Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

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pelmet
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#26 Post by pelmet » Sat Nov 03, 2018 6:11 am

complexintentions wrote:
Sat Nov 03, 2018 3:13 am
Yeah, Boeing's QRH does have stock power/pitch settings for "Unreliable Airspeed", and they're memory items as well.

It's one of the worst-handled emergencies in the sim. Everyone's an ace at the V1 cuts but lose their pitot/static and it looks like "man wrestling chicken". :(
Despite having flown a variety of types with a variety of instructors , I have only ever had this scenario once in the sim. Not only that but I knew that this scenario was going to happen with a couple of different types of ASI failure, so it was handled OK. The procedure doesn’t work well.

But.....I suspect that when it happens as a surprise and on top of that, is not an obvious failure(similar to what happened to me in the twin Cessna) we discover how much we really do rely on the airspeed indication.

Airspeed indication suddenly dropping to zero in cruise seems like it will be fairly obvious. Airspeed slowly increasing or decreasing during a climbing turn at low level of even in steady climb/descent caneasily result in the so-called wrestling match. There should be messages of some sort in an airliner like this, depending on the type of failure.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#27 Post by Eric Janson » Sat Nov 03, 2018 10:52 am

Another close call - this could easily have ended in disaster.

http://avherald.com/h?article=4bb4f5b3&opt=0

Really makes you wonder how such things are possible.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#28 Post by complexintentions » Sun Nov 04, 2018 3:04 am

I wonder who makes the pitot covers. I'd like to buy stock in that company, must be pretty great design to stay on the whole flight! :mrgreen:
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#29 Post by TeePeeCreeper » Sun Nov 04, 2018 9:38 am

Eric Janson wrote:
Sat Nov 03, 2018 10:52 am
Another close call - this could easily have ended in disaster.

http://avherald.com/h?article=4bb4f5b3&opt=0

Really makes you wonder how such things are possible.
WTF. My aircraft will yell at me if I’m not in appropriate TO config. It doesn’t need to as if I saw any red flags an abort would occur. Why did this crew continue the take off roll with multiple flags below V1???
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#30 Post by Eric Janson » Sun Nov 04, 2018 10:45 am

TeePeeCreeper wrote:
Sun Nov 04, 2018 9:38 am
Eric Janson wrote:
Sat Nov 03, 2018 10:52 am
Another close call - this could easily have ended in disaster.

http://avherald.com/h?article=4bb4f5b3&opt=0

Really makes you wonder how such things are possible.
WTF. My aircraft will yell at me if I’m not in appropriate TO config. It doesn’t need to as if I saw any red flags an abort would occur. Why did this crew continue the take off roll with multiple flags below V1???
Illustrates the competency of some crews in that part of the World perfectly.


https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index. ... ou-to-fly/

All 6 of the listed incidents really happened.

Just another day in Asia!

The only thing that surprises me is that there aren't more accidents in the region!
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#31 Post by pelmet » Sun Nov 04, 2018 2:53 pm

pelmet wrote:
Fri Nov 02, 2018 8:15 pm
Unknown if the accident pilots were aware of what happened on the previous flight. But if the journey log has an unreliable airspeed entry, it might be an idea to carefully review what to do if it turns out that it was not fixed properly.
A WhatsApp chat group that I am on had a picture of the previous flight logbook entry.

It says....”IAS and ALT DISAGREE shown after takeoff”.

The maintenance entry says....”...performed flushing LH ADM and static ADM. Ops test on ground found satisfied.”

An entry like that might make you want to review appropriate emergency procedures prior to departure.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#32 Post by Eric Janson » Tue Nov 06, 2018 5:05 pm

pelmet wrote:
Sun Nov 04, 2018 2:53 pm
An entry like that might make you want to review appropriate emergency procedures prior to departure.
It appears they had an issue on the 3 flights prior to the crash.

Not sure why a test flight wasn't done - hopefully the investigation will answer this question.

Not sure how a ground test tells you anything about an issue that happened inflight.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#33 Post by righthandman » Wed Nov 07, 2018 4:24 am

Some new info. that could be relevant:

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... air-crash/
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#34 Post by CAL » Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:59 am

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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#35 Post by aeroncasuperchief » Thu Nov 08, 2018 6:35 pm

Looking at CAL s picture, I ask WHY is the pilot taxiing in a poorly lit residential neighbourhood ! :lol:
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#36 Post by Longtimer » Tue Nov 13, 2018 1:38 pm

Based on the number of 737Max aircraft and others flying in Canada I am surprised this was not posted.
https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guid ... rgency.pdf
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#37 Post by righthandman » Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:47 am

Maybe planes (especially with sidestick controls) should have a red robust centrally located 3 position switch labeled “Auto L” @ 10 o’clock position, “Auto R” @ 2 o’clock position, and an “Auto Off” @ 6 o’clock position. There should also be 2 green lights below the L and R switch positions. The Auto positions (L or R) should normally be used by the PF and remain in that position if and only if reliable sensor inputs are fed to the corresponding pilot, otherwise the other side should be engaged and if that too is receiving unreliable sensor inputs then the Auto Off should disconnect any and all automation flying the plane and let the pilots do their piloting sh*t.

If it’s a plane with a sidestick/FBW and the plane’s automation is disconnected and in full manual mode, one or both green lights should then light up on the corresponding side(s) anytime the sidestick is sending valid control signals to the various aircraft flight controls.

All these freaking software safeguards are killing people. Commercial aircraft shouldn’t require a computer for stability argumentation. I just want the plane to behave something like what I learned to fly on. And then make sure that the good button pushers also retain basic flying skills otherwise drive a taxi.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#38 Post by Gannet167 » Wed Nov 14, 2018 9:34 am

righthandman wrote:
Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:47 am
Maybe planes (especially with sidestick controls) should have a red robust centrally located 3 position switch labeled “Auto L” @ 10 o’clock position, “Auto R” @ 2 o’clock position, and an “Auto Off” @ 6 o’clock position. There should also be 2 green lights below the L and R switch positions. The Auto positions (L or R) should normally be used by the PF and remain in that position if and only if reliable sensor inputs are fed to the corresponding pilot
That sounds basically like what an modern FCP/FCU has. AP1 and AP2. Green lights. PF uses onside one. Big red flashing light and alarm sound when they're disconnected.
If it’s a plane with a sidestick/FBW and the plane’s automation is disconnected and in full manual mode, one or both green lights should then light up on the corresponding side(s) anytime the sidestick is sending valid control signals to the various aircraft flight controls.
Define "valid".
All these freaking software safeguards are killing people. Commercial aircraft shouldn’t require a computer for stability argumentation. I just want the plane to behave something like what I learned to fly on. And then make sure that the good button pushers also retain basic flying skills otherwise drive a taxi.
All that software has saved thousands more lives than it has killed. Heavy commercial aircraft with swept, super critical wings fly at transonic speeds. They absolutely require stability augmentation, yaw dampers, mach trim or ... they don't fly well. A modern jet airliner that weighs over a hundred thousand lbs and flies at mach 0.8 near the tropopause does not behave at all like what you learned to fly on. Thankfully.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#39 Post by righthandman » Wed Nov 14, 2018 10:51 am

Gannet167 wrote:
Wed Nov 14, 2018 9:34 am
righthandman wrote:
Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:47 am
Maybe planes (especially with sidestick controls) should have a red robust centrally located 3 position switch labeled “Auto L” @ 10 o’clock position, “Auto R” @ 2 o’clock position, and an “Auto Off” @ 6 o’clock position. There should also be 2 green lights below the L and R switch positions. The Auto positions (L or R) should normally be used by the PF and remain in that position if and only if reliable sensor inputs are fed to the corresponding pilot
That sounds basically like what an modern FCP/FCU has. AP1 and AP2. Green lights. PF uses onside one. Big red flashing light and alarm sound when they're disconnected.
If it’s a plane with a sidestick/FBW and the plane’s automation is disconnected and in full manual mode, one or both green lights should then light up on the corresponding side(s) anytime the sidestick is sending valid control signals to the various aircraft flight controls.
Define "valid".
By valid I meant that if you input a 10% control surface deflection it won’t command a full deflection at the control surface for example. Some way of verification it’s a matching signal.

All these freaking software safeguards are killing people. Commercial aircraft shouldn’t require a computer for stability argumentation. I just want the plane to behave something like what I learned to fly on. And then make sure that the good button pushers also retain basic flying skills otherwise drive a taxi.
[/quote]
All that software has saved thousands more lives than it has killed. Heavy commercial aircraft with swept, super critical wings fly at transonic speeds. They absolutely require stability augmentation, yaw dampers, mach trim or ... they don't fly well. A modern jet airliner that weighs over a hundred thousand lbs and flies at mach 0.8 near the tropopause does not behave at all like what you learned to fly on. Thankfully.
Concerning my stability argumentation comment I meant the plane should be at least flyable in an emergency in Manual mode without the need for computer to “decide” what you really want. Sort of this “attitude + power = performance”. So if you pitch the nose up 2-4 degrees (whatever is normal for cruise flight) and apply 80-90% power the thing will at least fly straight and level. The only thing one would want to be sure of is before you take over full manual control the pitch trim is not wildly off from what it should be.

Did you read what the issue was that likely brought the plane down?

When Boeing developed 737MAX, it made some design changes to accomodate much larger and fuel efficient engines and extended the landing gear by eight inches. This developed a “pitch up” condition during higher thrust, and Boeing introduced a new 737 MAX system — called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System)., but failed to add it to operators manuals or inform operators.

MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

Any of my students I sent solo should be able to do a better job in flying than the guys on Air France 447 with a ten minute briefing on how to keep the plane straight and level without any computer systems functioning, in an emergency situation I mean.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#40 Post by pianokeys » Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:36 pm

righthandman wrote:
Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:47 am
Maybe planes (especially with sidestick controls) should have a red robust centrally located 3 position switch labeled “Auto L” @ 10 o’clock position, “Auto R” @ 2 o’clock position, and an “Auto Off” @ 6 o’clock position. There should also be 2 green lights below the L and R switch positions. The Auto positions (L or R) should normally be used by the PF and remain in that position if and only if reliable sensor inputs are fed to the corresponding pilot, otherwise the other side should be engaged and if that too is receiving unreliable sensor inputs then the Auto Off should disconnect any and all automation flying the plane and let the pilots do their piloting sh*t.
Other than the obvious which was already pointed out, autopilot, Airbii have a side stick priority function, meaning you can isolate a side stick from making any control input and put the aircraft solely on one stick.
If it’s a plane with a sidestick/FBW and the plane’s automation is disconnected and in full manual mode, one or both green lights should then light up on the corresponding side(s) anytime the sidestick is sending valid control signals to the various aircraft flight controls.
That’s why there are five flight computers, none of them talk to each other, and the plane only needs one to fly. Redundancy.

If you take the Airbii in to manual, it overrides any flight envelope protection. And it’s up to you, the pilot, to make sure to do as you said and make sure there are no “pitch disagreements...” or control disagreements.
All these freaking software safeguards are killing people. Commercial aircraft shouldn’t require a computer for stability argumentation. I just want the plane to behave something like what I learned to fly on. And then make sure that the good button pushers also retain basic flying skills otherwise drive a taxi.
Nope. Definitely not. They prevent people like you from “knowing better”
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#41 Post by righthandman » Wed Nov 14, 2018 6:49 pm

“People like me” just want to have a way of not being in planes that seem to have a mind of its own and hurtling out of control killing all on board including the confused pilots. :)
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#42 Post by Gannet167 » Wed Nov 14, 2018 10:32 pm

The trouble is, confused pilots often are the problem. Protections like Alpha Prot and Alpha Floor can and do save the day. It would be difficult to replicate the Asiana SFO crash in an Airbus in normal law. The plane wouldn't let you.

Lion Air seems to be a malfunctioning system. What seems to make the situation especially problematic is Boeing didn't tell anyone about it. If true, that's a problem with aircraft manuals and type training. Presumably if the crew knew how the system works and were trained to handle a malfunction, we wouldn't be talking about it. This does not invalidate the engineering of stability augmentation, which statistically has done wonders for safety. If true, this situation is a compelling argument for proper AOM documentation and crew training on systems and procedures. Not to get rid of equipment proven to increase safety.

I flew a plane with a stall protection system which included a stick pusher. It was required for certification since the plane had such terrible stall characteristics, it was generally accepted that you'd need 10,000 get to recover it if it ever did stall. The SPS was great and likely saved lives. The one day that it failed because one AoA vane failed, we knew how the system worked, how to handle the failure and recover the plane safely. It did not invalidate the whole concept.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#43 Post by pelmet » Thu Nov 15, 2018 6:19 am

pianokeys wrote:
Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:36 pm
righthandman wrote:
Wed Nov 14, 2018 4:47 am
Maybe planes (especially with sidestick controls) should have a red robust centrally located 3 position switch labeled “Auto L” @ 10 o’clock position, “Auto R” @ 2 o’clock position, and an “Auto Off” @ 6 o’clock position. There should also be 2 green lights below the L and R switch positions. The Auto positions (L or R) should normally be used by the PF and remain in that position if and only if reliable sensor inputs are fed to the corresponding pilot, otherwise the other side should be engaged and if that too is receiving unreliable sensor inputs then the Auto Off should disconnect any and all automation flying the plane and let the pilots do their piloting sh*t.
Other than the obvious which was already pointed out, autopilot, Airbii have a side stick priority function, meaning you can isolate a side stick from making any control input and put the aircraft solely on one stick.
If it’s a plane with a sidestick/FBW and the plane’s automation is disconnected and in full manual mode, one or both green lights should then light up on the corresponding side(s) anytime the sidestick is sending valid control signals to the various aircraft flight controls.
That’s why there are five flight computers, none of them talk to each other, and the plane only needs one to fly. Redundancy.

If you take the Airbii in to manual, it overrides any flight envelope protection. And it’s up to you, the pilot, to make sure to do as you said and make sure there are no “pitch disagreements...” or control disagreements.
All these freaking software safeguards are killing people. Commercial aircraft shouldn’t require a computer for stability argumentation. I just want the plane to behave something like what I learned to fly on. And then make sure that the good button pushers also retain basic flying skills otherwise drive a taxi.
Nope. Definitely not. They prevent people like you from “knowing better”
One of the companies that I worked for had a fleet of Airbus aircraft. Fortunately, we had a pilot who knew better. The Airbus training at the time made no mention that their wonderful aircraft flight control design could ever do wrong. After all, it was an Airbus and that would be "imposseeble". The system would save the passengers from the pilot, not the other way around.

Then one day a flight departed on one of those wet snowy days, fortunately with a pilot who knew better. They were climbing out in the higher levels when the Airbus decided that the pilot was placing the aircraft ina dangerous position. So it overrode everything and started descending.........at TEN THOUSAND feet per minute. The pilots tried pulling back on the control sticks but to no avail. It kept descending. Fortunately, the pilot who knew better, who also happened to be a check airman decided that he had had enough and did what Airbus should have trained pilots to do but did not. He disconnected the flight computers(known as ADR's) by pushing some buttons on the ceiling and all returned to normal.

Of course Airbus refused to believe that their aircraft had done anything wrong when informed of the incident but slowly, the recorded evidence became irrefutable. It turns out that.....similar to many jets, there are AOA vanes on the Airbus. There is a protective plate at the base of the AOA vanes where they enter the aircraft fuselage. Airbus was worried about ice crystals affecting these plates which are unheated so they created a replacement plate known as a conic plate. The problem was that the new conic plate was susceptible to water entering this area on the ground and then freezing in flight which is exactly what happened. The vanes froze at a certain AOA down low. That partcular AOA was lesser angle than what it would be at higher altitudes where such an AOA is near the stalling AOA. So the computers though the aircraft was stalling even though the indicated airspeed was just fine. Fortunately, this pilot knew what to do even though the manufacturer had not told him what he should do if such a thing would ever happen because....such a thing would never happen.

Airbus apparently issued what is known as an OEB to inform pilots of this issue and modified their training(and perhaps their AOA vanes). They did send a representative to one of our pilot safety meetings part way through their investigation to discuss the incident and while doing their best to avoid admitting blame on the manufacturer, they couldn't really do so. I knew they would try to hide this as much as possible so I specifically asked if a report on this specific incident would be published and was told yes. Haven't seen anything yet.

Anyways...what is the lesson. Perhaps, there is something to be said about learning some more about your aircraft above and beyond what the manufacturer tells you. Not ridiculous minutia but interesting systems knowledge. I suppose it is like the instructor many years ago said when describing the electrical control for the prop....."if there is a problem, get rid of the electrical sh*t". Same with the Airbus, get rid of the computer sh*t. Boeing too, I suppose. And if things settle down after that perhaps best not to turn it back on.

I always read my FCOM updates and compare with what was written in previous issues and mark it down. I see Boeing removing some detailed info from the fuel system description recently. Minor stuff but perhaps they feel we just don't need to know....sort like in the Lion Air case.
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#44 Post by tps8903 » Thu Nov 15, 2018 7:32 am

pelmet wrote:
Thu Nov 15, 2018 6:19 am
What year did that happen at your old company? When I read your post it reminded me of the Check Ride crash of the A320 in France that was featured on Mayday a few years back.

Official Report (en francais):
https://www.bea.aero/fr/les-enquetes/le ... -approche/

English Summary:
https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/ch ... -goes-bad/
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Re: Lion Air 737 MAX 8 Crashes in Indoesia

#45 Post by pianokeys » Thu Nov 15, 2018 9:21 am

pelmet wrote:
Thu Nov 15, 2018 6:19 am
Anyways...what is the lesson. Perhaps, there is something to be said about learning some more about your aircraft above and beyond what the manufacturer tells you. Not ridiculous minutia but interesting systems knowledge. I suppose it is like the instructor many years ago said when describing the electrical control for the prop....."if there is a problem, get rid of the electrical sh*t". Same with the Airbus, get rid of the computer sh*t. Boeing too perhaps. And if things settle down after that perhaps best not to turn it back on.
100% agree.

I was referring to pilots who "know better" as in the cocky-legends-in-their-own-mind type. The ones who think the airplane isnt doing what its supposed to and end up planting it in the ground. But its the true wizards of flying who can tell the difference between a problem, and a problem. There were a handful of incidents when the 320 first came on the scene where flight crews were fighting the airplane from doing what it was supposed to, keep it flying and keep it flying safe and it all boiled down to, as you said, not knowing the systems. If you know what the airplane can, will, and wont do, you can stay ahead of it and fly the plane. And not have the plane fly you.

Interesting incident though, and it doesnt surprise me that Airbus didnt want to believe or acknowledge what was going on. During those events I mentioned, and those other ones that were more public and caused hull losses in its early days, Airbus really tried very hard to snuff out any negativity on the type.
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