Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[L39Guy]

You completely misread my post.
No one has seen the data on how the 737 Max flies without MCAS. I’m merely suggesting that their is no proofthat the airplane won’t flip upside down without out MCAS installed.
The Transport Canada email leak suggests that they don’t have he data on how the MAX flies without MCAS.
“I put together a little presentation which I believe illustrates the problem and how an easy fix would be to have Boeing implement what they keep trying to tell us. The MCAS fixes makes the MAX an NG.”
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... m-737-max/

Will the plane flip upside down without MCAS? I doubt it, but it has to be proven exactly how it fly which at this point in time it doesn’t appear that information has been released to regulators.

No one has seen the data on how a MAX flies without MCAS? How about the test pilots, flight test engineers and flight control engineers who “saw the data” during the flight test program and saw that the MAX did not achieve positive, longitudinal stability and hence MCAS was introduced?

The aircraft “won’t flip upside down” without MCAS. It would simply not recover itself from the high angle of attack (near stall) condition under a very narrow set of circumstances.

One “simple” solution to this mess is to issue an exemption the FAR’s allowing the aircraft to fly without MCAS provided that the weight/C of G combination flight envelope that is longitudinally neutral or negatively unstable be forbiddden. One can’t stop incompetent pilots from nearly stalling but you can prevent a configuration that is in that corner of the envelope until a longer term fix is developed.

But since this is a media feeding frenzy with all sorts of “experts” coming out of the woodwork, that ain’t going happen.

[tailgunner]

So Boeing should be granted an additional easement of the certification requirements for the 737?
Not going to happen again.

[L39Guy]

It would not be an “exemption” in the normal definition but the AOM and W&B manuals would both prohibit aircraft loading (payload and fuel) in a manner that would have the aircraft enter the neutral stability zone.

[corethatthermal]

A C of G loading change will not correct the issue! The stab will still be run to trim the A/C and the neutral/negative stability will still be "felt" in the conditions which led to MCAS installation ! People say " increase the hor stab size" How the hell will that correct it? The only correction, other than an automatic system is to get rid of the lift/push generated by the engine nacelles! IMHO

[Curiousflyer]

You completely misread my post.
No one has seen the data on how the 737 Max flies without MCAS. I’m merely suggesting that their is no proofthat the airplane won’t flip upside down without out MCAS installed.
The Transport Canada email leak suggests that they don’t have he data on how the MAX flies without MCAS.
“I put together a little presentation which I believe illustrates the problem and how an easy fix would be to have Boeing implement what they keep trying to tell us. The MCAS fixes makes the MAX an NG.”
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... m-737-max/

Will the plane flip upside down without MCAS? I doubt it, but it has to be proven exactly how it fly which at this point in time it doesn’t appear that information has been released to regulators.

No one has seen the data on how a MAX flies without MCAS? How about the test pilots, flight test engineers and flight control engineers who “saw the data” during the flight test program and saw that the MAX did not achieve positive, longitudinal stability and hence MCAS was introduced?

The aircraft “won’t flip upside down” without MCAS. It would simply not recover itself from the high angle of attack (near stall) condition under a very narrow set of circumstances.

One “simple” solution to this mess is to issue an exemption the FAR’s allowing the aircraft to fly without MCAS provided that the weight/C of G combination flight envelope that is longitudinally neutral or negatively unstable be forbiddden. One can’t stop incompetent pilots from nearly stalling but you can prevent a configuration that is in that corner of the envelope until a longer term fix is developed.

But since this is a media feeding frenzy with all sorts of “experts” coming out of the woodwork, that ain’t going happen.

The entirety of the Fokner message releases proves that Boeing lied to the FAA about what MCAS was doing and what it was designed for.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... velopment/

Test pilots were keeping technical pilots out of the loop in regards to MCAS, so the FAA was getting inaccurate information about when MCAS would activate, how quickly it would trim, and under what conditions (high speed and low speed)

So do I trust Boeing? No- and that’s why. It would be irresponsible for regulators or anyone to take their word for how the aircraft will fly without MCAS.

Now it might be possible to change C of G loads to prevent the need for MCAS, maybe Boeing will present it one day. I think we’d all be more comfortable with MCAS out of the picture if that’s at all possible.

[Curiousflyer]

How exactly does this work then? MCAS is required flight control system for certification of the aircraft to fly. But it’s going to disable itself if both AoA sensors don’t agree? How then is the aircraft still certified to fly?

It works the same way as every other system on the airplane. Once the takeoff roll is commenced, there is no requirement for the aircraft to remain certified. Even on a plane without MCAS, an aircraft with a u/s AOA probe is no longer certified to fly. That doesn't mean you stop the plane on the side of the airway and call for a tug.

No. Aircraft must be designed with redundancy.
https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?n ... p14.1.25.d
FAR 25.601

[Raymond Hall]

An interesting take on the genesis of the Corporate demise—from an on-line publication, Quart:

The 1997 merger that paved the way for the Boeing 737 Max crisis

Late in the summer of 1997, two of the most critical players in global aviation became a single tremendous titan. Boeing, one of the US’s largest and most important companies, acquired its longtime plane manufacturer rival, McDonnell Douglas, in what was then the country’s tenth-largest merger. The resulting giant took Boeing’s name. More unexpectedly, it took its culture and strategy from McDonnell Douglas—even its commercial aviation department was struggling to retain customers. ...

In a clash of corporate cultures, where Boeing’s engineers and McDonnell Douglas’s bean-counters went head-to-head, the smaller company won out. The result was a move away from expensive, ground-breaking engineering and toward what some called a more cut-throat culture, devoted to keeping costs down and favoring upgrading older models at the expense of wholesale innovation. Only now, with the 737 indefinitely grounded, are we beginning to see the scale of its effects.

“The fatal fault line was the McDonnell Douglas takeover,” says Clive Irving, author of Jumbo: The Making of the Boeing 747. “Although Boeing was supposed to take over McDonnell Douglas, it ended up the other way around.” ...

Inside the company, there were rumblings of dissatisfaction. A formerly cosy atmosphere, in which engineers ran the show and executives aged out of the company gracefully, was suddenly cut-throat. In 1998, the year after the merger, Stonecipher warned employees they needed to “quit behaving like a family and become more like a team. If you don’t perform, you don’t stay on the team.” ...

Two decades on, perhaps the most lasting consequence of the change in culture has been in Boeing’s approach to aircraft building. Cutting costs and diversifying revenue ought to have served as an ideal way to subsidize the expensive process of plane development. Instead, with engineers now disempowered and management far away in Chicago, the actual building of new planes in Seattle all but stalled. Boeing would not actually announce even the plans for a new plane until 2003, with the 787 Dreamliner. Throughout this time, Boeing was led by its first chairman without a traditional aviation background: James McNerney had instead spent almost two decades in management at General Electric—now, he was following a tried-and-tested route of cutting, downsizing, and shifting.

[Article continues ...]

https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnel ... ax-crisis/

[Ifly]

Long ago my wife said the airplane will not fly again, and I disagreed, I'm starting to think my wife may have been correct and I'll explain why...

If the return to service is going to require additional training, the common type certificate is likely in jeopardy. If the Max is no longer considered a common type with the original 737 then it is a new type that will be required to meet modern FAR design criteria, which is impossible without a complete redesign.

My suspicion is that there is a great deal of discussion going on in the background between Boeing, the FAA and various other political bodies about how to unpaint the corner they've all found themselves in. At this point the silence is deafening.

[2R]

Any new return to service dates yet ?

[pilotbzh]

https://www.cp24.com/news/air-canada-we ... -1.4752495

Off schedule until March 31 for now, probably later, I have doubts it will fly this summer....

[Raymond Hall]

And the beat goes on—a new problem: wiring; from today's New York Times:

It’s Not Just Software. New Safety Risks Under Scrutiny on Boeing’s 737 Max.

The company and regulators are looking into everything from the wiring on the plane to its engines.

Even as Boeing inches closer to getting the 737 Max back in the air, new problems with the plane are emerging that go beyond the software that played a role in two deadly crashes.

As part of the work to return the Max to service, the company and regulators have scrutinized every aspect of the jet, uncovering new potential design flaws.

At the request of the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing conducted an internal audit in December to determine whether it had accurately assessed the dangers of key systems given new assumptions about how long it might take pilots to respond to emergencies, according to a senior engineer at Boeing and three people familiar with the matter.

Among the most pressing issues discovered were previously unreported concerns with the wiring that helps control the tail of the Max.
The company is looking at whether two bundles of critical wiring are too close together and could cause a short circuit. A short in that area could lead to a crash if pilots did not respond correctly, the people said. Boeing is still trying to determine whether that scenario could actually occur on a flight and, if so, whether it would need to separate the wire bundles in the roughly 800 Max jets that have already been built. The company says that the fix, if needed, is relatively simple.

The company informed the F.A.A. about the potential vulnerability last month, and Boeing’s new chief executive discussed possible changes to the wiring on an internal conference call last week, according to one of the people and the Boeing engineer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. [Continued]

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/busi ... 7-max.html

[2R]

How big would the Tail Strakes required be ?
To prevent a deep stall on a Max ?
An aerodynamic solution to an aerodynamic problem.
Tail strakes work on many different aircraft , the guys with the slide rules stuck them on Lear jets for a similar issue of power induced pitching at high alpha creating a deep stall . The tail strakes prevent further pitching ,
The counterintuitive part of deep stall recovery is reducing the power to get out of the trap.
Might be a work around for the Max, works on other high performance aircraft ?

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Wall Street Journal:

Boeing Considers Raising Debt as MAX Crisis Takes Toll
Compensation and maintenance costs rise as grounding stretches toward one-year mark

Boeing Co. BA -0.34% is considering plans to raise more debt to bolster finances strained by the grounding of its 737 MAX, according to people familiar with the matter.

The aerospace giant isn’t running out of cash. Boeing had about $20 billion in available funds at the end of the September quarter, according to the company’s financial statements. But costs associated with the MAX crisis are rising.

Boeing faces compensation claims from airlines and families of the 346 victims of two MAX crashes over the past 15 months. This month, Boeing halted production of the plane, lowering some costs but pushing back the likely date at which payments for finished planes would resume.

Analysts expect Boeing to raise as much as $5 billion in additional debt to help cover expenditures that could top $15 billion in the first half of this year. In addition to spending on maintenance for the MAX’s stalled production facilities and finished planes, the company plans to close its $4 billion acquisition of an 80% stake in the Brazilian plane maker Embraer SA ’s commercial airliner business. Boeing also has to repay some existing debt and fund shareholder dividends.

Chief Financial Officer Greg Smith said in October, when Boeing last provided guidance related to the MAX return to service, that the company didn’t expect to have to resort to certain unspecified “levers” to improve its finances. Mr. Smith is also serving as interim chief executive until David Calhoun takes over on Jan. 13.

Now, alongside raising more debt, Boeing is also thinking of deferring some capital expenditures, freezing acquisitions and cutting spending on research and development to preserve cash, people familiar with those possibilities said.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-con ... lead_pos5

[boeingboy]

How big would the Tail Strakes required be ?
To prevent a deep stall on a Max ?
An aerodynamic solution to an aerodynamic problem.
Tail strakes work on many different aircraft , the guys with the slide rules stuck them on Lear jets for a similar issue of power induced pitching at high alpha creating a deep stall . The tail strakes prevent further pitching ,
The counterintuitive part of deep stall recovery is reducing the power to get out of the trap.
Might be a work around for the Max, works on other high performance aircraft ?

The real problem is the vortex flow off the new, larger nacelle body which produces lift at high AoA. As the nacelle is ahead of the C of G, this lift causes a slight pitch-up effect, that – in turn - keeps the nose up instead of falling naturally. This abnormal nose-up pitching is not allowable under 14CFR §25.203(a) "Stall characteristics".

The 14CFR §25.203(a) regulation (a) is [2]:
>It must be possible to produce and to correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of the aileron and rudder controls, up to the time the airplane is stalled. No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longitudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover from a stall by normal use of the controls.

Remember - this is an expanded portionof MCAS and not it's sole function. It is not an anti stall software.

[Raymond Hall]

Another headache:

Ukrainian Airlines plane crashes in Tehran shortly after takeoff

A Boeing 737 plane carrying 180 passengers and crew crashed shortly after takeoff from Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran early Wednesday local time, Iran's semi-official news agency ISNA reported.

Most passengers on board the Ukraine International Airlines flight died, said Pirhossein Koulivand, head of Iran's Emegency Medical Services.

Emergency crews have been dispatched to the crash site but cannot assist because the area is currently ablaze, Koulivand said on IRINN, a state-run media outlet.

Flight-tracking service FlightRadar 24 said in a tweet that the jet had been in service for about three and half years.
ISNA reported the crash was due to to technical difficulties.

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/middleea ... index.html

[Raymond Hall]

Another Boeing 737 disaster. From the video released on CNN, it would appear that the aircraft was engulfed in flames, big time, immediately after take-off...

Ukrainian Airlines plane crashes in Tehran shortly after takeoff

A Boeing 737 plane carrying 180 passengers and crew crashed shortly after takeoff from Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran early Wednesday local time, Iran's semi-official news agency ISNA reported.

Most passengers on board the Ukraine International Airlines flight died, said Pirhossein Koulivand, head of Iran's Emegency Medical Services.

Emergency crews have been dispatched to the crash site but cannot assist because the area is currently ablaze, Koulivand said on IRINN, a state-run media outlet.

Flight-tracking service FlightRadar 24 said in a tweet that the jet had been in service for about three and half years.
ISNA reported the crash was due to to technical difficulties.

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/middleea ... index.html

[Raymond Hall]

Boeing's 180 — from today's New York Times:

In Reversal, Boeing Recommends 737 Max Simulator Training for Pilots

The company had long maintained that the training wasn’t needed to fly the plane, which was grounded after two deadly crashes.
From its inception, Boeing’s 737 Max was designed to save airlines the expense of training their pilots on flight simulators. During the initial approval of the plane and after two crashes killed 346 people last year, Boeing argued in conversations with the Federal Aviation Administration that simulator training was not necessary.

Now, after a worldwide grounding has cost the company billions of dollars over nearly 10 months and caused it to temporarily halt the production of the Max, Boeing has reversed course. On Tuesday, the company said it would recommend that pilots train in flight simulators before flying the Max.
The decision stems from Boeing’s analysis of recent flight simulator tests that were part of the work necessary to return the Max to service, which showed that pilots were not using the right procedures to handle emergencies. Those tests are the latest hurdle for Boeing, which has encountered setback after setback as it tries to fix problems with the Max and persuade regulators that the plane is ready to fly.

…

The training requirement may further complicate efforts to return the plane to service. The final decision on whether to mandate simulator training will be made by the F.A.A., which is likely to follow the company’s advice. The agency still has to complete testing of the plane.
The F.A.A. said it would consider Boeing’s recommendation, adding in a statement that it was “following a thorough process, not a set timeline, to ensure that any design modifications to the 737 Max are integrated with appropriate training and procedures.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/busi ... ining.html

[Raymond Hall]

From Bloomberg News:

Boeing faces US$5-billion tab on 737 Max simulator training

Boeing Co.’s costs would rise an estimated US$5 billion if pilots need to get simulator training before flying the 737 Max, according to Bloomberg Intelligence.

That would nearly double the US$5.6 billion that Boeing had committed to cover costs from last year’s grounding of the jetliner. The manufacturer will be expected to reimburse airline expenses for simulator training because it sold the plane on the basis that pilots certified for the previous 737 variant would need minimal additional training, analyst George Ferguson said in a note Thursday.

The manufacturer on Tuesday said it had advised regulators that pilots need more than brief tablet-based training before flying the Max, reversing its previous stance in part because of revisions to the plane after two crashes killed 346 people. Simulator training would delay the return of the aircraft, Ferguson said. The decision on simulators is up to regulators, who have yet to approve the plane’s return.

“Our estimates show the cost of airline lost profits will probably exceed Boeing’s US$5.6-billion reserve just for 2019,” he said. “As the production pause stretches on, suppliers will run into more financial difficulty, perhaps even needing support from Boeing.”

Boeing’s compensation to Southwest Airlines Co., the largest operator of the Max when it was grounded in March, likely will exceed US$1.2-billion if the plane remains parked through this quarter, Ferguson estimated. That would be 22 per cent of the US$5.6 billion that the manufacturer has set aside. Southwest hasn’t disclosed terms of its agreement with Boeing but said the grounding reduced operating income by US$830 million last year.

https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/boeing-face ... 1.1371460

[Raymond Hall]

Has the bad news finally hit bottom? From today's New York Times:

Boeing Employees Mocked F.A.A. and ‘Clowns’ Who Designed 737 Max

The company expressed regret at the embarrassing communications it sent to investigators on Thursday, which included a comment that “this airplane is designed by clowns, who are in turn supervised by monkeys.”

Boeing employees mocked federal rules, talked about deceiving regulators and joked about potential flaws in the 737 Max as it was being developed, according to over a hundred pages of internal messages delivered Thursday to congressional investigators.

“I still haven’t been forgiven by God for the covering up I did last year,” one of the employees said in messages from 2018, apparently in reference to interactions with the Federal Aviation Administration.

The most damaging messages included conversations among Boeing pilots and other employees about software issues and other problems with flight simulators for the Max, a plane later involved in two accidents, in late 2018 and early 2019, that killed 346 people and threw the company into chaos.

The employees appear to discuss instances in which the company concealed such problems from the F.A.A. during the regulator’s certification of the simulators, which were used in the development of the Max, as well as in training for pilots who had not previously flown a 737.

“Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn’t,” one employee said to a colleague in another exchange from 2018, before the first crash. “No,” the colleague responded.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/busi ... ages.html

[2R]

I would have thought clowns would make excellent consultants for aviation. I have been to the circus and was impressed by how many clowns they can pack in those small cars .I am sure they could get 300 pax in a 120 seat aircraft and still have room for their balloon animals .
As for the monkey comment I have been to the zoo and know that monkies have no problems getting rid of shit, in fact they will throw it at you and threaten you with more shit if you do not move .
Might be an improvement putting clowns and monkies in charge , so long as they have an MBA from a reputable on line school and have paid at least 73.59 plus tax for it