. Donnelly's position is that Lohrenz's decline commenced long before her commentary.

By May, Lohrenz ranked 113 out of 133 pilot trainees, and the wing's commanding officer, Cmdr. Fred Killian, had seen enough. He told the IG, "I'm dealing with an aviator at this point who is below the...standards to qualify in the F-14 initially. And here I have this aviator who has exhibited unsafe tendencies, who has demonstrated boarding rate problems, who has trouble debriefing with the LSOs. I'm saying to myself, 'I can't allow this to go on. This is unsafe.'" He denied that Lohrenz's sex was a factor. "In fact," he said, "if I did anything that showed gender bias, I probably let her fly a couple of days longer than I should have. "A Navy board, after reviewing her record, dropped Lohrenz from carrier training.

Burns in Jeopardy

The Inspector General's report closes out the issue of Carey Lohrenz flying off carriers. But one disturbing problem remains--the fate of whistleblower Burns. Now in his 17th year in the Navy, Burns faces a board for promotion to lieutenant commander later this year; if he is passed over, he could be out of uniform. And colleagues fear that a politically- correct Navy will exact revenge for his disclosures about the women fliers.

In a preemptive move, Burns has hired a lawyer, Robert Rae, of Virginia Beach, an Annapolis graduate and a onetime federal prosecutor. Rae pinned the Navy to the mat in several Tailhook cases, and he is ready to fight in court to save Burns' career, if necessary. "Lives were at stake," Rae told us. "Burns followed the book and no one would listen. I think the Navy would be well-advised to leave this man alone."

No fewer than five times The New York Times has trumpeted the cause of State Department whistleblower Richard Nuccio, who lost his security clearance for giving classified information to then-Rep. Robert Torricelli. Predictably, the secrets found their way to the front page of the Times, whose editors now demand protection for Nuccio.

We'd like to hear similar editorial support for Burns and Elaine Donnelly. We don't expect it from papers like The Washington Post and The New York Times, who support the social experiment that is rapidly diminishing our military's ability to fight wars, but you can be of help.

What You Can Do
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#627 Post by crazyaviator » Wed Aug 23, 2017 11:05 pm

Of course, there is this story, amusing and I would not bet my 1987 pinto on whether there is an ounce of truth in it ! :lol:


A pilot has dished the dirt on a former colleague who almost flew into the White House and dodged “UFOs” in the sky but somehow managed to avoid losing his job.

Former pilot Ron Wagner recently responded to a question on Quora asking what it took for a pilot to be fired.

ADVERTISING

Wagner answered the question by describing his former co-worker’s horrifying list of midair misdemeanors — and said none of them cost the maverick pilot his job.

He said the US-based captain with a now-defunct airline, who Wagner dubbed “Captain Zero”, first earned his bad reputation while he was a first officer.

In an early incident, while flying a Boeing 727 at full speed at 35,000 feet and during a full meal service, Captain Zero “quietly, and with no warning, reached up and dropped the landing gear.”

Modal Trigger
A Boeing 727Shutterstock
“This vastly exceeded the speed limits on the gear and gear doors. And the sudden deceleration made a mess of the meal service in back. You can imagine it also terrified the passengers,” Wagner said.

“When asked why, he said, ‘I was just sitting there wondering what would happen if I did it’.”

Wagner said the airline grounded Captain Zero with the intention of firing him, but Washington-based pilot union Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) intervened and got him reinstated.

He was made captain, and from there, his mid-flight antics got even more bizarre.

A few years later, Captain Zero was hand-flying another Boeing 727 when he suddenly “pulled the thing over about 120 degrees” and performed a series of totally inappropriate fighter pilot evasive maneuvers.

“You can imagine the horror this caused in the cabin. Flight attendants were hurt, passengers peed themselves,” he said.

“He [Captain Zero] claimed a flying saucer came straight at them and if he hadn’t made those maneuvers, they’d have crashed into it.”

“The airline grounded him immediately, but ALPA again rescued him, this time after a series of psychological tests. And he thought himself a hero who should be exalted for his bravery and skills in saving those lives.”

Wagner said similarly strange incidents followed over time and all the while, Captain Zero grew more convinced of his skill and bravery as a pilot.

But his colleagues grew especially concerned when Captain Zero was at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Washington, DC, and lined up for takeoff on Runway 36, which pointed almost directly at the White House.

Modal Trigger
Shutterstock
“Departure procedures, of course, call for an immediate left turn to fly northeast up the Potomac River. But for the first mile or so, you and your fast-moving jet are pointed directly at The White House,” Wagner explained.

“One day, awaiting takeoff clearance at the south end of Runway 36, Captain Zero very casually stated that he wondered what it would be like if, after takeoff, they just flew straight ahead and dived into the White House.”

“Then, just as casually, he took off and made a normal climb. The other two pilots were, well, I don’t know, but I can say that horrified was a monstrous understatement.”

“This was the guy who one day wondered what it would be like if he lowered the landing gear at cruise speed, which he did, just to find out. Reminds me of Johnny Cash in Folsom Prison Blues: ‘I shot a man just to watch him die’.”

Wagner said the incident happened before September 11, 2001, which may explain why Captain Zero was allowed to fly again.

Captain Zero eventually did lose his job, but not for the reason you would expect.

“Fortunately this airline soon went bankrupt and we all dispersed and the world was safe from Captain Zero,” Wagner said.

FILED UNDER AIR TRAVEL , PILOTS , UFOS , WTF
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#628 Post by Rockie » Thu Aug 24, 2017 6:10 am

You're a bit unhinged crazyaviator. An incident from 1947, the words of another anti-union crusader like yourself, and stories from the US Navy which I should point out, is not unionized.

Still waiting for a shred of proof.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#629 Post by Rockie » Thu Aug 24, 2017 8:01 am

rookiepilot wrote:
Rockie wrote:Yeah, sounds simple doesn't it, why would anybody fly fatigued? I can think of plenty of reasons starting with we are sometimes lousy judges on whether or not we are fatigued. Judgement after all is one of the first things to go. Next is you felt fine at the beginning of the flight and didn't know you would get fatigued four hours later. Should we land at Vegas because we're starting to feel tired?

Fatigue recognition and management is a learned skill some of us are better at than others. Statements like "stand down if you're fatigued" are easy to spout, not so easy to do in practice.
Unbelievable....... :roll: :roll: :roll:

You're a professional. ie. You are supposed to know this stuff, and ground yourself if physically incompetent. Not make excuses that communicate such a causal attitude towards risk.

Speechless.
Tell me unbelievably speechless, where did I state, infer, or in any way subtlely endorse flying fatigued or not booking off when you are? I invite you to search this entire site and find me a reference.

I said we are sometimes the worst judges of when we are fatigued. True statement and that includes you Superman.

I said fatigue reduces the judgement we would need to tell when we're fatigued. True statement.

I said we can takeoff not knowing we're going to be fatigued later. True statement, and guess what Superman?

I said fatigue recognition and management is a learned skill some of us are better at than others. True statement as well which also includes you.

So tell me again unbelievably speechless where I'm being less than professional about this subject.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#630 Post by rookiepilot » Thu Aug 24, 2017 9:31 am

Rockie,

By redirecting the commentary back at me, I see you consider your comments immune from critique, so I think I'll terminate the conversation here.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#631 Post by Rockie » Thu Aug 24, 2017 9:45 am

rookiepilot wrote:Rockie,

By redirecting the commentary back at me, I see you consider your comments immune from critique, so I think I'll terminate the conversation here.
I'm responding to your post incorrectly interpreting mine and calling into question my professionalism. Natural reaction I would think. What are you running from by terminating the conversation?
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#632 Post by Old fella » Thu Aug 24, 2017 12:06 pm

FICU wrote:
Old fella wrote:The 2.00 am trip was the start of my duty day and I couldn't plead fatigue if another trip came up a later in the duty time frame, simple as that. When covering Air Ambulance duties I took day time naps when covering night time operations. Aircraft utilized BE 100 and 200 with plenty of snow/wind/RDF especially at YYT with the winds. It was demanding flying.
Those were fun times... up all day on call with an afternoon nap maybe and get into bed at 10... phone rings at midnight followed by a 14 hour duty day of medevac flying with no autopilot... in the arctic no less. Two weeks of 24 hour on call...

Transport Canada approved!
You bet. Although I would suggest arctic AA work was more demanding that what I did in the Maritimes and I am going back my late 70-80's flying. Majority of my work had decent airports, navigation facilities with many ILS approaches and distances not that long outside of Labrador(YWK,YYR etc) although VFR short field work on occasion. Lucky we had autopilot and the ole Collins FD 108/9 Flight Directors - thank Christ! For you doing arctic coverage , gravel strips . NDB approaches, poor apch lighting, long distance and without assistance of an autopilot probably made you a very good stick and rudder driver, tired one at that. Fun times all around for both of us, no doubt.

Any way BBQ time and while ribbs are sizzling I will crack a beer toasting you and the memories.
By your leave
:drinkers: :partyman:
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#633 Post by 5x5 » Thu Aug 24, 2017 12:38 pm

Wow - 26 pages!!!

Somehow, this following image seems appropriate and besides I find it funny in a few different ways. (Whereas I don't find this thread funny, it's actually kind of sad.)

Image
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#634 Post by confusedalot » Thu Aug 24, 2017 7:13 pm

Unfortunate that personal slights are the norm on this board. I'll keep the faith and hold out for a bit of chill and a few good natured laughs amidst a bit of serious talk. :wink: You know, like the good old days at the bar.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#635 Post by pelmet » Thu Aug 24, 2017 11:49 pm

This incident has resulted in a SAFO(Safety Alert For Operators) from the FAA...

"Subject: Incorrect Airport Surface Approaches and Landings

Purpose: This SAFO provides some best practices for accomplishing an approach and landing on the correct airport surface.

Background: On July 7, 2017, a commercial airliner conducting a visual approach at night overflew other airliners positioned on a taxiway and awaiting takeoff clearance. This airliner was cleared to land on runway 28R at the San Francisco International Airport yet flew the approach while lined up on Taxiway “C”, which is adjacent and to the right of runway 28R. Runway 28L was closed and unlit, except for a lighted “X” identifying the runway closure. Taxiway “C” had four airliners in line to take-off on runway 28R. The inbound flightcrew queried the air traffic control tower (ATC) via radio asking about traffic on the runway. The response from ATC was “confirmed cleared to land” and that the runway was clear. The flightcrew continued their approach and associated misalignment without further questioning of ATC. A crewmember on one of the waiting airliners broadcast that the approaching jet was “on the taxiway.” The inbound flightcrew initiated a go-around while flying directly over the taxiway and waiting airplanes.

Discussion: This incident is an extreme example of incorrect surface approaches and landings. This event highlights the importance of employing best practices for successful approaches and landings to the correct airport and runway. Some of the best practices include:

A. Stabilized Approach: A stabilized approach is critical to pilots and flightcrews for maintaining situational awareness of the external environment. This means pilots and flightcrews are able to receive, process and utilize situational information to a greater affect. However, an unstable approach requires increased concentration on the performance of the airplane, by both the pilot flying (PF) and pilot monitoring (PM), to the detriment of processing other equally important situational information.

B. Technology: Utilize published approaches such as Very High Frequency Omni Directional Radio Range (VOR), Localizer (LOC), Instrument Landing System (ILS), Area Navigation (RNAV), etc. Conducting an approach in visual conditions increases the potential for confusing visual clues such as airport lighting configuration, surrounding lights, or areas that look similar to the airport. Therefore, use of the most precise available approach or Flight Management System (FMS) RNAV navigational aids will serve to support pilot and flightcrew decisions.

C. Cockpit/Crew Resource Management (CRM): Effective CRM is imperative because it leverages the skills of all crew-members. In a two-person (or more) flight deck, there is always a PF and a PM. If something does not look correct the observing crewmember bears the responsibility for communicating what they see. The key behind successful CRM is being receptive, informative, proactive, and persistent. CRM also delineates job functions and the expectation of support.

D. Utilization of Available Resources: Effective CRM also establishes the use of all available resources including but not limited to:
• A briefing of the airfield diagram;
• A review of airport lighting including any approach lights systems (ALS);
• A review and discussion of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS);
• Performance of the approach and landing checklists according to approved procedures;
• Use of approach navigational aids under both IMC and VMC conditions;
• Monitoring of the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) for information and changes to field conditions;
• Listening closely to all radio transmissions for pertinent information; and,
• Identification and verification of visual glide path information such as a Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI) or Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) not only for glide path indications but also their location relative to the runway of intended landing.

E. Be Ready to Go-Around: The potential for a go-around/missed approach is briefed during every approach briefing. However, PFs/PMs need to be aware of the variety of reasons that a go-around may be necessary so they are ready to use it, and, if necessary, use it early, particularly during a time of confusion. The old aviator’s adage, “when in doubt, go-around” still applies.

F. Other Pertinent Guidance: The FAA has recommended similar guidance in other documents:
• Advisory Circular 120-71B: “Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers, January 10, 2017.
• Advisory Circular 91-79A: “Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing”; April 28, 2016.
• SAFO 15011; “Roles and Responsibilities for Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM)”; November 17, 2015.
• Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Chapter 2: “Aeronautical Lighting and Other Airport Visual Aids”; December 10, 2015.

Due to the severity of the recent incident a review and incorporation of these recommendations is strongly encouraged.

Recommended Action: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) strongly urges directors of operations, directors of safety, directors of training, and chief pilots collaborate to:
• Emphasize the existing procedures and practices that ensure successful approaches and landings on the correct airport surface.
• Promote awareness of actual incorrect-surface landings throughout the National Airspace System, as well as international locations."

https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviatio ... O17010.pdf
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#636 Post by Cat Driver » Fri Aug 25, 2017 4:01 pm

I don't quite understand it.

It is now 2017 and we still have the industry being reminded that major airline company pilots should have basic piloting and decision making skills when flying the paying public.

Maybe the airlines should have all flights over two hours manned by five pilots, four to fly and monitor each other and one as a stand by.

For sure the CVR should be able to record for days with no way to erase the contents, that would at least allow the investigators to get a better understanding of what the crew were doing before, during and after such a major screw up as this one.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#637 Post by photofly » Fri Aug 25, 2017 4:13 pm

Cat Driver wrote: Maybe the airlines should have all flights over two hours manned by five pilots, four to fly and monitor each other and one as a stand by.
Here's a story by John Deakin about how even five pilots might not be enough:
The only points I'll give myself that night are that I didn't flinch, or look. I just said very quietly, "Gear down, please, and landing check."

The response was as if four cattle prods had been stuck straight up through the middle of each seat. Four men stiffened, then leaned forward, the better to see the gear handle. Four men simultaneously sucked in their breath. And four men watched as the gear handle went down, the green lights came on, and red light went off as the doors closed. I called for the final flaps, the checklist was completed passing 1,000 feet, and the landing was uneventful. Everything was within limits, if a little delayed by customary JAL standards.

We landed, completed the usual drills, cleared Customs, and split up to go our separate ways. No one said a word about the (near) incident, then or later. I knew my knees were shaking, but they didn't. I didn't tell the story for at least 15 years. There is no doubt in my mind that all five of us had slipped a gear somewhere during that approach, and we all thought the gear and flaps were down, and the checklist was complete. No, all five of us KNEW the gear was down – and it wasn't.
https://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/188536-1.html
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#638 Post by Rockie » Fri Aug 25, 2017 6:01 pm

Cat Driver wrote:I don't quite understand it.

It is now 2017 and we still have the industry being reminded that major airline company pilots should have basic piloting and decision making skills when flying the paying public.

Maybe the airlines should have all flights over two hours manned by five pilots, four to fly and monitor each other and one as a stand by.

For sure the CVR should be able to record for days with no way to erase the contents, that would at least allow the investigators to get a better understanding of what the crew were doing before, during and after such a major screw up as this one.
"The basics" never go out of style and are always relevant. But you are correct that with all the technology and thousands of other things we need to think about even on the simplest of flights, we need to constantly remind ourselves that basics always matter and they may even save your life some day.

AF 447.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#639 Post by complexintentions » Fri Aug 25, 2017 6:03 pm

I love stories from past eras, but they're just that - interesting stories from past eras. Things to learn from. And so we have: present-generation equipment will not allow the aircraft to be configured the way it was in the B747 story without a configuration warning blaring the entire time. If you could somehow sleep through that, there's also the GPWS warning "TOO LOW, GEAR". I doubt that very many landings are ever in need of these warnings, but they are there. Thus when was the last time (or even in this delightful little anecdote) an airliner accidentally landed gear-up, please?
Cat Driver wrote:I don't quite understand it.
Yes, we know.

I have a great deal of respect for experience, but that lessens with constant insinuation that aviation was safer in the past than it was now, which is neither true nor correct. It's utter nonsense to suggest human error such as lining up incorrectly never occurred when wings were covered in fabric. I agree that there is less critical thinking now than in the past, but that's hardly limited to aviation.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#640 Post by Cat Driver » Fri Aug 25, 2017 6:44 pm

Obviously I do not explain my thoughts clearly enough.

I do not think that aviation was safer in the era that I started flying, sixty four years ago.

I was merely expressing the opinion that aviation should be safer than it now is, considering the advances in aircraft and the airport systems.

I am aware that the SFO incident was an anomaly.

I am also aware that these discussions do not change anything.

Judging by the demand for pilots is on the increase it will be interesting to see how things go as the airlines are forced to take less experienced new pilots.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#641 Post by pelmet » Fri Aug 25, 2017 6:50 pm

complexintentions wrote:I love stories from past eras, but they're just that - interesting stories from past eras. Things to learn from. And so we have: present-generation equipment will not allow the aircraft to be configured the way it was in the B747 story without a configuration warning blaring the entire time. If you could somehow sleep through that, there's also the GPWS warning "TOO LOW, GEAR". I doubt that very many landings are ever in need of these warnings, but they are there. Thus when was the last time (or even in this delightful little anecdote) an airliner accidentally landed gear-up, please?
First of all, I guarantee you that the 747 is designed with a warning if the gear is not down with landing flap down. Even the old 727 had it.

As for landing with the gear up in an airliner...PIA did do it in a 747, Continental in a DC-9 and Continental once again scraped the runway on a go-around due to them being told that the gear was not down. All this just from memory. I am sure there are more.

If you take the time to read the story carefully, you will see that it could easily be applicable to this era in some cases, although I believe Boeing has added an 800' RA constraint as well to the warning of the gear not being down....to cover more possibilities.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#642 Post by photofly » Fri Aug 25, 2017 7:15 pm

I'm not sure why the "gear not down" horn in a 747 is under discussion. Deakin explains when it sounded and that it was silenced, as well as why and by whom. Or is the point that the answer is merely more clever warning horns.

Maybe we should have a "you're lined up to land on a taxiway" horn?
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#643 Post by Cat Driver » Fri Aug 25, 2017 8:12 pm

Maybe we should have a "you're lined up to land on a taxiway" horn?
Now, now that is not very nice. :mrgreen:
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#644 Post by confusedalot » Fri Aug 25, 2017 8:24 pm

Now that we are drifting like a rowboat in the mid atlantic, maybe someone can humor me on the specifics of the classic gear horn inhibit. Flew the thing as a first officer for the last time in 1993 and six type ratings later, darned if I remember the parameters. But I do remember it was a a pain in the a**. All I recall was that it was a function of airspeed and flap setting. Could not be silenced however with landing flaps selected.

Anyone?
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#645 Post by complexintentions » Fri Aug 25, 2017 10:21 pm

photofly wrote:I'm not sure why the "gear not down" horn in a 747 is under discussion. Deakin explains when it sounded and that it was silenced, as well as why and by whom. Or is the point that the answer is merely more clever warning horns.

Maybe we should have a "you're lined up to land on a taxiway" horn?
Guess you missed the point. The warning horns certainly are more clever now. Gear warning has nothing to do with the SFO incident, but hey whatever.

And there is a system to warn of lining up on a taxiway or with a wrong runway, it's called RAAS. Google if you're curious, I have no idea if AC is so equipped.

pelmet wrote:First of all, I guarantee you that the 747 is designed with a warning if the gear is not down with landing flap down. Even the old 727 had it.

As for landing with the gear up in an airliner...PIA did do it in a 747, Continental in a DC-9 and Continental once again scraped the runway on a go-around due to them being told that the gear was not down. All this just from memory. I am sure there are more.

If you take the time to read the story carefully, you will see that it could easily be applicable to this era in some cases, although I believe Boeing has added an 800' RA constraint as well to the warning of the gear not being down....to cover more possibilities.
I did read the story carefully. A story from many years ago with previous generation aircraft. PIA was 1986 and Continental was in 1996. I realize this is probably what is considered "current" in Canada given the mindset displayed, but come on. You would be more credible if you could find some examples within the last 20 years. If you read my POST carefully, you will spot the words "present generation". Again to my point that as equipment evolves, lessons are learned and systems are modified, developed, and added.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#646 Post by pelmet » Sat Aug 26, 2017 6:41 pm

complexintentions wrote:
photofly wrote:I'm not sure why the "gear not down" horn in a 747 is under discussion. Deakin explains when it sounded and that it was silenced, as well as why and by whom. Or is the point that the answer is merely more clever warning horns.

Maybe we should have a "you're lined up to land on a taxiway" horn?
Guess you missed the point. The warning horns certainly are more clever now. Gear warning has nothing to do with the SFO incident, but hey whatever.

And there is a system to warn of lining up on a taxiway or with a wrong runway, it's called RAAS. Google if you're curious, I have no idea if AC is so equipped.

pelmet wrote:First of all, I guarantee you that the 747 is designed with a warning if the gear is not down with landing flap down. Even the old 727 had it.

As for landing with the gear up in an airliner...PIA did do it in a 747, Continental in a DC-9 and Continental once again scraped the runway on a go-around due to them being told that the gear was not down. All this just from memory. I am sure there are more.

If you take the time to read the story carefully, you will see that it could easily be applicable to this era in some cases, although I believe Boeing has added an 800' RA constraint as well to the warning of the gear not being down....to cover more possibilities.
I did read the story carefully. A story from many years ago with previous generation aircraft. PIA was 1986 and Continental was in 1996. I realize this is probably what is considered "current" in Canada given the mindset displayed, but come on. You would be more credible if you could find some examples within the last 20 years. If you read my POST carefully, you will spot the words "present generation". Again to my point that as equipment evolves, lessons are learned and systems are modified, developed, and added.
Hilarious...I answer you specific question as asked and shown here....
complexintentions wrote: Thus when was the last time (or even in this delightful little anecdote) an airliner accidentally landed gear-up, please?
and now, somehow, I didn't read the question carefully.

When did an airliner ever land gear up? Answered by me above.

But for modern generation airliners, there don't seem to be any. That being said, a C-17 is pretty modern and these guys forgot to put their gear down. I know, I know.....it is not an airliner.

I believe a B-1 did similar as well.

https://theaviationist.com/2009/05/08/c ... n-results/

Anyways...thread drift. Perhaps something new about SFO.
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#647 Post by confusedalot » Sat Aug 26, 2017 8:31 pm

are we having fun yet?
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#648 Post by photofly » Sun Aug 27, 2017 2:16 pm

I have a question ... if the pilots had noticed their mistake at, say, 700AGL and gone around, what would the consequences internally within AC have been?

Actually two questions. The second is, what is the lowest altitude at which, having noticed the error, it would still have been acceptable for the pilots to reposition for the runway instead of the taxiway?
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#649 Post by rookiepilot » Sun Aug 27, 2017 4:03 pm

photofly wrote:I have a question ... if the pilots had noticed their mistake at, say, 700AGL and gone around, what would the consequences internally within AC have been?
You really expect to get an honest answer on this one?

:shock:
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Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?

#650 Post by Rockie » Sun Aug 27, 2017 5:31 pm

There are no consequences for doing a go-around ever. How foolish do you think it would be for an airline to adopt that kind of policy? As for the 2nd question pretty much every airline on the planet adheres to the stable approach policy which essentially begins at 1000 AGL. By then we have to be on the correct flight path to the runway with the final configuration selected. If that is not the case a go-around is mandatory. Further criteria applies at 500 feet or a go-around is mandatory.
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