DC-3 "Crash" Yellowknife

[Liquid Charlie]

However it doesn't seem to address the question of why they didn't notice the failed feather pump motor before the flight

-- it was likely not checked and even if it was these are not turbine engines so a ground check the button is pushed until the first indication of rpm drop and then pulled off - obviously one could not let it go to complete feather -- many schools of thought out there but the predominant one is do not check feathering pumps too often because the unprotected circuit can burn the motor out - we usually checked them on last flight of the day when all was warm and toasty and likely only once a week if you were always flying the same A/C --

[CpnCrunch]

However it doesn't seem to address the question of why they didn't notice the failed feather pump motor before the flight

-- it was likely not checked and even if it was these are not turbine engines so a ground check the button is pushed until the first indication of rpm drop and then pulled off - obviously one could not let it go to complete feather -- many schools of thought out there but the predominant one is do not check feathering pumps too often because the unprotected circuit can burn the motor out - we usually checked them on last flight of the day when all was warm and toasty and likely only once a week if you were always flying the same A/C --

That all sounds reasonable. I'm just wondering how often they check it at Buffalo (if at all).

[Eric Janson]

That all sounds reasonable. I'm just wondering how often they check it at Buffalo (if at all).

When I worked there on the first flight of the day we checked the operation of the feathering pumps and did a power check on each engine.

[Donald]

TSB findings as to causes and contributing factors:

5.The operator's safety management system was ineffective at identifying and correcting unsafe operating practices.

6.Transport Canada's surveillance activities did not identify the operator's unsafe operating practices related to weight and balance and net take-off flight path calculations. Consequently, these unsafe practices persisted.

I found this part of the report to be far more telling of how Buffalo Airways operates:

TC conducted its first SMS assessment at Buffalo Airways in 2009. During its investigation into this occurrence, the TSB reviewed the surveillance activities carried out by TC and the company's responses for the 3 years leading up to the occurrence (Appendix E). During this period, TC carried out 4 surveillance activities consisting of 1 SMS assessment, 1 process inspection (PI) and 2 program validation inspections (PVI). All 4 of these surveillance activities were focused on various required elements of the SMS.

Operators are required to submit corrective action plans (CAP) to TC for any findings arising from a TC surveillance activity. CAPs are expected to provide the operator's analysis of the reasons underlying the deficiency and provide an action plan to address them. TC inspectors are responsible for assessing the CAP. Accepted CAPs are assessed for either administrative or on-site follow-upFootnote 12 by TC whereas rejected CAPs can be returned to the operator for revision or form the basis for a notice of suspension of the AOC.

The TSB also reviewed CAPs submitted by Buffalo Airways. In the initial CAP submissions for the December 2011 PVI, the operator took exception to multiple findings, requesting clarification as to the regulatory basis for the deficiencies identified by TC, and explicitly questioning the competence and motivation of TC inspectors. TC rejected these initial CAPs noting that the CAP process was not the appropriate venue for “repeated diatribes against Transport Canada.”Footnote 13 Buffalo Airways revised the CAPs and they were accepted by TC. The picture presented by the TSB review was one of an operator at odds with the regulator.

[boeingboy]

I saw that too. A very interesting report to read. Just re-affrims what we all thought about them in the first place, and really Ice pilots was not all that far off. I noticed one of the CAPS actions was the accountable execuative was replaced.

Guess we finally know why Joe stepped down.

[swordfish]

When I worked for NWT Air, we never pushed the feather switch in to complete feathering of the prop. It was pushed to initiate the feathering of the prop, then released. I can visualize that repeated 6-second (test) operations of the pump would conceal its potential failure.

And 1200 lbs over gross...? What a joke. You should have seen the way we operated drum hauls on skis. And in those days, there were "heavy drums" (75 lbs, I believe) and "light drums" (50 lbs). Heating oil (P50) was always in heavy drums; avtur was in light drums. But any drum ALWAYS weighed in at 400 lbs at Yellowknife...and we only needed to carry 1-way VFR fuel. We could "refuel" at McGregor Lake.

But we never had an engine go right after take-off either.

[godsrcrazy]

Not sure if what i heard is true. I understand the annual NATA conference is in Yellowknife this week. I was told the same day this report came out (Monday) Joe received a big award at NATA for Safety.

[quasistationary]

When did piston operators approximately go from using 100/130 fuel to 100LL ?
Would I be correct in assuming that a DC-3 would have had better performance with 100/130 fuel? Maybe not huge benefits but better at least?
I do not know much about changes in octane in fuel but wondering if 100/130 was better or not.