Pilot leaves towbar on runway??

[pelmet]

Others can decide for themselves if they feel the 10 to 30 extra seconds is worth it.

At the airlines you can't. That's the whole point of SOPs in a multicrew environment: to follow the company determined standard way of doing things. Not doing your own checks because you feel like it.

If the SOPs are unsafe, SMS it. If not, follow them, even -especially- if you disagree with them!

Yes you can do it. I do it....silently, every time. And I am going to continue to do it because I do feel like it....and I will continue recommending it. By the way, pitot heat is a good item to double check for many types. Brought down a Russian airliner last year...many died.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saratov_A ... Flight_703

Entertaining(well...scary) how many seem opposed. I guess they never make mistakes.

[digits_]

Entertaining(well...scary) how many seem opposed.

Because your suggestions will make things worse, not better.

[pelmet]

Entertaining(well...scary) how many seem opposed.

Because your suggestions will make things worse, not better.

Not for the people on these flights....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest ... Flight_255
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air ... light_1141
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_540
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandala_A ... Flight_091
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanair_Flight_5022
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saratov_A ... Flight_703
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_5050
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_799

and there are many, many more. Thank god none of the pilots ever silently did a last minute check as it would have made things worse, not better.

[digits_]

If we all started doing extra checks, and thus devaluating the importance of the manufacturer checklists, that list would most likely be much longer.

CRM and checklist got introduced for a reason. Stick to them.

[photofly]

If you catch an item on your impromptu post-checklist killer-items-only checklist, that you should have caught on your official checklist ... is that a big deal? Or does the fact that you caught it on your post-checklist checklist mean that everything is ok?

I think we have to move checks from a thing you do once, to an awareness of aircraft state. I don't have a checklist for airspeed; I don't see why I need a checklist for flap position. I don't want a checklist item to "confirm towbar stowed" - I just want to be aware that the towbar is still attached to the nose gear.

[pelmet]

If we all started doing extra checks, and thus devaluating the importance of the manufacturer checklists, that list would most likely be much longer.

CRM and checklist got introduced for a reason. Stick to them.

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident. How about you show just one where it(the action of silently confirming the certain critical items were actually completed after having completed the checklist) caused an accident.

Nuff said.

[photofly]

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident.

There are dozens of things that could have been done differently in your examples, that would have prevented an accident. Correctly completing the action lists or checklists, the first time, being the obvious example.

It's meaningless to make a new procedure which, if completed perfectly, would have prevented an accident, when the old procedures, if completed perfectly, would also have prevented the same accident. You must see that, surely?


The second fallacy to which you have fallen victim is to presume that you can overlay a new layer of checks, on top of an old layer of checks, without affecting how the old checks are done. You're saying "I want it done exactly the old way, except we'll do it the new way, as well." For all you know, those accidents were actually caused because the pilots had instituted their own mental killer-items checklists, not taken sufficiently seriously the original checks, and then screwed up their own killer-item checklists. "We don't need to worry about the flaps now, because I make a mental note to always check them just before takeoff." Until that time they didn't.

[pelmet]

Thank you for your argument. It is something for any pilot to consider.

Once again....

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident. How about you show just one where it(the action of silently confirming the certain critical items were actually completed after having completed the checklist) caused an accident.

[photofly]

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident.

But you haven't done that at all. I state with equal certitude (and an equal lack of factual knowledge) that the unauthorized implementation and acceptance of your technique, contrary to established SOPs, actually caused those accidents.


To be clear, the act of perfectly confirming killer-items would have prevented those accidents. But if one could guarantee perfection in silently confirming killer items, one could equally well guarantee perfect not-silent confirming of aircraft configuration at the appropriate time, and you would no longer need a silent check of killer items. The reason why you think you need a killer-item check - human fallibility at repetitive checks - is the very reason why another level of repetitive checks cannot be the solution to missed checklist items. You cannot fix a leaky bucket with another leaky bucket.

[pelmet]

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident.

I state with equal certitude (and an equal lack of factual knowledge) that the unauthorized implementation and acceptance of your technique, contrary to established SOPs, actually caused those accidents.

Please show the details on any one of them where my technique of silently checking the killer items after completion of the checklists caused any one of those accidents. I'm sorry but you are getting ridiculous and I bet you didn't even read the reports of most of them if any of them in the short time they were posted(I admit I haven't read the Russian report).

[pelmet]

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident.

To be clear, the act of perfectly confirming killer-items would have prevented those accidents.

Thank you.

[photofly]

Please show the details on any one of them where my technique of silently checking the killer items after completion of the checklists caused the accident. I'm sorry but you are getting ridiculous and I bet you didn't even read the reports of most of them if any of them in the short time they were posted(I admit I haven't read the Russian report).

Delta 1141: The captain said to himself: "You know, the copilot isn't taking these configuration checks seriously, but that's ok because I always use Pelmet's secret silent killer items checklist by myself, so I don't need to step in and ensure that the checks are done right. I'll just catch any mistakes later.
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.
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Shit. Forgot the flaps.

The NTSB didn't say that a probable cause was failure to implement a Pelmet's silent killer-items checklist. A probable cause was "inadequate cockpit discipline". They said "Delta did not insist on standardized crew cockpit management, and that flight crews were allowed significant latitude in their conduct of cockpit operations."

[pelmet]

Please show the details on any one of them where my technique of silently checking the killer items after completion of the checklists caused the accident. I'm sorry but you are getting ridiculous and I bet you didn't even read the reports of most of them if any of them in the short time they were posted(I admit I haven't read the Russian report).

Delta 1141: The captain said to himself: "You know, the copilot isn't taking these configuration checks seriously, but that's ok because I always use Pelmet's secret silent killer items checklist by myself, so I don't need to step in and ensure that the checks are done right. I'll just catch any mistakes later.
Shit. Forgot the flaps.

The NTSB didn't say that a probable cause was failure to implement a Pelmet's silent killer-items checklist. A probable cause was "inadequate cockpit discipline". They said "Delta did not insist on standardized crew cockpit management, and that flight crews were allowed significant latitude in their conduct of cockpit operations."

Sorry, your response to my question of showing an example of where my technique caused an accident(which is what you said) does not back up your claim. In reality what you are doing is known as "making up shit". And stupid shit at that.


I wonder how many pilots reading this thread double or triple check that the landing gear is down and locked after completing their checklist.

Be honest photofly...do you?

[photofly]

I have given several examples where my technique would have prevented an accident.

To be clear, the act of perfectly confirming killer-items would have prevented those accidents.

Thank you.

Can you guarantee your personal silent killer-item checklist is executed perfectly every time?

[pelmet]

I wonder how many pilots reading this thread double or triple check that the landing gear is down and locked after completing their checklist.

Be honest photofly...do you?

Yes you do. And if you don't, you ain't too bright. Good night.

[photofly]

I wonder how many pilots reading this thread double or triple check that the landing gear is down and locked after completing their checklist.

Be honest photofly...do you?

I check lots of things, as often as possible. I haven't yet invented for myself the following formal procedure:

The last thing you do before getting in the aircraft is your final check. I have my own one that covers the variety of general aviation aircraft that I fly....

I start at the front of the aircraft and say either to myself or out loud as I walk around the aircraft, no towbar, no intake plugs, no chocks, no tiedowns, oil cap secure, fuel caps secure, no pitot cover, no external locks, baggage door secure.

Takes about 30 seconds and ensures that none of these items are missed

Except that it doesn't ensure that any of these items are missed, any more than any other checklist ensures that none of these items are missed.

Yes you do. And if you don't, you ain't too bright. Good night.

Yes, I'm clearly very very stupid. Good edit to your post, and great observation. Well done.

[pelmet]

Bottom line, you double check your gear. Most likely because you have decided that it is an important item. I double check other things as well.

Just like your double checking of the gear almost certainly doesn’t negatively affect your checklist management, neither does my technique. It is just the intelligent thing to do. And I have expanded its scope.

[photofly]

The gap that your "procedure" fails to address is the gap between intention and reality. If the intention to double check the gear was all it took, nobody would ever land gear-up.

To put it bluntly: if you can guarantee to be so bloody effective and reliable at doing last minute walk-around checks as you claim, you couldn't possibly have any difficulty stowing the tow bar, removing the cowl plugs and doing up the fuel caps in the first place.

[photofly]

double post

[pelmet]

Bottom line.....your double checking of the gear EVERY time you land a retractable gear aircraft completely undercuts all you arguments.

But it is a very smart thing for you to do.

Good job.