Be Familiar With the Supplemental Procedures

[pelmet]

Once one starts flying the bigger aircraft they will discover that in addition to the emergency procedures that are required to be memorized(usually followed by a checklist) and the non-emergency checklists that don't have memory items, there may be a separate section of procedures(some of which may be checklist style) grouped under a title such as Supplementary Procedures.

A memorized emergency procedure could be for something such as an engine fire. A non-memorized checklist could be for something such as a generator failure. The supplemental checklists could cover a wide variety of situations. It could be certain winter operations procedures or unusual fueling procedures. And there can be a large number of them for a particular type. Some of them are for quite obscure situations such as operations or in sandy environments/volcanic ash affected airports or for quite rare events. However, the information can be critically important and some of them may be best to know them thoroughly by memory. There can be so many of them that it could be near impossible to be intimately familiar with all of them but one should at least know about them.

Recently, I trained for a new type and spent a considerable amount of time memorizing the titles of the supplemental procedures in alphabetical order. That means if a rare situation arises at some point, I would quickly know that there is a procedure to handle that situation. Some people may be able to recall that there is an appropriate supplemental procedure from distant memory but my memory isn't that good which is why I like to have the titles memorized and to be able to name all the titles quickly.

Here is an accident that happened quite a few years back that would likely have been prevented if the pilots had known the titles of their supplemental procedures and memorized what to do for one of those supplemental procedures that had time critical items...…

https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 19980521-0

In this case, the aircraft had a double failure in the brake system. The first one was an electrical fault that happened when the autobrakes were selected for the landing which resulted in the Brake & Steering Control Unit(BSCU) not functioning. The Alternate Brake system did not work either because it had a hidden mechanical fault due to a housing containing a valve having let in water which froze preventing valve operation. This led to no wheel brakes available on landing.

When the first fault happened, there was a message but the normal checklist gave no further action. The airplane indications showed that only one of the two electrical channels for normal braking(brake by wire system) was faulty so the crew likely assumed that they would still have normal brakes. In fact, both electrical channels had failed. But if the crew had remembered that there was a BSCU Reset Supplemental Procedure and followed it, they could have decided to reset the channel that was showing as faulty and the normal brakes would have been available again. But they didn't.

If they had been familiar with their supplemental procedures, they might have thought to review the BRAKING Supplemental Procedure(or had it memorized), and they would have known that the park brake handle will give braking action in an emergency where all braking is lost. But they didn't know about this procedure. The report says that they were not trained about this which shows that one needs to go beyond the basic training and at least try to know where information is located.

Instead, they found themselves with no brakes and a jet airplane headed for a dropoff into the Mediterranean. Due to desperate maneuvering, the end result was fortunately only a badly damaged airplane. Since this incident, procedures have been changed by the manufacturer.

Here is the report.....

https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/d ... -21-ES.pdf

One last thing to mention. The F/O was landing and had selected max reverse. The captain, presumably because the end of the runway was approaching quickly, started to ask the F/O about slowing down to which the response from the F/O was that there was no braking and he also stowed the reversers. Really bad move when you have no braking. Keep the reversers deployed in such a situation. There can be an instinct to cancel the reverse when that is what is done repeatedly on normal flights.

[Eric Janson]

A number of things in this post are not correct.

BSCU reset is not a supplementary procedure - it is found in a separate section of the Quick Reference Handbook dealing with resets.

Loss of Braking is a memory item on the Airbus.

FCOM has an Abnormal section, a Supplementary section and a Special Operations section.

QRH doesn't contain all Abnormal procedures - you may need to refer to the FCOM. Failure management can become very complex on the airbus.

I agree with your premise that you should know your aircraft and be familiar with the location of Abnormal procedures.

[pelmet]

A number of things in this post are not correct.

Thanks Eric,

Did you read the report? It is from 1998, over 20 years ago and procedures were different back then, which is why I stated in my initial post.....

"Since this incident, procedures have been changed by the manufacturer."

BSCU reset is not a supplementary procedure - it is found in a separate section of the Quick Reference Handbook dealing with resets.

It is now, but it wasn't back then as quoted from the report below....
"Regarding BSCU resetting (switching OFF and then ON the A/SKID & N/W STRG selector-switch), the information appearing in the FCOM, Volume 3, Section 4, Supplementary Techniques, indicates that in the case of difficulties with the brakes and/or steering the BSCU may be reset"

Loss of Braking is a memory item on the Airbus.

Not at the time of this accident. Once again from the report....

"The crew were not aware of the presence, in the Supplementary Techniques Section 4 of the FCOM Volume 3, landing gear, LOSS OF BRAKING: In a case of extreme emergency, and only if the pedals are ineffective, with the BSCU switch in OFF, the aircraft may be stopped with the Parking Brake (full pressure application will occur); ie the possibility of using the parking brake in the event of extreme emergency.

There was no reference whatsoever, in the FCOM Vol 3 Section 2 Abnormal and Emergency Procedures section regarding the crew action to be taken in the event of a loss of braking, as was experienced on this occasion. This action is now a 'Memory Recall' item and has been included in the Abnormal & Emergency Procedures Section."


So once again, at the time, if they had made themselves more aware of the supplementary procedures in effect, an accident could have been prevented. The fact that Airbus turned a supplementary procedure into a memory item shows how critically important one of the supplementary procedures actually was. There could be other critical ones on some aircraft hidden away in this section.

[Eric Janson]

A number of things in this post are not correct.

Thanks Eric,

Did you read the report? It is from 1998, over 20 years ago and procedures were different back then, which is why I stated in my initial post.....

"Since this incident, procedures have been changed by the manufacturer."

BSCU reset is not a supplementary procedure - it is found in a separate section of the Quick Reference Handbook dealing with resets.

It is now, but it wasn't back then as quoted from the report below....
"Regarding BSCU resetting (switching OFF and then ON the A/SKID & N/W STRG selector-switch), the information appearing in the FCOM, Volume 3, Section 4, Supplementary Techniques, indicates that in the case of difficulties with the brakes and/or steering the BSCU may be reset"

Loss of Braking is a memory item on the Airbus.

Not at the time of this accident. Once again from the report....

"The crew were not aware of the presence, in the Supplementary Techniques Section 4 of the FCOM Volume 3, landing gear, LOSS OF BRAKING: In a case of extreme emergency, and only if the pedals are ineffective, with the BSCU switch in OFF, the aircraft may be stopped with the Parking Brake (full pressure application will occur); ie the possibility of using the parking brake in the event of extreme emergency.

There was no reference whatsoever, in the FCOM Vol 3 Section 2 Abnormal and Emergency Procedures section regarding the crew action to be taken in the event of a loss of braking, as was experienced on this occasion. This action is now a 'Memory Recall' item and has been included in the Abnormal & Emergency Procedures Section."


So once again, at the time, if they had made themselves more aware of the supplementary procedures in effect, an accident could have been prevented. The fact that Airbus turned a supplementary procedure into a memory item shows how critically important one of the supplementary procedures actually was. There could be other critical ones on some aircraft hidden away in this section.

Ok - I missed the date of the report. Then things make more sense.

When I first started flying the A320 there was no stall recovery procedure as "the aircraft can't stall". That has also turned out to be false and procedures have again been updated to reflect reality.