I spent time as an observer at the recent International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly and came away with interesting data regarding the status of safety oversight around the world. ICAO since 1996 has been auditing contracting states' compliance with ICAO standards. To ICAO's credit, a couple of things have happened recently. First, there has been a big - and painful - move toward public disclosure of some audit data. Second, in 2005, ICAO moved beyond just reviewing compliance with standards to implement a powerful new audit that assesses a nation's overall ability to oversee its industry.
At the Assembly, ICAO shared summary data from the first 53 states to go through this new audit. While these states represent only a 28 percent sample, this is a nice cross-section of different-sized administrations and geographic locations. The data confirm what many of us have been worried about for a long time: Embarking on a great aviation industry expansion, we are building on a very fragile safety oversight foundation.
These audits clearly show a shortage of qualified people. The report says, "With respect to aircraft operations, approximately half of the audited states have an insufficient number of flight operations inspectors to adequately perform safety oversight of civil aviation activities. Often, this insufficient number of inspectors is due to the fact that a flight operations inspector's remuneration is not favorable when compared with corresponding remuneration in the aviation industry."
The report goes on to say, "Forty percent of the states do not adequately review and approve a prospective air operator's training manual before granting an air operator certificate, including the training manuals for flight and cabin crewmembers and for aircraft dispatchers/flight operations officers." That is pretty basic stuff, and it is not getting done.
Here is another tough finding: "Approximately 62 percent of states audited do not formally include the airworthiness inspection division in the approval of an air operator certificate or the associated specific operational approval." And just to drive the point home, here is one more thing that none of us want to hear: "Concerning aircraft operations, 68 percent of the audited states have not developed a formal surveillance program to monitor air operators' compliance with national regulations and international standards."
True, safety actually happens in the airline and on the flight line, but let's remember that safety is also a partnership. High levels of safety are not sustainable without high levels of safety oversight. The ICAO report drove this home with a statistical analysis correlating accident rates with a region's lack of effective implementation in oversight functions, licensing, surveillance and resolution of safety deficiencies. The relationship proved to be extraordinarily strong.
Around the world, people are putting together strategies to maintain safety in the face of extraordinary growth. If those strategies do not explicitly provide for a healthy and competent regulatory authority, they are doomed to fail. It sometimes may be difficult, but remember to support your local regulator.
William R. Voss
President and CEO
Flight Safety Foundation
"True, safety actually happens in the airline and on the flight line, but let's remember that safety is also a partnership. High levels of safety are not sustainable without high levels of safety oversight. The ICAO report drove this home with a statistical analysis correlating accident rates with a region's lack of effective implementation in oversight functions, licensing, surveillance and resolution of safety deficiencies. The relationship proved to be extraordinarily strong."
This is what some of us have been saying. I had to post this before I read the other links. Thanks again, CD.
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"What's it doing now?"
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
The Secretary of State of Transport has appointed Sir Joseph Pilling to lead an independent strategic review of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The review would welcome comments from organisations or individuals with an interest in the CAA. Contributions should be sent to by 20 December 2007.
Terms of reference
Following a recommendation of the House of Commons Transport Committee, this review will consider the structure, scope and organisation of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) with a view to ensuring that the UK’s arrangements for aviation regulation and policy making are fit for purpose and able to meet current and future challenges.
The Transport Committee said: "While operating generally well against its remit, our inquiry identified a number of challenges for the CAA resulting from the ongoing development of the UK aviation sector."
The review will begin in October 2007 and conclude in 2008. Its report will be made available on the Department for Transport website. It is complementary to (but separate from) the Competition Commission enquiry into BAA, which may comment on CAA's specific powers for the economic regulation of airports.
The review will be principally focused on:
* The strategic and operating context for aviation regulation in the future, including:
*
o economic and environmental challenges as defined by the Eddington Transport Study and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change;
o aviation industry developments;
o evolution of the roles of ICAO and Europe in aviation regulation.
* What should be the functions and responsibilities of the CAA?
* The structure of the CAA including governance and statutory framework
* The CAA's relationship with Government
* The CAA's relationships with those whom it regulates, including funding mechanisms, and more generally with aviation stakeholders
In considering the above the review should consult stakeholders. It should make some comparisons with other regulators. The review will make recommendations to Ministers about the structure and functions of the CAA; and will also look for ideas as to how the way the CAA carries out its functions can be improved for the future.
Canada "scored" quite well in that audit didn't they. How sad that said oversight will be virtually dismantled by the end of SMS implementation.
Noting that Canada is the first country to implement SMS into regulation, and with the concern that oversight will be reduced by TCCA, this was discussed at the TRAN meetings earlier this year.
I understand. That's where we have a problem with Transport Canada's approach. You audited Transport Canada's operations in 2005. In March of 2006, after safety management systems were put in place, Transport Canada terminated the National Audit Program which targeted the eight largest air carriers in the country. This means that the eight largest air carriers are no longer subject to an annual audit.
I won't ask you a question about that, because perhaps you're embarrassed by Transport Canada's actions, but I don't feel that Transport Canada is being reasonable by terminating an audit program simply because safety management systems were put in place.
Would you agree with me?
[English]
Capt Daniel Maurino (Coordinator, Flight Safety and Human Factors, International Civil Aviation Organization):
Yes, sir. In any change there is a transition period. What is the safety picture going to be in 20 or 25 or 30 years' time? Nobody really knows. If SMS evolves to the potential that we hope it will achieve, there may be a scenario in which audits are no longer going to be necessary.
But we're at the beginning. I want to reinforce a notion that I have expressed already. We're talking about SMS as if SMS were a done deal. It is not. We're at the beginning. We haven't even landed. We haven't even started this campaign. I believe that what's going on here is the fate that trailblazers suffer, which is growing pains.
In many aspects, we're learning as we move, and we become wiser as we get additional feedback. What I'm trying to say is that this early in the game, taking any radical measures, whatever they might be, would be unwise. I think the elimination of an inspectorate force, audits, or other conventional mechanisms that have ensured safety in aviation for over sixty years would not be applicable until we are absolutely certain that what we're removing is being replaced by a better system.
