Ethiopian Airlines: 'No survivors' on crashed Boeing 737 max

[mbav8r]

Does the 37 not have the ability to remove bad information, ie; transfer the good side to the opposite display?
The RJ can transfer an ADC from one side to the other, thereby removing the spurious info. You can also disable the stick shaker.

[ant_321]

The stab trim cutout switches are checked for position in the first flight, "before start checklist to the line" by every crew, before every first flight of the day every time. They aren't some obscure switches never dealt with unless it's called for in a QRC or NNC. The Captain touches the switches before every first flight of the day.

I’ve never heard of a “before start checklist to the line”. With the Boeing SOP’s the switch position is checked in the captains pre flight flow but not backed up with any checklists.

[FICU]

The stab trim cutout switches are checked for position in the first flight, "before start checklist to the line" by every crew, before every first flight of the day every time. They aren't some obscure switches never dealt with unless it's called for in a QRC or NNC. The Captain touches the switches before every first flight of the day.

I’ve never heard of a “before start checklist to the line”. With the Boeing SOP’s the switch position is checked in the captains pre flight flow but not backed up with any checklists.

The Captain calls for the Before start checklist "to the line" after the flows are complete. In our checklist(B737-200 ad 300) we have an item on the checklist for first flight of the day... "Stab trim cutout switches" ... "Normal".

[BTD]

At my airline the stab switches are checked prior to departure for each flight during the cockpit check.

They are not backed up with a checklist. We do have a before start “to the line” but the only thing after the line is anti collision light. It prevents sitting at the gate for 10 min waiting for traffic behind to clear with the anti collision light blinking away. Then you have a long line of vehicles holding for you on the apron roads.

There are many ways to safely fly an aircraft. And many more ways not to.

Btd

[boeingboy]

They'd just taken off from Denpasar (Bali).

Stick shaker/loss of speed and altitude information on Capt PFD/MCAS activation when flaps raised.

Stop spreading misinformation!. Get your facts straight before commenting!!!! This is a major problem with this investigation.

This stick shaker activated on the takeoff roll at rotation. As did the airspeed disagree. Mcas started when the flaps went to 0.

[boeingboy]

Is it true that the Lion Air crew retracted the flaps, the MCAS started then they put the flaps out again and it stopped, then they retracted the flaps again and it started once more or is that from another incident?

Yes - that's exactly what happened to lion air.

[BTD]

https://reports.aviation-safety.net/201 ... MINARY.pdf

This is the PDF link for the preliminary report for lion air. For interested persons it is worth reading rather than asking questions to the message board as it contains factual information.

[boeingboy]

I even posted the FDR data for all to see.....but some people are not interested.

[FICU]

Looking at the report thew crew was able to stop the nose down trim and trim nose up with electric trim. I wasn't sure if nose up trim only stopped the nose down. If they had only put flaps out a second time after the nose down trim started again.

I'm m finding it tougher to believe the Ethiopian accident is identical to Lion Air after the AD was issued and if Ethiopian put as much effort in informing their pilots about dealing with the issues that Lion Air did with their crews.

[boeingboy]

Looking at the report the crew was able to stop the nose down trim and trim nose up with electric trim.

This is what I've been saying all along - The crew was able to more or less maintain their requested 5000 foot altitude for 10 min using the nose up trim. It was not a completely out of control situation. so why not trim up to level and then shut it off?

I'm m finding it tougher to believe the Ethiopian accident is identical to Lion Air after the AD was issued and if Ethiopian put as much effort in informing their pilots about dealing with the issues that Lion Air did with their crews.

It makes it harder to believe when the airline says - Hey this is what happened and if it does run the uncommandrd stab movement checklist...….only to have the pilots say - what the hell is that? as NONE of their crews (Max or NG) have ever been trained on that memory item. Not even in the sim.

The stab trim checklist is a memory item.....why the hell is everyone flipping through manuals?? Has no-one been drilled in this??

[tbaylx]

The stab trim cutout switches are checked for position in the first flight, "before start checklist to the line" by every crew, before every first flight of the day every time. They aren't some obscure switches never dealt with unless it's called for in a QRC or NNC. The Captain touches the switches before every first flight of the day.

I’ve never heard of a “before start checklist to the line”. With the Boeing SOP’s the switch position is checked in the captains pre flight flow but not backed up with any checklists.

The Captain calls for the Before start checklist "to the line" after the flows are complete. In our checklist(B737-200 ad 300) we have an item on the checklist for first flight of the day... "Stab trim cutout switches" ... "Normal".

5T uses an SOP based on Westjets rather unique SOP. Outside of those two airlines most others are using Boeing based SOP and don’t use to the line anywhere and have memory items instead of QRC’s.

Like previously mentioned it’s part of the captains Preflight flow and not on any checklist if you’re using Boeing’s SOP like most airlines.

[Eric Janson]

The stab trim checklist is a memory item.....why the hell is everyone flipping through manuals?? Has no-one been drilled in this??

It appears that there may have been multiple failures. Some of which may have masked the trim movement (like a continuously operating Stick Shaker).

A number of ambiguous warning messages will only add to the confusion imho.

I can certainly see how this combination could rapidly overload a crew.


Here's something you can try in the Sim sometime - I used to give this on the Command upgrade Sim (737 Classic).

On descent - dual Generator failure.

The overhead panel lights up like a Christmas tree - hard to isolate the failure. The crew didn't realise what the failure was.

Next session - dual Engine failure on descent.

The overhead panel lights up like a Christmas tree - the crew start doing the dual Generator failure checklist! The indications on the overhead panel are identical. The only differences are 2 low oil pressure lights below the Captain's flight instruments and the indications on the Standby Engine Instrument display. Very easy to miss.

On a more modern Type a Simultaneous Engine Flameout on one side and a Fire indication on the other side will create plenty of issues as the crew follows the Checklist on the screen and shuts off the only engine developing power!

The above scenario happened in real life to a Sabena crew (who managed it correctly).


My point is that I don't believe that the Lion Air or Ethiopian crash was a simple, easily managed event.

[TheStig]

What a obscenely antiquated airplane to still be rolling off the production line.

Eric, I know you're familiar with both Airbus and Boeing products. However, for anyone who wonders about the differences between the two. The same scenarios in an Airbus identified as follows:
Master Warning & Upper ECAM:
ELEC GEN 1 FAIL
ELEC GEN 2 FAIL

ENG 1 FAIL
ENG 2 FAIL

Under those messages are checklists of corrective actions for the Pilot Monitoring to follow, the items are removed from the checklist after they are completed.

Obviously, Airbus' aren't perfect, but you have to wonder how much of Boeing's own 777/787 developed systems are worth omitting in order to keep the common type rating.

[BMLtech]

Now reported that MCAS implicated in Ethiopian crash:
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47745191

[FICU]

Now reported that MCAS implicated in Ethiopian crash:
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47745191

The latest media report is saying the nose pitched down at about 450 feet AGL. MCAS is supposed to be inhibited with the flaps extended so unless this crew raised the flaps to zero by 450 feet AGL this doesn't seem like an MCAS problem. Could it be a 200 hour wonder problem in a classic Metro nose dive after take off?

Makes you wonder... no pun intended

[Mick G]

Who is sick of this thread? I know I am. Does this make me a troll for asking?

Consensus please.

[FICU]

Who is sick of this thread? I know I am. Does this make me a troll for asking?

Consensus please.

I think the point of this thread is to discuss the accident.

You have the option of reading, posting, and ignoring.

[BMLtech]

It sounds like they are reporting that for whatever reason, they experienced uncommanded nose down trim. Preliminary report should be out any day.

[J31]

Boeing's fix for 737 MAX will take additional weeks....

https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/politics ... index.html

[ykzrampie]

So now MCAS was alive and well even after it (the trim system presumably) was disabled? Rrrrealllly??? Hmmmm

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing ... -1.5082472