TheStig wrote: ↑Mon Mar 18, 2019 10:23 am
... do you believe anything criminal occurred during the certification process?.
Thank you for the generally positive reflection. My attempt was to explain to the public, in basic lay terms, the facts (what is known) and to identify one or more industry issues that need attention. Issues such as manufacturer regulator oversight, flight crew training or lack thereof and unforeseen problems including the apparent design failure to include any instrument error-checking in the computerized intervention of the flight control system. Also the incredibly low number of flying hours (lack of flying experience) of some operator's pilots, as well as potential lack of fluency in English (the language used for their flight training) of some of those who would ultimately operate the aircraft. Those issues, in my view, ought to be addressed as a
design issue by providing clear, simple information in writing and by proper training.
Each of those issues is very serious and needs attention.
The most serious issue, in my view, has nothing to do with any potential criminality and I don't see that area of law having much impact here. Negligence law, yes, but criminal law, no.
Rather it is the creeping, conscious and pervasive effort of manufacturers and regulators to tune pilots out of the information system and decision-making process.
Late last week when Roy Green and I cosidered potential discussion points for the interview, I reminded him of the scenario in Tom Wolfe's book,
The Right Stuff (not sure if this was included in the ensuing movie) where NASA informed the first astronauts that the astronaut on the first mission would not be provided with any flight controls to his capsule—that he would be just along for the ride, like a monkey in a cage.
The astronauts, although competing individually to be selected as the first American in space, collectively revolted. They refused to participate in the program unless they were given controls, especially for re-entry. Subsequently, NASA relented. Of course, it later turned out that having control over the thrust on re-entry played a pivotal role in saving one of the missions from disaster when the automated system failed.
This NASA subject did not get aired because we essentially ran out of time.
Boeing's decision to make no reference to the MCAS in its aircraft's operation manual is strikingly similar, in my view. Not only did it not advise pilots of the existence of the system, it did not alert them that the system's resolution actions are based on input from only one AoA sensor, not both. And it did not alert them to the potential super-human pitch-down control forces that would result when the augmentation system was activated. More importantly, it did not alert them to the fact that the only way to disengage the system in the event of faulty input was through the stabilizer trim control switches. According to reports, Boeing and the FAA believed that in the event that the MCAS was improperly activated pilots should recognize the problem and trigger the switches as part of their existing emergency procedures. No sh*t.
This gap between expectations and reality thus ultimately and tragically came to the fore in not just one of the accidents, but in both.
Not included in the podcast as well was Roy Green's mention that although he had originally scheduled me for 20 minutes (about 14 minutes of air time, given commercial breaks) he consciously decided during the interview that, although he rarely allows any one issue to run a full hour, he would make an exception here, given the information being disclosed and the serious safety issues being raised.
May I say that I have received considerable positive feedback regarding the interview from both airline insiders, including many of my former pilot colleagues, and from people outside the industry, regarding the basic factual explanation that I provided of the genesis of the grounding. I was pleased that the interview seemed to flow nicely, and that I was able to leave the interview by quoting one of the industry's safety patriarchs, as you mentioned.