Night flight into a thunderstorm

[pelmet]

I recently read this article about an in-flight incident. It was certainly thoughtful of him to share the experience so others could hopefully avoid the same but I have to admit, I didn't come to the same conclusion of what the real reason was for this incident combined with the real world reality of being an operator that should be able to safely fly in this sort of weather. What do you think.....

"Never Again: When to fold ’em

Night flight into a thunderstorm

In the 1988 song The Gambler, Kenny Rogers sang, “You’ve got to know when to hold ’em, know when to fold ’em, know when to walk away, and know when to run.” That is pretty good advice for pilots. All pilots are trained and evaluated on problem solving: fuel endurance, performance, weight and balance, systems malfunctions, and lots of emergencies, to name a few. Preflight decisions also are important and should not be taken lightly. Sometimes the best action is to remain on the ground.

In 1990, I was selected for active duty in the Army National Guard to fly a new medium cargo aircraft based on the Short 360. These airplanes are unpressurized, twin-turboprop, 30-passenger, 25,000-pound regional airliners. The military modified version of the Short was called the C–23 Sherpa and was used for many things. In 1991, my unit was based at Aberdeen, Maryland, near the then-Baltimore/Washington International Airport.

One summer day we were assigned to relocate our airplane from Aberdeen to Plattsburgh Air Force Base in upstate New York. Because of scheduled maintenance, our departure was delayed until the early evening. The airplane was released from maintenance on schedule, inspected, and necessary paperwork signed off. The only problem remaining was the disabled condition of the on-board weather radar system. According to the minimum equipment list, the airplane was legal for IFR dispatch without the weather radar, provided a Stormscope is installed and operational. Without radar, precipitation return information would be unavailable. Only convective electrical activity would be seen with the Stormscope. Our aircraft had such an instrument and it was operational.

It is common for summer weather in the Chesapeake Bay area to include isolated thunderstorms in the evening. Our weather briefings by flight service and military sources indicated isolated small thunderstorms around the Baltimore area, diminishing as our proposed track continued to the northeast. Since the cells were not along our route and reported to be small, the decision was made to launch the aircraft as scheduled and briefed. We filed our instrument flight plan knowing Baltimore Radar would keep us clear of any weather. Like all pilots, we wanted to be dependable and complete the mission, and we were confident in our decision.

It was a dark, overcast night when we accelerated down the runway passing V1 and VR. After takeoff and during the initial climb, Baltimore Radar identified us but surprised us with a northwest heading. Radio traffic on the frequency was extremely busy for a Friday night, and we surmised we were being sent off course temporarily because of inbound traffic stacking up because of the weather.

Leveling at an assigned initial altitude of 6,000 feet, we were told to maintain the northwest heading for a few more minutes because of traffic and could expect an on-course turn soon. It was night IMC, and we began to experience rain with light turbulence. The Stormscope was lighting up like a Christmas tree, showing convective action ahead.

Light turbulence soon became moderate turbulence and was increasing the longer the aircraft remained on the assigned heading. Reducing to turbulence penetration speed, we reported the turbulence and asked for a right turn, but ATC did not acknowledge the call because of constant radio communications.

Suddenly, we flew directly into an apparent full-blown thunderstorm. It was like walking into a concrete wall in total darkness. We entered severe turbulence with heavy rain pelting the airplane. We activated our anti-ice system as well as our auto-ignition as required by procedures. Holding the airplane’s altitude was impossible, and the only thing to do was try to keep the wings and nose level. The airplane wanted to roll uncontrollably left, then right. The recovery from an unusual attitude by instruments at night in severe turbulence would be a challenge. If the airplane were to go inverted, it would be difficult to save, given our low altitude.

The pounding wall of water and what sounded like hail was so loud, the intercom was useless. The co-pilot had to shout to talk, but I could not hear what he or the communications radio were saying. Altitude excursions could not be arrested. Losing and gaining altitude was like riding a roller coaster.

Finally, after what seemed like hours but was probably only a matter of a minute, we broke out of the cell and exited the other side as easily as we had entered. Visibility was increasing and we could now see occasional ground lights. The turbulence and rain lightened up. The co-pilot advised ATC that we had encountered a storm cell and reported our position with turbulence as being severe (momentary loss of control). Having had enough excitement for one night and a desire to inspect our aircraft, we requested vectors to the nearest airport. ATC offered a heading to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Having the diversion airport in sight, we contacted the tower and made a straight-in approach, taxied to the FBO, and parked.

The airplane was inspected that evening as well as the next day and found to be without any damage. Later that morning, after a detailed preflight and lengthy runup, we filed another IFR flight plan and departed under better conditions. Although the mission was delayed, it was accomplished easily and safely.
Some very important lessons were learned: Just because the minimum equipment list says you can fly doesn’t mean you should. There were many negatives looking right in our faces during our decision to launch: reported thunderstorms, Friday night ATC saturation, and our airplane weather radar out of service. These items were obvious red flags, but we did not see them as potential danger—only as problems that needed our solutions. Looking back, they all added up, and this story could have ended differently.

Small, isolated storm cells often merge together to form much larger cells with greater intensity. Weather can change faster than weather agencies are able to report those changes. Last, you cannot and should not depend upon ATC to keep you out of adverse weather. Remember, their first responsibility is traffic separation.

It makes no difference if you are flying a Boeing 777 for a major carrier or building solo time in a Piper PA–28-140. The FARs are clear: The pilot in command is responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. We had complete authority to refuse this flight and no questions would have been asked. We freely chose not to exercise that right. Like Kenny Rogers once said, you have to know when to walk away.

For many years after this incident, I would often visit with crewmembers from my old unit and on board that flight. Although we occasionally disagreed on many subjects, we always agreed on one thing: We would never do that again."

[Eric Janson]

Night departure with Thunderstorms all quadrants. Departure was delayed slightly due to lightning close to the airport.

On taxi out we used the radar to see how things were looking. Unable to fly the normal route due to a line of Thunderstorms.

Departure was off Rwy 11 with a right turn out - we requested a left turn to a heading of 300 initially to go around the line of storms before proceeding West.

This was requested but not given by ATC. We were told to coordinate this with departure when airborne.

After getting airborne we were not switched to departure. There was a Thunderstorm in front of us that I wasn't going to fly through so I started a left turn.

We were then switched over to departure who informed us we had deviated from an ATC clearance. They wanted the contact details for our Airline which we gave them.

On arrival at our destination there was an e-mail from my boss requesting an explanation. ATC had stated in their report that they knew why we started the left turn and that there had been no conflict with any other traffic.

ASR was filed and a report sent to my boss - never heard another word. I'm still employed by the same company.

ATC procedures were changed at this airport to be in line with everywhere else.

If necessary I would have defended my actions using ICAO Annex 2 where the Captain's Emergency Authority is clearly defined. This is a useful one to know - don't be afraid to use it.

Flying through Thunderstorms is not a good idea.

[goingnowherefast]

My favourite clearance so far has been "cleared to (destination) by headings of your choice..."

Given the weather that day, I think they knew I wouldn't have accepted anything else.

[pelmet]

Night departure with Thunderstorms all quadrants. Departure was delayed slightly due to lightning close to the airport.

On taxi out we used the radar to see how things were looking. Unable to fly the normal route due to a line of Thunderstorms.

Departure was off Rwy 11 with a right turn out - we requested a left turn to a heading of 300 initially to go around the line of storms before proceeding West.

This was requested but not given by ATC. We were told to coordinate this with departure when airborne.

After getting airborne we were not switched to departure. There was a Thunderstorm in front of us that I wasn't going to fly through so I started a left turn.

We were then switched over to departure who informed us we had deviated from an ATC clearance. They wanted the contact details for our Airline which we gave them.

On arrival at our destination there was an e-mail from my boss requesting an explanation. ATC had stated in their report that they knew why we started the left turn and that there had been no conflict with any other traffic.

ASR was filed and a report sent to my boss - never heard another word. I'm still employed by the same company.

ATC procedures were changed at this airport to be in line with everywhere else.

If necessary I would have defended my actions using ICAO Annex 2 where the Captain's Emergency Authority is clearly defined. This is a useful one to know - don't be afraid to use it.

Flying through Thunderstorms is not a good idea.

Correct.

If things are not working out for weather avoidance, take action yourself to avoid the weather. In the story, he says....

"We had complete authority to refuse this flight and no questions would have been asked." And that is true but he had the stormscope and it was working as he said "The Stormscope was lighting up like a Christmas tree, showing convective action ahead." While a stormscope may not be ideal, he knew where the weather was and did nothing about it when a clearance was not available.


We had an aircraft get their windshields battered(among other damage) because they didn't deviate around a thunderstorm when a clearance was unavailable. They just continued on their assigned route. One need only turn as appropriate or even hold at present position while squawking 7700 to avoid going through some of these thunderstorms if an ATC clearance is unavailable.


So the lesson to be learned in the story is, take action yourself in an extreme situation if ATC won't help you. I'm sure if it was a mountain appearing ahead, something would have been done.

[rookiepilot]

Flying GA, with a stormscope and Nexrad -- delayed radar picture, 2-5 minutes late -- which can be an issue in fast changing conditions -- I have been surprised how fast cells can blow up, even while remaining clear. Yellow can turn to a big red blotch in no time.

ATC: Thankful for their help, which has been there most times. Don't ever count on it, though.

[complexintentions]

Asking for an alternative departure clearance to avoid wx is good practice and just common sense . I always consider the radar returns on the missed approach as well and ask for a alternative heading "in the event of" if the conditions require it.

I also agree with the use of emergency authority when necessary. Sometimes you just can't reach ATC in a timely matter, perhaps on an oceanic crossing where comms aren't always instant, or just because they're useless (ie India) or bound to procedure (ie China). God knows the number of times I've had to TELL controllers in places like BKK and MNL what I'm doing rather than asking.

But I'd never depart without getting the alternate clearance from Tower first (as coordinated with Departure). Wayyyy too busy once you're airborne and a very good chance you'll be in the cell before you can make your request due to a) a late handoff or b) busy/blocked frequency - Departure controller is gonna be extra loaded-up with the poor wx, after all. Or you do reach him right away and then he says "unable, remain on the SID". Well, now what? Sure, you can declare a Pan and go around it, and I would - but the argument could be made that you put yourself in the situation by not insisting on receiving your desired heading before you even starting rolling. And failing that - waiting.

The thing about using "Captain's Emergency Authority" in this particularly scenario is you have to remember SID's aren't designed randomly or by accident. Deviating from a departure clearance in a busy terminal isn't quite the same as moving off a NAT track or an airway. Far higher risk of prox traffic, to mention only one threat of many. ("Missed the cell! Yay! TCAS RA! Boo!")

In cruise you can (usually) see weather well in advance. But something a few miles off the departure end of the runway? I'll get that clearance now, thanks. While the parking brake is set at the hold line.

To be honest if a Tower controller tried to pass the buck like that a red flag should have gone up. If he's unable to get alternative clearance from Departure - why? Controllers don't usually do much without good reason. I'm quite content to hold short for as long as it takes for him to hotline his colleague and arrange what I asked. If they won't - or very probably, can't - why would I want to take off anyway?

IMHO.

[Outlaw58]

("Missed the cell! Yay! TCAS RA! Boo!")

I laughed out loud

Good one!

58

[Eric Janson]

Just some additional information.

The airport is in a remote location and is joint Civilian/Military.

All controllers are Military - it is also a Training facility where new Controllers are trained.

There was a thread running on PPRuNe about ATC at this location - a lot of complaints.

Time of departure was 0200 local - we were the only ones flying.

There are some funny rules in this part of the world - it is mandatory to file a SID/STAR but the airway we arrive/depart on has no connection to it from a SID/STAR.

Had a Controller rudely ask us if we were unable to fly a STAR. Simpler just to coordinate direct to the IF for the active runway.

[complexintentions]

Fair comments Eric.

Just stumbled across this exchange and thought it might help to illustrate why I'd rather have things sorted out on the ground...I love me the JFK controllers but some days they do get on your last nerve.

Kennedy Departure and Lingus have a go