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Diadem
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by Diadem »

China_CAAC_Exam wrote: Sat Dec 08, 2018 10:07 pmHi Diadem, I have never once said that the Merger Policy was the ultimate guide to forming a seniority list. The Merger Policy is not where ALPA's guidance is found regarding seniority list construction.
Here are some quotes from you:
Well, is it one seniority list, subject to ALPA Merger Policy rules, or is it a concept of such a list?
This will be lengthy. It is a faithful reproduction of the REPORT OF THE SENIORITY COMMITTEE delivered November 9, 1954. It will hopefully expose the connection between ALPA seniority policy and ALPA merger policy, and what drove the association to formulate them.
Not only that, but a common employer action, if successful, would mean the ALPA Merger Policy applies, as both groups are represented by ALPA. This means the integration of both seniority lists. ALPA Merger Policy prevents an ISL from changing the order of the pre-Merger lists, so any integration of the lists would penalize pilots who have already flowed (unless Encore pilots were stapled to the BOTL).
In the ALPA Merger Policy, Part 3 C is entitled Seniority List Integration
That said, if WJE pilots had certified with any other union besides ALPA, thereby meaning that the ALPA merger policy was not governing, and therefore allowing the order of the respective seniority lists to be re-ordered in the ISL, it is unlikely that there would have been political interest in a merger, ALPA being "dissed" by the WJE pilots. So in reality, the election of ALPA at WJ cemented the division to come.
There is a reason why ALPA has a Seniority policy, and why it has a Merger policy.
This isn't even true; ALPA doesn't have a seniority policy, and the only place seniority integration is mentioned is in the Merger Policy. Maybe if you were an ALPA member and had access to their docs you'd know that.
The policy manual from 1967 was superceded by an amended policy in 2009. The Merger Policy that governs seniority is a bylaw, whereas the administrative manual you cited is not; the bylaws supercede administrative manuals, and the fact that the latter hasn't been updated to match the former doesn't mean the former is invalid. I'm sure there are lots of Government of Canada webpages that still stay marijuana is illegal because they haven't been updated since October, but that doesn't override the Criminal Code.
You lost. Give up.
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The Tenth Man
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by The Tenth Man »

Diadem wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 9:02 am
China_CAAC_Exam wrote: Sat Dec 08, 2018 10:07 pmHi Diadem, I have never once said that the Merger Policy was the ultimate guide to forming a seniority list. The Merger Policy is not where ALPA's guidance is found regarding seniority list construction.
Here are some quotes from you:
Well, is it one seniority list, subject to ALPA Merger Policy rules, or is it a concept of such a list?
This will be lengthy. It is a faithful reproduction of the REPORT OF THE SENIORITY COMMITTEE delivered November 9, 1954. It will hopefully expose the connection between ALPA seniority policy and ALPA merger policy, and what drove the association to formulate them.
Not only that, but a common employer action, if successful, would mean the ALPA Merger Policy applies, as both groups are represented by ALPA. This means the integration of both seniority lists. ALPA Merger Policy prevents an ISL from changing the order of the pre-Merger lists, so any integration of the lists would penalize pilots who have already flowed (unless Encore pilots were stapled to the BOTL).
In the ALPA Merger Policy, Part 3 C is entitled Seniority List Integration
That said, if WJE pilots had certified with any other union besides ALPA, thereby meaning that the ALPA merger policy was not governing, and therefore allowing the order of the respective seniority lists to be re-ordered in the ISL, it is unlikely that there would have been political interest in a merger, ALPA being "dissed" by the WJE pilots. So in reality, the election of ALPA at WJ cemented the division to come.
There is a reason why ALPA has a Seniority policy, and why it has a Merger policy.
This isn't even true; ALPA doesn't have a seniority policy, and the only place seniority integration is mentioned is in the Merger Policy. Maybe if you were an ALPA member and had access to their docs you'd know that.
The policy manual from 1967 was superceded by an amended policy in 2009. The Merger Policy that governs seniority is a bylaw, whereas the administrative manual you cited is not; the bylaws supercede administrative manuals, and the fact that the latter hasn't been updated to match the former doesn't mean the former is invalid. I'm sure there are lots of Government of Canada webpages that still stay marijuana is illegal because they haven't been updated since October, but that doesn't override the Criminal Code.
You lost. Give up.
I think in your rush to find any mention of the word "merger" in my posts, that you ignore the context in which each mention of the word "merger" is used. I understand your emotion and passion. I have lost three airline jobs through no fault of my own, other than my choices to seek employment at the companies, and stay there past when I should have.

This was never about me "winning". When I tried to make WJE pilots aware of the threat that certification meant to the One List, I was unsuccessful. For those pilots and their destiny under ALPA, it was not about "rights", but about realities. They were protected by the WJPA. When the WJ pilots chose certification with ALPA, the WJE pilots lost any protection except that of a temporary statutory freeze, which led to the illusion that things were fine.

Except for the odd antagonistic post on my part, I largely didn't address the One List issue for the year or so prior to the November 2, 2018 Update issued by the WJ MEC under the now-recalled Chairman. With that official message, I realized that the equities involved required a campaign of awareness by all parties, so that a bad and legally indefensible agreement was not blindly entered into by a group of WJ pilots who were overwhelmingly ignorant of the law. In that group I would include, if for no other reason that I haven't heard justification for thinking otherwise, the members of the WJ MEC and WJ LEC's.

The vast majority of you, those of you reading this and the "you" meaning the majority of WJ pilots have been living under of self imposed fog of delusion. When you last saw clear skies, the ocean that was your WJPA world was lapping at your feet. In the intervening period of wilfull blindness, the water receded and now all of your boats are stranded in a strange, new world where the old rules don't apply. We can call that land ALPA World.

To answer some assumptions made by you regarding my motives in contacting the ALPA Archivist, I would direct you to the fact that the ALPA OC members were woefully ignorant of the truth about policy at ALPA. They responded to valid inquiry with a dismissive and paternalistic wave of the hand. The points you raise, Diadem, regarding my arguments, are valid discussion points that should have been thoroughly vetted prior to certification. If, that is, the goal was an informed decision on the merits of certification. Sadly, that was never the goal. And that pattern of opaqueness has continued, unabated, up until today. Your bargaining unit representatives, assuming you belong to the group of WJ or WJE pilots, have said precious little about the One List since the November 2, 2018 message regarding the Herndon Pact.

Personally, I was curious about the origin of the Seniority policies of ALPA. When did they first take shape? The archives supplied the answers.

Some readers of this forum, have quietly, and the odd one or two, publicly admitted that they have finally seen the light. I was right all along regarding the challenges facing the WJE pilots and the One List. They changed their opinion because of the evidence I provided. Do you honestly think that any of them would have changed their mind in every post of mine on the issue could have been distilled down to:

"I know it's impossible. I know it's against the ALPA Constitution and the ALPA BOD policies. I cannot say why, but it is. I have had a lawyer review my position and he has confirmed I am right. For confidentiality reasons, I cannot give you any particulars of the preceding claims."

Obviously, everyone would have rightly called me a lunatic.

Unfortunately, the stages of grief have just set in for you, Diadem. You are in the denial stage. I understand completely. In order to continue progressing through the ensuing phases more quickly, enabling you to make a coherent decision regarding your career options, I suggest you contact a labour lawyer ASAP and have her review all of the evidence at bar. Perhaps form an association of wrongfully treated WJE pilots. Something. Anything. Whatever it is, don't simply and blindly accept, without evidence

"“One List” Update  

In Washington, D.C., we held a joint MEC meeting with the Encore MEC. There were many items to discuss about how to work together, but one of the most important interim steps was to formalize an agreement and language between the two pilot groups on how to recognize the contribution that all pilots bring to WestJet. This agreement recognizes the seniority of WestJet and Encore pilots within the WestJet group. This document has been legally reviewed and meets the requirements set forth under the ALPA Constitution and Canadian labour law.  

This initiative follows the original intent of the “One List,” a policy that was overwhelmingly supported by pilots (based on survey results) at WestJet. Additionally, we believe WestJet group should view this agreement as good for them, as a major retention and attraction initiative at Encore.  

The two MECs will propose this formal agreement in the form of a Letter of Understanding (LOU) between both pilot groups to WestJet management. They in turn will also have to accept the LOU and be a signatory. The final step will be to hold a pilot vote at each group before it will be implemented.  

While only a first step of many toward fully uniting with the Encore pilots, this will serve as an excellent example of how unity between pilot groups can benefit the pilot profession and airlines in Canada."


As the CIRB repeatedly mentions in its decisions. Labour relations issues cannot be allowed to malinger and foster disharmony. The light must shine on the problems and they must be dealt with or else the cancer at the heart of the pilot group will grow. Founding any agreement on the perilous foundation of illegality and bad faith and arbitrariness is a path that cannot be taken unless we all choose to doom our fortunes.
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mbav8r
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by mbav8r »

China_CAAC_Exam wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 10:04 am
Diadem wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 9:02 am
China_CAAC_Exam wrote: Sat Dec 08, 2018 10:07 pmHi Diadem, I have never once said that the Merger Policy was the ultimate guide to forming a seniority list. The Merger Policy is not where ALPA's guidance is found regarding seniority list construction.
Here are some quotes from you:
Well, is it one seniority list, subject to ALPA Merger Policy rules, or is it a concept of such a list?
This will be lengthy. It is a faithful reproduction of the REPORT OF THE SENIORITY COMMITTEE delivered November 9, 1954. It will hopefully expose the connection between ALPA seniority policy and ALPA merger policy, and what drove the association to formulate them.
Not only that, but a common employer action, if successful, would mean the ALPA Merger Policy applies, as both groups are represented by ALPA. This means the integration of both seniority lists. ALPA Merger Policy prevents an ISL from changing the order of the pre-Merger lists, so any integration of the lists would penalize pilots who have already flowed (unless Encore pilots were stapled to the BOTL).
In the ALPA Merger Policy, Part 3 C is entitled Seniority List Integration
That said, if WJE pilots had certified with any other union besides ALPA, thereby meaning that the ALPA merger policy was not governing, and therefore allowing the order of the respective seniority lists to be re-ordered in the ISL, it is unlikely that there would have been political interest in a merger, ALPA being "dissed" by the WJE pilots. So in reality, the election of ALPA at WJ cemented the division to come.
There is a reason why ALPA has a Seniority policy, and why it has a Merger policy.
This isn't even true; ALPA doesn't have a seniority policy, and the only place seniority integration is mentioned is in the Merger Policy. Maybe if you were an ALPA member and had access to their docs you'd know that.
The policy manual from 1967 was superceded by an amended policy in 2009. The Merger Policy that governs seniority is a bylaw, whereas the administrative manual you cited is not; the bylaws supercede administrative manuals, and the fact that the latter hasn't been updated to match the former doesn't mean the former is invalid. I'm sure there are lots of Government of Canada webpages that still stay marijuana is illegal because they haven't been updated since October, but that doesn't override the Criminal Code.
You lost. Give up.
I think in your rush to find any mention of the word "merger" in my posts, that you ignore the context in which each mention of the word "merger" is used. I understand your emotion and passion. I have lost three airline jobs through no fault of my own, other than my choices to seek employment at the companies, and stay there past when I should have.

This was never about me "winning". When I tried to make WJE pilots aware of the threat that certification meant to the One List, I was unsuccessful. For those pilots and their destiny under ALPA, it was not about "rights", but about realities. They were protected by the WJPA. When the WJ pilots chose certification with ALPA, the WJE pilots lost any protection except that of a temporary statutory freeze, which led to the illusion that things were fine.

Except for the odd antagonistic post on my part, I largely didn't address the One List issue for the year or so prior to the November 2, 2018 Update issued by the WJ MEC under the now-recalled Chairman. With that official message, I realized that the equities involved required a campaign of awareness by all parties, so that a bad and legally indefensible agreement was not blindly entered into by a group of WJ pilots who were overwhelmingly ignorant of the law. In that group I would include, if for no other reason that I haven't heard justification for thinking otherwise, the members of the WJ MEC and WJ LEC's.

The vast majority of you, those of you reading this and the "you" meaning the majority of WJ pilots have been living under of self imposed fog of delusion. When you last saw clear skies, the ocean that was your WJPA world was lapping at your feet. In the intervening period of wilfull blindness, the water receded and now all of your boats are stranded in a strange, new world where the old rules don't apply. We can call that land ALPA World.

To answer some assumptions made by you regarding my motives in contacting the ALPA Archivist, I would direct you to the fact that the ALPA OC members were woefully ignorant of the truth about policy at ALPA. They responded to valid inquiry with a dismissive and paternalistic wave of the hand. The points you raise, Diadem, regarding my arguments, are valid discussion points that should have been thoroughly vetted prior to certification. If, that is, the goal was an informed decision on the merits of certification. Sadly, that was never the goal. And that pattern of opaqueness has continued, unabated, up until today. Your bargaining unit representatives, assuming you belong to the group of WJ or WJE pilots, have said precious little about the One List since the November 2, 2018 message regarding the Herndon Pact.

Personally, I was curious about the origin of the Seniority policies of ALPA. When did they first take shape? The archives supplied the answers.

Some readers of this forum, have quietly, and the odd one or two, publicly admitted that they have finally seen the light. I was right all along regarding the challenges facing the WJE pilots and the One List. They changed their opinion because of the evidence I provided. Do you honestly think that any of them would have changed their mind in every post of mine on the issue could have been distilled down to:

"I know it's impossible. I know it's against the ALPA Constitution and the ALPA BOD policies. I cannot say why, but it is. I have had a lawyer review my position and he has confirmed I am right. For confidentiality reasons, I cannot give you any particulars of the preceding claims."

Obviously, everyone would have rightly called me a lunatic.

Unfortunately, the stages of grief have just set in for you, Diadem. You are in the denial stage. I understand completely. In order to continue progressing through the ensuing phases more quickly, enabling you to make a coherent decision regarding your career options, I suggest you contact a labour lawyer ASAP and have her review all of the evidence at bar. Perhaps form an association of wrongfully treated WJE pilots. Something. Anything. Whatever it is, don't simply and blindly accept, without evidence

"“One List” Update  

In Washington, D.C., we held a joint MEC meeting with the Encore MEC. There were many items to discuss about how to work together, but one of the most important interim steps was to formalize an agreement and language between the two pilot groups on how to recognize the contribution that all pilots bring to WestJet. This agreement recognizes the seniority of WestJet and Encore pilots within the WestJet group. This document has been legally reviewed and meets the requirements set forth under the ALPA Constitution and Canadian labour law.  

This initiative follows the original intent of the “One List,” a policy that was overwhelmingly supported by pilots (based on survey results) at WestJet. Additionally, we believe WestJet group should view this agreement as good for them, as a major retention and attraction initiative at Encore.  

The two MECs will propose this formal agreement in the form of a Letter of Understanding (LOU) between both pilot groups to WestJet management. They in turn will also have to accept the LOU and be a signatory. The final step will be to hold a pilot vote at each group before it will be implemented.  

While only a first step of many toward fully uniting with the Encore pilots, this will serve as an excellent example of how unity between pilot groups can benefit the pilot profession and airlines in Canada."


As the CIRB repeatedly mentions in its decisions. Labour relations issues cannot be allowed to malinger and foster disharmony. The light must shine on the problems and they must be dealt with or else the cancer at the heart of the pilot group will grow. Founding any agreement on the perilous foundation of illegality and bad faith and arbitrariness is a path that cannot be taken unless we all choose to doom our fortunes.
There is definitely a CANCER in the WJ group!
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The Tenth Man
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Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

This thread required two posts to initiate.

After the failed attempt at a Single Employer designation between Air Canada and the Air Canada connector airlines sought by CALPA/ALPA represented pilots at the Air Canada connectors in the late 1990's, the connector pilots unsuccessfully sought solace and/or restitution via the Berry v. Pulley series of actions.

In one of those actions, Berry v. Pulley, 2012 ONSC 1790, a class action proceeding pitting regional pilots against various groups of Air Canada pilots, both in and out of their representational capacity under CALPA and/or ACPA (IIRC). The more interesting examination I would like to take, using this case and the judgment as a guide, is whether certain classes of WJ (and potentially WJE pilots), in their representational roles in various MEC/LEC/NC positions did conspire, on or about the period preceding the November 2, 2018 Update issued by the WJ MEC, to injure both financially and in career progression, a class of OTS pilots hired subsequent to the hiring of the first WJE pilot.

For the tort of conspiracy to be provable, I believe damages to the OTS pilots would have to result, which means that an LOU would have to be agreed to by WJ and ALPA, with injury done to the seniority rights of OTS pilots.

I must make clear that I am not accusing anyone of anything, and I must be clear to avoid libelling any person. So, I will endeavour to analyze actions in a general way. The tort of unlawful conspiracy differs from a Breach of Contract action agianst ALPA, or an allegation of a DFR in that liability can be found as against the persons individually, removed from the cover of their roles as ALPA reps. I think.

Anyhoo, rudder was involved in this proceeding, if I am not mistaken, and perhaps can add commentary if he chooses.

Due to the bandwidth I have utilized in the last month, I have donated another $100 to AvCanada today in recognition of their help in discussing very important issues that do not have a means of being discussed elsewhere without being subject to the ALPA censor.

I reproduce here the unabridged excerpt from the 2012 case that deals with the conspiracy claim as alleged by the regional pilots. In time I will post some thoughts and comparisons. It is very dry reading and requires several read throughs and an understanding of the situation some 20 years ago with respect to Air Canada pilots and the relationship it had with its connector colleagues. The unhappiness of Air Canada pilots with their membership in CALPA lead to the formation and certification of ACPA, and further resulted in the amalgamation of CALPA into ALPA.

Happy reading!

1. Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy

(i) Legal Principles

[371] There are two types of actionable conspiracy: lawful act conspiracy, also known as conspiracy to injure; and unlawful conduct conspiracy, also known as conspiracy to commit an unlawful act or unlawful act conspiracy: Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd. This case only engages the second type, namely unlawful act conspiracy. As such, the Plaintiffs need not establish that the Defendants' predominant purpose was to injure the Plaintiffs. In Canada Cement Lafarge, Estey J. described unlawful act conspiracy:

"[W]here the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result."

[372] For the Defendants to be liable for the tort of unlawful act conspiracy, it must be established that:

(a) they acted in combination, that is, in concert, by agreement or with a common design;
(b) their conduct was unlawful;
(c) their conduct was directed towards the Plaintiffs;
(d) the Defendants should have known that, in the circumstances, injury to the Plaintiffs was likely to result; and
(e) their conduct caused injury to the Plaintiffs: Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas.


[373] I will discuss each of these elements in turn.

(a) Agreement or Common Design

[374] Proof of an agreement is an essential requirement of the tort of conspiracy. The necessity for an agreement does not require a binding contract or a specific form: "Agreement is not used in the formal sense of a binding contract but rather in the sense of a joint plan or common design": Nicholls v. Richmond (Municipality). Conspiracy is a serious allegation and is not to be lightly inferred: Kaymar Rehabilitation Inc. v. Champlain Community Care Access Centre. The existence of an agreement can be proven either by direct evidence or by inference: Nicholls v. Richmond (Township).

[375] Conduct alone is insufficient, as is mere acquiescence: McKinlay Transport Ltd. v. Motor Transport Industrial Relations Bureau of Ontario. As noted in Pontillo v. Zinger:

"... one does not participate in a conspiracy by conduct. One participates in a conspiracy by conspiring, that is, by agreeing, either at the outset of the conspiracy, or during its course. Conduct can be evidence of agreement, but there is no tort of engaging in acts that further someone else's conspiracy."

[376] So, for instance in Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange, a Board of Governors voted to dismiss an employee. They had agreed upon nothing before voting. It was held that by so voting, they did not enter into an agreement. As such, the tort of unlawful act conspiracy was not established.

[377] The Court held:

"… the directors of a corporation do not make an 'agreement' in the conspiracy sense by voting the same way. They individually make the same decision. In the popular sense, they are 'in agreement', but in the sense in which the law of conspiracy uses 'agree', they were not. Each simply expressed an individual opinion and the majority opinion prevailed. (1984), 52 B.C.L.R. 302 (S.C.) at para. 98, per McLachlin J. (as she then was). 2010 ONSC 2248; [2010] O.J. No. 3865 at para. 132. Indeed, as seen in para. 38 of Canada Cement Lafarge, supra note 19, some advocate the demise of the tort of conspiracy."

[378] A simple synopsis of the agreement requirement is found in the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in Golden Capital Securities Ltd. v. Holmes:

"Thus, to prove a case in conspiracy, it is first necessary to plainly establish, directly or by inference, that there was an agreement between the defendants and one or more others. This does not mean an agreement in the contractual sense. A defendant must be shown to have agreed in the sense of having combined or conspired with one or more others to carry out a common design or a means of achieving a common objective, which is then implemented with resulting injury to the plaintiff."

(b) Unlawful Conduct

[379] The conduct may be unlawful if it constitutes a tort, a breach of contract or breach of legislation. Not surprisingly, a breach of fiduciary duty may also constitute unlawful conduct for the purposes of the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy: GHL Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, and Levy-Russell Ltd. v. Techmotiv Inc. Fiduciary obligations may be owed by union officers to their union and a failure to abide by a union's constitution and bylaws by officers of a union has been held to amount to a disregard of a duty of loyalty and a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the union: U.F.C.W., Local 1252 v. Cashin. See also Burley v. OPSEU.

[380] Although dealing with the tort of interference with economic relations, in Reach MD Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn. of Canada, Laskin J.A. held that an unlawful act included the making of a ruling that was beyond the powers of the party but he declined to decide the "outer limits" of the definition of unlawful means or act. The tort was made out because the actions of the defendant, a voluntary association that caused its members to stop advertising with the plaintiff, constituted unlawful means directed at third parties, which then caused them to injure the plaintiff. These actions were beyond the lawful authority that the defendant had under its constitution, and could be set aside by the Court at the behest of the three plaintiffs.

[381] The trial judge in Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas determined that an unlawful act included conduct that the defendant was "not at liberty" or "not authorized" to engage in, whether as a result of a law, a contract, a convention or an understanding. The trial judge had in part relied on Ontario Realty Corp. v. P. Gabriele & Sons Ltd., in which Newbould J. determined that the broader definition was also appropriate for a claim of conspiracy.

[382] In light of the Court of Appeal's decision in Agribrands overturning the trial judge, it is fair to conclude that the broader definition afforded to the term "unlawful act" has not been accepted as good law. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge's reasons on the issue of the scope of unlawful conduct.

[383] The Court of Appeal made other observations. Goudge J.A. stressed that there must be unlawful conduct by each conspirator. The tort is designed to catch unlawful conduct done in concert, not to turn lawful conduct into tortious conduct. To constitute unlawful conduct, the conduct must be wrong in law. Quasi-criminal conduct and conduct in breach of the Criminal Code would constitute unlawful conduct, though not actionable. In addition, he noted the separate evolution of unlawful conduct in the context of the tort of civil conspiracy and that of intentional interference and cautioned against turning away from this separate evolution simply to achieve a unified theory for economic torts. He held, "What is required, therefore, to meet the 'unlawful conduct' element of the conspiracy tort is that the defendants engage, in concert, in acts that are wrong in law whether actionable at private law or not."

(c) The Conduct Must be Directed Towards the Plaintiff

[384] The predominant purpose of the defendant's conduct need not be to cause injury to the plaintiff, but the conduct must be directed towards the plaintiff in some manner.

(d) Knowledge that Damages Were Likely to Result

[385] A plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or ought to have known that damages were likely to result to the plaintiff from the defendant's conduct. A constructive intent to injure the plaintiff is derived from the defendant's knowledge that injury to the plaintiff would ensue: Levy-Russell Ltd. v. Tecmotiv Inc.

(e) Conduct Caused Injury

[386] A plaintiff must establish that there was a causal connection between the loss suffered by the plaintiff and the defendant's conduct. In Canada Cement Lafarge v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada stated:

"I turn then to the third submission relating to the causation and remoteness aspects of the tort of conspiracy. The issue raised by this proposition is simply whether or not the loss suffered by the respondent was occasioned by any action or omission on the part of the appellants.
. . .
It is sufficient in my view to conclude on this branch of the appeal that there is no causal connection between the unlawful activities of the appellants and the commercial demise of the respondent."


(ii) Plaintiffs' Conspiracy Claim

[387] The Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim is that from March 28, 1995 until November 14, 1995, First Officer Pulley and members of the Defendant classes conspired with each other by expressly or impliedly entering into an agreement or agreements to prevent the implementation of the Picher Award. The particulars were that:

a) the Defendants did not take any steps to cause the negotiation in good faith of the merged seniority list with Air Canada;

b) the Defendants attempted to negotiate alternatives to the Picher Award with Air Canada, without the Plaintiffs' knowledge or consent;

c) the Defendants refused to be bound by the Award of arbitrator Picher dated March 28, 1995 and took steps in an effort to avoid being bound by it;

d) the Defendants refused to support and opposed the negotiation of the merged seniority list with Air Canada;

e) the Defendant classes instructed their representatives on the Air Canada MEC to reject the Picher Award, to refuse to negotiate it and to use any and all means to stop its implementation;

f) the Defendants failed to take steps to prevent their representatives from rejecting the Picher Award, from refusing to negotiate the Award or from using any and all means to stop the implementation of the Award when they knew that their representatives planned to do those acts;

g) the Air Canada MEC Defendants members declared the Award to be unacceptable, refused to be bound by it and to implement it;

h) the Defendants wrote letters to the CALPA President and signed petitions calling for Air Canada to reject any merged seniority list arising out of the Picher Award;

i) First Officer Pulley, the Air Canada MEC Chair, the Air Canada MEC members and the Air Canada Merger Representatives refused to participate in meetings to fashion the seniority and bidding list in accordance with the Picher Award;

j) the Air Canada MEC members authored a newsletter directed to pilots in the Defendant class which improperly advised the pilots and the Defendant class that the Picher Award would not govern them unless they voted in favour of it;

k) First Officer Pulley, the Air Canada MEC members and the members of the Negotiating Committee refused to negotiate the Picher Award with Air Canada in contract negotiations in 1995;

l) First Officer Pulley instructed the Negotiating Committee of the Air Canada MEC that no proposal for the implementation of the Picher Award could be made to or be discussed with Air Canada in contract negotiations in 1995; and
m) the Air Canada MEC members did not replace their Merger Representatives after the Merger Representatives resigned in September 1995.

[388] The Plaintiffs state that these acts were directed or authorized by members of the Defendant classes or alternatively were ratified by them.

(iii) Common Issues Relating to Conspiracy

[389] The following common issues relate to the claim of conspiracy:

(a) Did Defendant Pulley and members of sub-classes 1 to 6 enter into an agreement giving rise to an actionable conspiracy?

(b) Did the members of sub-class 7, by failing to take steps to prevent their representatives on the Master Executive Council, the Local Executive Councils, the Negotiating Committee, the Merger Representatives and the members of the SMMAC refusing to implement the Picher Award, impliedly enter into the agreement giving rise to the conspiracy?

(c) Was the conduct of Defendant Pulley and the sub-classes unlawful?

(d) Should the Defendants have known that injury would result to members of the Plaintiff Class? and

(e) Were actions taken pursuant to the conspiracy binding on the members of the sub-classes?

[390] With each issue, I will provide a brief though not exhaustive review of the arguments advanced by the parties followed by a discussion of the common issue itself.

Conspiracy Issue (a)

Did the Defendant Pulley and members of sub-classes 1 to 6 enter into an agreement giving rise to an actionable conspiracy?

1. Parties’ Positions

[391] The Plaintiffs submit that the Air Canada pilots and their elected and appointed representatives were aware of the circumstances that gave rise to Mr. Picher's Award and their obligations as union members and officials. The Air Canada pilots had been polled on the motion to delay, postpone or cancel the merger and actively campaigned against the Award as evidenced by the execution of the Declaration of Pilot Solidarity, communications with Air Canada management and their continued direction to the Air Canada MEC and LECs to refuse to accept the Award. First Officer Pulley, the Air Canada MEC, the LECs and committees which comprise sub-classes 1 to 5, agreed with the direction provided by the members. The Defendants had a joint plan or common design to actively oppose the acceptance of Mr. Picher's Award and its implementation.

[392] The Defendants submit that there was no agreement and no actionable conspiracy. Rather, a great number of Air Canada pilots had similar reactions and voiced similar opposition to the Award, but this does not constitute a conspiracy. Opposition was spontaneous and uncoordinated. The reaction to the Award was a "grass roots uprising." Relying on Fullowka v. Pinkertons of Canada Ltd., union members have an unqualified right to speak out against the agenda of their bargaining agent. This is a union member's right to dissent. The CALPA Merger Policy did not exist in a vacuum. The Air Canada bargaining unit had the right to advance its members' own interests with their employer and the Merger Policy did not force members of the bargaining unit to renounce their own interest in favour of the interests of members in anotherbargaining unit. In particular, the Defendants rely on Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange and Gardiner in support of their position.

[393] The Third Party submits that there is no evidence that the Defendant First Officer Pulley or members of sub-classes 1 to 6 entered into any agreement giving rise to actionable conspiracy. Like the Defendants, the Third Party relies on Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange and Gardiner in which the court found that individuals who reach the same decision independently have not, by inference, entered into an agreement. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of an action is insufficient to amount to an agreement for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy. At most, the evidence indicates that individuals came to the same decision to oppose efforts to implement the Award and were speaking out against the agenda of their bargaining agent, CALPA, as they were entitled to do.

2. Discussion

[394] Before embarking on a discussion of this cause of action, however, it is helpful to consider the contextual background of this issue.

[395] The late 1980s and 1990s witnessed huge changes in the airline industry in Canada including the Open Skies Agreement, a difficult economic environment, and the ultimate demise of Canadian Airlines International Ltd. The airlines were in competition with one another yet their pilots were all in the same union. To use Mr. Shell’s expressive terminology, CALPA was a stew of pilot discontent. The union pot of pilots – containing pilots from different airlines and in different bargaining units – was boiling over and containment was a major difficulty. By 1995, the pot effectively exploded and CALPA disappeared. Maintaining the cooking metaphor, part of the problem was the recipe. This was a proposed merger of the seniority lists of six airlines in the absence of any operational merger. Some called it a fictional or fake merger; others, a bargaining position. The merger procedure was really CALPA strategy designed to seek to change the existing bargaining unit structure. Indeed, on the two occasions when Air Canada pilots had been polled on the desirability of a merged seniority list, first in 1988 and then in May 1994, support was lacking. Another part of the problem was the composition of the chefs. The pilot groups were all united conceptually in their desire to thwart any efforts by Air Canada to play one group of pilots off the other, but fundamentally, both the Air Canada pilots and the Air Ontario pilots were motivated by financial self-preservation or personal financial enhancement. Just as the Air Canada pilots wished to protect their economic interests, the Connector pilots wished to enhance theirs. This was not a case of a contest between those with a higher purpose and those without; rather, it was a dispute over opportunity.

[396] The first fundamental issue to be addressed with respect to the conspiracy claim is whether there was an agreement between the Defendants. Put differently, is there evidence of a joint plan or common design to prevent the implementation of the Picher Award?

[397] There is no evidence of an agreement in a conventional sense but in my view, it may be inferred that there was a joint plan or common design to prevent the implementation of the Picher Award by the Defendants in sub-classes 1 to 6. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

[398] Firstly, on joining CALPA, each pilot received a copy of the Constitution and Administrative Policy. Even if he did not, the Air Canada MEC newsletters repeatedly addressed the subject of the merger process and its progression. This included newsletters dated July 25 and 29 and October 11, 1988, September 7 and November 29, 1990, March 18, April 25, May 31, August 28, and December 30, 1991, February 20, May 19, August 10, and September 17, 1992, September 1, November 17, and December 15, 1993, February 1994 (which contained a very detailed review of the history of the merger of seniority lists with the Connectors), March 23, May 17 and 18, July, August, November, and December 1994, March, April 5 and 21, two newsletters in May, 1995, July, August, September, and October 1995.

[399] It is fair to conclude that the Air Canada pilots were aware of the Merger Policy, the merger process, the Picher Award and its final and binding nature.

[400] It is evident from the minutes of meetings that the Declaration of Solidarity, the activities of SMMAC, the motions passed, the poll to delay, postpone or cancel the merger, the establishment of the Seniority Protection Committee in May 1995, and the content of the communications made between Air Canada pilot representatives and Air Canada management that the pilots in these sub-classes had a common design to thwart implementation of the Picher Award. Specifically, the Declaration of Solidarity expressly stated that "we the pilots of Air Canada are united in our complete rejection of the Picher Award."

[401] Mr. Picher in his March Award remitted the matter to the parties to fashion the seniority and bidding lists in accordance with the Award but the Air Canada pilots, led by their MEC, did not do so.

[402] The issue of a right of dissent is not a response to whether there was a joint plan or common design. Rather, that defence is more properly analyzed in the context of whether the Defendants' conduct was unlawful.

[403] As for the Defendants' submission that the position of members of sub-classes 1 to 6 was akin to the directors in the Posluns decision, in my view, the conduct of the Defendants was not so passive as Defendants' counsel suggest. This was not simply a situation of the triumph of majority opinion or spontaneous opposition. Rather, it was a concerted, organized effort by the members of sub-classes 1 to 6 to achieve an objective: to defeat the Picher Award and impede its implementation.

[404] I find that an agreement was established by members of sub-classes 1 to 6 to prevent the implementation of the Picher Award. Whether it gave rise to an actionable conspiracy is dependent on the other elements that comprise the tort.

Conspiracy Issue (b)

Did the members of sub-class 7, by failing to take steps to prevent their representatives on the Master Executive Council, the Local Executive Councils, the Negotiating Committee, the Merger Representatives and the members of the SMMAC refusing to implement the Picher Award, impliedly enter into the agreement giving rise to the conspiracy?

[405] As mentioned, a settlement was approved with respect to sub-class 7 and members had to deliver a statutory declaration by November 1, 2011. Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants submit that common issue (b) relating to sub-class 7 should be answered in the negative presumably as a result of the settlement. I agree and therefore do not propose to address that issue in detail except to say that, at a minimum, members of that class did not impliedly or inferentially enter into any agreement giving rise to a conspiracy.

Conspiracy Issue (c)

Was the conduct of Defendant Pulley and the sub-classes unlawful?

1. Parties' Positions

[406] The next common issue to consider is whether the Defendants’ conduct was unlawful. The Plaintiffs submit that the CALPA Constitution was binding on every member of CALPA and that its elected representatives were required to assist in the implementation of CALPA's policies. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' refusal to accept the Picher Award and to implement the CALPA Merger Policy constituted a breach of contract, a breach of fiduciary duty and/or conduct the Defendants were not at liberty to commit.

[407] The Defendants submit that it was not unlawful for individual Air Canada pilots to speak out against implementation and to direct their MEC not to seek implementation of the Award. Relying on Fullowka v. Pinkertons of Canada Ltd., union members have an unqualified right to speak out against the agenda of their bargaining agent. This is a member's right of dissent. The CALPA Merger Policy did not exist in a vacuum. The Air Canada bargaining unit had the right to advance their own interests with their employer and the Merger Policy did not force members of the bargaining unit to renounce their own interest in favour of the interests of members in another separate bargaining unit.

[408] The Third Party submits that labour law principles inform the lawfulness of the Defendants' conduct. As noted in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Berry v. Pulley, a union is a democratic organization. The merger process was a means for CALPA to establish its bargaining position, the result of which was the Award. CALPA controlled the power to seek Air Canada's agreement to implement the Award. The Third Party also took issue with the Plaintiffs' particularized allegations.

2. Discussion

[409] As mentioned, this action went to the Supreme Court of Canada on a summary judgment motion brought by the Defendants. The Supreme Court determined that there is no contract between union members and therefore there was no cause of action for breach of the CALPA Constitution by one union member against the other. Among other things, "it is not within the reasonable expectations of union members that they could be held personally liable to other members for breaching the union Constitution." Rather, a relationship in the nature of a contract arises between individual members and the trade union itself, however, the terms of that contract "will be greatly determined by the statutory regime affecting unions generally as well as the labour law principles that the courts have fashioned over the years." So, for example, due to statute, members of a union may change bargaining agreements without penalty provided they comply with the relevant statutory requirements.

[410] Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal accepted that union members may be liable in tort. At paragraph 33 of the Court of Appeal decision, Sharpe J.A. wrote:

"However, it is well recognized that the acts of individual union members may attract tort liability for conspiracy and interference with economic relations… A claim for tortious conspiracy to deprive a party of contractual rights is plainly distinct from a claim for breach of those contractual rights. Similarly, there is a distinctive nature to a claim for intentional interference with economic interests..."

[411] In the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Justice Iacobucci wrote at paragraphs 63-64:

"However, this is not to say that union members do not have some obligations inter se. By joining a union, the member agrees to follow the rules of the union, and, through the common bond of membership, union members have legal obligations to one another to comply with these rules. If there is a breach of a member's constitutional rights, this is a breach by the union, and the union may be liable to the individual. Similarly, the disciplinary measures in the constitution can be imposed by the union on a member who contravenes the union's rules. A failure by the union to follow these disciplinary procedures may cause it to breach its contractual obligations to the other members, giving rise to corresponding contractual remedies."

"In addition to potential internal procedures, a failure by the union to insist on compliance with the constitution or impose disciplinary measures for its breach may allow members to initiate proceedings either at the CIRB, or the courts, depending on the nature of the complaint. Aside from actions against the union, a member who is harmed by the breach of the union's rules by another member may, if the requisite elements are present, have an action in tort against that member."


[412] It seems implicit from these dicta that the Plaintiffs may meet this requirement of illegality provided that the Defendants deprived the Plaintiffs of their contractual rights under the Constitution or, put differently, assuming the other elements of the tort of conspiracy are present, the Plaintiffs were harmed by the Defendants’ breach of the CALPA Constitution.

[413] In addressing whether the illegality component of the tort of conspiracy has been met, I will consider whether the Defendants breached their contract by trying to avoid implementation of the Picher Award. In addition, a breach of a fiduciary duty would also ground a finding of illegality in this case. This requires a consideration of the status of the members of the Defendant Classes. First, however, I will consider whether a union member’s right of dissent precludes a finding of illegality.

[414] The right of a trade union member to dissent was described by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Tippett et al v. International Typographical Union, Local 226:64

"All members of trade unions have the unqualified right to speak out against the manner in which union affairs are conducted. There is a right of dissent. There is a right of decertification, subject to the condition that no member of a union shall conspire with his employer to injure the union… No person can be expelled or penalized by a trade union for insisting on his rights."

[415] The Supreme Court of Canada also referred to this right of dissent in the summary judgment appeal in this case in the context of the breach of contact claims. Justice Iacobucci wrote at paragraph that: "Exposing the personal assets of dissenting union members to liability would be antithetical to this 'unqualified right' of union members to speak out against the agenda of their bargaining agent. The result would be to discourage member participation in union affairs and to erode union democracy." He did not comment on the interaction of tort claims with the right of dissent.

[416] More recently, in Fullowka v. Pinkertons of Canada Ltd., Justice Cromwell writing for the Supreme Court stated:

The relationship between a union member and his or her union is contractual in nature, with both the union and the member agreeing to be bound by the terms of the union constitution. However, the analogy to contract has its limits given that the relationship is greatly determined by the relevant statutory regime and the general principles of labour law which have been fashioned over the years. Significantly, the members have the "unqualified" right to speak out against the agenda of their bargaining agent…

[417] The first question to be asked is whether a right to speak out against an agenda of a bargaining agent or the manner in which union affairs are conducted permits departure fromterms contained in a Constitution and Administrative Policy that govern at least in part an employee’s relationship with his or her union.

[418] I have no hesitation in concluding that the members of sub-classes 1 through 5 should not be protected by virtue of the right to dissent. They were either officers of the union or acting on behalf of officers. The more troublesome proposition is whether members of sub-class 6 were permitted to seek to avoid the implementation of the Picher Award. I conclude that they were.

[419] The complaint of the Plaintiffs as pleaded is that the Defendant Classes conspired to prevent the implementation of the Picher Award. A review of the Merger Policy places the primary responsibility for implementation on CALPA, not the MECs, much less the individual members. Furthermore, while the Constitution bound union members, the Merger Policy provides that the President shall notify the MECs that it is their responsibility, as representatives of the affected pilots, to activate the described procedure for the integration of the pilot lists. The remainder of the Merger Policy describes the role of the MEC, the Merger Representatives and CALPA. With the exception of a passing reference to "pilot groups" in section 5(a) of the Merger Policy, there is no reference to the individual union members.

[420] It seems to me that the unqualified right to dissent should operate to permit members of Class 6 to speak out against the agenda of CALPA and its union officers in these circumstances.

[421] Many members of Class 6 communicated with Air Canada, urged the MEC and LECs to oppose the implementation of an integrated seniority list, supported the formation of SMMAC or the Local Seniority Protection Committee, signed the Declaration of Solidarity, and took other steps and positions to advocate against the imposition of the Picher Award. I decline to find that any of these actions or the conduct advanced by the Plaintiffs constituted unlawful conduct for the purposes of liability for conspiracy. Rather, they were permissible given the Class members' right to dissent. To the extent there are any members of Class 7 who did not sign settlement declarations, by necessary implication, they too would have no liability.

[422] Turning to sub-classes 1 to 5, two grounds of illegality are advanced by the Plaintiffs. Firstly, they submit that breach of a fiduciary obligation may be the source of illegality for the tort of conspiracy. I agree. Sub-class 1, namely the members of the Air Canada MEC, were officers of CALPA, as were members of sub-class 5, that is, members of the LECs of Local Councils 1, 7, 11 and 14. They owed fiduciary obligations to CALPA and were obliged to act in the best interests of the union as a whole: Office and Professional Employees International Union v. Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 1566 and Burley v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union.67 Although the fiduciary duty is not owed to the Plaintiffs by the Defendants, the breach of such a duty may still constitute unlawful conduct. Members of sub-classes 1 and 5 owed duties of loyalty to CALPA which they breached by actively pursuing a course of conduct that was inconsistent with the express provisions of the union’s Merger Policy. In my view, members of sub-classes 2, 3 and 4 were not fiduciaries, did not owe fiduciary duties and committed no breach in that regard.

[423] In addition to breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiffs also rely on breach of the CALPA Constitution as a basis of illegality. The Merger Policy is found in the Administrative Policy section of the Constitution and Policy. The preamble to the Administrative Policy expressly states that some of the policies may represent desirable goals which, for one reason or another, are incapable of being realized at any particular time.

[424] The Policy required that specific steps be taken by the MECs of the affected airlines. There were some steps that the Air Canada MEC did not follow. It made no effort to obtain agreement from Air Canada that "all questions of pilot seniority shall be determined by the Association through its established procedures" although as I will discuss later, such agreement never would have been forthcoming and in any event, CALPA was the bargaining agent. It did appoint Merger Representatives who did attempt to negotiate a single integrated pilot seniority list. It attended at mediation and also participated fully at the arbitration. Clearly the Merger Policy contemplated that there could be disagreement among the parties, however, the decision of the arbitrator was final and binding.

[425] The implementation provision contained in the Merger Policy then required: (i) acceptance of the integrated pilot seniority list by the Association within five days (or other time period specified by the President) of the Arbitration Award; and (ii) that the President call a meeting of the MECs to discuss the procedure for implementation. The Administration Policy did not particularize how the merged seniority list was to be implemented although it does state that the intent of the Association would be to negotiate the integrated list as the seniority list to be used by the successor airline.

[426] I do not accept many of the Plaintiffs' allegations of unlawful acts. For instance, the MEC did not authorize and direct SMMAC to meet with Air Canada management and immunize Air Canada from a common employer application. Similarly, the Air Canada MEC did not assist with the formation of a new bargaining unit. The Air Canada MEC was entitled to work to prevent a s. 35 application and to engage in acts that legitimately delayed the implementation of the Merger Policy, recognizing the MEC's responsibility to represent the views of the Air Canada pilots.

[427] The Defendants and the Third Party submit that the integrated pilot seniority list was never accepted by CALPA and was not in existence until Mr. Picher’s Award of November 7, 1995 was issued. As such, they argue that there was no breach of the Merger Policy because the triggering event was acceptance of the list and this never occurred. Furthermore, they submit that there was no Award to implement until one week prior to CALPA’s decertification as the bargaining agent for the Air Canada pilots, a right the Air Canada pilots were entitled to pursue.

[428] The arguments advanced by the Defendants and the Third Party address whether anything flowed from the MEC's conduct but this does not dispel illegal acts. The Merger Policy states that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties to the arbitration. The Air Canada MEC's conduct was inimical to this provision. This included communication with Air Canada management to advise of their opposition to implementation of the Award and the MEC's work with SMMAC which was, at its heart, designed to avoid the binding nature of the Picher Award even though SSMAC also served to alleviate the MEC’s workload. The parties to the arbitration were the MECs. Certainly, the Air Canada MEC refused to be bound by the Picher Award and its members acted so as to avoid its implementation. In my view, this constituted illegal conduct for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy.

[429] I do not believe that liability for illegal conduct based on breach of contract should be visited upon members of sub-class 5 (the LECs), sub-class 2 (the Merger Representatives), or sub-class 4 (the Negotiating Committee.) The latter two class members had a limited contractual role. In addition, they acted under the control and direction of the Air Canada MEC. Furthermore, it is not clear to me that their conduct did amount to a breach of contract. Similarly, members of sub-class 5 (the LECs) did have a responsibility to represent the opinions of their members and they too had a limited contractual role.

[430] I put the members of SMMAC who constitute sub-class 3 in a different category. While they were a sub-committee of the MEC, they acted with some degree of independence and actively and knowingly assisted the MEC in its unlawful conduct.

[431] In conclusion, I find that there was unlawful conduct on the part of members of subclasses 1, 3 and 5 for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy based on either breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract or both. There was no unlawful conduct on the part of members of subclasses 2, 4 and 6.

Conspiracy Issue (d)

Should the Defendants have known that injury would result to members of the Plaintiff Class?

1. Parties' Positions

[432] The Plaintiffs submit that the Defendants knew that as a result of the Defendants' conduct, the Plaintiffs and CALPA would be unable to implement the merged seniority list arising from Mr. Picher's Award through negotiation or through a section 35 common employer application. In addition, they submit that at all material times the Defendants knew that the Air Ontario pilots were incurring expenses related to the merger process.

[433] The Defendants submit that injury to the Plaintiff Class was not reasonably foreseeable and there is no causation.

[434] The Third Party acknowledges that members of the Defendant Class were aware that if the merged list was not implemented, members of the Plaintiff Class would not become employees of Air Canada and gain access to such things as flying Air Canada's equipment, however, members of the Plaintiff class knew that the list would require acceptance by Air Canada. The Defendants’ conduct did not cause the Plaintiffs any damages.

2. Discussion

[435] This common issue addresses the third, fourth and fifth elements of unlawful act conspiracy, namely whether the Defendants' conduct was directed towards the Plaintiffs; whether the Defendants should have known that, in the circumstances, injury to the Plaintiffs was likely to result; and whether the Defendants' conduct caused any injury to the Plaintiffs.

[436] Dealing with the third element, as mentioned, with unlawful act conspiracy, the Plaintiffs need not establish that the predominant purpose of the Defendants was to cause injury to the Plaintiffs but must establish that the Defendants' conduct was directed towards the Plaintiffs.

[437] Both the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd.68 and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas state that a constituent element of the tort of conspiracy is that a defendant's conduct must be directed towards the plaintiff.

[438] The Defendants submit that the Defendants' response to the Picher Award was driven by a desire to protect their career expectations and economic interests, avoid unfairness to Air Canada junior pilots and the undermining of morale. The Defendants state that they were motivated by job preservation concerns and a desire to maintain their perceived pilot supremacy and status. They assert that they were not primarily motivated by a desire to harm or negatively impact the Plaintiffs.

[439] This argument loses sight of the fact that the focus of the dispute was the result of the Merger Policy and within that context, the object of the Defendants' conduct clearly was the Connector pilots. Put differently, the Connector pilots were the impediment to the Air Canada pilots' desire to avoid a merged list reflecting Mr. Picher’s Award.

[440] As already mentioned, in Nicholls v. Richmond (Township), McLachlin J. (as she then was) stated that a conclusion of actionable conspiracy is not to be arrived at by light conjecture, and I am mindful of that direction. Having said that, while the original adversary in the merger process was Air Canada, once the Air Canada pilots determined that they did not wish to pursue the implementation of the Picher Award, the impediment to their objective was the Plaintiffs, other Connector pilots and CALPA. While certainly this is not a case of lawful act conspiracy in which an intent to injure is a requisite element, I am persuaded that the Defendants’ conduct was directed at the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs, together with the other Connector pilots and CALPA, stood in the way of the abandonment of the Picher Award and the avoidance of its implementation.

[441] The second and third elements associated with this common issue are whether the Defendants knew or ought to have known that injury was likely to result, and did the Defendants’ conduct cause injury to the Plaintiffs.

[442] The second element is straightforward. Clearly the Air Canada pilots knew or ought to have known that the Connector pilots might have been harmed. They certainly knew or ought to have known that the Air Ontario pilots were subject to assessments for merger expenses just as the Air Canada pilots were themselves.
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Last edited by The Tenth Man on Sun Dec 09, 2018 1:50 pm, edited 7 times in total.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

[443] The third and last consideration is whether the Defendants' conduct caused the Plaintiff Class any injury or damage. Put differently, was the loss of chance caused by the Defendants? As Estey J. stated in Canada Cement Lafarge, "Damage is, of course, the gist of most tortious actions…"

[444] The Plaintiffs submit that the Defendants’ conduct deprived the Plaintiffs of the opportunity to negotiate with Air Canada for the acceptance of a merged seniority list and to bring a s. 35 application with the support and assistance of the Air Canada pilots.

[445] In my view, the Plaintiffs have failed to established causation and no chance was lost as a result of conduct of the Defendants.

[446] The Plaintiffs submitted in oral argument that they need not prove it was likely that they would achieve a common collective agreement or that they would have negotiated an agreement with Air Canada. They argue that they were deprived of opportunities by the conduct of the Defendants and in assessing damages for loss of chance, the Plaintiffs must establish causation and the value of the loss of chance on a balance of probabilities; that is, the Plaintiffs must prove on a balance of probabilities that a chance has been lost and that the chance of success is above the de minimis range. They submit that the Plaintiffs are not required to prove on a balance of probabilities that the chance would have in fact materialized. In oral argument, counsel for the Plaintiffs framed the issue as follows: were the Plaintiffs deprived of the opportunity to pursue implementation of the integrated seniority list through negotiation and a strike or through a single employer application? The Plaintiffs argue that according to Professor McLaren, a merger of operations is an unnecessary precondition for an integrated seniority list and while the Merger Policy contemplated a common collective agreement and this was the ideal, this was not the only approach available.

[447] In discussing loss of chance, Griffiths J.A. in Eastwalsh Homes Ltd. v. Anatal Developments Ltd. stated that in a breach of contract action, the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove on a balance of probabilities that the breach and not some intervening factor or factors caused loss to the plaintiff. The courts, however, had not relaxed the basic standard of proof:

"Where it is clear that the defendant's breach has caused loss to the plaintiff it is no answer to the claim that the loss is difficult to assess or calculate. The concept of the loss of a chance then begins to operate and the court will estimate the plaintiff's chance of obtaining a benefit had the contract been performed. But even in this situation, the Supreme Court of Canada has said in Kinkel v. Hyman, [1939] S.C.R. 364 that proof of the loss of a mere chance is not enough; the plaintiff must prove that the chance constitutes "some reasonable probability" of realizing "an advantage of some real substantial monetary value." "

[448] In Wong v. 407527 Ontario Ltd., Laskin J.A. addressed a finding of negligence and the need for the Court to assess would have happened had the tortfeasor fulfilled his duty:

"The court is called on to decide not what did happen but what would have happened in hypothetical circumstances. The proper approach is not to decide on the balance of probabilities whether Liang [the real estate agent] would have obtained security, but to value the lost opportunity to do so. The court must, therefore, value the probability that Liang’s efforts would have been successful and award damages proportionally. At best, this is an uncertain and difficult exercise; at worst, it is an exercise in speculation. The court, however, must do the best it can with the available evidence."

[449] In that case, the Court valued the reasonable probability of the real estate agent successfully negotiating realizable security for a vendor's warranty at 20%.

[450] In Fasken Campbell Godfrey v. Seven-Up Canada Inc., the Court of Appeal again addressed the issue of loss of chance. In that case, the trial judge assessed the loss of chance at close to zero and awarded nominal damages of $1000. The Court reiterated that in the loss of chance assessment, the plaintiff must establish causation and the value of the loss of chance on a balance of probabilities:

"However, the plaintiff need not prove on a balance of probabilities that the chance would have in fact materialized… Thus, the fact that the chance of avoiding a loss or obtaining a benefit was less than 50% does not serve as a bar to the plaintiff’s claim for damages, provided that the chance of success is above the de minimis range identified in Eastwalsh Homes.

[451] In Graybriar Industries Ltd. v. Davis & Co., Thackray J. held that: "the law is clear that I must make an award if it is established that the claim is not merely 'fanciful' but establishes as a possibility that there is a loss of a chance to benefit."

[452] In Kipfinch Developments Ltd. v. Westwood Mall (Mississauga) Limited, the Court of Appeal characterized the issue as follows: "The issue addressed here was causation: was the lost chance caused by the appellant’s breach of contract?"

[453] I reach my decision that the Plaintiffs have failed for any one of the following reasons: the timing of the final and binding Award rendered the value of any lost opportunity negligible; the Defendants were entitled at law to decertify CALPA as the bargaining agent; Air Canada's position; the inability of the pilots to legally strike; the CIRB's involvement; and the need for ratification of any collective agreement containing the integrated list by the Air Canada pilots. In my view, the Plaintiffs' chance of success did not exceed the de minimis range contemplated by the case law.

[454] Firstly, as a factual matter, the integrated seniority list was not final until November 7, 1995. The Air Canada pilots joined ACPA just a few days after the November Award. The delay between the March Picher Award and the November Award was not all caused by the Air Canada pilots’ conduct. Even though the Air Canada MEC was not at liberty to thwart the Award, it was open to them to take all appropriate legal steps to reduce its negative impact on the Air Canada pilots. The list lay with Mr. Picher from August 9, 1995 to October 12, 1995. It should be noted that Mr. Picher’s March Award only addressed one type of bidding, that is, bidding for base, equipment and status. It omitted any reference to the other type of bidding list that was of importance to pilots, namely the schedule and vacation bidding list. This was only addressed in his November 7, 1995 Award. The window of opportunity within which to implement the final list contemplated by the Merger Policy before the Defendants legally decertified CALPA as their bargaining agent only amounted to one week. The value of any lost opportunity in this time period is negligible or de minimis.

[455] Secondly, the Defendants were entitled at law to decertify CALPA as the bargaining agent of the Air Canada pilots: Beaudet v. Fortun. Even though the Picher Award was binding, the Air Canada pilots were not bound to stay in CALPA. There was no reasonable prospect or possibility of implementing the integrated seniority list in the short time frame available in which the Air Canada pilots remained in CALPA.

[456] Thirdly, although there was evidence given at trial of different approaches to implementation of the integrated seniority list, the Plaintiffs' pleadings contemplate one collective agreement, as does the Merger Policy itself. The only way that the integrated seniority list could be implemented was by agreement of the employer. Alternatively, CALPA could seek a single employer declaration from the CIRB and then negotiate for implementation of the list.

[457] Dealing with the first alternative, as noted at paragraph 13 of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the Berry v. Pulley summary judgment appeal, the Picher Award had no practical force or effect without the agreement of the employer. Similarly, to borrow language from Arbitrator Foisy in Re Air Canada and ACPA, the Picher Award, in the absence of consent by Air Canada, merely constituted a bargaining position. I find that there was no possibility or probability that Air Canada would have agreed to a merged seniority list as espoused by the Picher Award or to the alternative configurations advanced by Professor McLaren. As such, even if the Defendants had fully complied with the Merger Policy and taken all necessary steps to implement the integrated seniority list, there was no possibility that Air Canada would have agreed to a merged list. I make this determination recognizing as I do, that pilots are an essential group and not easily replaced and that CALPA had significant bargaining power.

[458] Air Canada had good business reasons unrelated to the Defendant sub-classes to oppose implementation of the Picher Award.

[459] Mr. Harris, now retired, was the CEO of Air Canada at the relevant time and was a credible and forceful witness. He also had had considerable experience in the airline business and with mergers. He was unequivocal in his evidence that he had the authority to decide whether to accept the Award and that he would not. "It would have been a financial disaster for Air Canada," he said. This made business sense. Amongst other things, acceptance of a merged list as contemplated by the Merger Policy would have ramifications for the other bargaining units and unions in Air Canada's operations and financial ramifications for Air Canada. There would be, for example, additional training costs and screening issues. The 1999 single employer proceedings before the CIRB generated opposition from numerous unions, not to mention employers. While it may be that some Air Canada management representatives were prepared to discuss a merged list, this does not supplant Mr. Harris' firm conviction that a merged list was unacceptable. He was the decision maker. As he testified, "We could not operate the mainline carrier with a seniority list that had all the Connector pilots on it." There was no reliable evidence that his successor would have taken any different approach.

[460] I reject the Plaintiffs’ contention that Mr. Harris had lack of recall that impeded his ability to provide reliable evidence. He was an impressive witness who made no effort to reconstruct events. In my view, he failed to recall the sorts of things one would expect a witness not to recall 15 years after the event. He had been examined extensively for discovery, but his evidence was not impeached and indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not even try to impeach his testimony.

[461] Furthermore, the Plaintiffs seek to read into non-committal letters from various Air Canada representatives a willingness to negotiate the issue of an integrated list. I do not view the letters in that light. Rather, they were for the most part polite postponements of the inevitable: the rejection of the Picher Award.

[462] Fourthly, Professor D'Cruz was a credible witness and made a compelling case that Air Canada's interest would be best served by doing everything in its capacity to avoid a pilot strike. He did readily accept, however, that a strike of one or two days would not be such a threat. He had no expertise in labour relations.

[463] As CALPA had suspended its collective bargaining with Air Canada, the statutory preconditions to a legal strike had not been met. The applicable conditions at the time were found in s. 180 of the Canada Labour Code. They provided for the following procedure: notice was to be given requiring the other party to commence collective bargaining; the bargaining agent and the employer were to meet and bargain in good faith; if within 20 days of notice, collective bargaining had not commenced or the parties had negotiated but had been unable to reach an agreement, either party could so notify the Minister of Labour; within 15 days, the Minister had to appoint a conciliation officer, commissioner or board or advise of his or her intention not to do so; if conciliation failed, the Minister had to appoint a commission or board or advise of his or her intention not to do so; a board report is then provided to the Minister.

[464] As stated by Claude H. Foisy et al in Canada Labour Relations Board Policies and Procedures:

"Ultimately, if the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a collective agreement, they may resort to strike or lockout action as a means to resolve their differences. This action is only legal when certain conditions spelled out in s.180 have been met.



An employee member of a bargaining unit may not legally participate in a strike unless he is a member of a bargaining unit in respect of which a notice to bargain has been given and the conditions set out above have been met in respect of the bargaining unit of which he is a member. In other words, employees of another bargaining unit in respect of which the right to strike is not acquired may not participate in a legal strike of another bargaining unit. If employees strike without having met these requirements, their action is illegal and they may be ordered back to work by the Board…


[465] As such, the Air Canada pilots would not have been in any position to strike.

[466] Additionally, a bargaining agent has no authority to bargain for employees outside the bargaining unit. Similarly, the scope of the employer's obligation is to bargain with the agent for employees in the unit, not for employees outside the unit. This regime is not altered just because the union is the same agent for differing bargaining units: Lethbridge Television, a Division of Western TV Group Ltd. et al. A union cannot force an employer to agree to an expansion of a bargaining unit that the CIRB has approved: Lethbridge Television. A strike by the Air Canada pilots, due to the scope of the bargaining unit, would be contrary to the statutory regime. As stated in A.T.U., Local 1374 v. Brewster Transport Co.:

"That is not to say that parties may not raise the issue of the scope of the certification order at the bargaining table. It does mean very clearly, however, as has been held on numerous occasions by this Board and by others, that that issue may not be pushed to an impasse; that where a party determines that it has no desire to bargain the scope of the collective agreement, whether it be the employer or the union, then the certification order issued by this Board is the one that will stand, without any limitations between the parties."

Accordingly, a strike by the Air Canada pilots would have been illegal and readily addressed through injunctive remedies.

[467] I would also observe that the Merger Policy called for a common collective agreement and did not call for a strike. It also did not call for a single employer application. A liberal and in my view flawed interpretation of the Policy by Captain Campbell, First Officer Pulley or others does not result in the imposition of those terms into the Merger Policy either expressly or by inference. The Merger Policy is clear in this regard. Furthermore, to impose such an onerous commitment on union members would be unfair and the antithesis of their right to dissent.

[468] Fifthly, the implementation of the Picher Award was not just a function of the CALPA Merger Policy. The CIRB has and had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the bargaining unit. It is never up to the parties, through collective agreements, to alter the size and scope of the unit declared by the Board to be appropriate: Re Matthews83. See also s. 27 of the Canada Labour Code. There would have to be a declaration from the CIRB.

[469] Additionally, until decertified, CALPA had exclusive authority to seek Air Canada's agreement to a common collective agreement and seniority list subject to ultimate approval by the CIRB: s. 36(1) of the Canada Labour Code. Only CALPA as bargaining agent could bring such an application. An MEC had no standing to bring this application: Re Air Canada. The Plaintiffs therefore did not have a right in this regard; it belonged to CALPA and, although asked to bring such an application by the Air Ontario MEC, CALPA opted to do nothing until 1996.

[470] On March 20, 1996, CALPA filed an application under section 35 of the Canada Labour Code asking the CIRB to declare Air Canada and the five Connector airline subsidiaries as a single employer and to consolidate the six separate pilot bargaining units into one. The application was opposed by about six different unions representing various bargaining units. On December 22, 1999, the CIRB dismissed the application, stating that it failed utterly and noted that it was one of ALPA's strategies for the implementation of the Picher Award. It concluded, amongst other things, that there was no evidence of whipsawing and no corporate mischief relating to LOU 17. Section 22 of the Canada Labour Code provides that subject to certain inapplicable exceptions, a decision of the CIRB shall not be questioned or reviewed by any court.

[471] It is not possible or indeed appropriate to second guess that decision based on speculation that it would have been different if supported by the Air Canada pilots and if the LOU 17 grievance had been pursued. Furthermore, the Board had already dismissed a single employer application back in 1989. I conclude that there was no possibility or probability that a single employer application would have had a different result but for the Defendants' conduct. It was dependent on the CIRB. Lastly, the CIRB also dismissed a complaint that ACPA acted contrary to the Canada Labour Code in seeking to negotiate a collective agreement with Air Canada without implementing the Picher Award. Based on s. 36(2) of the Labour Code, ACPA was at liberty to decide whether a new list should be in the collective agreement for the Air Canada pilots. The Board had decided that ACPA was the appropriate unit for collective bargaining.

[472] Lastly, while the Air Canada pilots were bound by the terms of their Constitution and Administrative Policy, in my view they would have been entitled to ratify any collective agreement incorporating or appending an integrated seniority list. They were not bound to ratify a collective agreement that incorporated the integrated seniority list. While the Administrative Policy did state that an MEC could ratify a collective agreement, Captain Campbell acknowledged that only in exceptional circumstances did ratification of a collective agreement not go to the pilots. It is inconceivable to me that a collective agreement containing, or in some fashion appending, a controversial integrated seniority list would not go to the Air Canada pilots for ratification. This was not akin to the actual merger of Air Canada’s pilot list with that of NWT Air which involved just a handful of pilots and planes nor was it comparable to extending an existing collective agreement for a limited time period. Had a collective agreement incorporating the integrated list been taken to the Air Canada pilots for ratification, it most certainly would have been defeated by the Air Canada pilots. Alternatively, a refusal to permit a ratification vote by the Air Canada pilots would be tantamount to an invitation to move to decertify CALPA as the Air Canada pilots' bargaining agent.

[473] In my view, there was no possibility of a different result. This was the outcome that CALPA could not and did not guarantee. Indeed, it was foreseeable that the possibility of an integrated seniority list was unattainable. As stated in the preamble to the Administrative Policy, some of the policies "may represent desirable goals which, for one reason or another, are incapable of being realized at any particular time." The Merger Policy was one such goal.

[474] In this case, in my view, the evidence compels the conclusion that notwithstanding the Defendants' conduct, an integrated seniority list would not have been implemented nor was there any chance of same. This leads to the conclusion that this cause of action cannot succeed.

[475] Although not a ground to refuse relief, I note that if the damages claimed by the Plaintiffs were awarded, the 23 members of sub-classes 1, 3 and 5 would each be liable to pay $8,604,094.17 to the Plaintiffs.
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Diadem
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by Diadem »

John, please explain how I'm wrong. I cited the actual ALPA policies that would apply, not documents from 1956 and 1967 that have been superceded, but you've simply dismissed them. Your only assertion is that I'm in denial. Please tell me how the policy I quoted is not applicable to the argument that you've made, which can be boiled down to, and I quote, "The merger policy governs". Do you not think the merger policy governs anymore? If the merger policy no longer governs, what policy does?
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by The Tenth Man »

mbav8r wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 11:18 am
China_CAAC_Exam wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 10:04 am
Diadem wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 9:02 am

Here are some quotes from you:











This isn't even true; ALPA doesn't have a seniority policy, and the only place seniority integration is mentioned is in the Merger Policy. Maybe if you were an ALPA member and had access to their docs you'd know that.
The policy manual from 1967 was superceded by an amended policy in 2009. The Merger Policy that governs seniority is a bylaw, whereas the administrative manual you cited is not; the bylaws supercede administrative manuals, and the fact that the latter hasn't been updated to match the former doesn't mean the former is invalid. I'm sure there are lots of Government of Canada webpages that still stay marijuana is illegal because they haven't been updated since October, but that doesn't override the Criminal Code.
You lost. Give up.
I think in your rush to find any mention of the word "merger" in my posts, that you ignore the context in which each mention of the word "merger" is used. I understand your emotion and passion. I have lost three airline jobs through no fault of my own, other than my choices to seek employment at the companies, and stay there past when I should have.

This was never about me "winning". When I tried to make WJE pilots aware of the threat that certification meant to the One List, I was unsuccessful. For those pilots and their destiny under ALPA, it was not about "rights", but about realities. They were protected by the WJPA. When the WJ pilots chose certification with ALPA, the WJE pilots lost any protection except that of a temporary statutory freeze, which led to the illusion that things were fine.

Except for the odd antagonistic post on my part, I largely didn't address the One List issue for the year or so prior to the November 2, 2018 Update issued by the WJ MEC under the now-recalled Chairman. With that official message, I realized that the equities involved required a campaign of awareness by all parties, so that a bad and legally indefensible agreement was not blindly entered into by a group of WJ pilots who were overwhelmingly ignorant of the law. In that group I would include, if for no other reason that I haven't heard justification for thinking otherwise, the members of the WJ MEC and WJ LEC's.

The vast majority of you, those of you reading this and the "you" meaning the majority of WJ pilots have been living under of self imposed fog of delusion. When you last saw clear skies, the ocean that was your WJPA world was lapping at your feet. In the intervening period of wilfull blindness, the water receded and now all of your boats are stranded in a strange, new world where the old rules don't apply. We can call that land ALPA World.

To answer some assumptions made by you regarding my motives in contacting the ALPA Archivist, I would direct you to the fact that the ALPA OC members were woefully ignorant of the truth about policy at ALPA. They responded to valid inquiry with a dismissive and paternalistic wave of the hand. The points you raise, Diadem, regarding my arguments, are valid discussion points that should have been thoroughly vetted prior to certification. If, that is, the goal was an informed decision on the merits of certification. Sadly, that was never the goal. And that pattern of opaqueness has continued, unabated, up until today. Your bargaining unit representatives, assuming you belong to the group of WJ or WJE pilots, have said precious little about the One List since the November 2, 2018 message regarding the Herndon Pact.

Personally, I was curious about the origin of the Seniority policies of ALPA. When did they first take shape? The archives supplied the answers.

Some readers of this forum, have quietly, and the odd one or two, publicly admitted that they have finally seen the light. I was right all along regarding the challenges facing the WJE pilots and the One List. They changed their opinion because of the evidence I provided. Do you honestly think that any of them would have changed their mind in every post of mine on the issue could have been distilled down to:

"I know it's impossible. I know it's against the ALPA Constitution and the ALPA BOD policies. I cannot say why, but it is. I have had a lawyer review my position and he has confirmed I am right. For confidentiality reasons, I cannot give you any particulars of the preceding claims."

Obviously, everyone would have rightly called me a lunatic.

Unfortunately, the stages of grief have just set in for you, Diadem. You are in the denial stage. I understand completely. In order to continue progressing through the ensuing phases more quickly, enabling you to make a coherent decision regarding your career options, I suggest you contact a labour lawyer ASAP and have her review all of the evidence at bar. Perhaps form an association of wrongfully treated WJE pilots. Something. Anything. Whatever it is, don't simply and blindly accept, without evidence

"“One List” Update  

In Washington, D.C., we held a joint MEC meeting with the Encore MEC. There were many items to discuss about how to work together, but one of the most important interim steps was to formalize an agreement and language between the two pilot groups on how to recognize the contribution that all pilots bring to WestJet. This agreement recognizes the seniority of WestJet and Encore pilots within the WestJet group. This document has been legally reviewed and meets the requirements set forth under the ALPA Constitution and Canadian labour law.  

This initiative follows the original intent of the “One List,” a policy that was overwhelmingly supported by pilots (based on survey results) at WestJet. Additionally, we believe WestJet group should view this agreement as good for them, as a major retention and attraction initiative at Encore.  

The two MECs will propose this formal agreement in the form of a Letter of Understanding (LOU) between both pilot groups to WestJet management. They in turn will also have to accept the LOU and be a signatory. The final step will be to hold a pilot vote at each group before it will be implemented.  

While only a first step of many toward fully uniting with the Encore pilots, this will serve as an excellent example of how unity between pilot groups can benefit the pilot profession and airlines in Canada."


As the CIRB repeatedly mentions in its decisions. Labour relations issues cannot be allowed to malinger and foster disharmony. The light must shine on the problems and they must be dealt with or else the cancer at the heart of the pilot group will grow. Founding any agreement on the perilous foundation of illegality and bad faith and arbitrariness is a path that cannot be taken unless we all choose to doom our fortunes.
There is definitely a CANCER in the WJ group!
I thought you said you were done with me. Can’t help yourself? And when you do it is nothing germane to the discussion apart from an attack on my character. I guess, if that’s all you have in your quiver, fire away.
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by The Tenth Man »

Diadem wrote: Sun Dec 09, 2018 3:05 pm John, please explain how I'm wrong. I cited the actual ALPA policies that would apply, not documents from 1956 and 1967 that have been superceded, but you've simply dismissed them. Your only assertion is that I'm in denial. Please tell me how the policy I quoted is not applicable to the argument that you've made, which can be boiled down to, and I quote, "The merger policy governs". Do you not think the merger policy governs anymore? If the merger policy no longer governs, what policy does?
Diadem, we seem to have reached an impasse. You seem unwilling to acknowledge that nowhere am I suggesting that ALPA Merger Policy is applicable to the LOU proposal announced by the WJ MEC. I have already discussed why a merger of the two pilot lists, in the unlikely event that WJ would agree to such a thing would doubly punish WJE pilots who had already flowed to WJ by the time of the “merger” implementation date. As a result of ALPA Merger Policy, the order of the pre-merger seniority lists cannot be changed in the integrated seniority list (ISL).

What this means is that if I am a pilot at WJ and I’m more senior to pilot Y, then in the ISL, I MUST be more senior to pilot Y. Similarly, if a WJE pilot is senior to pilot X on the EPSL, then she MUST be senior to pilot X in the ISL.

Consider a WJE pilot who was the #1 senior pilot at Encore with 4 years of service at WJE and he was above 500 WJE pilots on the list. If he flowed yesterday to WJ (new hire class of one pilot) he is now the most junior pilot, or the last guy on the list.

If a merger of the two pilot groups were announced today, then at least some WJE pilots he was senior to yesterday (all of them) would be senior to him on the ISL, UNLESS the WJE pilots were stapled to the bottom of the WPSL, below the last WJ pilot. But stapling the WJE pilots to the bottom of the WPSL does not recreate the WPDL (One List). Also, a lot more than one WJE pilots have flowed to WJ in the past few years.

So, if you tried to recreate the WPDL via a merger of the two lists, any pilot who had flowed already to WJ by the date of the merger would first lose all his WJE service time when he flowed to the bottom of the WPSL, and then next, as a result of the merger, he would lose even more seniority spots to WJE pilots he used to be senior to.

For this reason, even if WJ agreed to a merger of the lists, it would not be politically acceptable to more and more WJE pilots who flow each month.

For all of the above, this situation has NOTHING to do with ALPA Merger Policy.

John
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Re: ALPA Archives: 1956 Seniority Policy Origin

Post by The Tenth Man »

To answer your question, the following 62 year old ALPA BOD policy governs. It can be found in Section 40 of the ALPA Administrative Manual. It can also be found in the 1967 ALPA policy manual in my possession.




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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Mach1 »

Image
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I'm going to knock this up a notch with my spice weasle. Bam!
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Mach1 »

Listen to this song https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KsomXlyTyaQ while watching this gif Image
and you will feel much, much better.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by DrSpaceman »

Does westjet HR know about this man?
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by lownslow »

Surely there's a better platform than avcanada for these manifestos.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Lateralus »

Dude get some help.
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by Lightchop »

Im sure your MEC just loves you posting internal documents on a public forum. Even if they are partially blacked out.
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Re: 2017 CIRB Single Employer decision

Post by The Tenth Man »

flyinhigh wrote: Fri Feb 09, 2018 3:30 pm
JBI wrote: Fri Feb 09, 2018 2:32 pm NCP: Pilots with no legal training practice law just as well as lawyers with no flight training fly airplanes. (bede excluded :lol:)

LOLOL, that made me laugh hard.
I don't think anyone is laughing so hard anymore.
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Re: 2017 CIRB Single Employer decision

Post by bose »

Don't kid yourself John.....everyone is still laughing.......AT YOU!!! :lol: :lol: :lol:
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Re: 2017 CIRB Single Employer decision

Post by RidersRule »

I’m having a good chuckle about all this lol
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Re: 2017 CIRB Single Employer decision

Post by hurtin'albertan »

China_CAAC_Exam wrote: Tue Dec 11, 2018 7:08 pm
flyinhigh wrote: Fri Feb 09, 2018 3:30 pm
JBI wrote: Fri Feb 09, 2018 2:32 pm NCP: Pilots with no legal training practice law just as well as lawyers with no flight training fly airplanes. (bede excluded :lol:)

LOLOL, that made me laugh hard.
I don't think anyone is laughing so hard anymore.
:P :P :P :P :P :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

No. The fact that you remember each and every zombie thread you have spammed with bullshit makes us all laugh harder.

Post the company update from today here (blacked out) and see how long it take for you to get a phone call...

Standing at Portage and Main with a cardboard sign would get your just as much traction as posting your manifestos here. I look forward to you challenging the outcome of the one list stuff in the new year. Should be awesome
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Re: Herndon Pact: Tort of Unlawful Conduct Conspiracy?

Post by The Tenth Man »

Step by step.
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