Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[Eric Janson]

What could possibly go wrong?

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-06- ... ngineers-0

With more and more issues emerging (and more to come by the look of things) I don't see this aircraft in service again before 2020.

The entire Certification process is deeply flawed - this aircraft should never have been certified in the first place.

[Victory]

Boeing falsified records for 787 jet sold to Air Canada. It developed a fuel leak

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing ... -1.5193550

[Raymond Hall]

From today's LA Times:

Boeing’s jet deliveries slide as 737 Max grounding takes a toll

Boeing Co.’s second-quarter jet deliveries slid 54% from a year earlier to 90 aircraft, reflecting the toll from a global grounding of its bestselling 737 Max after two fatal crashes. At the same time, deliveries for Airbus SE surged, giving the archrival a strong chance to wrestle back the crown of world’s biggest planemaker in 2019.

Boeing hasn’t delivered any Max aircraft, the company’s largest source of profit, since regulators banned commercial flights on March 13, days after an Ethiopian Airlines jet plunged into a field shortly after takeoff. Boeing did deliver 24 of an earlier 737 model during the quarter, along with 42 of its 787 Dreamliner.

Boeing’s commercial aircraft sales have also slowed after the tragedies and amid heightened U.S.-China trade tensions and economic uncertainty. The Chicago-based manufacturer is down 119 for the year with the 737 shedding 180 orders because of cancellations, conversions and an accounting rule.
The tallies are closely watched by investors and analysts trying to assess the financial fallout of the Max crisis for Boeing ahead of its July 24 earnings release. While customer payments have slowed, Boeing is still building 737s at a 42-jet monthly clip and stockpiling completed airplanes around the Seattle area and as far afield as San Antonio.

The growing inventory costs of the undelivered planes are draining about $3 billion a quarter from Boeing, estimated Cai von Rumohr, an analyst with Cowen & Co., in a July 8 report. Cash generated from 787 Dreamliner deliveries, defense and services sales should soften some of the blow, he said.
The company’s backlog of unfilled 737 orders, after an accounting adjustment, fell by 10 aircraft to 4,415 from May’s results, according to Boeing’s website.

https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi- ... story.html

[Raymond Hall]

From the Toronto Star:

SEATTLE—After less than a year in charge in Renton, the Boeing vice president who runs the assembly plant there and manages the 737 MAX program is retiring. A factory operations expert, Eric Lindblad was brought in to fix manufacturing and supply chain issues but leaves as the jet program is engulfed by a safety crisis that has raised doubts about Boeing’s design.

Lindblad, 57, who has spent 34 years at Boeing as a well-regarded manufacturing executive, took over the Renton plant and the 737 program last August following a series of issues with the supply of engines and fuselages that had slowed jet deliveries and led to a buildup of parked 737 planes.

https://www.thestar.com/business/2019/0 ... etire.html

Meanwhile, United has pulled the Max out of its schedule until at least November 3rd:

United Airlines has extended its cancellation of Boeing 737 Max flights until at least November 3rd, the company announced on Friday, which will affect 5,000 flights through September and October.

The airline had previously extended cancellations through September 3rd, following the news that the Federal Aviation Administration had discovered a new flaw in the flight software of Boeing’s 737 Max plane — one that was different from the flaw that led to two deadly crashes that claimed 346 lives. Boeing’s CEO recently acknowledged that the company needs more time to fix this new flaw and that the FAA will have to approve the fix before it recertifies the plane.

https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/12/2069 ... s-november

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Washington Post:

Boeing takes $5.6 billion revenue hit to compensate 737 Max customers

Boeing said the grounding of its 737 Max jets would reduce its revenue and earnings by $5.6 billion in the second quarter, the largest financial effect of two deadly crashes of the jetliner so far.

In a statement Thursday, the plane manufacturer said it would record a $4.9 billion charge to compensate airline customers for the delays in getting its 737 Max planes back into service. Boeing’s costs to produce the airplane were also $1.7 billion higher in the second quarter because of changes in production rates, the company said.

The financial toll of the 737 Max grounding is starting to add up for Boeing, which has frozen sales of its flagship jetliner since regulators issued a global grounding of the plane in March. Airlines have canceled thousands of flights late into the fall — incurring losses of hundreds of millions of dollars — while a timeline for the jet’s return remains uncertain.

Boeing said Thursday it is basing its financial projections on the assumption that regulators will approve safety fixes to the 737 Max and clear the planes for commercial travel early in the fourth quarter of this year.

…
Boeing is likely to repay customers in the form of discounts, additional service packages and other extras over a period of years, rather than cash payouts to compensate for the losses, analysts have said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business ... 35f1c7d713

['97 Tercel]

Early 4th quarter return? Ha! They'll be lucky if it's back flying with operators worldwide by next spring.

[BMLtech]

So are the max guys still getting paid to sit around or have they started re-training?

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Wall Street Journal:

MAX Grounding Puts Boeing on Track for Fewest Deliveries in Eight Years

Boeing Co. BA +1.97% delivered 18 jetliners in August, leaving the aerospace giant on track for its lowest annual total in eight years.

Boeing booked nine orders last month, including two 737 business jets. It booked no MAX deals for the sixth month in succession, though it has 4,544in backlog.

The company has also suffered setbacks in other programs, with 787 output at its North Charleston, S.C., facility closed for four days last week because of Hurricane Dorian. Testing of its delayed 777X jet has also been interrupted after a testing failure last week. Boeing said Tuesday that the problem wouldn’t have a significant impact on its testing or delivery schedule.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/max-ground ... lista_pos2

['97 Tercel]

Stock's up 10 bucks today...

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times Magazine, a very lengthy, (opinionated) background piece to the present 737 Max saga:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/maga ... e=Homepage


What Really Brough Down the Boeing 737 Max?
Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.

The paradox is that the failures of the 737 Max were really the product of an incredible success: a decades-long transformation of the whole business of flying, in which airplanes became so automated and accidents so rare that a cheap air-travel boom was able to take root around the world. Along the way, though, this system never managed to fully account for the unexpected: for the moment when technology fails and humans — a growing population of more than 300,000 airline pilots of variable and largely unpredictable skills — are required to intervene. In the drama of the 737 Max, it was the decisions made by four of those pilots, more than the failure of a single obscure component, that led to 346 deaths and the worldwide grounding of the entire fleet.
…
The 737 Max remains grounded under impossibly close scrutiny, and any suggestion that this might be an overreaction, or that ulterior motives might be at play, or that the Indonesian and Ethiopian investigations might be inadequate, is dismissed summarily. To top it off, while the technical fixes to the MCAS have been accomplished, other barely related imperfections have been discovered and added to the airplane’s woes. All signs are that the reintroduction of the 737 Max will be exceedingly difficult because of political and bureaucratic obstacles that are formidable and widespread. Who in a position of authority will say to the public that the airplane is safe?

[L39Guy]

Finally, an article in the public press that really calls a spade a spade. The aviation trade journals (AW&ST, Flight International, etc.) nailed this issue a long, long time ago, i.e. weeks after the ET accident.

All of the stuff about Boeing’s corporate issues, which happen in every organization, and whenever any test fails, like the 777 cargo door, which happens during testing, is all immaterial to the true cause of these accidents.

[plausiblyannonymous]

all immaterial to the true cause of these accidents.

The true cause was that the pilots were not trained because the airlines were not notified of the way this system works.

You can blame it on the pilots all that you want, but Boeing implemented MCAS to move the trim faster than it could be moved by the pilots. They failed to add fail safes and, on top of that, decided to have a single point of failure.

This is on Boeing and the aircraft. The problem can be fixed, but the trust is already lost.

[L39Guy]

Every type rated B737 pilot should know the memory drills. Unreliable airspeed was the first failure that neither the Lion Air or ET pilots did hence they flew around T take-off power until they hit the ground or water. The Lion Air incident crew did the UAS drill, controlled the aircraft, dealt with MCAS then flew 1 1/2 hours to destination with UAS and MCAS.

The MCAS drill is identical to the stab trim runaway drill that has been a standard B737 memory drill since the 1960’s. Neither of the accident crews did that drill either; the incident crew did after being told by the jumpseater to turn off the stab trim switches.

It is inexcusable that professional pilots did not do the UAS drill, let alone the stab trim runaway drill.

[rudder]

They put ‘experienced’ 737 pilots in the SIM with the same MCAS failure and not all maintained control. And they knew what was coming.

Careful about assigning fault.

[goingnowherefast]

Multiple, seemingly unrelated failures occurring in quick succession. Unreliable airspeed followed shortly afterwards by trim moving twice as fast as normal, then not at all, then twice as fast as normal, then not at all, then twice as fast as normal...basically an atypical and unexpected failure mode. Drop this on the crew at a very busy phase of flight.

Boeing decided that the redundancy for the MCAS was the pilots, but decided not to tell the pilots about it or it's failure modes and symptoms.

[L39Guy]

Multiple, seemingly unrelated failures occurring in quick succession. Unreliable airspeed followed shortly afterwards by trim moving twice as fast as normal, then not at all, then twice as fast as normal, then not at all, then twice as fast as normal...basically an atypical and unexpected failure mode. Drop this on the crew at a very busy phase of flight.

Boeing decided that the redundancy for the MCAS was the pilots, but decided not to tell the pilots about it or it's failure modes and symptoms.

Explain then why the UAS drill was not followed long before the flaps were raised and MCAS kicked in?

Explain why the ET crew engaged the autopilot when the UAD drill calls for all automation to be turned off?

Explain why the throttles were never reduced from take-off power per the UAS drill and why nobody noticed that they were flying around at Vmo?

Explain why anyone would not return to the departure airport with UAS yet all three event aircraft cleaned up with every intention of continuing to destination as the incident aircraft did? Highly questionable airmanship.

Explain why nobody applied normal electric trim from the control wheel switches that would have brought the aircraft into trim as well as neutralizing MCAS.

Lots of attention has been placed on a lack of pilot training about MCAS. The fact of the matter is that it exhibits the identical, general characteristics of a stab trim runaway...uncommanded trim. Whether it is continuous or in bursts or is slow or rapid is immaterial. It’s a runaway trim due to some cause, the source of which is immaterial while in flight. When an jet engine fails, apart from determining if it is severe damage, does one try to determine if it is due to an FCU/FADEC issue, fuel contamination, fuel pump, etc? No. You secure the engine, do the drills, land and sort out the cause on the ground. Same with MCAS - the cause of the runway is irrelevant at that moment, what is important is to use the stab trim cutout switches. Pronto.

These episodes point to terrible training, experience and airmanship.

[altiplano]

Do you fly the B737max?

You mention the AP was engaged in an incident? That terminates mcas input, are you sure?

Have you ever handled a trim runaway on a B737max either in the sim or real life?

Lot's of control force there. LOTS. Manual trim is impossible after you hit the trim cutoff. Unless you allow the aircraft to dive you can't turn that wheel.

I don't think any crew is prepared for that. I sure didn't have a clue that was what it took until after these events happened and I tried it in the sim. MCAS or other reason, I'm a reasonably experienced and diligent pilot, I knows the drill. And even after the drill was ran, wow... I didn't crash, but I had a heads up on what was coming, I was briefed about the control loads, and wow... who knew?

Boeing certainly wasn't telling anyone in their literature. I didn't learn the finer points on that drill in my initial rating...

Did I get terrible training? Do I exhibit a lack of experience and airmanship?

[goingnowherefast]

Yes, the training was sub standard, at a basic level. Pilot decision making clearly isn't something even thought about. But you also can't train for a failure the manufacturer initially hid from you. Part of Boeing's sales pitch for the Max was minimal training required. Turns out there is a very nasty surprise if a bird takes out the left AoA vane.

I agree with the article in general, but it leaves out the issues at Boeing.

[L39Guy]

Do you fly the B737max?

You mention the AP was engaged in an incident? That terminates mcas input, are you sure?

Have you ever handled a trim runaway on a B737max either in the sim or real life?

Lot's of control force there. LOTS. Manual trim is impossible after you hit the trim cutoff. Unless you allow the aircraft to dive you can't turn that wheel.

I don't think any crew is prepared for that. I sure didn't have a clue that was what it took until after these events happened and I tried it in the sim. MCAS or other reason, I'm a reasonably experienced and diligent pilot, I knows the drill. And even after the drill was ran, wow... I didn't crash, but I had a heads up on what was coming, I was briefed about the control loads, and wow... who knew?

Boeing certainly wasn't telling anyone in their literature. I didn't learn the finer points on that drill in my initial rating...

Did I get terrible training? Do I exhibit a lack of experience and airmanship?

16 years of B737 time and another 10 of other Boeing time. Haven't done a trim runaway on the Max in sim or real life however that is not necessary - the stab trim runaway characteristics of a MAX/MCAS are identical to the stab trim runaway of intermittent fault, i.e. a periodic short circuit that would drive the trim motor. Yes, the magnitude of the MCAS pitch change is greater but does it matter? A trim runaway is a trim runaway is a trim runaway.

Do you really think that someone would think "gosh, this pitching of the nose-down is not constant and is not at rate I saw in the simulator therefore it cannot be a stab trim runaway?" There are scores of possible runaway scenarios but the principles are all the same - an uncommanded change in the pitch of the aircraft.

If you allow the aircraft to roar around at 340+ knots there is a lot of control forces - too many in fact to manually trim the aircraft with the trim wheel. That is why you pull the throttles back and control the speed and the aircraft. That is fundamental flying. As far as trimming is concerned, if one knew how to fly an aircraft they would know to you continuous trim while the electric system was still working to restore an in trim situation. This was possible but if you look at the FDR output you will see there were only small bursts of trim which did not change the controls forces.

But tell me, why didn't either of the accident crews at least do the UAS drill - they had almost two minutes from take-off to flap retraction to do it before the flaps went up and MCAS kicked in? Why? If that done just that drill alone which would have resulted in the aircraft flying around at a speed considerably less than Vmo they would have been able to overcome the control forces of the stab being out of trim. So why?

[L39Guy]

Yes, the training was sub standard, at a basic level. Pilot decision making clearly isn't something even thought about. But you also can't train for a failure the manufacturer initially hid from you. Part of Boeing's sales pitch for the Max was minimal training required. Turns out there is a very nasty surprise if a bird takes out the left AoA vane.

I agree with the article in general, but it leaves out the issues at Boeing.

With the exception of the intermittent nature and rate of pitch change, how is this MCAS failure any different than a stab trim runaway? A non-MCAS stab trim runaway can be intermittent too (intermittent short circuit somewhere), it can have a slower or faster rate of stab trim? Are you suggesting that stab trim runaway training has to demonstrate multiple combinations of intermittent trim/trim rate in order to adequately train pilots? If so, you will spend the entire 4 hour session doing nothing but stab trim runaway combinations.

How many engine failure combinations should we train for too? Contaminated fuel, fuel pump failure, FADEC failure, fuel line becoming detached, clogged fuel line, oil pressure going to zero, birdstrike, fan blade failure, etc? That would take a couple of days in the simulator to train for that one too.

Or perhaps one learns the simple principles: the stab trim/aircraft pitch is not doing what I am commanding it to do therefore it is in a runaway condition therefore I do the drill and sort out the cause later when I am back on terra firma safely? The engine fails, for whatever reason, you do the engine failure drill and all of the other stuff then land and sort it out?