Yes, you have to come to Vernon. Coffee is on at the club house every morning at 1000 hours. We even have beer in the fridge for those who are really thirsty... (;>0)
PS About the windsock thing: you do know that my tongue was firmly planted in my cheek, right?
But, in my opinion, none of the foregoing would have been a factor in a runway over run accident at Pitt Meadows. I would not want newer pilots to think that they could should attempt to attribute their accident to "winds" in such a circumstance. I'm certain that I'm not alone in this opinion. When investigating any accident/incident, the investigator must assure that they have considered the broad set of possibilities, which as HiFli and others have said, often comes back to a pilot doing their best, but it not being good enough, and then they don't recall the detail well afterward.
The nosewheel would be light on the oleos if not elevated during the timing of this RTO decision in the middle of expected rotation. So the power maybe is chopped here while still at liftoff speed/AOA, and that would be higher groundspeed (which might prolong rollout airspeed too .. esp if farther along veers back to S/SSW/SW while braking).
From "10.9kph SW" in early roll (IBRITISH217/2:42pm) to an opposite direction "component" mid roll (ie: 4.8kph ESE at IBCPITTM3/2:48pm) is potentially already 10mph decay at this V1; so would that much decay suffice to trigger such RTO if unsuspecting (airspeed disruption) on the "nice" day ? How does a 747 like in the video fare if power were cut in RTO while nose high (as seen early in that footage) ?
You do realize that those Weather Underground stations you're using data from are amateur home stations, installed by their owners, and likely without regard to placement. They're not reliable for wind direction and speed, or temperature measurements. Anyone can buy a $100 home weather station, stick it anywhere and start uploading data.
That particular station, IBRITISH217 has reported temperature of -40C and pressure of 4872 Hpa. Unlikely to be accurate for Pitt Meadows.
At 2:42pm IBRITISH217 is 13.9C at 20 meters of elevation there (station registered as being 11 meters higher than the nearby airport) and 1005.6hPa. Enter those 3 numbers (temp, elev, and pressure) into a Sea Level Pressure calculator and it should read out MSL ... 1007.99 hPa, which is basically the same as CWMM 900meters to the South (looks like IMO this "217" station is situated up higher too .. maybe a rooftop ?).
In this case that closest one to CWMM ("217") contains extra intervals between the 2&3pm hourly data GyvAir put on page one, which is the same as the airport's CWMM except for where it's history misses that closest/3pm METAR .. the one 10-15 min after this 2:45pm incident description.
Notice even on many of the very poor stations the changes in pressure still register very accurately even though you might not want to trust the readings themselves, and temperature as well, even though might be off by a degree or more. And most still useful here for verifying the lowest daily relative humidity trending in that hour / area.
For proof we need actual math to calculate component / change affecting the accelerating laminar surfaces that are building up their required relativewind for the lift to be/become airborne on 'fixed runway heading' at the point of this expected rotation ("wouldn't lift"/CADORS). If truly the type of lift-off hesitation it seemed to suggest there, then going solely by one single light METAR 15min late over there among buildings at CWMM (a mile or two away) by itself could not be sufficient evidence to exclude component-variation as partly a factor. Yes, lots of other potential factors/contributors are already listed in this thread, some pretty good ones; and as someone posted previously, anything obvious would already be included in the CADORS.
edit FYI Rookiepilot, your first page post was right on topic ...
Let's assume you're correct, PDW, for fun. I've taken off with V .. 15-20kt moving from slight headwind to tailwind and back again ...
I needed some preparation to engage in that discussion, by first researching a surface analysis of the pressure-pattern (storm system) involved.
And then this from page one:
Again, for only that much decay normally yes; except that in this reference the refusal to rotate comes totally as surprise / out of the blue (only looks like the perfect/stable day) where nothing remotely unusual could be expected.10kts should not be an issue in any light aircraft.
Certainly, when AWARE of strong or gusty you'd ALWAYS be poised/prepared to compensate (you're on the ball). Yet not the same here, when simply not anticipating anything like a peculiar shear-hesitation at that most vulnerable V1 moment ... especially just after having-established / been-shown weak component prevailing via preflight wx-check or windsock on taxi (a "nice day" all around).
The unexplained delay for liftoff by surprise, might briefly unnerve a beginner multi to RTO in a snap decision.
EDIT: If the control locks weren't left in. Wow, that's incredible
(weather clears up real nice ...and off we go)
Yes there are some in this industry who seem to think that way.No. Apparently its impolite to even ask.
To me it makes no sense to not discuss what happened and try and remember not to make the same mistakes.
It is unlikely it was a mechanical failure because they would have gone public with that information by now I would think.
So I guess we should be birds in this industry, ostriches and just bury our heads in the sand and see and know nothing.
I am aware that they do not actually bury their heads in the sand and it is only a saying.
I learned that when I got my degree in reading.
Impossible. Every flight school has "controls free and correct" at least twice on their checklists.
Apart from that, it would imply that nobody noticed the control lock, the student didn't bother moving the controls while taxiing, and the instructor didn't do any of the above either.
Ass, Licence, Job. In that order.
https://www.ebay.com/itm/PIPER-PA-34-SE ... 2492402136
From my experience, I've never seen a Piper with any provision for the Cessna style of control lock on the control column. From the above link, it appears this is the only sort of option. On Aircraft Spruce their writeup for the same product states "...since Pipers and Mooneys do not have control locks..."
Edit: Not to mention, it's right in the checklist and the POH a number of times, especially in the pre-takeoff checks: Controls - Free/Correct, full range of movement.
Ass, Licence, Job. In that order.
External gust locks are far superior to those in the cockpit control locks.
Yes, and I quite agree. But, gust locks are only needed for variable tailwinds, are you sure you want to open that discussion for this accident?External gust locks are far superior to those in the cockpit control locks.
Discussing gust locks would be the right way to carry on, now that the discussion is about the control locks.
Then Saabguy called it correctly at the beginning, unless BGH was also only suggesting it as an idea. But when that is verified, does the CADORS get ammended ?
And if so: ..Maybe more time in Sim during the previous day's bad weather? I mean how is including this checklist item adapted in the routine flights in a SIM ?
A very valid point. During my very distant sim time, I'm not sure if "Controls free and correct" was a checklist item. Are we normalizing deviance, if we employ procedures trainers which skip vitally important simple elements of good piloting? It brings to mind my time at deHavilland, during which we received a request that a Twin Otter landplane be equipped with a landing gear selector with working position lights. "Why?" was the obvious reaction to such a request. The operator explained that all of there other types were retractable, so they wanted the operation of a landing gear selector, and checking gear position to be common across their fleet. I see the logic...I mean how is including this checklist item adapted in the routine flights in a SIM ?
If we are training new pilots that the primary walk around and "upon entering aircraft" checks are less important that programming avionics, we have a problem.