Air France Flight 447 update

[complexintentions]

I would agree with the general sentiment to not judge until you've walked a mile...it's one thing to recover a stall when you're getting a clear indication of one, another when it isn't so clear with conflicting information. When you lose a portion or the whole pitot/static system it really is horrific. It's one thing to say "oh he pitched up against the stall warning", but who knows if the stall warning was even valid at that time? And since when is Richard Quest an aviation expert, I thought he was CNN's financial guru...("Quest Means Business") or does he just kinda do it all? I'd wait for the full analysis of the data.

All I know is I've been given a similar scenario in the sim - loss of pitot/static info (simulated volcanic ash encounter - you also flame out both engines and get cargo fire warnings), with all kinds of erroneous displays resulting, and it isn't pretty. It's one thing to correctly interpret your instruments, it's another when multiple ones are feeding you false information. Stressful in a simulator, a nightmare in the a/c.

Comparing it to the crash in Buffalo isn't correct in my opinion, their instruments were working fine.

[KISS_MY_TCAS]

Comparing it to the Q400 accident in Buffalo I think is somewhat valid, difference being this aircraft was at 38,000 feet, given a proper stall recovery the crew in Buffalo may not have made it anyways. 3 and a half minutes, falling from 38,000 feet and no recovery? I honestly hope the investigation boils down to a structural failure, or perhaps a design flaw that prevents recovery, because without it the industry is doomed once the media grabs hold. Automation is the worst thing to happen to aviation, it makes life easy until something that wasn't in ground school happens and you need to hang on to that much airplane in thin air. Unrealistic sim sessions do not prepare crews for the real world, and the real world no longer prepares flight crews. The airplane hit nose up, with the taps wide open in a 10,000+ft/min descent. Somewhere along the way, training or design has failed enormously. I cannot wait to see what the investigation unearths, simply because I hope it benefits the entire flying public. Something went VERY wrong in this accident.

[complexintentions]

Um, yes I think it safe to say "something went VERY wrong".

The AF flight appears to have lost almost all of the their basic pitot/static driven information. The Colgan crew let their a/c get slow and then didn't recover properly. Big, big difference.

Did you read the AF report?

From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the
controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall
warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp fall from about 275 kt
to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments
later in the speed displayed on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS).

I'm gonna go out on a limb and say that 215knot speed loss was an indication problem, not the a/c actually slowing to 60kts instantly. Of course the system gives a stall warning, it thinks you're trying to do 60kts in the flight levels.

The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started
to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The
vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied
between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased
sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the
recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees.

I think he started to correct but then got confused and overloaded by no doubt all kinds of other conflicting information.

A lot here seem quick to express their disbelief that this could happen, a "simple stall recovery" gone bad. I do hope they never encounter this situation as it may not turn out so well, as the previous crashes attributed to pitot/static failure demonstrated.

[BEFAN5]

Regardless of what happened and what opinions are expressed, I stand by my point (and alway will) that it is time for government agencies and safety experts to step in and take control of this "loss of control in the cockpit" situation. Pilots do not know how to fly anymore. If I was on a A340 flight and it lost its autopilot, I would rather the beech baron pilot riding in econ class go up front and fly the ils than the actual men in the flight deck. I am sure there are many pilots on here who fly highly automated aircraft perfectly capable of flying an ILS, but incidents in the last few years are really starting to highlight that more and more pilots don't know what to do after their 400 feet AP on call.

[radaration]

Regardless of what happened and what opinions are expressed, I stand by my point (and alway will) that it is time for government agencies and safety experts to step in and take control of this "loss of control in the cockpit" situation. Pilots do not know how to fly anymore. If I was on a A340 flight and it lost its autopilot, I would rather the beech baron pilot riding in econ class go up front and fly the ils than the actual men in the flight deck. I am sure there are many pilots on here who fly highly automated aircraft perfectly capable of flying an ILS, but incidents in the last few years are really starting to highlight that more and more pilots don't know what to do after their 400 feet AP on call.

[Panama Jack]

Well, the flames have begun on the Wall Street Journal.

Crash Report Shows Confused Cockpit
Pilots of Ill-Fated Air France Flight Tried to Halt Loss of Momentum by Tilting Nose Up, Not Down.

By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS
Cruising at 35,000 feet and nearly four hours into what seemed a routine overnight flight to Paris from Rio de Janeiro, an Air France cockpit crew got a stall warning and responded by doing what even weekend pilots know to avoid: They yanked the nose of the plane up instead of pointing it down to gain essential speed.

Apparently confused by repeated stall warnings and reacting to wildly fluctuating airspeed indications, pilots of Flight 447 continued to pull back sharply on the controls—contrary to standard procedure—even as the Airbus A330 plummeted toward the Atlantic Ocean, according to information released Friday by French accident investigators. The June 2009 crash took the lives of all 228 on board.

The pilots' actions are likely to lead to a global shake-up in pilot training that reappraises the role of computer aids, as aviation-safety experts increasingly worry that many airlines scrimp on drilling manual flying techniques.

Still to be answered is how seasoned pilots for a top airline, flying one of the industry's most advanced jets, violated such a fundamental rule of airmanship.

The introduction of automation has made flying dramatically safer over the years. In the U.S., for instance, fatal accident rates are at record lows. But if pilots are taught to abdicate too much responsibility to automated systems, essential piloting skills can dull and aviators become too reliant on computers in emergencies.

That's particularly troublesome if onboard flight-control computers malfunction, disconnect or, as in the case of Flight 447, give conflicting information and warnings to pilots. "Pilots are starting to serve the automation, not the automation serving the pilots," said Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation of Alexandria, Va., an independent advocacy group championing enhanced training. "It's almost like we have to train the pilots to know how to triage these situations."

The long-awaited factual report, though it doesn't explicitly say the pilots acted improperly, provides important new details about their actions during a dangerous loss of forward momentum that lasted more than three and a half minutes.

Investigators already concluded that except for malfunctioning airspeed probes, there were no other mechanical, electrical or system errors.

The report paints a somewhat unflattering picture of a seemingly confused cockpit, with the crew making extreme inputs to their flight controls and the engines spooling up to full power and later the thrust levers being pulled back to idle. At one point, according to the report, both pilots sitting in front of the controls tried to simultaneously put in commands.

The preliminary findings offer "a strong piece of evidence that as an industry, we need to improve upset recovery training," said John Cox, a former airline pilot and accident investigator who now runs Safety Operating Systems LLC, a consulting firm based in Washington, D.C.

The senior captain on the flight, Marc Dubois, who was on a routine rest break in the cabin when the trouble started, rushed back to the cockpit and was present and observing the other pilots' actions during a large portion of the descent.

Air France praised the three pilots, who "demonstrated a totally professional attitude and were committed to carrying out their task to the very end," the airline said in a statement.

The carrier, a unit of Air France-KLM SA, noted that "the initial problem was the failure of the speed probes which led to the disconnection of the autopilot and the loss of the associated piloting protection systems."

The largest trade union representing Air France pilots, SNPL, said Friday the report "describes only part of the sequence of events experienced by the crew" and it awaits the full report.

Throughout the sudden descent, according to the report, "inputs made by the [pilot flying] were mainly nose-up," which reduced the plane's lift. Pilots are taught from their earliest training that if an airplane begins to stall and its wings have lost the lift to remain airborne, they should immediately push the nose down to regain speed, lift and maneuverability.

The report could provide ammunition for the lawsuits against Air France, though plaintiffs also are likely to pursue Airbus for how it handled airspeed-indication issues over the years.

The problems with the speed probes on the Air France plane, and others like it, were well known. They had a history of icing up and giving faulty readings. The probe's maker, Thales SA of France, declined to comment. Airbus and regulators had established procedures to handle such situations with the probes, which are called pitot tubes. These procedures focused on maintaining sufficient thrust and avoiding extreme maneuvers.

Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., said in a statement it is committed to continuing to provide support to the investigation "with the objective of identifying all potential lessons to be learnt."

About three hours and 40 minutes into the flight, when the airspeed-indication issue first cropped up and the pilots received their initial stall warning at around 35,000 feet, the report shows the crew maintained control and temporarily managed to stabilize the plane at an altitude above 37,000 feet. That took just under a minute.

But then with their jet basically flying level despite airspeed-sensors that continued to display unreliable readings, the pilots started to veer away from typical procedures, the data released Friday reveals. French investigators didn't comment on reasons for the crew's behavior.

Upon receiving a second stall warning, the crew increased engine thrust substantially—part of standard practice to cope with such a situation. But for the next 50 seconds, the pilot at the controls did something that safety experts consider anathema: He continued to pull the jet's nose up, despite the threat of worsening the stall.

About two minutes after the first problems—and with the captain back in the cockpit—the jet was falling at a rate of 10,000 feet a minute, comparable to dropping 15 stories a second in an elevator. Yet the plane's nose remained pointed sharply upward as the wings rocked side to side and its forward speed hovered around 100 miles an hour, too slow for a jetliner to fly.

"I don't have any more indications," one of the pilots said, perhaps referring to airspeed but possibly something else. "We have no valid indications." The report doesn't elaborate.

At that juncture, according to the report, both thrust levers were pulled back to idle. The report also said that both engines were operating and responding normally to pilot commands.

The report goes on to describe how roughly a minute later, with the plane already dropping to around 10,000 feet altitude, there were "simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks" that control the aircraft, with one of the pilots trying to clear up the confusion by telling the other "go ahead, you have the controls." Pilots are trained to avoid such simultaneous commands.

The plane's data recorders stopped four minutes and 27 seconds after the autopilot kicked off, with the plane still dropping at roughly 10,000 feet a minute, tail down and slightly rolled to the left.

Air France has had a history of safety issues over recent years. After the crash of an Air France Airbus A340 on landing in Toronto 2005 that resulted in no fatalities but destroyed the plane, the airline ordered a thorough study of its approach to safety. The airline later said most of the report's recommendations had been implemented.

After the 2009 crash, the airline commissioned another study of its practices by a panel of leading international safety experts. That report, which was delivered to the airline in January, found a lack of "strong safety leadership at all levels of management" that resulted in lax cockpit discipline and ineffective pilot training. Air France said it was studying and implementing the report's recommendations.

In terms of future impacts, Friday's report is a prelude to a broad, industrywide study likely to be released later this year, focusing on the interplay of training and automation. After analyzing more than 730 incidents, 26 accidents and thousands of flights world-wide going back to 2001, Kathy Abbott, the Federal Aviation Administration's chief technical adviser for flight-deck design, told a safety conference last year that too many pilots rely excessively on automation.

One cross-cutting theme of the study, featuring broad participation from unions, carriers, manufactures and regulators, is that "pilots sometimes abdicate too much responsibility to the automated systems," according to Ms. Abbott. Part of the reason, she said, are persistent messages from airline management and trainers stressing that "automated systems can do the job better than" pilots.

The final Air France report, which may be a year or more away, also is expected to provide momentum for safety experts seeking sweeping changes in all types of stall-recovery training, including low-level events. Traditionally, flight instructors and senior airline training officials have emphasized the importance of strictly maintaining altitude while powering out of a stall. But lately, regulators and airlines increasingly are embracing a new training approach emphasizing pushing down the nose of the plane to gain speed and recover control—even if it entails giving up altitude.

That technique also was highlighted by findings from the 2009 crash of a Colgan Air turboprop near Buffalo, N.Y., which killed 50 people.


Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at daniel.michaels@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... e_linkedin

[Changes in Latitudes]

Want to see some horrible reporting? http://www.theaustralian.com.au/busines ... 6064924740

Baby pilots are killing us now. Captain Mike Doerr should be shot for his statements.

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

Why did the PF not realize that he was nose up ... and stalling ... for 3 minutes? i think that is the best question. I find there is quite a bit of contradictory information (pilot was aware / pilot was not aware). Full power and yet "nose up". That to me is mind boggling and I hope there is more to this than "pilot error".

[Cat Driver]

That to me is mind boggling and I hope there is more to this than "pilot error".

You would rather there is a fault somewhere in all Airbus A330's computerized fly by wire systems, rather than a finding of pilot error?

[frog]

I know nothing about AIrbus but I experimented once a pitot blockage in a Jet (Boeing) and to say the least it is very confusing and if you throw turbulences in the mix it jut gets worse !

[CID]

Many have the opinion that the pilots in this accident made some fundamental errors in flying the airplane. Comments like "nothing else was wrong with the airplane" except air data information to the flight control system and the pilots....

Seriously, if people think that even very experienced pilots should be able to maintain control of an airplane like an A340 or a 767 or 747 for that matter, that happens to have erroneous air data at cruise doesn't know what they are talking about. Loss of air data is (very) potentially catastrophic for aircraft like this.

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

That to me is mind boggling and I hope there is more to this than "pilot error".

You would rather there is a fault somewhere in all Airbus A330's computerized fly by wire systems, rather than a finding of pilot error?

Do you comprehend the English language ? " I (me) hope (desire) there is (such thing exists) more (other things) to this (the AF447 investigation) than "pilot error" . In other words, if the pilots knew the situation why did they not act , and some interpretations = they did act. So why are they not here today to explain their experiences? You're telling me you hope its pilot error and that there should be no issues with the 330 systems? I do not want to believe that a man sat there for 3.5 minutes and watched his airplane sink 10,000 fpm with a nose up attitude knowing what the situation was. Correct .

[scopiton]

Full power and yet "nose up".

up to 40deg nose up sometimes. quite a disorientation.

[Cat Driver]

Do you comprehend the English language ? "

I believe I do.

I also have a little bit of exposure to the Airbus systems and can understand some of the issues those pilots were experiencing.

Until the final report is released we can only speculate as to why they seem to have flown it into the ocean in a stalled attitude.

Personally I am wondering how they got into that situation to begin with, the route is known for severe weather at the ITCZ and it would appear that particular flight had many abnormal issues that resulted in the loss of the airplane and the people in it......so what will be learned from this accident?

Hopefully with the data recovered from the recorders the industry will know what not to do should a similar set of abnormal diversions from controlled flight occur again.

One thing I do know is the ITCZ can be very, very difficult to fly through.

Thirty seven years ago during my first flight through the ITCZ we were talking to a U.S. Air Force radar operator who told us he was painting C.B. tops at 76,000 feet ahead of our flight path.

So yeh, I do understand English and also a little bit about flying in that area of the world.

How much experience do you have flying in that area, winds_in_flight_wtf?

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

You decided to start waving a gun around in the air for what purpose? Everyone in here knows you are amazing so the power trip can stop. I made a sympathetic statement and I hope that there is more to this investigation than a pilot who simply just kept his nose pointed "40 degrees up" , full power, for 3 1/2 minutes.

In response to your final question:

Experience says @#$! all about competence. Not saying you lack competence, however the fact you went out of your way to create an issue makes me question your reputability. Point your gun somewhere else if you feel the desire again.

[ogc]

Full power and yet "nose up".

up to 40deg nose up sometimes. quite a disorientation.

As I said earlier the 40 degrees was in reference to the angle of attack NOT the nose up pitch, that never exceed 16 degrees.

[Cat Driver]

Experience says @#$! all about competence.

You can be competent without experience?

Not saying you lack competence,

Then why bother mentioning it?

however the fact you went out of your way to create an issue makes me question your reputability.

Really, then please explain why I have made it clear to everyone here what my real name is, yet you question my integrity.

Reading through your post history I note you seem to hold a deep resentment towards the older generation winds_in_flight_wtf, with that attitude you just may have some real problems getting ahead in aviation.

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

Experience says @#$! all about competence.

You can be competent without experience?

Not saying you lack competence,

Then why bother mentioning it?

however the fact you went out of your way to create an issue makes me question your reputability.

Really, then please explain why I have made it clear to everyone here what my real name is, yet you question my integrity.

Reading through your post history I note you seem to hold a deep resentment towards the older generation winds_in_flight_wtf, with that attitude you just may have some real problems getting ahead in aviation.

The quote I used is nothing new in the aviation community. You can be very competent without experience. I tried to put worries aside by stating the above about you from my encounter today, and I must say it is less than appealing : Instead, you dismissed everything I said and continue to wave your gun around. Also, after reading some of your posts dating back to 2006, this is not the first time you have freely stepped out of line to satisfy this sick self righteousness thing you have going on.

Its funny you bring up past posts about "resentment" towards the older generation. Simply not the case. If you actually read those topics and fluently understood my thoughts, I was simply questioning / playing devils advocate towards all you perfect "wise" men. You never offer any solutions to any issues which you raise regarding age . Never, to this day were those topics answered. You resort to what you're good at, which is belittling people who think differently than yourself.

You accused me of having issues with the older generation of pilots within the industry, that sir makes you ignorant because it is not true.

How did this start again? Oh right, I said I hope there is more to this investigation than a pilot free falling for 3+ minutes not following the basics. If there isn't more to it ... well , scary times.

You can put the gun away now

[SkySailor]

You do get nasty in a hurry, don't you WIF-WTF?

[bandaid]

A plane crashes, people die, and this thread about it turns into personal attacks. You should be ashamed of yourselves. It stops now or the thread will be locked. show some respect towards the families of those who passed.

[Castorero]

"How did this start again? Oh right, I said I hope there is more to this investigation than a pilot free falling for 3+ minutes not following the basics. If there isn't more to it ... well , scary times."

Windy Pilot, WTF dude ? You need to lay off whatever you're taking too much or not enough of, my friend.
Take a few deep breaths and relax a little, AND don't pick on Cat like that. He has more than earned his right to spout off...

I can't imagine having conflicting speed data in the cockpit, at night, in the dark, likely with no external visual inputs, It would be difficult enough flying with no speed data in daylight.

There are some lessons to be gleaned from this awful tragedy, I am sure, but starting by pointing the finger at the pilots right off the bat seems a bit more than premature.

[beaverbob]

delete

[Cat Driver]

There are some lessons to be gleaned from this awful tragedy, I am sure, but starting by pointing the finger at the pilots right off the bat seems a bit more than premature.

This accident may give the industry some real helpful data on how an airworthy airplane flew out of control and they were unable to regain control until it hit the ocean.

I see two phases in this terrible accident.

Phase one: Flying into weather beyond the airframe systems to cope with.

Phase two the inability of the crew to sort out what was happening.

Is there a flaw in how the data is presented, is it to complex to follow with all the erroneous alarms and changing visual presentations on the tubes.

How bad was the turbulence and the ice buildup rate?

One real plus is they have the recorder data from all the boxes.

One thing about the Airbus side sticks there is no feed back such as the faster it goes the stiffer the stick movement gets, without that feed back you lose that tactile source of information.

[fish4life]

Does anyone remember this crash... wasn't part of the cause the aircraft's fly by wire systems not reacting to the pilot's commands properly? As well I may be confused but in the airbus if you hold the side stick all the way back doesn't the plane not let you stall it by automatically reducing the nose up attitude? I may be confused but perhaps having messed up Air Data Computers might have screwed with the fly by wire systems ability to protect the aircraft from stalling as well.

[Panama Jack]

During the A320 "Chainsaw" accident you describe, fish4life, the aircraft's Flight Control System would have been in Normal Law. In Normal Law the aircraft has high angle of attack protection to prevent stalling, which is what happened in that accident. I believe that since the Chainsaw accident Alpha Protection was also added, which is an Autothrust mode. Basically, when the airspeed goes to within a few knots of the lowest permissable speed Takeoff/Go-Around (TOGA) thrust is automatically applied.

However, in the AF447 accident, with the loss of Airspeed Indicator probes the Flight Control System would have degraded to Alternate Law. In Alternate Law, most or all protections are lost and it is perfectly possible to stall the aircraft.

For more information on Airbus FBW Flight Control Laws (based on the A320), check out the following:

http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm