737 max

Discuss topics relating to Air Canada.

Moderators: lilfssister, North Shore, ahramin, sky's the limit, sepia, Sulako, I WAS Birddog

Post Reply
Raymond Hall
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 597
Joined: Mon Nov 02, 2009 5:45 am

Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

I was interviewed by CBC Television last Thursday on this issue. Their focus in the interview was on why there was only a brief reference to MCAS in the flight manual's glossary, but no description of the control augmentation system in the flight manual itself.

The segment will air tonight, Tuesday March 26th on The National. There is a brief reference to the segment now posted on the CBC web site:

https://www.cbc.ca/news/boeing-737-manu ... -1.5065842

Afterthought: Watched it on the Toronto CBC station. Very short. Over an hour in the studio to yield about 30 seconds of air time.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Last edited by Raymond Hall on Tue Mar 26, 2019 6:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
FICU
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1253
Joined: Sun Dec 23, 2007 2:37 am

Re: 737 max

Post by FICU »

From that CBC report...
The pilots, unfamiliar with the MCAS system, may have been helpless to respond and unable to bring its nose back up.
"Helpless" or not properly trained on how to shut off the stab trim motors in dealing with a stab trim that was trying to drive them into the ocean?

The stab trim cutout switches are checked for position in the first flight, "before start checklist to the line" by every crew, before every first flight of the day every time. They aren't some obscure switches never dealt with unless it's called for in a QRC or NNC.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Raymond Hall
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 597
Joined: Mon Nov 02, 2009 5:45 am

Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

FICU wrote: Tue Mar 26, 2019 3:10 pm From that CBC report...
The pilots, unfamiliar with the MCAS system, may have been helpless to respond and unable to bring its nose back up.
The stab trim cutout switches are checked for position in the first flight, "before start checklist to the line" by every crew, before every first flight of the day every time. They aren't some obscure switches never dealt with unless it's called for in a QRC or NNC.
Well that's the problem, isn't it? There was no Alert saying "AOA DISAGREE", despite the "option" being available but not purchased by the two airlines.

Put yourself in these pilots' situation. They are a precious few seconds from death and they did not recognize that the flight control intervention stemmed from a system that they were not even advised of (in the case of Lion Air) and not trained in the recognition of (in the case of Ethiopian), despite the modification to the AOM issued month earlier.

Put 100 pilots in a simulator in the same knowledge scenario (i.e. prior to the second accident) and more than a few of them would have not taken the correct, timely action, in my view. The report in the Atlantic states that Boeing made an edict to the designers that the resultant design was to result in no additional pilot training cost.

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ar ... e/584947/

Where does the responsibility lie for that decision lie? Any why no training?

The choice of Boeing to make this alert as an add-on option that required an outlay of additional cash by the airlines, and the decision to not provide any information about the system and no training in its application ultimately cost Boeing thousands of times more than it would have it they had made provided it as standard software. Safety, for a price.

What price do you put on a manufacturer's reputation, or more importantly, on people's lives?
---------- ADS -----------
 
Gino Under
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 749
Joined: Sat Jan 16, 2010 12:06 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by Gino Under »

Ray
It’s unbelievable Boeing sidestepped system redundacy like this. Especially with stall protection. This would seem entirely inconsistent with their history. It’s also shocking the FAA didn’t insist MCAS be covered in pilot differences training. And it is definitely a show stopper that Boeing decided to sell redundancy as an option.
No doubt they’ll be facing numerous lawsuits over this.
It’s going to cost them big sums of money in settlements and lost orders.
---------- ADS -----------
 
yvrflyguy
Rank 1
Rank 1
Posts: 41
Joined: Tue Apr 07, 2009 10:30 am

Re: 737 max

Post by yvrflyguy »

Raymond Hall wrote: Tue Mar 26, 2019 5:21 pm
FICU wrote: Tue Mar 26, 2019 3:10 pm From that CBC report...
The pilots, unfamiliar with the MCAS system, may have been helpless to respond and unable to bring its nose back up.
The stab trim cutout switches are checked for position in the first flight, "before start checklist to the line" by every crew, before every first flight of the day every time. They aren't some obscure switches never dealt with unless it's called for in a QRC or NNC.
Well that's the problem, isn't it? There was no Alert saying "AOA DISAGREE", despite the "option" being available but not purchased by the two airlines.

Put yourself in these pilots' situation. They are a precious few seconds from death and they did not recognize that the flight control intervention stemmed from a system that they were not even advised of (in the case of Lion Air) and not trained in the recognition of (in the case of Ethiopian), despite the modification to the AOM issued month earlier.

Put 100 pilots in a simulator in the same knowledge scenario (i.e. prior to the second accident) and more than a few of them would have not taken the correct, timely action, in my view. The report in the Atlantic states that Boeing made an edict to the designers that the resultant design was to result in no additional pilot training cost.

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ar ... e/584947/

Where does the responsibility lie for that decision lie? Any why no training?

The choice of Boeing to make this alert as an add-on option that required an outlay of additional cash by the airlines, and the decision to not provide any information about the system and no training in its application ultimately cost Boeing thousands of times more than it would have it they had made provided it as standard software. Safety, for a price.

What price do you put on a manufacturer's reputation, or more importantly, on people's lives?


I would say that the pilots in that situation shouldn't be thinking of the "WHY" to the question of stabilizer is running away, but just to the fact that the stabilizer is running away. Even pilots without training on the MCAS should be able to execute the quick action items from memory for the runaway stabilizer. Hold the control column firmly, AP off, AT off...and if the runaway continues, which is this case it would, then click both stab trim switches off. Who cares why the trim is running away, get those quick action items done and then you can troubleshoot from there!! A well trained, professional crew should have been able to do this without issue. Just my 2 cents..
---------- ADS -----------
 
FICU
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1253
Joined: Sun Dec 23, 2007 2:37 am

Re: 737 max

Post by FICU »

They fought it for 10 minutes. The Captain was able to hand control to the FO and pull out the NNC book then go through it to try to find a solution. 10 minutes from when the flaps were retracted and the plane trimming nose down on its own into a dive. How could he not try to cutout the trim?

If the trim is doing something you don't want it to do like drive you into the ocean your training should have you do the "Uncommanded stab trim QRC" which are memory items. Regardless of the what system might be driving the trim... The trim is the problem. If the crew didn't think the stab trim was the problem that comes down to experience and or training.

Everyone is so caught up on the MCAS but it's just another system that uses stab trim even if pilots don't
know MCAS existed.

There is no separate Uncommanded stab trim checklist for autopilot on or autopilot off or speed trim. There is one QRC that encompasses all systems that can cause a possible Uncommanded stab trim.

Boeing definitely screwed up with the lack of a redundant AoA input for MCAS but 2 planes should not have crashed in day VMC conditions. I imagine Boeing would have expected the pilots to treat an erroneous MCAS activation as a stab trim issue with the QRC.
---------- ADS -----------
 
corethatthermal
Rank 5
Rank 5
Posts: 391
Joined: Tue Feb 12, 2019 7:27 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by corethatthermal »

Hold the control column firmly, AP off, AT off...and if the runaway continues, which is this case it would, then click both stab trim switches off. Who cares why the trim is running away, get those quick action items done and then you can troubleshoot from there!! A well trained, professional crew s
hould have been able to do this without issue. Just my 2 cents..
Hindsight is 20/20 for pilots, trained to stay on automation as much as possible. The core flying skills ( shut off the automatics and fly by pitch, power and airspeed ) are replaced by complex and generally robust and dependable systems,,,,,, but that is not why we are in the cockpit !
---------- ADS -----------
 
Raymond Hall
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 597
Joined: Mon Nov 02, 2009 5:45 am

Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

On one of my last SIMs on the 767 (before transitioning to the 777) after I did a departure from LHR and leveled off at 5,000 ft, the inspector froze the simulator to ask me a question: "Do you always hand-fly your departures?" To which I replied, "Doesn't everybody?"

One of the most curious characteristics that I noticed about my F/Os on all of the aircraft that I operated was that as soon as we rotated, almost every one would remove their feet from the rudder pedals. Rotate, feet back. Result: every turn thereafter resulted in a slip. Anathema to being a real pilot, in my view. Ab initio training demanded coordinated turns. You have three primary flight controls. Why don't you want to use all three to coordinate the operation of the aircraft? Why should that principle of operation change just because you are operating a larger aircraft?

When you choose to ignore the hands and feet skills that you learned in your primary training, you are essentially abandoning your professional responsibility, in my view. Similarly, when you allow the aircraft to overtake your own control of your attitude, you might as well give up being a pilot. Stay home and let the autopilot or the system design run the operation.

Yes, I am old school, but I am still alive.
---------- ADS -----------
 
User avatar
Daniel Cooper
Rank 4
Rank 4
Posts: 272
Joined: Thu Dec 20, 2018 6:38 am
Location: Unknown

Re: 737 max

Post by Daniel Cooper »

I've literally never seen someone take their feet off the pedals on rotation.
---------- ADS -----------
 
loadshed
Rank 3
Rank 3
Posts: 125
Joined: Tue Jan 11, 2005 9:54 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by loadshed »

I’m surprised at how quick many Pilots (here on this forum and elsewhere) are to blame the crew in the Ethiopian crash. Many are hypothesizing that they didn’t shut off the stab control switches and seem to think they could have had a different outcome.

It would appear from radar data that this flight had issues right after takeoff, and if it was an MCAS issue, it appears it may have come into play in this instance (as designed) after the flaps were selected up at Flap retraction altitude (likely 1000 feet AGL).

for the armchair quarterbacks out there, Let’s see you recover at 1000 feet AGL when the nose is uncommandedly pushing down on you, generating an excess rate of descent, and your only recourse is to recognize the problem..follow the initial memory items...and then pull the trim wheel handle out and start cranking like mad, in a desperate effort to get the nose up. Good luck to you.

Keep in mind Addis Ababa is 7600 feet elevation. It looks like this crew was unable to gain much above 1000 to 1500 feet in altitude., and was airborne for under 3 minutes.
Lets not be not be so quick to judge these Pilots who died in a desperate effort to regain control of their aircraft.
The planes are grounded for a reason.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Fanblade
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1045
Joined: Mon Mar 28, 2011 8:50 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by Fanblade »

It’s the startle affect of three things happening at the same time. Unreliable airspeed, stick shaker, MCAS. I think the simultaneous unreliable airspeed and stick shaker is being under played in our comprehension of what probably happened.

I don’t fly the Max but I assume the unreliable airspeed drill is probably full thrust and a pitch attitude. But two other systems are warning of imminent stall.

What would your instinct be? Lower the nose to gain some speed? Not follow the unreliable airspeed drill completely?

Problem is that lowering of the nose and excessive acceleration would mask the MCAS operation. MCAS will be actually trimming in the correct direction for high speed flight.

The accessive speed and nose down trim eventually lead to elevator blowback.

Oh yeah. Now imagine this is all going on and you have 300 hours.

If you haven’t heard of elevator blowback here is an article.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/22/bjorn ... sh-part-2/
---------- ADS -----------
 
Last edited by Fanblade on Wed Mar 27, 2019 7:41 am, edited 1 time in total.
Fanblade
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1045
Joined: Mon Mar 28, 2011 8:50 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by Fanblade »

We all know how disconcerting unreliable airspeed could be. Ignoring everything the instrumentation is telling you and flying a thrust setting and pitch attitude is difficult mental gymnastics. It is why that drill is so important.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Last edited by Fanblade on Wed Mar 27, 2019 7:43 am, edited 1 time in total.
J31
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1074
Joined: Thu Feb 26, 2004 7:21 am

Re: 737 max

Post by J31 »

Raymond Hall wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 12:27 am On one of my last SIMs on the 767 (before transitioning to the 777) after I did a departure from LHR and leveled off at 5,000 ft, the inspector froze the simulator to ask me a question: "Do you always hand-fly your departures?" To which I replied, "Doesn't everybody?"

One of the most curious characteristics that I noticed about my F/Os on all of the aircraft that I operated was that as soon as we rotated, almost every one would remove their feet from the rudder pedals. Rotate, feet back. Result: every turn thereafter resulted in a slip. Anathema to being a real pilot, in my view. Ab initio training demanded coordinated turns. You have three primary flight controls. Why don't you want to use all three to coordinate the operation of the aircraft? Why should that principle of operation change just because you are operating a larger aircraft?

When you choose to ignore the hands and feet skills that you learned in your primary training, you are essentially abandoning your professional responsibility, in my view. Similarly, when you allow the aircraft to overtake your own control of your attitude, you might as well give up being a pilot. Stay home and let the autopilot or the system design run the operation.

Yes, I am old school, but I am still alive.
Most if not all SOP's have direction to "Guard" all flight controls with the autopilot on. Personally I "Guard" the flight controls especially the rudder till 10000 AGL. Any pilot that removes one's feet from the rudder right after rotation should be "educated"!

Raymond, I disagree with your "every turn thereafter resulted in a slip" comment. Boeing recommends that rudder is not used in normal flight as a properly working yaw damper will keep things coordinated with or without the autopilot on.

Of course there are exceptions like a Yaw damper inop MEL or intentional rudder input slipping for takeoffs and landings.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Fanblade
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1045
Joined: Mon Mar 28, 2011 8:50 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by Fanblade »

Many places train off the rudders out of concern for pilot initiated rudder reversal.

Remember this.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/America ... Flight_587
---------- ADS -----------
 
yycflyguy
Rank 10
Rank 10
Posts: 2734
Joined: Tue Feb 24, 2004 9:18 am

Re: 737 max

Post by yycflyguy »

J31 wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 7:41 am
Raymond Hall wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 12:27 am On one of my last SIMs on the 767 (before transitioning to the 777) after I did a departure from LHR and leveled off at 5,000 ft, the inspector froze the simulator to ask me a question: "Do you always hand-fly your departures?" To which I replied, "Doesn't everybody?"

One of the most curious characteristics that I noticed about my F/Os on all of the aircraft that I operated was that as soon as we rotated, almost every one would remove their feet from the rudder pedals. Rotate, feet back. Result: every turn thereafter resulted in a slip. Anathema to being a real pilot, in my view. Ab initio training demanded coordinated turns. You have three primary flight controls. Why don't you want to use all three to coordinate the operation of the aircraft? Why should that principle of operation change just because you are operating a larger aircraft?

When you choose to ignore the hands and feet skills that you learned in your primary training, you are essentially abandoning your professional responsibility, in my view. Similarly, when you allow the aircraft to overtake your own control of your attitude, you might as well give up being a pilot. Stay home and let the autopilot or the system design run the operation.

Yes, I am old school, but I am still alive.
Most if not all SOP's have direction to "Guard" all flight controls with the autopilot on. Personally I "Guard" the flight controls especially the rudder till 10000 AGL. Any pilot that removes one's feet from the rudder right after rotation should be "educated"!

Raymond, I disagree with your "every turn thereafter resulted in a slip" comment. Boeing recommends that rudder is not used in normal flight as a properly working yaw damper will keep things coordinated with or without the autopilot on.

Of course there are exceptions like a Yaw damper inop MEL or intentional rudder input slipping for takeoffs and landings.
You saved me some typing J31.... I'd also like to point out that departing LHR we are encouraged to use the AP early as LHR is a noise sensitive/high traffic airport and guys were getting violated for noise abatement because they weren't exactly on the SID and there are noise sensors positioned everywhere there. There is a time and place for automation. It's one thing departing straight out of YEG or YYC and handbombing to cruise but high traffic volume TCA is one place to use it.

I've been hearing for a few years that pilots are complacent and utilize automation too much. These accidents are not a result of over-reliance on automation but an inability to recognize how a system worked due to an initial lack of Boeing disclosure, a lack of training and a lack of situational awareness. It's sad because it was 100% preventable.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Raymond Hall
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 597
Joined: Mon Nov 02, 2009 5:45 am

Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

CNN: Software Fix Completed
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/27/economy/ ... index.html

Boeing unveiled an overhaul Wednesday to a software system and the pilot training of its signature 737 MAX plane, marking its most direct attempt to fix an element of the plane's original design that investigators believe led to two recent crashes.
At the company's plant in Renton, Washington, where the plane is assembled, Boeing pilots ran through scenarios on a flight simulator that was transmitted live into a conference room where regulators and some 200 pilots from client airlines were gathered, according to Mike Sinnett, Boeing's vice president for product strategy. The guests were able to request test simulations.

Boeing also said Wednesday it would make an alert that displays if the two AOA sensors are contradicting each other standard on the 737 MAX. It had been included only as an option in the original model.
Sinnett called the alert, known as the AOA disagree flag, "supplemental information that is not required by any crew procedures or any alerts to operate the airplane."

The software has also been changed so that it does not repeat the downward pushing cycle in the event of an abnormal AOA reading, and will no longer produce an angle that can not be counteracted manually by a pilot. …

Software updates to the plane will take about an hour, and pilots will have to have to complete a new, more rigorous layer of computer-based training before being allowed to fly the plane, Sinnett said.
---------- ADS -----------
 
User avatar
'97 Tercel
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 581
Joined: Fri Jul 19, 2013 5:19 pm

Re: 737 max

Post by '97 Tercel »

Interesting. Any new estimates on WJ and AC operating them again?
---------- ADS -----------
 
Raymond Hall
Rank 7
Rank 7
Posts: 597
Joined: Mon Nov 02, 2009 5:45 am

Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

yycflyguy wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 8:21 am Raymond, I disagree with your "every turn thereafter resulted in a slip" comment. Boeing recommends that rudder is not used in normal flight as a properly working yaw damper will keep things coordinated with or without the autopilot on.

You saved me some typing J31.... I'd also like to point out that departing LHR we are encouraged to use the AP early as LHR is a noise sensitive/high traffic airport and guys were getting violated for noise abatement because they weren't exactly on the SID and there are noise sensors positioned everywhere there. There is a time and place for automation. It's one thing departing straight out of YEG or YYC and handbombing to cruise but high traffic volume TCA is one place to use it.
It is one thing to have Boeing "recommend" that one should not use the rudder to coordinate one's turns, and it is entirely another to keep your turns coordinated. Real pilots fly the airplane and fly the SID. They could allow the autopilot to fly the SID, but they could also use their own skills to execute the procedures and keep their skills honed. In my view, there is no excuse for slipping in a turn. Yaw damper or no yaw damper. Leave the autopilot for the lowest common denominator. The reason that we have had these recent accidents stems at least in part from the fact that the pilots operating these multi-million dollar machines don't recognize that, Fleet Canuck or Boeing 737 Max, it all comes back to one fundamental concept: needle, ball and airspeed.
---------- ADS -----------
 
Last edited by Raymond Hall on Wed Mar 27, 2019 10:31 pm, edited 1 time in total.
FICU
Rank (9)
Rank (9)
Posts: 1253
Joined: Sun Dec 23, 2007 2:37 am

Re: 737 max

Post by FICU »

I just looked at the FDR data and the Lion Air crew was able to trim the nose up with electric trim while interupting the MCAS.
BTD wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 7:32 pm https://reports.aviation-safety.net/201 ... MINARY.pdf

This is the PDF link for the preliminary report for lion air. For interested persons it is worth reading rather than asking questions to the message board as it contains factual information.
---------- ADS -----------
 
yycflyguy
Rank 10
Rank 10
Posts: 2734
Joined: Tue Feb 24, 2004 9:18 am

Re: 737 max

Post by yycflyguy »

Raymond Hall wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 10:26 pm
yycflyguy wrote: Wed Mar 27, 2019 8:21 am Raymond, I disagree with your "every turn thereafter resulted in a slip" comment. Boeing recommends that rudder is not used in normal flight as a properly working yaw damper will keep things coordinated with or without the autopilot on.

You saved me some typing J31.... I'd also like to point out that departing LHR we are encouraged to use the AP early as LHR is a noise sensitive/high traffic airport and guys were getting violated for noise abatement because they weren't exactly on the SID and there are noise sensors positioned everywhere there. There is a time and place for automation. It's one thing departing straight out of YEG or YYC and handbombing to cruise but high traffic volume TCA is one place to use it.
It is one thing to have Boeing "recommend" that one should not use the rudder to coordinate one's turns, and it is entirely another to keep your turns coordinated. Real pilots fly the airplane and fly the SID. They could allow the autopilot to fly the SID, but they could also use their own skills to execute the procedures and keep their skills honed. In my view, there is no excuse for slipping in a turn. Yaw damper or no yaw damper. Leave the autopilot for the lowest common denominator. The reason that we have had these recent accidents stems at least in part from the fact that the pilots operating these multi-million dollar machines don't recognize that, Fleet Canuck or Boeing 737 Max, it all comes back to one fundamental concept: needle, ball and airspeed.
Real pilot... teehee
---------- ADS -----------
 
Post Reply

Return to “Air Canada”