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The Tenth Man
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

From Berry v. Pulley, 2012 ONSC 1790:

"[372] For the Defendants to be liable for the tort of unlawful act conspiracy, it must be established that:

(a) they acted in combination, that is, in concert, by agreement or with a common design;
(b) their conduct was unlawful;
(c) their conduct was directed towards the Plaintiffs;
(d) the Defendants should have known that, in the circumstances, injury to the Plaintiffs was likely to result; and
(e) their conduct caused injury to the Plaintiffs: Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas. 35
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

(a) they acted in combination, that is, in concert, by agreement or with a common design;







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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

With reference to the two attachments in the previous post, here is a paragraph from Berry v. Pulley, 2012 ONSC 1790



"[378] A simple synopsis of the agreement requirement is found in the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in Golden Capital Securities Ltd. v. Holmes:[43]

Thus, to prove a case in conspiracy, it is first necessary to plainly establish, directly or by inference, that there was an agreement between the defendants and one or more others. This does not mean an agreement in the contractual sense. A defendant must be shown to have agreed in the sense of having combined or conspired with one or more others to carry out a common design or a means of achieving a common objective, which is then implemented with resulting injury to the plaintiff.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

(b) their conduct was unlawful;

From Berry v. Pulley, 2012 ONSC 1790:

[379] The conduct may be unlawful if it constitutes a tort, a breach of contract or breach of legislation. Not surprisingly, a breach of fiduciary duty may also constitute unlawful conduct for the purposes of the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy: GHL Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, and Levy-Russell Ltd. v. Techmotiv Inc. Fiduciary obligations may be owed by union officers to their union and a failure to abide by a union's constitution and bylaws by officers of a union has been held to amount to a disregard of a duty of loyalty and a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the union: U.F.C.W., Local 1252 v. Cashin. See also Burley v. OPSEU.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

From Berry v. Pulley

"[410] Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal accepted that union members may be liable in tort. At paragraph 33 of the Court of Appeal decision, Sharpe J.A. wrote:

However, it is well recognized that the acts of individual union members may attract tort liability for conspiracy and interference with economic relations… A claim for tortious conspiracy to deprive a party of contractual rights is plainly distinct from a claim for breach of those contractual rights. Similarly, there is a distinctive nature to a claim for intentional interference with economic interests...

[411] In the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Justice Iacobucci wrote at paragraphs 63-64:

However, this is not to say that union members do not have some obligations inter se. By joining a union, the member agrees to follow the rules of the union, and, through the common bond of membership, union members have legal obligations to one another to comply with these rules. If there is a breach of a member's constitutional rights, this is a breach by the union, and the union may be liable to the individual. Similarly, the disciplinary measures in the constitution can be imposed by the union on a member who contravenes the union's rules. A failure by the union to follow these disciplinary procedures may cause it to breach its contractual obligations to the other members, giving rise to corresponding contractual remedies.

In addition to potential internal procedures, a failure by the union to insist on compliance with the constitution or impose disciplinary measures for its breach may allow members to initiate proceedings either at the CIRB, or the courts, depending on the nature of the complaint. Aside from actions against the union, a member who is harmed by the breach of the union's rules by another member may, if the requisite elements are present, have an action in tort against that member. [Emphasis added.]


[412] It seems implicit from these dicta that the Plaintiffs may meet this requirement of illegality provided that the Defendants deprived the Plaintiffs of their contractual rights under the Constitution or, put differently, assuming the other elements of the tort of conspiracy are present, the Plaintiffs were harmed by the Defendants’ breach of the CALPA Constitution."
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

(c) their conduct was directed towards the Plaintiffs;

From Berry v. Pulley:

"[384] The predominant purpose of the defendant's conduct need not be to cause injury to the plaintiff, but the conduct must be directed towards the plaintiff in some manner."


It should be self evident that elevating the seniority rights of former Encore pilots at WJ would have a necessary negative impact on the seniority rights of OTS pilots. Seniority is a zero sum game: when one person gains, another person loses. There is no way the ALPA members and officers gathered for the Herndon Pact could not have known that their conduct would be directed towards the OTS pilots. They were, allegedly, gathered to increase the seniority rights of the former and existing Encore pilots. The people negatively affected by this action would be the OTS pilots.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

(d) the Defendants should have known that, in the circumstances, injury to the Plaintiffs was likely to result;

It is unavoidable that injury would occur to the OTS pilots. As stated previously, seniority is a zero sum game: if the former Encore pilots gain seniority rights and/or rankings by somehow recognizing the WPDL (One List), then OTS pilots would by necessity and clearly suffer financial harm and injury to their quality of life.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

(e) their conduct caused injury to the Plaintiffs:

I believe this is the unfinished part of the puzzle. Will the MEC's proceed with the LOU? If they sign the LOU, and it replicates the WPDL (One List), as the recalled MEC Chairman and the incoming Canada Board President maintain, then there will be, I think, a triable issue as to whether the people gathered in Hernodon in Oct/Nov 2018 who formulated the proposed LOU, were particpatory to and guilty of an unlawful conspiracy to cause harm to the OTS pilots.



Sounds scary.
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Re: 2017 CIRB Single Employer decision

Post by DropTanks »

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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

In mulling over this tort, my thoughts are directed towards the third prong of the test is satisfied: was the conduct of the WJ MEC officers and WJ LEC officers present for the Herndon Pact, directed at the the OTS pilots? I'm not convinced that it was. It may have merely been a result of conduct directed towards Encore pilots, with an unavoidable result being that the conduct was simulatenously directed at the OTS pilots (one goes up, the other MUST go down).

In the quest to find some guidance, here is a case involving an illegal one day sick out by some air traffic controllers at CYYZ on September 26, 1980. Some inconvenienced passengers on an Air Canada flight filed an action against the controllers.
Only by causing injury in the form of upset, inconvenience and financial loss to passengers could the air traffic controllers attain their objective. If a storm had closed Toronto International Airport at that time, there would certainly have been no strike as it would be completely ineffectual. It would serve no purpose. It was only by striking while the airport was operating that pressure could be brought upon Transport Canada. In other words, it was only by action hurtful to the passengers that the controllers could obtain their objective.

Defence counsel argued that the defendant did not even know of the existence of the plaintiffs and could hardly have intended to cause them any loss. It is clear, however, that the defendant knew of a group of people, i.e., intending passengers, against whom his efforts were directed. The fact that he did not know their individual identities is irrelevant.

Appellants' counsel brought to the attention of the court a note of the English county court case of Falconer v. A.S.L.E.F. and N.U.R. (May 7, 1986, unreported). Here rail unions went on an illegal strike on January 17, 1986, leaving a passenger, Mr. Falconer, stranded in London. He sued for unlawful interference by the unions with his contract of carriage with British Rail. The trial judge held:

"The plaintiff was one of a definite and identifiable group of people in a contractual relationship with British Rail. The fact that his actual name and description were unknown to the defendants at that time does not preclude him from bringing the action."

Later, as to whether the union action was directed against the plaintiff, he said that:

"To suggest as did the defendants that the effect on passengers was merely consequential was "both naive and divorced from reality'' since "it was clearly the intention of the defendants in calling the strike to direct its effect on the plaintiff and others and that by doing so create pressure upon the Board by the plaintiff and others and thus to induce the Board to accede to the defendant's wishes."

We adopt this reasoning.

Finally in this connection it should be observed that the first alternative set out in the test of Estey J. in LaFarge requires that where lawful means are employed, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's "predominant purpose" was to injure the plaintiff but where, as here, the means used are unlawful, he need only show that it is "directed against the plaintiff" and that the defendant should have known that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result.

In summary, we hold that the agreement of the defendant and his fellow controllers to go on an illegal strike was directed towards the plaintiffs and others and that the defendant should have known in the circumstances that injuries to the plaintiffs were likely to result and did result. Accordingly, the test laid down in LaFarge has been satisfied and the plaintiffs are entitled to damages from the defendant.
With reference to this sentence: "...it was clearly the intention of the defendants in calling the strike to direct its effect on the plaintiff and others and that by doing so create pressure upon the Board by the plaintiff and others and thus to induce the Board to accede to the defendant's wishes.", I don't think one could reasonably state that the MEC et al. "directed its effect on the" OTS pilots. It seems more likely the MEC was just ignoring the effect on the OTS pilots in refusing to discuss the impact on their seniority rights.

I'll keep looking for other sources.

Cheers,

John
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

Not being a lawyer, it is a confusing issue to untangle. Was ALPA's conduct (through its officers) directed at the OTS pilots? Without a doubt, ALPA was aware of the issue of the One List, and its consequences upon seniority for the various parties.

By way of example, is there a difference between:

(a) putting one pilot one position lower on a seniority list, from spot 722 to spot 721, and

(b) moving one pilot one position higher on a seniority list, from spot 721 to spot 722?

If the MEC were to direct its conduct to situation (a), how is that in any way different from situation (b)? Put another way, is directing its conduct to (a) simply another way of expressing or carrying out or directing its conduct to (b)?

Or is it necessary that there be discussion between the alleged members of the conspiracy regarding the conduct being specifically directed toward the OTS pilots. I suppose only the production of documents or the examination for discovery of those present for the Herndon Pact discussions would reveal whether there was a "meeting of the minds" to injure the OTS pilots.

If evidence showed there was absolutely zero discussion of the OTS pilots, and that all of the discussion focused simply on the Encore pilots, then could the conduct have been directed towards the OTS pilots, even if all present knew, or even if none present knew it might be a corollary of their agreement to formulate the LOU?

I suppose if the record did support a contention that no discussion was directed towards the disposition of the OTS pilots, then this might be dispositive of the conspiracy issue with a result that the tort claim fails. Alternatively, proof that no discussion took place reagrding the OTS pilots would lend support to the fact that ALPA failed in its duty to consider the impact of their plans on the OTS pilots, and therefore failed in its Duty to Fairly Represent the OTS pilots.

Like Alpa Male said, a lwayer would throw a bunch of things at the wall and see what stuck.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Lightchop »

If you're so passionate about what you believe in, your "talents" (if we want to call it that) would be better served as an LEC representative, no? That is if you get voted in based on your platform. Remember LEC reps are supposed to bring the concerns of their members to the MEC. And I'd wager a lot of your nonsensical mumbojumbo isn't really a concern of anyone else at WJ.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

Some more colour unlawful conspiracy tort is found in Golden Capital Securities. v Rempel et al., from a 2004 BC Court of Appeal decision.

I reproduce an unabridged section of the ruling, but the paragraphs I think are instructive are [57],and [58].
[45] The starting point for the law of civil conspiracy is the definition in Mulcahy v. R. (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 306 at 307, quoted by Lord Wright in the Crofter case at 461:

"A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means."

[46] It has long been recognized that liability in conspiracy requires proof by compelling evidence. In Sweeney v. Coote, [1907] A.C. 221 at 222, the Lord Chancellor said:

"In [an action for conspiracy] it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove a design, common to the defendant and to others, to damage the plaintiff, without just cause or excuse. That, at all events, it is necessary to prove. Now, a conclusion of that kind is not to be arrived at by a light conjecture; it must be plainly established. It may, like other conclusions, be established by inference from proven facts, but the point is not whether you can draw that particular inference, but whether the facts are such that they cannot fairly admit of any other inference being drawn from them."

[47] Thus, to prove a case in conspiracy, it is first necessary to plainly establish, directly or by inference, that there was an agreement between the defendant and one or more others. That does not mean an agreement in the contractual sense. A defendant must be shown to have agreed in the sense of having combined or conspired with one or more others to carry out a common design or a means of achieving a common objective, which is then implemented with resulting injury to the plaintiff.

[48] Where the means are unlawful, there must also be proof that the unlawful conduct was directed toward the plaintiff and that the likelihood of injury to the plaintiff was or should have been known to the defendant.

[49] What becomes important for the purposes of this appeal is the meaning to be given to the "likelihood of injury". What knowledge must the defendants have had, or should they have had, about the potential for injury to the plaintiff?

[50] The source of the expression "that injury to the plaintiff is likely" is Estey J.'s discussion of the elements of the tort of conspiracy in LaFarge. At pages 471-72, he said:

"Although the law concerning the scope of the tort of conspiracy is far from clear, I am of the opinion that whereas the law of tort does not permit an action against an individual defendant who has caused injury to the plaintiff, the law of torts does recognize a claim against them in combination as the tort of conspiracy if:

(1) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predominant purpose of the defendants' conduct is to cause injury to the plaintiff; or,

(2) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result.

In situation (2) it is not necessary that the predominant purpose of the defendants' conduct be to cause injury to the plaintiff but, in the prevailing circumstances, it must be a constructive intent derived from the fact that the defendants should have known that injury to the plaintiff would ensue. In both situations, however, there must be actual damage suffered by the plaintiff."


[51] Significantly, Estey J. used both the phrase "is likely to and does result" and the phrase "would ensue" in this passage.

[52] The litigation in LaFarge arose out of two cement manufacturers unlawfully conspiring to lessen or eliminate competition. The plaintiff was a supplier of lightweight aggregate used in the manufacture of cement. At first the supplier benefited from the unlawful conduct by contracting with the two manufacturers to supply its product, but it then lost its business after the contracts expired and the manufacturers began to use a different product. Because of their unlawful action, the supplier was unable to develop a new market. Given that the manufacturers had not made deliberate plans to drive the plaintiff out of business, Estey J. had to consider whether liability in conspiracy arises where the defendants' predominant purpose was not to injure the plaintiff but instead to eliminate their competition. He concluded that it could where there was a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, but he found that the supplier's case failed, nonetheless, because the manufacturers' unlawful action had not been directed towards the supplier.

[53] In rejecting the notion that the intention to injure need not be considered once it is established that the agreed upon acts which caused the damage were unlawful, at 469-71, Estey J. observed that the presence of intention to injure appears to be common to all the Canadian cases in which the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means has been applied. He concluded that liability for a conspiracy to act unlawfully requires that at least a constructive intent to injure the plaintiff be proven.

[54] Estey J. considered a constructive intent would exist where those conspiring knew or should have known that "injury to the plaintiff is likely" but, as emphasized above, he also used the phrase "would ensue". In Claiborne, at 79, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied the latter phrase in holding a bank liable in conspiracy:

"Put shortly, this means that the conduct complained of must be found to be unlawful and in circumstances where the Bank should have known that damage would ensue and, in fact, damage did ensue."

[55] "Likely" has been said to mean "more likely than not": Sayle v. Jevco Insurance Co. Ltd. Management Company (1985), 16 C.C.L.I. 309 at 310 (B.C.C.A.), Lambert J.A., such that having known that something would likely happen means knowing that there was a better than 50% chance it would occur. But having known that something "would ensue", in the words of Estey J., suggests to me a much greater knowledge of what is to happen.

[56] Civil conspiracy, as it has long been understood, has been the conspiring of two or more to injure a third. Having particular regard for the fact that conspiring to act unlawfully is an extension of that tort, I consider that a constructive intent must constitute more than a greater than 50% chance that injury to the plaintiff will occur; it must amount to a clear expectation.

[57] The tort exists not to provide a remedy for unlawful conduct per se but to provide a remedy where conduct of that kind is directed at a particular person (or persons) who suffers injury.

[58] I would then say that liability in conspiracy will arise where two or more have agreed to carry out a common design by unlawful means, directed at a third person, if those who have agreed knew, or in the circumstances should have known, that injury to that person was likely in the sense that it was clearly expected, and the injury was sustained as a result of the agreed upon means being implemented.

[59] Golden Capital distinguishes between what it says constitutes an injury and what amounts to loss or damages. It says that all that need be established is that those who conspire to commit unlawful acts directed at one or more others knew or ought to have known that it was likely they would cause injury because they created a risk of loss or damage.

[60] The only authority cited to support what appears to me to be a somewhat novel distinction is the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of "injury" which includes an infringe­ment of rights, insult, hurt, loss, harm, detriment, or damage. This approach to arriving at the meaning of the word was adopted in Vancouver General Hospital v. Scottish & York Insurance Co. (1987), 1987 CanLII 2601 (BC SC), 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 178 at 192, 41 D.L.R. (4th) 657 (S.C.).

[61] In my view, however, the definition is of little assistance in drawing the distinction for which Golden Capital contends and I do not consider the distinction to be one that can be sound in law. The tort is premised on an actual or constructive intent to injure, not the creation of a risk of injury. Until a loss or damage is sustained, there is no injury. I am unable to accept the distinction Golden Capital seeks to draw and I reject it.


Pulling pargraphs 57 and 58 from the above:

[57] The tort exists not to provide a remedy for unlawful conduct per se but to provide a remedy where conduct of that kind is directed at a particular person (or persons) who suffers injury.

[58] I would then say that liability in conspiracy will arise where two or more have agreed to carry out a common design by unlawful means, directed at a third person, if those who have agreed knew, or in the circumstances should have known, that injury to that person was likely in the sense that it was clearly expected, and the injury was sustained as a result of the agreed upon means being implemented.
I find it hard not to accept that the ALPA's intention was to injure the OTS pilots. It is true that the Encore pilots would simultaneously gain as a result of the LOU, but it would be clear to all present in Herndon for that gathering that they would injure the OTS pilots by proceeding with their plan.

It should be noted that even with four of the five elements of the conspiracy established, the tort is not complete without the LOU being signed. For this to happen, WJ itself would have to unknowingly participate in the conspiracy, with or without knowledge that ALPA's conduct was illegal (as a result of the constitutional breach, per Berry v. Pulley).

In any event, I could not see WJ going anywhere near an LOU that attempted to do what the MEC and the incoming Canada Board President suggest it intended to do.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

I read through Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas a couple of times last night and tried to understand an updated view of conspiracy as presented by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

I read with interest the following passages:
[38] What is required, therefore, to meet the "unlawful conduct" element of the conspiracy tort is that the defendants engage, in concert, in acts that are wrong in law, whether actionable at private law or not. In the commercial world, even highly competitive activity, provided it is otherwise lawful, does not qualify as "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of this tort.

[39] The appellants submit that while Purina's breach of its contract with Raywalt was sufficient to qualify as "unlawful conduct", neither Ren's nor McGrath did anything that would do so. I agree. In my view, the trial judge used an approach that is too broad. Assessed against the correct test, their conduct was not unlawful.

[40] Dealing with Ren's conduct, at the time it purchased feed from McGrath, it had no contract with either Purina or Raywalt. Ren's was free to purchase Purina feed from McGrath at the best price it could obtain and sell it wherever it could. I disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that Ren's was not entitled to be able to obtain Purina feed for resale at advantageous pricing available only to Purina dealers. Ren's conduct in doing so breached no contract. Nor was this conduct tortious or in breach of any statute. Indeed, the trial judge explicitly found that Ren's committed no crime or tort apart from the conspiracy. Ren's required no authorization from Purina to act as it did.

[41] On appeal, the respondent advanced for the first time the proposition that Ren's induced Purina to breach its contract with Raywalt and induced McGrath to breach its contract with Purina. Neither of these allegations was advanced at trial. They are belied by the trial judge's finding that, other than conspiracy, Ren's committed no tort. Moreover, the trial judge's finding that Purina knew of, and approved of the arrangement between Ren's and McGrath, leaves little room for the conclusion required by the inducing breach of contract tort, namely, that Ren's caused Purina to breach its contract with Raywalt or induced McGrath [page439] to breach its contract with Purina, assuming such a breach could be found. There was nothing in Ren's conduct that was wrong in law. It was not "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy.

[42] Turning to McGrath's conduct, the trial judge found it to be "unlawful" because McGrath had no authority to effectively establish a sub-dealership for Ren's to obtain Purina feed at advantageous prices and then sell it into Raywalt's territory. The trial judge characterized McGrath's conduct as a violation of Purina's standard operating procedures. He therefore did not find McGrath's conduct to constitute a breach of his contract with Purina. Indeed, the standard dealership agreement that Raywalt and Ren's had with Purina did not prohibit such an arrangement. Moreover, the trial judge could not have found McGrath to be in breach of his dealership contract with Purina. His finding that Purina knew and approved of what McGrath was doing precluded that possibility, even if such a prohibition had been a term of McGrath's contract. There is no suggestion that McGrath's actions were tortious or in violation of any statute or in other way wrong in law. In my opinion, McGrath's actions cannot be said to be "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy.

[43] In summary, I conclude that only Purina engaged in any unlawful conduct. The other two appellants did not. As a consequence, the finding of unlawful conduct conspiracy and the damages flowing from it must be set aside. The respondents' claim based on civil conspiracy must be dismissed.
It seems to me, a person with no legal training, that the above comments mean that in our situation, the claim of conspiracy must fail. Although the proposed LOU, as presented by the MEC update of November 2, 2018, requires the WJ MEC and the WJE MEC Chairman to violate their constitutional duty to "comply with" and "further" the policies of the BOD, the meeting in Herndon was only a plenary session. The actual act that would cause the harm to the OTS pilots would be the signing of the LOU. This required WJ's agreement. WJ is entitled to sign agreements with ALPA, and in doing so, regardless of its opinion on the lawfulness of ALPA doing so, it would commit no wrong. It's conduct would not be "unlawful". The tort of conspiracy, if I undrestand it (and I may might not) requires that all parties to the agreement commit some kind of unlawful behaviour in doing so.

Therefore, I think the claim fails.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by '97 Tercel »

What's the best headset to buy?
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

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'97 Tercel wrote: Fri Dec 14, 2018 6:17 pm What's the best headset to buy?
The most brilliant thing ever written here!!!
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Liftdump »

Yes it is
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Schooner69A »

I dunno. I haven't read many decisions, but 'Agribrands' vs 'Kasamekas' seems par for the course. Needs some distillation in spots, but judges aren't known for being taciturn.


Other than that, good write up.
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Re: SWOOP OTS Captains punted from left seat...

Post by twinpratts »

How many of the original 30 OTS hires at Swoop are still on property?
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Re: SWOOP OTS Captains punted from left seat...

Post by KAG »

Swallow, imho I'll wager (no money just bragginging rights) the swoop starting left seat and CBA will be damn near what we (wj) currently have. Rouge has set the bar, and I dont think Kaplan is going to deviate far from it. $103 / hour for 737 skipper is laughable, an unrealistically low offer that they cant expect to maintain given today's environment. Nor do I feel were (again WJ) going to hit it out of the park and match AC. I think overall it'll fit somewhere between what we have, and what AC has. Some give and take. We'll see soon enough
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