Easy Jet Pilot France Aerotoxic Syndrome Litigation

[navajo_jay]

http://aerotoxic.org/information/report ... ober-2016/

The airline pilots, the disease of the cockpits:

( Pilotes de ligne, la maladie des cockpits )

For the first time in France, a pilot removal complaint against his company. He believes that the air circulating in the aircraft would cause a “aérotoxique syndrome“.
Collectives of seafarers and passengers have given a name to their combat: The “aérotoxique syndrome”. (Sipa Press)

Can flying a plane be dangerous to your health? Monday, Eric B., Captain among EasyJet, will file a complaint against the airline for involuntary violations of physical integrity, endangering the lives of others and… deception on the quality of the air”. He is convinced to have been “poisoned due to small fire” in his cockpit. He is 53 years old, which makes him one of the most senior pilots at the low-cost airline that he has integrated into since February 2002. After the end of the year 2009, he began suffering from a number of disorders including (nausea, gastrointestinal, fatigue, hyperventilation, etc. ) which have led to a chain of neurological and mental judgment diseases. In 2012, his state of health has deteriorated, as well as its relations with his employer. The center of expertise of Aviation Medicine of Toulouse-Blagnac issued to him a “medical incapacity Temporary” in June 2015. The former Airbus Instructor then lost his license to fly and was later nailed to the ground, no longer allowed to fly. He now seeks an explanation to his health problems.

Eric B. discovered that other Pilots have symptoms that are strangely similar to its own and that since a dozen of years collectives of seafarers and passengers, supported by a network of doctors and researchers, are organized in the United Kingdom, Germany or Australia. They have given a name to their combat: The “aérotoxique syndrome”. This is very similar symptomatically to the farmers with the sheep dip pesticides. Seafarers and airline passengers would be contaminated by neurotoxic (organophosphates) that circulate in the ventilation system of the aircraft. In flight, the air sampled to the outside is in the compressors of front motors to be disseminated in the cabin. However, the oil of the engines contains toxic substances, such as phosphate of tricrésyle (TCP). In the case of leaks, in particular, due to a deterioration of the seals, the synthetic oil heated to a very high temperature to degrade and release of toxic substances. When these emissions of neurotoxic smoke vapors on board, the pilots were instructed to put on a mask, to land quickly and to change the mode of supply of air. However, sometimes, these fumes would be invisible and manifest themselves only by a smell of “SOCKS dirty or wet dog“.

There was a pilot death four years ago in 2012. The death of 43 years of Richard Westgate, a pilot from British Airways, constituted the first alert. His lawyers have produced an autopsy which concludes that “a degeneration of the Nervous System”. Due to these documents, Éric B. has the intention to open new litigation in France.

“There is no argument to say that there is a risk of chronic intoxication”
“everything that relates to the management of the air in aircraft cabins notes of standards which are laid down by the EASA and the FAA, the agencies European and US aviation. The air in the cab is renewed every two to three minutes. We know that some of the crew or passengers are skeptical of the quality of the air but no analysis in our possession does not allow you to highlight such problems”, explains to the JDD a spokesman of Airbus. Air France, the answer is also reassuring: “There is no argument to say that there is a risk of chronic intoxication. The measures carried out by the INERIS, independent body, in December 2015, have shown that the levels of concentration measured at the nominal operation of an aircraft, are zero or close to zero for the Volatile Organic Components.” Certainly. But it is precisely the situations “abnormal” which concerned the seafarers and airline passengers. According to the statistics of air transport, a flight on 2,000 would be affected by the suspicious fumes (smokes events). “These incidents are under-assessed, explains the driver of a large national company, and most of the time are the subject of no account. It really must be that the flight has been assigned for it to be listed.”

Thursday, the company doctor EasyJet must come and explain in front of the CHSCT in Roissy to answer the questions of the staff representatives, worried about the toxicity of the air.

Anybody heard of this before or know someone in Canada that suffers from that?

[CpnCrunch]

Anybody heard of this before or know someone in Canada that suffers from that?

More info here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerotoxic_syndrome

There's no evidence it's caused by anything to do with the cabin air in planes, and the symptoms are typical of burnout from chronic stress.

[JulietTango]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nocebo

Similar and yet opposite effect of a placebo, in that like a placebo, the "cause" is harmless--neither good, nor bad--but the effect is instead of helpful, as in the case of a placebo, harmful.

[navajo_jay]

http://avherald.com/h?article=49fd405e&opt=0

Accident: British Airways A388 near Vancouver on Oct 24th 2016, 25 treated for smoke inhalation

A British Airways Airbus A380-800, registration G-XLEB performing flight BA-286 from San Francisco,CA (USA) to London Heathrow,EN (UK), was enroute at FL370 about 640nm east of Vancouver,BC (Canada), when the crew declared medical emergency and initiated a diversion first in direction to Calgary,AB (Canada), subsequently to Vancouver reporting a number of crew and passenger were feeling sick. The aircraft landed safely on Vancouver's runway 08L about 30 minutes later. Ambulances took 25 occupants to local hospitals.

Vancouver Hospitals reported 25 patients, 20 crew and 5 passengers, suffering from smoke inhalation have been taken to three hospitals in Vancouver. 20, all of them members of the crew, were later discharged.

The airline reported 25 crew including the three pilots and 2 passengers were taken to hospitals as a precaution after a number of cabin crew became unwell during the flight, the causes of occurrence are under investigation, however, none of the occupants was treated for smoke inhalation. All 25 crew have been discharged already. The passengers have been taken to hotels and are being rebooked onto other flights.

[navajo_jay]

http://avherald.com/h?article=49f591ed&opt=0

Incident: Lufthansa A321 at Dubrovnik on Sep 24th 2016, fumes on board



By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Oct 14th 2016 18:47Z, last updated Friday, Oct 14th 2016 21:14Z
A Lufthansa Airbus A321-200, registration D-AIRS performing flight LH-1416 from Frankfurt/Main (Germany) to Dubrovnik (Croatia), was descending towards Dubrovnik when oil fumes were detected on board. The aircraft continued for a safe landing on Dubrovnik's runway 30.

The aircraft remained on the ground for 24 hours, then departed for a ferry flight back to Frankfurt but again suffered oil fumes, see Incident: Lufthansa A321 at Frankfurt on Sep 25th 2016, fumes on board.

Germany's BFU reported that following extensive assessment of information available the occurrence was rated an incident and is not being investigated according to regulations and law.

Following the release of the initial coverage The Aviation Herald received information, that the first officer, pilot flying, started to feel unwell during the approach and requested the captain to check him very carefully. Later, during the turn to base an odour became noticeable. After landing the crew decided they were not fit to perform the return flight, the first officer was dizzy. Both went to the local hospital to take blood samples. Maintenance personnel were dispatched to Dubrovnik, reported traces of oil in the #1 engine bleed ducts as well as the APU bleed air, disabled both left engine and APU bleed air and released the aircraft for the ferry flight back to Frankfurt.

[navajo_jay]

http://avherald.com/h?article=485e4e7c&opt=0

Incident: Austrian DH8D at Vienna on May 6th 2015, smoke in cabin due to oil contamination

By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, May 7th 2015 21:20Z, last updated Tuesday, Sep 27th 2016 18:44Z
An Austrian Airlines de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration OE-LGA performing flight OS-905 from Vienna to Innsbruck (Austria) with 53 passengers and 4 crew, was climbing out of Vienna's runway 29 when the crew stopped the climb at 5000 feet reporting smoke in the cabin and returned to Vienna for a safe landing on runway 16 about 15 minutes after departure.

Passengers reported haze in the cabin that reduced visibility.

The airline reported a defect in an engine, the haze/light smoke was then distributed into the cabin through the air conditioning system. The cause of the defect is being investigated. The flight was cancelled, the return flight was performed by a replacement aircraft.

On Sep 23rd 2016 Austria's Accident Investigation Commission (SUB), part of Austria's Civil Aviation Authority (VERSA), signed off their final report in German concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The serious incident has been caused by damage in a seal of bearing 2.5 of the right hand engine, which resulted in bleed air leakage and oil entering the bleed air system via the Inter Compressor Case and bleed air connector 2.7 and further the air conditioning system.

VERSA reported that the captain (40, ATPL, 6,631 hours total, 3,717 hours on type) was pilot monitoring, the first officer (31, CPL, 3,837 hours total, 3,837 hours on type) was pilot flying.

Shortly after departure, when the crew operated the switches for bleed air #1 and #2, smoke appeared in the cabin and shortly afterwards in the cockpit, a lavatory smoke detector activated and could not be silenced. The first officer instructed the flight crew to don the oxygen masks and to work the "fire/smoke on flight deck" check list. The flight crew decided to return to Vienna. The captain contacted the cabin via "normal call" to prepare the cabin for emergency arrival, estimated landing in 15 minutes. The crew started to work the emergency procedures, however, did not declare emergency with Air Traffic Control but reported the nature of the occurrence to ATC. While working the checklists the crew recognized the smoke originated from the bleed air of the right hand engine, the aircraft was about 12nm before the runway 34 threshold. The crew performed an ILS approach to runway 34 and landed safely, smoke was still present in the cabin. The aircraft stopped on the runway, emergency services inspected the aircraft and apart from seeing some smoke from the inboard side of the right hand engine no damage was visible. With this information the crew decided to taxi the aircraft to the apron, where the passengers disembarked normally.

The SUB reported that neither flight crew nor cabin crew nor 3 passengers, that could be reached for comment, complained about any health impact following the occurrence.

The SUB reported after landing a massive oil leak was detected at the right hand engine. Oil was found on the right hand main gear, right hand flaps, at the right hand side of the aft fuselage as well as the right hand horizontal stabilizer/elevator.

A first inspection of the right hand engine revealed a crack in the inter compressor case (ICC) at about the 6 o'clock position. The ICC transports compressed air from the low pressure compressor to the high pressure compressor.

A borescopic inspection determined the crack was the sole source of the oil leakage onto the gear, fuselage and tail plane. However, engine oil was also found in the bleed air ducts towards the Nacelle Shut Off Valve (NSOV). Oil contamination was further found along the lines towards the air conditioning systems raising doubts that the crack at the ICC could be responsible for this kind of contamination. Therefore the engine was sent to the engine manufacturer for further investigation, this examination was supervised by Canada's TSB.

When the engine was disassembled it was found that all blades of the low pressure compressor were oily. Subsequently carbon sludge and metallic particles were found at the inner barrel of the first low pressure compressor stage and the flange and seal of bearing 2.5. Bearing 2.5 itself was undamaged.

The seal showed damage to the wave springs and sheets of carbon seal. Therefore the seal could no longer seal off pressurized air, which resulted in oil entered the bleed air system via bleed air connector 2.7 within the ICC and further into the environmental control system.

The crack at the ICC was identified to be the result of fatigue.

An examination of the smoke detector, which had triggered and could not be silenced, did not reveal any malfunction.

The SUB analysed that there had been a number of cases already, where bearing 2.5 received damage resulting in smoke in the cabin, 4 cases were documented between March 2014 and February 2015.

The SUB analysed that the smoke probably was too dense to silence the smoke detector.

The SUB reported that the certification of engines is done according to standard CS-E510, which requires risk assessments, that are to be done by the engine manufacturer. Those risks include amongst others:

…“(iv) Toxic products.

CS-E 510 (g)(2)(ii) concerns generation and delivery of toxic products caused by abnormal Engine operation sufficient to incapacitate the crew or passengers during the flight. Possible scenarios include:

- Rapid flow of toxic products impossible to stop prior to incapacitation;

- No effective means to prevent flow of toxic products to crew or passenger compartments;

- Toxic products impossible to detect prior to incapacitation.

The toxic products could result, for example, from the degradation of abradable materials in the compressor when rubbed by rotating blades or the degradation of oil leaking into the compressor air flow.

No assumptions of cabin air dilution or mixing should be made in this Engine-level analysis; these can only be properly evaluated during aircraft certification. The intent of CS-E 510 (g)(2)(ii) is to address the relative concentration of toxic products in the Engine bleed air delivery. The Hazardous Engine Effect of toxic products relates to significant concentrations of toxic products, with “significant” defined as concentrations sufficient to incapacitate persons exposed to those concentrations.

Since these concentrations are of interest to the installer, information on delivery rates and concentrations of toxic products in the Engine bleed air for the cabin should be provided to the installer as part of the Engine instructions for installation.

The SUB further analysed that the air conditioning filters were not designed and chemically unable to filter out oil fumes.

The SUB analysed that although there is guidance by the aircraft manufacturer of how to clean up the environmental control system following a fumes event, there is no guidance for cleaning cabin and/or cockpit following a fumes event.

The SUB analysed that the manufacturer of the engine oil in use provided following warning in the safety and hazard instructions:

„WARNING ! While no significant adverse effects on health are expected when properly handled and used, this product contains tricresyl phosphate (TCP) which, if taken internally, can cause paralysis.“

The SUB analysed that working the fire/smoke in cockpit checklists is primarily geared towards fighting a fire, however, gives no concern to protecting the cockpit and cabin against fumes. The checklist thus contributed to increase oil fumes to invade cabin and cockpit because the bleed air was selected to ON/MAX in accordance with the checklist.

The same applies to the checklist "Fire/Smoke in cabin" checklist. However, this checklist enabled the crew to identify the right hand engine and its bleed air system as cause of the fumes resulting in the right hand bleed air system being shut down.

The SUB analysed that both pilots used their oxygen masks, however, not the smoke goggles. In addition the crew did not declare Mayday and did not communicate with cabin crew via the emergency calls but normal calls. Further, the captain removed his oxygen masks on several occasions for better communication.

The SUB analysed that the oxygen masks mounted on the aircraft were not the same type that the crew had been trained on during their simulator training. Other than in the simulator which featured a combined oxygen mask and smoke goggle the aircraft featured a oxygen mask and separate smoke goggles.

The SUB analysed that cabin crew did not use their protective equipment. Cabin crew did not perceive any aggressive/dangerous odour and described the smoke as dense haze. The SUB complained that the risk of incapacitation of a cabin crew member should not be taken by such judgement, the toxic nature of gases can only be assessed by chemical analysis and according equipment, neither of which is present on board of the aircraft.

The SUB analysed, using the largest part of the entire analysis, that engine oils, hydraulic fluids and other materials contain toxic substances, in particular organo phosphates, due to the outstanding properties as softener in plastic as well as lubricant even at high temperatures. Therefore all engine oils contain 3 to 5 percent of tricresyl phosphates (TCP), the ortho isomer of which can cause neuropathies.

The SUB wrote (in German Original, translation below):

Zu den bekannten Symptomen nach einem solchen Öldampf-Vorfall bei Passagieren und Besatzungsmitgliedern zählen Beklemmungen, Leistungsminderung, Sprachstörungen, gereizte Schleimhäute, brennende Augen, Husten, Speichelfluss, erhöhte Bronchialsekretion, Bronchospasmus (Krampfzustand der Bronchialmuskulatur), Atemnot, oberflächliches Atmen, bis hin zu Lähmungen und plötzlich auftretendes Zittern in den Gliedmaßen, Übelkeit, Erbrechen oder auch starke (migräneartige) Kopfschmerzen.

Eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Messungen der Flugzeugkabinenluftverunreinigung mit mehr oder weniger toxischen Substanzen wurde bisher weltweit durchgeführt. Jedoch gibt es signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den berichteten Ergebnissen. Dies kann eine mögliche unterschiedliche Realität zwischen verschiedenen Luftfahrzeugtypen in verschiedenen Stadien der Triebwerkswartungszyklen reflektieren. Unglücklicherweise geben die meisten Berichte nicht ausführlich genug Information in dieser Hinsicht wider. Auf der anderen Seite sind Messungen an sich schwierig durchzuführen und die fehlende Übereinstimmung kann systematische Fehler durch falsche Messmethoden reflektieren.

Translation:

The known symptoms of passengers and crew following oil fume events include feel of anxiety, drop in performance, speech impediment, irritations of mucuous membranes, burning eyes, coughing, flow of saliva, increased bronchial secretion, bronchial spasm (spasm of the bronchial muscles), shortness of breath, shallow breathing up to paralysis, shaking of limbs, nausea, vomitting and strong (migraine like) head aches.

A substantial number of measurements of cabin air contamination with more or less toxic substances has been done worldwide so far. The results however show significant differences, which could reflect a possible different reality between various aircraft types and different stages of engine maintenance. Unfortunately most of those reports do not provide sufficient detail. On the other hand those measurements are difficult and the lack of agreement can indicate systematic errors in the measurement methodes.

The SUB analysed that following the occurrence neither crew nor passengers were offered medical assistance. There is no standard established in Austria of how to handle crew and passengers following fume events.

I'm not trying to prove anything here posting these links, I'm just sharing with you guys. There's hundreds of fume events every year. I just think it needs to be investigated better simply for our health.

[7ECA]

There's an article on the BBC about the BA diversion, they've stated that the cause was not smoke inhalation as previously reported.