China_CAAC's Merged Threads

[jjj]

“That’s unlikely.”

That is the truth. Dig a little and verify for yourself.

JJJ

[CaptainHaddock]

Cloak,

Regarding your “retrospect” comment.

The only way we could have done the flying on an interim basis was if the Union agreed to sacrifice rights under the labour code.

That was a term set by the company.

Let’s see - give up bargaining power to fly Swoop under interim conditions then bargain without any power???

The union told the company to shove it.

Cheers.

JJJ

Triple J speaks the gospel Cloak.

[The Tenth Man]

I legitimately forget the precise details of the company's request to ALPA in order to discuss Swoop terms, was it that ALPA had to agree to not bring a common employer request to the CIRB?

[Transonic]

I legitimately forget the precise details of the company's request to ALPA in order to discuss Swoop terms, was it that ALPA had to agree to not bring a common employer request to the CIRB?

Plus to waive the right to strike. And there would be no discussion of terms, only what was offered.

Further, if WestJet had chosen a different path at that moment. We would have:
1. 20-40 million more in the bank;
2 A stock price in the 20-25$ range and not 17-20$;
3. A significantly weaker Flair as bookaways strengthen their position;
4. A weaker APLA MEC and negotiation position with negotiations ongoing.

[The Tenth Man]

This will be lengthy. It is a faithful reproduction of the REPORT OF THE SENIORITY COMMITTEE delivered November 9, 1954. It will hopefully expose the connection between ALPA seniority policy and ALPA merger policy, and what drove the association to formulate them. It will clearly show why a consistent definition of how to detemine seniority start date was necessary. This report preceded the implementation of the 1956 Executive Board policy on seniority.

It would be a mistake to see this report as applying only to mergers. This report was THE reason that seniority now has the definition it does at ALPA, and the reasons are in this report that explain why the seniority policy has been unchanged for 62 years.

From the report:

...After this rather comprehensive study and evaluation of the seniority concept and application, the Committee is confused and dismayed. It is quite evident to the Committee that seniority has as many and varied definitions and interpretations as there are pilots in the airlines...

November 9, 1954

REPORT OF THE SENIORITY COMMITTEE

In accordance with a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors, the Executive Committee on April 23, 1954 appointed a Seniority Committee of five members with the following specific assignments:

1. To review the present policies and procedures of the Association for the handling of seniority disputes to determine whether and in what manner they might be improved.
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2. To review the application of the policies and procedures for the handling of seniority disputes to recent mergers to determine whether they have been correctly applied and followed or what administrative practices might be adopted to improve their application.
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3. To make recommendations to the Board of Directors for the improvement of the proceduresor policies of the Association for the handling of problems arising from mergers.
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4. To make recommendations for additional policies or procedures which might be adopted by the Board of Directors for the handling of internal disputes arising from merger problems.

The members of this Seniority Committee were:

C.E. Cochran, Ozark
W.E. Fallon, United
S.E. Pangburn, American
C.H. Ruby, National
F.W. Saul, Pan American


The committee first met on June 23, 1954 and elected Captain C.E. Cochran Chairman. Also, at this initial meeting the Home Office supplied the committee with copies of awards and decisions and other pertinent material relating to each merger seniority dispute that has arisen since the Fourth Executive Board meeting.

Since that initial meeting the committee has met numerous times both in open and closed sessions and has met with and interviewed pilot representatives from each airline that has been merged or is anticipating a merger in the near future. The committee is appreciative of the time and effort that these representatives have spent in order to acquaint the committee with their individual Airline Pilot Seniority merger problems and concepts.

On the basis of this study and familiarization program the committee feels that they have achieved a degree of expertness on seniority problems which is adequate for the purpose of writing the following summary and recommendations. However, we freely admit that the degree of expertness we have attained can be considered authoritative only when compared with the average pilot's knowledge of past and present application of policies and procedures in seniority disputes. The purpose of this report is to acquaint you as briefly as possible with what we have gleaned from our studies, interviews, and general association with the merger seniority problem.

It was apparent to the committee that the Association has long recognized that the problem of how to merge seniority lists was serious and was a continual threat to the existence of the Association as a representing organization. Through the years there have been attempts through convention and Executive Board resolutions to forestall this threat by declarations of policy and procedure. This effort culminated at the Fourth Executive Board when faced with two mergers and anticipating more, the Board authorized the appointment of a four man committee to study the problem and formulate an Association policy and procedure for the merging of system seniority lists. However, it was recognized by the Fourth Executive Board, that their committee would be unable to submit their recommendations for approval to the Board of Directors until the eleventh convention convened some eight months later. Some interim procedure and policy was necessary.

ALPA_1954_Seniority_List_Committee_p1.jpg (1.97 MiB) Viewed 2045 times

[The Tenth Man]

The Fourth Executive Board, by majority vote, adopted an interim procedure and policy which embodied the following principles:

1. A Board shall be formed consisting of two pilot members from each of the affected airlines and one neutral member selected by the National Mediation Board.
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2. This Board of arbitration was to establish a single seniority list for the merging airlines using five factors as a basis for adjusting the equities for each group involved in the merger. These five factors were:
   1. Recognize employment date of pilots as a factor.
   2. Recognize employment status of pilots prior to mergers as a factor.
   3. Recognize that monetary gains or losses by men of either air line should be kept to a minimum.
   4. Resist loss of employment by any pilots involved. However, if such losses do result, payment will be sought for such loss.
   5. Minimize loss or gain of future advancement opportunities.

The seniority merger committee, appointed by the Fourth Executive Board, in their report to the Eleventh Convention recommended that each individual seniority problem be considered on the basis of the problems peculiar to it, but when combining the lists full consideration should be given to those five principles or factors set forth in the Fourth Executive Board resolution. They further recommended the following procedure for arriving at an equitable and acceptable merged seniority list.

1. The pilots of each air line affected shall appoint or elect one First Pilot and one Copilot to represent their pilot group and act with finality for them.
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2. These pilot representatives from each of the affected airlines shall meet for a maximum period of sixty days from the date of approval and attempt to negotitate the merger of the seniority lists.
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3. If after thirty days of the above mentioned negotiations the representatives have not been able to resolve their differences and make a decision a five man panel shall be formed by having the representatives alternately strike a name from a list of eleven pilots, furnished by Headquarters, until the list is reduced to three first pilots and two copilots from airlines not in any way involved in the merger or consolidation.
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4. Upon the expiration of the sixty days allowed in paragraph two above if a decision still has not been reached by the representatives the five man panel shall meet as a neutral board, to hear the claims and contentions of the affected pilot groups as presented by the representatives of the pilots.
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5. The neutral board shall within 80 days from the date of the approval by the C.A.B. of the merger, render its recommendations for the settlement of the seniority dispute and the merger of the pilots seniority list.
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6. If agreement by the representatives is not reached within 10 days after the date the neutral panel rendered its recommendations, then arbitration shall be mandatory.
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7. The Arbitration Board shall consist of the four representatives and a fifth and neutral member whose appointment shall be by agreement of the four representatives within 95 days of the approval of the merger or failing to agree on a neutral fifth member shall request Headquarters to secure one through the National Mediation Board. The award of this Arbitration Board shall be final and binding and the proceedings and award shall be completed within 120 days of the date of the approval by the C.A.B. of the merger.
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8. Nothing in this Association policy shall be construed to prevent the respective pilot groups from entering into an arbitration agreement irrespective of the procedures above provided except that the time limits specified shall be respected.

[The Tenth Man]

Upon adoption by the Eleventh Convention, this policy and procedure remained as the only pattern for Association participation in seniority disputes until the Twelfth Convention convened in October of 1952. The Board of Directors at the Twelfth Convention, by majority vote, reaffirmed the procedure established at the Eleventh Convention, as outlined above, but amended the Association policy by deleting the paragraph wherein recognition of the five factors was to be the basis for settling and combining the seniority lists and inserted in its place the following:

"2. The Board in reaching its decision shall recognize as the governing factor pilots' length of service as pilots with their respective airlines and also will consider that monetary losses by pilots of either airlines should be kept to a minimum, resist loss of employment, minimize loss of future advancement opportunities."

At this time the official Association policy and procedure is that procedure established as the Eleventh Convention and that policy established at the Twelfth Convention.

As stated in the first part of this report, the present Seniority Committee has studied and has attempted to evaluate numerous summaries, briefs, and decisions relative to about every merger that has taken place since the Association was founded. In addition, we have interviewed or examined or examined representative pilots form each airline that has been merged or consolidated since the Fourth Executive Board meeting. After this rather comprehensive study and evaluation of the seniority concept and application, the Committee is confused and dismayed. It is quite evident to the Committee that seniority has as many and varied definitions and interpretations as there are pilots in the airlines. It is also evident that regardless of the manner in which two seniority lists have been merged, it is almost impossible to satisfy a majority of either of the two groups of pilots affected. To elaborate on this point is unnecessary. We have prepared the following summary of most of the seniority mergers studied by the Committee. Each case must, of necessity, be condensed to a bare minimum of facts and figures and as a consequence the interplay and byplay, emotional or otherwise, is left unsaid. We want to emphasize to you that it has been almost impossible to arrive at an uncontrovertible statement of fact on how seniority lists were integrated prior to the Fourth Executive Board resolution. The written record is not clear and the memory of man is evidently a fleeting and pliable thing influenced mainly by how he individually was affected.

ALPA_1954_Seniority_List_Committee_p6_resize.jpg (1.31 MiB) Viewed 2038 times

[The Tenth Man]

1. Seniority integration of major trunk carriers after consolidation of predecessor companies into one major corporate entity..
   1. United Air Lines: Integration policy and procedure agreed upon by pilot representatives at a meeting on December 5th and 6th, 1940. Seniority list to be composed of pilots from four predecessor companies. Generally speaking, the accepted list was compiled as follows:
      1. Top group of names on seniority list assigned position based on date of assignment to flight as Captain.
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      2. Next group of names assigned position on list as of their date of promotion to Captain.
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      3. Remainder of names assigned position on final list as of their date of hire.
   2. American Airlines: First system seniority list published in 1938 and was compiled on the basis of date of employment as a pilot with American Airlines or with predecessor or absorbed companies. American Airlines System is the result of many acquisitions, mergers, consolidations and purchases. As these companies were acquired or merged, the pilots were given seniority credit for their length of service with their company.
      .
   3. Pan American World Airways: System Seniority List compiled and agreed upon in 1945. Seniority position was awarded on the basis of length of service with Pan American, or with acquired companies as of the date they were owned or controlled by Pan American Airways, Inc.
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   4. Capital Airlines (Penn-Central): Capital Airlines was formed after the merger or acquisition of Central Airlines by Pennsylvania Airlines in 1937. Pennsylvania Airlines was nine years old at the time and Central Airlines was about three years old. The Third ALPA Convention of October, 1936 passed the first resolution establishing Association policy for the integration of seniority lists in the event of mergers or consolidations. The policy adopted by the Convention: the date of employment or length of service concept as shown on the system seniority list. By Convention resolution, this policy was to be applied to the Penn-Central merger problem. It is apparent that the affected pilots disregarded this Convention mandate and the seniority list was integrated by negotiation.
      
      The airlines were small, there was no route duplication, they had equal or identical equipment and the merger preceded acceptance of a working agreement. There was a disparity in the ages of the two airlines.
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   5. Eastern Airlines: Eastern had two formative seniority disputes that were studied in part by the Committee.
      
      1. Eastern - Luddington: In 1933 Ludington Airways was acquired by Eastern. In this particular case, Eastern Airlines' management refused to recognize the seniority ratings or rights of the Ludington pilots. The Eastern Company asserted that because Eastern had acquired Ludington, the Ludington pilots should be considered as new employees and placed at the bottom of the seniority list. The ALPA on behalf of the Ludington pilots submitted the dispute to the National Labor Board without opposition from the Eastern pilots. The N.L.B. ruled that the Ludington pilots should receive fifty percent of their length of service with Ludington as the basis for seniority integration on the combined Eastern seniority list.
         .
      2. Eastern - Williams: In 1935 Eastern Airlines acquired Williams Airways. This dispute was settled with the aid of a state governor acting as mediator, on the basis of preserving status of pilots and the list was integrated by a ratio method.
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2. The length of service policy adopted by the Third Convention remained as Association policy until the Fifth Convention in 1939 adopted a new policy which required that the pilots involved in a merger or consolidation would be integrated within a single list in accordance with the terms of the working agreement governing the largest group of the affected pilots.
   
   The following mergers were consumated after the airlines were parties to and subject to the terms of negotiated working agreements. For the first time they now have agreed upon enforceable seniority lists and seniority rules.
   
   1. Western - Inland: On May 23, 1944 the C.A.B. approved the acquistion of Inland by Western Airlines. In this proceeding, in which ALPA intervened, Western acquired the majority of the stock of Inland. Prior to CAB approval a combined System Seniority List was agreed upon by the pilots using dates of assignment to status and runs as the principle factor to determine relative position. This solution was ratified and made final to determine relative position. This solution was ratified and made final and binding by the Eighth ALPA Convention held December 4th-7th, 1944. The two companies were relatively of the same age, although Western was considerably larger both in routes and pilot personnel.
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   2. Monarch - Challenger: On December 16, 1949 the C.A.B. approved acquisition of Challenger Airlines Company by Monarch Airlines. The Civil Aeronautics Board in its opinion said: "The record shows that the only pilot problem is one with respect to the settlement of seniority rights as between the pilots of the two companies. That is the matter for private negotiation between the two groups of pilots and one as to which there clearly should not be interference by us."
      
      For a period of some six months the pilots attempted to negotiate their differeneces and integrate the two seniority lists, without success. Finally, Headquarters requested that representatives of both airlines meet in Chicago for final determination of their seniority problem with instructions to stay in conference until they could agree on one seniority list. Conferences were convened on May 1, 1950 and an agreement was reached at 4:00 a.m. on May 5th. This was the first seniority integration problem resolved by application of the principles and procedures adopted by the Fourth Executive Board and the Eleventh Convention. The lists were integrated by a ratio method. The two companies operated the same type of equipment; there was a minimum if route duplication; and they were relatively of the same age and size.
      .
   3. Pan American - American Overseas: Pursuant to an order of the C.A.B. and approved by the President, Pan American Airways on September 25, 1950, acquired the routes and equipment of American Overseas Airlines. The routes acquired were parallel to and competitive with the routes Pan American operated over the North Atlantic into Europe and beyond. Equipment operated over these competitive routes were essentially equal. Pan American operated their first flight in 1927. American Overseas, an outgrowth of American Export Lines, made their first flight in 1942.
      
      The parallel route structure and disparity in age of the two air lines were the major factors that resulted in a clash of viewpoints within the two pilot groups were voluntary negotiation and mediation a fruitless gesture.
      
      The Pan American pilots maintained that seniority and length of service are synonymous and must continue without deviation. The American Overseas pilots maintained that seniority was relative insofar as it represented a position on a list whereby certain benefits accrued. This relative position must be preserved and status attained prior to the merger preserved, on the combined list.
      
      The C.A.B., through numerous orders attempted to encourage and finally force voluntary settlement. Continuing failure of voluntary negotiations resulted in the C.A.B. assuming jurisdiction of the dispute and arbitrarily ordering that the seniority lists of the two groups be integrated on the basis of length of service with P.A.A. and in the case of AOA pilots length of service with American Export and American Overseas and with any other scheduled airline. This Order of the Board, made on November 27, 1951, was attacked by both pilot groups claiming that the Board was without jurisdiction and such action by the Board illegal. The Board's Order was stayed and court action discontinued when the two pilot groups agreed on March 2, 1952 to submit their dispute to arbitration.
      
      The Board of Arbitration by a majority assent rendered its awards on May 1, 1952, almost two years after the acquisition was approved by the President, integrating the master seniority list on the basis of a formula whcih allowed two-thirds credit for length of service and one-third credit for status or ratio by category.
      
      This particular dispute was expressly exempted from the Fourth Executive Board procedure and policy resolution.
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   4. Braniff - Mid-Continent: The merger or consolidation of Braniff Airways, Inc. and Mid-Continent Airways, Inc. was approved by the C.A.B. on May 26, 1952, and the merged airline was to be known as Braniff Airways, Inc. Appropriate and proper protective conditions for employees of both airlines were included in the Board's decision to approve the merger.
      
      In accordance with the Association'a policy and procedure, the two affected pikot groups attempted to resolve their different viewpoints on seniority integration by direct negotiation. This initial step proved to be practically pointless as little if any area of agreement was found.
      
      It was the position of the Braniff pilots that the lists should be integrated on a ratio by equipment category basis. It was the position of the Mid-Continent pilots that the lists should be integrated by application of a formula recognizing status and length of service.
      
      The next step, that of appearing and presenting their contentions before a five man neutral pilot panel, had to be bypassed as it coincided with the disruptive litigation then being processed within the Association. The next and final step, arbitration, was agreed upon on August 15, 1952 and the final arbitration award was made on October 14, 1952.
      
      It was the decision of the majority of the members of the Board of Arbitration to integrate the two seniority lists on the basis of a ratio by equipment category. It was the decision of the Board that the integration could most equitably be accomplished by an evaluation not only of the positions pilots held on currently owned or operated equipment, but on probable positions pilots would hold, within their separate airlines, if the two airlines acquired the new equipment they had on firm order, received certain daily utilization of the new aircraft, and disposed of aircraft currently in use as it was replaced.
      
      Because the integrated list was formulated and was based upon the anticipated fleet of the merged operations and because these anticipated equipment plans might not be realized for some months, the Arbitration Board imposed protective conditions on the implementation of the award so that certain pilots within certain categories would have prior or continuing rights to the jobs ont he currently owned or operated equipment.
      
      The two airline companies had a minimum of route duplication and were relatively of the same age. However, there was a disparity in size and to a degree in equipment.
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   5. West Coast - Empire: On June 27, 1952, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved the acquisition by West Coast Airlines, Inc. of all the outstanding stock of Empire Airlines, Inc. In its decision to approve the merger the Board imposed the same protective labor conditions as were attached to the Braniff - Mid-Continent merger.
      
      The pilots of both airlines willingly submitted the problem of the integration of their seniority lists to the procedures and policies adopted by the Eleventh Convention. The pilots complied with each procedural step without success and no agreement was reached. The parties thereupon entered into an arbitration agreement dated September 11, 1952, and a Board of Arbitration was established.
      
      It was the contention of the West Coast pilots that the seniority list should be integrated by application of a formula which would take into consideration certain factors which they maintained should be recognized.
      
      On August 1, 1952, Empire employed 26 pilots and utilized 5 DC-3's and West Coast employed 42 pilots and utilized 6 DC-3's.
      
      The Arbitration Board in its award, dated November 25, 1952, combined the two lists on the basis of the following formula:
      1. Integrate the lists of each category by straight length of service.
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      2. Opposite each individual name on each list compute the theoretical position of each pilot.
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      3. Show gain or loss each pilot would sustain numerically in relation to this number as aligned on the straight length of service list.
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      4. Apply a uniform correction of 50% to minimize gains and losses.
      It is of particular interest to note that in this dispue the affected airlines had no route duplication; (as a matter of fact, the merger resulted in a route extension) had the same equipment; were exactly the same age. The only disparity of any consequence is int he number of pilots employed by the separate airlines prior to the merger.
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   6. Delta - Chicago and Southern: The Civil Aeronautics Board on December 24, 1952 approved the joint application of Delta Airlines, Inc. , and Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc., providing for a merger of these two companies subject to acceptance by the surviving company of appropriate protective conditions for employees who may be affected adversely by the merger.
      
      The pilot employees of the two airlines, in compliance with the procedure for the resolution of seniority integration problems adopted by the Eleventh and Twelfth Conventions, appointed or elected two seniority representatives from each airline to meet and attempt to resolve their differences and compile a single acceptable combined seniority list,
      
      The pilot representatives met in Chicago and after lengthy negotiation involving compromises by both groups, arrived at what they considered an equitable and acceptable single list. The list was examined and approved by a majority of the members of the Master Executive Council of each affected airline prior to acceptance by the Seniority Representatives and prior to the effective date of agreement. The letter of agreement, binding the pilots to the adopted solution, provided for a protest period in which pilots could protest their position om the combined list. Protests were to be resolved by a Board consisting of the four pilot representatives and a neutral member appointed by the National Mediation Board. Out of a total list of 501 pilots, 141 protests were received and all were denied. This was the first merger problem influenced by the policy adopted by the Twelfth Convention.
      
      The airlines were of relatively the same age. Howver, there was a disparity in the amount of equipment, types of equipment, and number of pilot personnel.
      .
   7. Flying Tigers - Slick: In an order dated January 7, 1954, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved the application of the Flying Tigers Line, Inc. and Slick Airways, Inc. for a merger agreement executed by them on March 26, 1953. The CAB in its order provided for proper and appropriate protective conditions for employees adversely affected by the merger, including a statement that provisions shall be made for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equitable manner, either by collective bargaining or by arbitration.
      
      The Slick pilots opposed on legal grounds that portion of the CAB order providing for the integration of seniority lists by arbitration in the event negotiations failed and requested that the CAB assume jurisdiction of the dispute and integrate the two lists in a fair and equitable manner. Their petition was denied and they agreed to follow ALPA procedure for final determination of their seniority problem.
      
      The two pilot groups were unable to resolve their differences by direct negotiation and the problem was presented to a five man neutral pilot panel, The neutral panel, after hearing the contentions of both groups, compiled a single list which proved unacceptable and Board of Arbitration was convened.
      
      It was the contention of the Slick pilots before the Board of Arbitration that the lists should be integrated on the basis of at least a fifty per cent recognition of a lenght of service factor and that a freeze period be incorporated to adjust equity.
      
      It was the contention of the Tiger pilots that seniority is not simply length of service but is a quantum of job rights, a property interest that an employee has obtained as a result of his labor in the service of a particular employer which must be maintained to the degree possible by recognition of the factors and circumstances inherent in each individual merger.
      
      The Seniority Arbitration Board, by a majority vote, ruled that the lists should be integrated on the basis of ratio by equipment category. The formula used in determining the ratio was based on comparative numbers of equal equipment and on anticipated utilization of that equipment by pilots flying an average of 77.5 hours per month.
      
      The two airlines were of equal age. Howver, there was a large disparity in numbers of pilot personnel employed and equipment operated. Most of both route structures were competitive and parallel.

[The Tenth Man]

From the foregoing it is apparent that thus far the methods used for the final resolution of seniority integration problems do not fall within any set pattern. The final solutions range from the application of the straight length of service concept to a ratio concept based on anticipated equipment purchases and hoped for utilization. One cannot accurately measure the success or failure of one method over the other for in no case has complete satisfaction been attained.

The air line pilots are not alone with this seniority integration problem. Other industries of a similar nature or structure have had this problem for a great many more years than we. The railroad organizations, for instance, fought this issue for years before finally establishing a permanent committee to hear and rule on disputes of this nature. Their decision is final and is accepted by the majority. Unless we get such discipline, the problem will remain with us.

This comparative lack of discipline within the Association membership has a definite bearing on this seniority problem, and we of the committee have had to recognize it as one of the main hurdles to successful seniority integration. If you, the elected leaders, had unqualified acceptance of your leadership by the membership and a majority vote in favor of a particular solution meant immediate and everlasting compliance, our problem would be minimized. But you will admit that there is no one more independent and individualistic than an air line pilot, especially when he thinks his rights or his pay or his security have been unilaterally or unfairly predetermined without consideration of individual case merit or equity. He will compacently accept your decisions and will agree that you acted for the best interest of all until he finds that his airline, and conseuqently his rights, his pay, his security, is embroiled in a merger or a consolidation and an Association law governs and limits his actions by an inflexible prescribed policy. He then becomes vocal and outright rebellious against a policy which is now applied prospectively to his problem and set of circumstances which he will maintain is unique and should be considered and adjudged on individual merit and equity. He refuses compliance; threatens to resign; and invites expulsion from the Association by seeking legal and governmental help outside the prescribed Association policy and procedure.

Therein lies our weakness. We cannot enforce or compel compliance with policy except by threat of expulsion. Confronted with this particular problem, the committee is convinced, the affected pilot groups will invite expulsion.

Further, even if we expel a group, we have not solved the problem but have only compounded it. They will still refuse to comply with prescribed policy, they are outside of the Association, and as a result, the Association is immeasurably weakened and discredited.

This is one conclusion that this Seniority Committee agrees can definitely be drawn from their study. Pilot groups will not willingly submit their rights, their jobs, and their security to a procedure and policy which they feel does not allow for, or disregards consideration of the facts and merits of their particular case. However, they will submit to a policy and procedure which does allow for the free expression of what each side considers equitable and just, and allows final determination on the basis of fact and merit. They will, as pointed out in our summary, bind themselves irrevocably by agreement to procedures wherein they think or hope that their ideas on equity and justice will influence the final and binding award.

Of all the cases the committee has studied and analyzed and which we consider pertinent, there are only two that have been determined solely by agreement between the affected pilots. The rest were decided by arbitration proceedings. We would point out here that in all the cases studied, there has been ample evidence that the pilots had unlimited opportunity through direct negotiation to apply any particular policy or formula which they could agree upon. In all cases, without exception, application of a fixed rule or method was unacceptable and agreement was reached only after equities were adjusted by exceptions to the rule and variations of the principle.

The merger of Inland and Western is the best example we could use, for this merger is the one which is always upheld as the ideal by the adherents of a fixed inflexible rule for the merging of two lists. Further, the use of Inland - Western is perfect to use as an example because they had the ideal set of conditions to deal with. They were both of equal age. There was little or no route duplication. As a matter of fact, the separate routes complimented each other in that one could feed into the other. They were relatively small; Inland had 37 pilots and Western had 103 pilots. Both operated equal or comparable equipment.

On January 21, 1943 the representatives of the pilots on Inland and Western agreed upon an integrated list that would become effective on the date the C.A.B. approved the merger and Western took over Inland's routes as the operating agency. At that time it was also agreed that the Inland pilots would, at the time of actual implementation of the list, be governed byu the terms of the Western Agreement with all the rights and privileges appurtenant therefrom in accordance with his position in the integrated list.

The accepted list was a negotiated list and was compiled in the following manner:

Numbers 1 to 25 inclusive: postion on the list base don date of First Pilot or reserve Pilot assignment.

Numbers 26 to 48 inclusive: position on list base don date of employment by either company.

Numbers 49 to 139 inclusive: position based on date of assignment to a Copilot run.


The C.A.B. approved the merger on May 23, 1944 and the lists, in accordance with the aforementioned agreement, should have been integrated on that date and the two companies operated as one. However, there had developed a strong apathy and dislike for the final list by the Western pilots and they refused to commit themselves to it for many months. Even as late as January 19, 1945, two years after the list had been agreed to, Headquarters received a petition stating: "The majority of Western Air Lines pilots want the list re-arbitrated and activation date changed." It was only after extreme pressure was exerted by Headquarters that differences were settled and passive acceptance acknowledged on March 2, 1945.

Another case where conditions were ideal for the application of a set rule for merging two seniority lists was the merger of West Coast - Empire. They were the same age. Had the same type and numbers of equipment and were of equal size. There was no route duplication and Board approval resulted in a route extension. The affected pilots had ample opportunity to discuss and agree upon a method of equitably integrating the two lists, but were unable to do so. Even with this apparently simple problem, the dispute ended in arbitration and the award made final and binding. The question arises in our minds: could we, by Convention mandate, even in this relatively simple casem have forced them to accept our solution and preclude then the right of arbitration?

The Committee, after interviewing representative pilots from all groups does not think so. Threat of expulsion is serious and undoubtedly would make individual groups pause and think before forcing the issue. But, in our opinion, the right of arbitrationis so generally accepted by all in our field that recourse to that procedure would inevitably follow. Can we as an Association of pilots justify, even to ourselves, actual expulsion when what the affected pilots wish to do is to follow the orderly procedure for settling their dispute which has all the precedence in all labor relations and is best exemplified by the processes set forth in the Railway Labor Act.

When considering this particular aspect of the problem one must also keep in mind that the Association, as well as the affected pilot groups, would be under constant pressure by the Civil Aeronautics Board, the National Mediation Board and by their individual companies to settle their differences through arbitration. Anyone subjected to that pressure once never again underestimates its force.

Let's then examine arbitration and find where the fault is. Admittedly there have been some awards come out of arbitration that, to say the least, do violence to our everyday concept of seniority. Pilot groups have spent thus far in excess of $90,000 either attempting to avoid arbitration or to void an arbitration award but they still do not accept final resolution of their problem by any other means. Seemingly, they seek arbitration as a gamble they they will win their point and their ideas will prevail.

The Committee in their review and study of arbitration awards has not attempted to explain or justufy each award. We can only observe and hear the cries of anguish. To our knowledge not a single request has been made to a company or to the C.A.B. for compensation under the protective conditions imposed by the Board in all recent mergers for adversely affected pilots.

We can and do justify the arbitration procedure as an orderly and due process of law. We, without exception, ackowledge the integrity and sincerity of the neutral arbiters assigned to hear and rule on past arbitration proceedings. They have all acted in good faith and in accordance with what they, in their judgment, thought was right. The fault lies not in the procedure or the choice of neutrals but in the complexities of airline seniority and all its ramifications.

By common practice and in accordance with past Association procedure, we have placed our fortunes and our destiny into the hands of a man, acting as a neutral, who is usually completely uninformed in airline operational and managerial problems. A man who probably learned of seniority in text books and successfully applied that knowledge to resolve many seniority problems outside the airline industry. His indoctrination in airline pilot seniority consists of sitting and listening for a few concentrated hours to the testimony of two opinionated groups each pleading a different seniority precept. He listens while they expound endlessly on bases, equipment, routes, bid rights, pay differentials, length of service and corporate stability until he is completely confused and grasping for straws in an effort to compromise the issues without due consideration for the overall impact. Sometimes the straw he grasps has been proffered by the most persuasive of the two parties involved and in these cases the award seems somewhat prejudiced. Further, it is evident to this Committee, that the function, of executive sessions of the arbitration panel has been nullified and is meaningless to most neutrals. They consider such meetings as a waste of time and nothing more than an additional opportunity for the party arbiters to reiterate the arguments and statistics he has listened to for hours. He writes his opinion and award secure in the knowledge that one or the other will sign it with him.

We propose to correct this apparent deficiency by amending Association procedure for the settling of seniority merger problems. We propose to bracket the uninitiated neutral with two of the initiated, who, because of their familiarity with airline pilots seniority and airline operations in general, can keep the final award within acceptable bounds or limits. Then we feel we will have a realistic and responsible arbitration.

The Committee has spent a great deal of time, effort and thought on our assignment. We, unlike our predecessor committees, have had access to pilots and records involved in controversial merger integrations. Among ourselves we have analyzed each one in an attempt to define the fault. Our solution is an easy one and one which we think will hold the Association together. However, it hasn't been easy for us to reconcile ourselves to our own solution. For the past five months, three of us in particular have had to slowly adjust our thinking to the seniority facts which we have studied. We realize that it is impossible, in this short time, to acquaint you with all that we have learned. We also realize that it is impossible to expect you, on our plea, to adjust your seniority ideas to ours. We only hope that you consider and accept our efforts as sincere and unprejudiced and that what we offer is, in our opinion, for the best interest of the association and the pilots.

[The Tenth Man]

ALPA_1956_Executive_Board_Resolution_Seniority_Definition_resize.jpg (1.44 MiB) Viewed 2035 times

[The Tenth Man]

ALPA_1956_Executive_Board_Resolution_Master_Seniority_List_p1_resize.jpg (1.36 MiB) Viewed 2030 times

ALPA_1956_Executive_Board_Resolution_Master_Seniority_List_p2_resize.jpg (1.25 MiB) Viewed 2030 times

[The Tenth Man]

There is a reason why ALPA has a Seniority policy, and why it has a Merger policy. As can be seen in the examples cited by the Seniority Committee, mergers are difficult. Having a common foundation via a common definition of seniority is merely the first step in trying to find an equitable solution for the parties involved.

[Lightchop]

Buddy just give it a rest. You have no idea what you're talking about. Maybe if you are a member and volunteered your time to work within the MEC you might know that. I'm sure there are many people on here actively involved with ALPA laughing at you.

[The Tenth Man]

lightchop, that is a very erudite response.

[TeePeeCreeper]

lightchop, that is a very erudite response.

Perhaps but am I ever glad to be non unionised or affiliated with your agenda! *bullet dodged*

[The Tenth Man]

Perhaps but am I ever glad to be non unionised or affiliated with your agenda! *bullet dodged*

First of all, your feelings aren’t germane to the discussion.

Secondly, the agenda is simply the search for the truth. I maintain that the President of ALPA, and one of the Vice-Presidents, misrepresented the truth, prior to the certification vote, regarding the disposition of the WPDL in an ALPA CBA. Numerous members of the Organizing Committee did same.

Closer to the present day, former members of the WJ MEC did the same.

There is overwhelming evidence, as I see it, that

(a) the WestJet Pilot Seniority List (WPSL) contains only pilots from WestJet and Swoop on it, and

(b) that the WPSL is ordered by DOH.

IF (a) and (b) are correct, then I further maintain that

(c) the order of the WPSL cannot be changed merely by collective agreement between ALPA and WJ, and

(d) pilot base, aircraft, and status (CA or FO) must be determined only by seniority as determined by reference to the WPSL, with no credit for service at Encore.

I believe the truth trumps whatever political issues are at play.

That is my agenda.

[MrMerth]

Guess you haven’t heard about the latest Encore MEC email China? The one where the ONE LIST, which approved by both MECs has been submitted to the company.

[Shady McSly]

[The Tenth Man]

MrMerth, I know there’s a point in there somewhere.

[goingnowherefast]

Many other ALPA companies have upgrade requirements beyond DOH and seniority. These are signed collective agreements that have been approved and in place for years.