Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[telex]

They'll spend billions to get it flying again. Probably already have. Boeing reputation is riding on this jet. Even if they never make a penny on the 737 program again, they'll fix it to save face. Even if they have to jack up the landing gear and lower the engines, but I bet they'd do it.

I certainly wouldn't buy a 797 I were worried I'd be buying a plane that might turn into a giant paperweight forever.

I'd buy a 797. A clean sheet design vs a fifty year old airframe covered in patchwork fixes should be ok.

However, the A321XLR might have already killed the 797 concept.

[Raymond Hall]

To date, 4,937 orders at an average price of U.S. $121.6 million per order: U.S. $662,545 million (big bucks).

That's what I would call an "incentive" to get this program back on the rails. Further, it demonstrates just how insignificant the potential damages could be as a result of any and all litigation, both by individuals and by the airlines that lost use of the aircraft for a sustained period of time.

The technical problems are not insurmountable. The public perception problems are equally not insurmountable.

My guess is that it will be back in the air in October. And the public will be provided sufficient assurance to overcome any skepticism resulting from its history.

[speedah]

Over half a trillion according to your calculation!

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Washington Post:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/tr ... dec7e3f523

Boeing had a history of failing to fix safety problems

Safety problems known to FAA for years, including…
Boeing subcontractor falsifying certifications;
legal enforcement cases for failing to comply with safety regulations;
often late or incomplete with required safety submission;
inability to rid aircraft of foreign object debris (such as tools left behind);
apparent failures of corrective action;
administrative problems related to sub-delegation of FAA oversight authority to a Boeing management unit (the Organization Designation Authorization program (ODA)), with Boeing’s designated inspectors lobbying the federal government on behalf of Boeing;
complaints of undue pressure on internal (FAA ODA) inspectors by Boeing managers; and
issues raised about Boeing’s oversight of its network of parts suppliers and their respective inspectors...

Boeing’s own employees in Renton and Everett, Wash., and elsewhere also recorded false information for certain planes, including on a 787 that was sold to Air Canada and later experienced a fuel leak, the FAA found. A Boeing mechanic and inspector involved in that case faced unspecified “corrective action,” the company said. …

In a recent study, Barnett found that about 1 in 8 million passengers worldwide died on a scheduled commercial flight in the decade ending in 2017. But for passengers who flew on the Max, Barnett estimated the risk was “at least 20 times that,” or roughly 1 in every 300,000 passengers.

[Old fella]

To date, 4,937 orders at an average price of U.S. $121.6 million per order: U.S. $662,545 million (big bucks).

That's what I would call an "incentive" to get this program back on the rails. Further, it demonstrates just how insignificant the potential damages could be as a result of any and all litigation, both by individuals and by the airlines that lost use of the aircraft for a sustained period of time.

The technical problems are not insurmountable. The public perception problems are equally not insurmountable.

My guess is that it will be back in the air in October. And the public will be provided sufficient assurance to overcome any skepticism resulting from its history.

Not that I know much about this issue but I am willing to wager your assessment is certainly accurate. As for flying public(which I am part of) perception , most that I know couldn’t tell the difference between an EMB90/A320-21/B737 Max if you lined them up side by side. People are going to continue utilizing the services of the various airlines when the Max issues get ironed out and returned to operations.

[Eric Janson]

What could possibly go wrong?

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-06- ... ngineers-0

With more and more issues emerging (and more to come by the look of things) I don't see this aircraft in service again before 2020.

The entire Certification process is deeply flawed - this aircraft should never have been certified in the first place.

[Victory]

Boeing falsified records for 787 jet sold to Air Canada. It developed a fuel leak

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing ... -1.5193550

[Raymond Hall]

From today's LA Times:

Boeing’s jet deliveries slide as 737 Max grounding takes a toll

Boeing Co.’s second-quarter jet deliveries slid 54% from a year earlier to 90 aircraft, reflecting the toll from a global grounding of its bestselling 737 Max after two fatal crashes. At the same time, deliveries for Airbus SE surged, giving the archrival a strong chance to wrestle back the crown of world’s biggest planemaker in 2019.

Boeing hasn’t delivered any Max aircraft, the company’s largest source of profit, since regulators banned commercial flights on March 13, days after an Ethiopian Airlines jet plunged into a field shortly after takeoff. Boeing did deliver 24 of an earlier 737 model during the quarter, along with 42 of its 787 Dreamliner.

Boeing’s commercial aircraft sales have also slowed after the tragedies and amid heightened U.S.-China trade tensions and economic uncertainty. The Chicago-based manufacturer is down 119 for the year with the 737 shedding 180 orders because of cancellations, conversions and an accounting rule.
The tallies are closely watched by investors and analysts trying to assess the financial fallout of the Max crisis for Boeing ahead of its July 24 earnings release. While customer payments have slowed, Boeing is still building 737s at a 42-jet monthly clip and stockpiling completed airplanes around the Seattle area and as far afield as San Antonio.

The growing inventory costs of the undelivered planes are draining about $3 billion a quarter from Boeing, estimated Cai von Rumohr, an analyst with Cowen & Co., in a July 8 report. Cash generated from 787 Dreamliner deliveries, defense and services sales should soften some of the blow, he said.
The company’s backlog of unfilled 737 orders, after an accounting adjustment, fell by 10 aircraft to 4,415 from May’s results, according to Boeing’s website.

https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi- ... story.html

[Raymond Hall]

From the Toronto Star:

SEATTLE—After less than a year in charge in Renton, the Boeing vice president who runs the assembly plant there and manages the 737 MAX program is retiring. A factory operations expert, Eric Lindblad was brought in to fix manufacturing and supply chain issues but leaves as the jet program is engulfed by a safety crisis that has raised doubts about Boeing’s design.

Lindblad, 57, who has spent 34 years at Boeing as a well-regarded manufacturing executive, took over the Renton plant and the 737 program last August following a series of issues with the supply of engines and fuselages that had slowed jet deliveries and led to a buildup of parked 737 planes.

https://www.thestar.com/business/2019/0 ... etire.html

Meanwhile, United has pulled the Max out of its schedule until at least November 3rd:

United Airlines has extended its cancellation of Boeing 737 Max flights until at least November 3rd, the company announced on Friday, which will affect 5,000 flights through September and October.

The airline had previously extended cancellations through September 3rd, following the news that the Federal Aviation Administration had discovered a new flaw in the flight software of Boeing’s 737 Max plane — one that was different from the flaw that led to two deadly crashes that claimed 346 lives. Boeing’s CEO recently acknowledged that the company needs more time to fix this new flaw and that the FAA will have to approve the fix before it recertifies the plane.

https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/12/2069 ... s-november

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Washington Post:

Boeing takes $5.6 billion revenue hit to compensate 737 Max customers

Boeing said the grounding of its 737 Max jets would reduce its revenue and earnings by $5.6 billion in the second quarter, the largest financial effect of two deadly crashes of the jetliner so far.

In a statement Thursday, the plane manufacturer said it would record a $4.9 billion charge to compensate airline customers for the delays in getting its 737 Max planes back into service. Boeing’s costs to produce the airplane were also $1.7 billion higher in the second quarter because of changes in production rates, the company said.

The financial toll of the 737 Max grounding is starting to add up for Boeing, which has frozen sales of its flagship jetliner since regulators issued a global grounding of the plane in March. Airlines have canceled thousands of flights late into the fall — incurring losses of hundreds of millions of dollars — while a timeline for the jet’s return remains uncertain.

Boeing said Thursday it is basing its financial projections on the assumption that regulators will approve safety fixes to the 737 Max and clear the planes for commercial travel early in the fourth quarter of this year.

…
Boeing is likely to repay customers in the form of discounts, additional service packages and other extras over a period of years, rather than cash payouts to compensate for the losses, analysts have said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business ... 35f1c7d713

['97 Tercel]

Early 4th quarter return? Ha! They'll be lucky if it's back flying with operators worldwide by next spring.

[BMLtech]

So are the max guys still getting paid to sit around or have they started re-training?

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Wall Street Journal:

MAX Grounding Puts Boeing on Track for Fewest Deliveries in Eight Years

Boeing Co. BA +1.97% delivered 18 jetliners in August, leaving the aerospace giant on track for its lowest annual total in eight years.

Boeing booked nine orders last month, including two 737 business jets. It booked no MAX deals for the sixth month in succession, though it has 4,544in backlog.

The company has also suffered setbacks in other programs, with 787 output at its North Charleston, S.C., facility closed for four days last week because of Hurricane Dorian. Testing of its delayed 777X jet has also been interrupted after a testing failure last week. Boeing said Tuesday that the problem wouldn’t have a significant impact on its testing or delivery schedule.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/max-ground ... lista_pos2

['97 Tercel]

Stock's up 10 bucks today...

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times Magazine, a very lengthy, (opinionated) background piece to the present 737 Max saga:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/maga ... e=Homepage


What Really Brough Down the Boeing 737 Max?
Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.

The paradox is that the failures of the 737 Max were really the product of an incredible success: a decades-long transformation of the whole business of flying, in which airplanes became so automated and accidents so rare that a cheap air-travel boom was able to take root around the world. Along the way, though, this system never managed to fully account for the unexpected: for the moment when technology fails and humans — a growing population of more than 300,000 airline pilots of variable and largely unpredictable skills — are required to intervene. In the drama of the 737 Max, it was the decisions made by four of those pilots, more than the failure of a single obscure component, that led to 346 deaths and the worldwide grounding of the entire fleet.
…
The 737 Max remains grounded under impossibly close scrutiny, and any suggestion that this might be an overreaction, or that ulterior motives might be at play, or that the Indonesian and Ethiopian investigations might be inadequate, is dismissed summarily. To top it off, while the technical fixes to the MCAS have been accomplished, other barely related imperfections have been discovered and added to the airplane’s woes. All signs are that the reintroduction of the 737 Max will be exceedingly difficult because of political and bureaucratic obstacles that are formidable and widespread. Who in a position of authority will say to the public that the airplane is safe?

[L39Guy]

Finally, an article in the public press that really calls a spade a spade. The aviation trade journals (AW&ST, Flight International, etc.) nailed this issue a long, long time ago, i.e. weeks after the ET accident.

All of the stuff about Boeing’s corporate issues, which happen in every organization, and whenever any test fails, like the 777 cargo door, which happens during testing, is all immaterial to the true cause of these accidents.

[plausiblyannonymous]

all immaterial to the true cause of these accidents.

The true cause was that the pilots were not trained because the airlines were not notified of the way this system works.

You can blame it on the pilots all that you want, but Boeing implemented MCAS to move the trim faster than it could be moved by the pilots. They failed to add fail safes and, on top of that, decided to have a single point of failure.

This is on Boeing and the aircraft. The problem can be fixed, but the trust is already lost.

[L39Guy]

Every type rated B737 pilot should know the memory drills. Unreliable airspeed was the first failure that neither the Lion Air or ET pilots did hence they flew around T take-off power until they hit the ground or water. The Lion Air incident crew did the UAS drill, controlled the aircraft, dealt with MCAS then flew 1 1/2 hours to destination with UAS and MCAS.

The MCAS drill is identical to the stab trim runaway drill that has been a standard B737 memory drill since the 1960’s. Neither of the accident crews did that drill either; the incident crew did after being told by the jumpseater to turn off the stab trim switches.

It is inexcusable that professional pilots did not do the UAS drill, let alone the stab trim runaway drill.

[rudder]

They put ‘experienced’ 737 pilots in the SIM with the same MCAS failure and not all maintained control. And they knew what was coming.

Careful about assigning fault.

[goingnowherefast]

Multiple, seemingly unrelated failures occurring in quick succession. Unreliable airspeed followed shortly afterwards by trim moving twice as fast as normal, then not at all, then twice as fast as normal, then not at all, then twice as fast as normal...basically an atypical and unexpected failure mode. Drop this on the crew at a very busy phase of flight.

Boeing decided that the redundancy for the MCAS was the pilots, but decided not to tell the pilots about it or it's failure modes and symptoms.