737 max

[BMLtech]

Well Ray I give you kudos for trying to explain some of these issues to the general public, a task those within the industry are reluctant to do. Just imagine if an active pilot publicly questioned the certification basis of a current aircraft.

Why would that be so bad?

I think every metro 3 pilot wonders how that plane ever got certified with such crappy ailerons and single AoA stick pusher. Why would max pilots be exempt from wondering or talking publically?

If and/or when you are employed by any major airline I invite you to go into the public domain and question anything to do with the safety of the operation,the equipment, or anything else that could have a negative impact on the brand, then sit back and see what happens....
Companies have an internal process called SMS, and this is where any questions employees have are required to be raised.

[TheStig]

Raymond Hall, that was one of the better interviews I've heard about the Boeing 737 MAX, or as the host tweeted Boeing 737 Super Max.

I don't agree with feeding the media frenzy. Boeing is in the business of selling airplanes, that isn't some conspiracy, neither is industry working with regulators to bring products to market. How many rides over the course of your career were conducted by a Company Check Pilot acting as a delegate for Transport Canada?

I am neither a supporter of Boeing or the 737 but just for the sake of balancing the conversation, do you believe anything criminal occurred during the certification process? That's how it sounded to the listener of the show.

It's understandable that you're trying to fill the void of information that is so instantly demanded after an accident but to be frank, why bother? Did you read the comments? Trumps comments? In 2017 he was taking credit for the safety record in the industry. A little information seems adequate to be only misinformed. Last week the public all became experts on the Attorney Generals' role within the Government, this week Jet Aerodynamics and flight control augmentation.

I'm glad you referenced Sully's comments about pilot experience.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

[Raymond Hall]

... do you believe anything criminal occurred during the certification process?.

Thank you for the generally positive reflection. My attempt was to explain to the public, in basic lay terms, the facts (what is known) and to identify one or more industry issues that need attention. Issues such as manufacturer regulator oversight, flight crew training or lack thereof and unforeseen problems including the apparent design failure to include any instrument error-checking in the computerized intervention of the flight control system. Also the incredibly low number of flying hours (lack of flying experience) of some operator's pilots, as well as potential lack of fluency in English (the language used for their flight training) of some of those who would ultimately operate the aircraft. Those issues, in my view, ought to be addressed as a design issue by providing clear, simple information in writing and by proper training.

Each of those issues is very serious and needs attention.

The most serious issue, in my view, has nothing to do with any potential criminality and I don't see that area of law having much impact here. Negligence law, yes, but criminal law, no.

Rather it is the creeping, conscious and pervasive effort of manufacturers and regulators to tune pilots out of the information system and decision-making process.

Late last week when Roy Green and I cosidered potential discussion points for the interview, I reminded him of the scenario in Tom Wolfe's book, The Right Stuff (not sure if this was included in the ensuing movie) where NASA informed the first astronauts that the astronaut on the first mission would not be provided with any flight controls to his capsule—that he would be just along for the ride, like a monkey in a cage.

The astronauts, although competing individually to be selected as the first American in space, collectively revolted. They refused to participate in the program unless they were given controls, especially for re-entry. Subsequently, NASA relented. Of course, it later turned out that having control over the thrust on re-entry played a pivotal role in saving one of the missions from disaster when the automated system failed.

This NASA subject did not get aired because we essentially ran out of time.

Boeing's decision to make no reference to the MCAS in its aircraft's operation manual is strikingly similar, in my view. Not only did it not advise pilots of the existence of the system, it did not alert them that the system's resolution actions are based on input from only one AoA sensor, not both. And it did not alert them to the potential super-human pitch-down control forces that would result when the augmentation system was activated. More importantly, it did not alert them to the fact that the only way to disengage the system in the event of faulty input was through the stabilizer trim control switches. According to reports, Boeing and the FAA believed that in the event that the MCAS was improperly activated pilots should recognize the problem and trigger the switches as part of their existing emergency procedures. No sh*t.

This gap between expectations and reality thus ultimately and tragically came to the fore in not just one of the accidents, but in both.

Not included in the podcast as well was Roy Green's mention that although he had originally scheduled me for 20 minutes (about 14 minutes of air time, given commercial breaks) he consciously decided during the interview that, although he rarely allows any one issue to run a full hour, he would make an exception here, given the information being disclosed and the serious safety issues being raised.

May I say that I have received considerable positive feedback regarding the interview from both airline insiders, including many of my former pilot colleagues, and from people outside the industry, regarding the basic factual explanation that I provided of the genesis of the grounding. I was pleased that the interview seemed to flow nicely, and that I was able to leave the interview by quoting one of the industry's safety patriarchs, as you mentioned.

[J31]

Great interview Raymond Hall!

[Old fella]

... do you believe anything criminal occurred during the certification process?.

Thank you for the generally positive reflection. My attempt was to explain to the public, in basic lay terms, the facts (what is known) and to identify one or more industry issues that need attention. Issues such as manufacturer regulator oversight, flight crew training or lack thereof and unforeseen problems including the apparent design failure to include any instrument error-checking in the computerized intervention of the flight control system. Also the incredibly low number of flying hours (lack of flying experience) of some operator's pilots, as well as potential lack of fluency in English (the language used for their flight training) of some of those who would ultimately operate the aircraft. Those issues, in my view, ought to be addressed as a design issue by providing clear, simple information in writing and by proper training.

Each of those issues is very serious and needs attention.

The most serious issue, in my view, has nothing to do with any potential criminality and I don't see that area of law having much impact here. Negligence law, yes, but criminal law, no.

Rather it is the creeping, conscious and pervasive effort of manufacturers and regulators to tune pilots out of the information system and decision-making process.

Late last week when Roy Green and I cosidered potential discussion points for the interview, I reminded him of the scenario in Tom Wolfe's book, The Right Stuff (not sure if this was included in the ensuing movie) where NASA informed the first astronauts that the astronaut on the first mission would not be provided with any flight controls to his capsule—that he would be just along for the ride, like a monkey in a cage.

The astronauts, although competing individually to be selected as the first American in space, collectively revolted. They refused to participate in the program unless they were given controls, especially for re-entry. Subsequently, NASA relented. Of course, it later turned out that having control over the thrust on re-entry played a pivotal role in saving one of the missions from disaster when the automated system failed.

This NASA subject did not get aired because we essentially ran out of time.

Boeing's decision to make no reference to the MCAS in its aircraft's operation manual is strikingly similar, in my view. Not only did it not advise pilots of the existence of the system, it did not alert them that the system's resolution actions are based on input from only one AoA sensor, not both. And it did not alert them to the potential super-human pitch-down control forces that would result when the augmentation system was activated. More importantly, it did not alert them to the fact that the only way to disengage the system in the event of faulty input was through the stabilizer trim control switches. According to reports, Boeing and the FAA believed that in the event that the MCAS was improperly activated pilots should recognize the problem and trigger the switches as part of their existing emergency procedures. No sh*t.

This gap between expectations and reality thus ultimately and tragically came to the fore in not just one of the accidents, but in both.

Not included in the podcast as well was Roy Green's mention that although he had originally scheduled me for 20 minutes (about 14 minutes of air time, given commercial breaks) he consciously decided during the interview that, although he rarely allows any one issue to run a full hour, he would make an exception here, given the information being disclosed and the serious safety issues being raised.

May I say that I have received considerable positive feedback regarding the interview from both airline insiders, including many of my former pilot colleagues, and from people outside the industry, regarding the basic factual explanation that I provided of the genesis of the grounding. I was pleased that the interview seemed to flow nicely, and that I was able to leave the interview by quoting one of the industry's safety patriarchs, as you mentioned.

Based on your experience at AC on various types including WB international and as well as your curriculum vitae, most if not all will stipulate as to your ability/knowledge to speak on this particular subject in the public domain.

[Gino Under]

Well done Roger.
Simple. Isn’t it?
The general public are afraid and anxious. Since they pay the airfares, they get to say when they’re nervous, upset, or just simply scared sh*tless. In the old days, when flying was fun, we invited those passengers to visit the Flight Deck. Aviation safety shouldn’t have as negative an affect on the travelling public. But, it does here. What pilot forces a passenger onto an airplane while knowing that passenger has serious concerns about safety? Let me re-phrase that. What pilot is okay with forcing thousands, if not millions of passengers onto an aircraft that clearly has a serious problem? What passenger knows the difference between a twin engine jet and a B737 Max 8? It’s an airplane as far as the public is concerned and they too have an investment in knowing what the hell happened.
As professional aircrew we know the differences between assorted 37s.

Good job.
Gino
Cheers

[timeflies]

https://globalnews.ca/news/5071188/air- ... il-july-1/

Grounded until at least 1st of july. and i'm guessing this statement is to be '' politically correct'' I wouldn't be surprised if it's more than that.

I know AC have a clause regarding paying pilots for aircraft not flying for reasons beyond their control. What will happen with 737 pilots?

[pilotbzh]

Not really grounded until July 1st, but off the schedule, if the certificate of airworthiness is re-issue before, they'll have it flying.... could also be later...

[LETUN]

Listened to the interview, technically ok for John Q Public. One inaccuracy: the MCAS is not to prevent upset at TO, it is only active in manual flight and clean config.
The swipe at non-native English speaker was unwarranted. I flew with many Ethiopians and their English was always very good. Most are from the upper middle-class and study at private American schools in ADD and/or in the USA. They were all good pilots too. Also flew with Indonesians and though they have thicker accent, their mastery of English was more than adequate. Ex-Lion Air pilots I flew with did have hair raising stories, it's a company culture issue really (expats and Indonesians). Some nationalities have a problem with English, not these two.
Ref experience, highly experienced AC crew crashed a plane in YHZ, another did an Asiana-style in Montego Bay, Rouge nearly crashed a 767 on the side of a mountain in Mexico, 2 SFO incidents... Most airlines outside North America have some abinitio programme and are considered safe (Lufthansa, cadet programme and non-English).
Still, as a non-rated 737 pilot I would not go on national media to talk about the 737 max.
BTW you are a good communicator and can't blame you for trying to inform the public.

[Raymond Hall]

Listened to the interview, technically ok for John Q Public. One inaccuracy: the MCAS is not to prevent upset at TO, it is only active in manual flight and clean config. The swipe at non-native English speaker was unwarranted.

Thank you for the feedback. Please understand that it was not I who inferred or implied that MCAS is designed to prevent upset on take-off. Rather, it was the host who was trying to put the pieces of the puzzle together, as was most of the public.

Also, I certainly did not intend my reference to non-native English speakers to be a swipe, and I certainly did not mean to imply that either the Malaysians or the Ethiopians were any less competent in English than required. I made the reference to language only because language is one factor, and sometimes a very important factor, in the design of aircraft systems. The manuals and the training should be designed to make the operation fully functional and ridiculously safe. Language and communication are factors in the process of training and integrating knowledge into one's skill set so as to make the skills almost second nature.

For example, imagine if the international language of aviation was not English and the training was not done in English, but rather in Mandarin, Korean, Arabic or Hebrew, all of which are not only foreign languages but use completely different alphabets. Then put a layer of technical jargon on top of the language itself. Would that be problematic for you? We are fortunate--we don't have that problem. Others do. It is an issue that can affect safety and that must be considered in the design of systems.

My point was simply that as North Americans we possess a cultural bias that may betray our expectations. Ethnocentrism. We naturally tend to think that if we readily understand something, if we can do something, everyone else should be able to understand it and do it equally as well. On reviewing the reports regarding this particular design, I cannot help but think that that was an issue both for Boeing and for the Boing FAA inspectors who signed off on the certification, consciously believing that no explanation of the system was required in the AOM because, as they asserted, pilots would be able to recognize and deal with flight control faults through their existing emergency training and procedures.

For many carriers, including those in Japan and China that are new and/or rapidly expanding, hiring pilots with very low time and very low foreign language experience, language is another one of the factors that needs to be reduced as a potential impediment to safe operations.

That cultural bias, in my view, was a factor in both these accidents.

Aircraft accident reports are replete with operational failures in communications. That fact should be addressed in the design of the aircraft systems, including the text of aircraft operations manuals. Simply adding the term MCAS to the glossary of an AOM is wholly inadequate.

[Raymond Hall]

I am not the only one who has highlighted the discrepancy between expectations and reality. Have a look at this article written by the Executive Director of the AOPA Air Safety Institute:

https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all ... 1yABlWbImE

[FICU]

Good interview but missed one important detail of MCAS.

Control wheel stab trim will override MCAS and allow you to trim the nose up.

[FL410AV8R]

Good interview but missed one important detail of MCAS.

Control wheel stab trim will override MCAS and allow you to trim the nose up.

I am not sure what was said in the interview, as I haven't listened to it, but I believe what was said above is not correct either.

The control column stab trim switches if actuated will stop the nose down trim movement bit will not reverse it. Also if the switches are released and MCAS still detects a high AoA it will resume nose down trim after I believe 5 seconds. The only way to trim the aircraft nose up is to turn off the cutout switches and manually trim using the trim wheels. However, if the pilot is still holding considerable back pressure he/she may not be able to trim manually due to air loads on the stab, trimming would require releasing back pressure to relieve the air loads with the subsequent initial pitch down which at low altitude may not be recoverable. The severity of this would depend on how quickly the crew got to the shutoff switches, hence the change in the QRH to make the cutoff switches a memory action as opposed to a read and do checklist.

[FICU]

He mentioned just pulling on the column in the interview.

The way I have read it is that you can trim with the switches and not just stop it.

"The system can be deactivated if the pilots trim the aircraft manually to override the MCAS". By "manually" I'm assuming they mean with the control column trim since they refer to it being "deactivated".

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... cas-jt610/

You may have better info.

[Victory]

Here's a question, why would you design an airplane where the control wheel forces are too large to overcome even at full nose down trim and full forward C of G? These are hydraulically powered surfaces so you don't need cables and pulleys galore. Just turn up the hydraulic pressure.

[rudder]

Here's a question, why would you design an airplane where the control wheel forces are too large to overcome even at full nose down trim and full forward C of G? These are hydraulically powered surfaces so you don't need cables and pulleys galore. Just turn up the hydraulic pressure.

Wrong. It is about aerodynamics. Influence of elevator control surface vs influence of horizontal stabilizer surface. Speed also affects elevator vs stabilizer dynamic.

[Fanblade]

Here's a question, why would you design an airplane where the control wheel forces are too large to overcome even at full nose down trim and full forward C of G? These are hydraulically powered surfaces so you don't need cables and pulleys galore. Just turn up the hydraulic pressure.

All jets I have flown can be trimmed far enough up or down that there is not enough elevator control to overcome the trimmed setting of the stabilizer. The surface area of the stabilizer (forward piece) is larger than the elevator ( rear piece) The stabilizers entire surface is what is moving when you trim. The elevator, being smaller than the stabilizer, only has limited range either side of the trimmed position of the stabilizer. This is why a trim setting is so important for takeoff. Set too far out and you won’t have pitch control.

A stabilator has the whole tail surface moving. Used on fighters. I’m not an aerodynamic engineer obviously but I believe stabilators can be very unstable and need a lot of computer help for stability. With that said some of the small piper aircraft had stabilators.

[BMLtech]

Good interview but missed one important detail of MCAS.

Control wheel stab trim will override MCAS and allow you to trim the nose up.

I am not sure what was said in the interview, as I haven't listened to it, but I believe what was said above is not correct either.

The control column stab trim switches if actuated will stop the nose down trim movement bit will not reverse it. Also if the switches are released and MCAS still detects a high AoA it will resume nose down trim after I believe 5 seconds. The only way to trim the aircraft nose up is to turn off the cutout switches and manually trim using the trim wheels. However, if the pilot is still holding considerable back pressure he/she may not be able to trim manually due to air loads on the stab, trimming would require releasing back pressure to relieve the air loads with the subsequent initial pitch down which at low altitude may not be recoverable. The severity of this would depend on how quickly the crew got to the shutoff switches, hence the change in the QRH to make the cutoff switches a memory action as opposed to a read and do checklist.

I think this is the focal point of the issue at hand, that being if the MCAS activates falsely at low altitude and is not disabled promptly, the stab becomes out of trim to the point where perhaps it can not be manually re-trimmed in the altitude available. To me its understandable that Joe Average pilot around the world may take several seconds to figure out all that is happening with the other false warnings going off, not everyone is Ace McCool. Another poster mentioned that 20 seconds gets you to full nose down trim. Whats a reasonable amount of time to process everything that's happening and get the trim cutout switches?
That's also an interesting point that the column trim switches will halt the nose down trim, but not reverse it. I had thought that they could reverse it. That means that if MCAS is active the trim just gets more and more nose down until it's cut out. The whole system sounds half baked to me.
I'll take a 727 anytime over that. Trimming down? Pull back on the yoke and KaBang! Stab is mechanically locked, and not going anywhere.

[rudder]

Most pilots think that they are . Yeager until the s$!¥ hits the fan. And let’s make it a combination of faults that you never saw in the Sim.

Sure, the outcome could have been different. But in 2 cases it was not. That is way too high an occurrence rate in commercial aviation.

[Raymond Hall]

Attached is the FAA Airworthiness Directive that was issued November 7th. Note the following:

"This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to address this potential resulting nose-down trim, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain." ...

"Within 3 days after receipt of this AD, revise the Certificate Limitations chapter of the applicable AFM to include the information in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD.


Runaway Stabilizer
In the event of an uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement, combined with any of the following potential effects or indications resulting from an erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) input, the flight crew must comply with the Runaway Stabilizer procedure in the Operating Procedures chapter of this manual:
• Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
• Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
• Increasing nose down control forces.
• IAS DISAGREE alert.
• ALT DISAGREE alert.
• AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).
• FEEL DIFF PRESS light.
• Autopilot may disengage.
• Inability to engage autopilot."

Note especially the words, AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed).

This necessarily reflects on Boeing decision-making and FAA certification of same. It tells us that Boeing actually did contemplate discrepancy of the two AoAs, and provided an "option" in the display for an alert. The option was apparently a cost item. As no mention has been made of this message being displayed in either accident, it would appear that both Lion Air and Ethiopian Air elected to not purchase the option.

Many, many questions arise from this, concerning the design, the certification, the cost of improving safety, and whether the majority of operators elected not to pay the price of adding the option, as well as other issues.