737 max

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Raymond Hall
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Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

GRK2 wrote: Tue Apr 02, 2019 8:20 am Cmon Raymond, you appear to be a bright fellow. Listen to what the informed and more recently experienced pilots are saying. You seem to be a bit behind the times when it comes to how complicated SIDS and STARS are to flown in busy terminal areas. Hand flying has its place in many operations, but it has to be balanced between what is required by SOP's and when it's appropriate. I agree with the majority here that "real pilots" can still fly using all the features their machines have in all phases, but it takes a good one to know when to use those features properly and to do it with maximum safety and efficiency.
You will not get an argument from me against this logic. I did not intend to create a firestorm regarding principles of flight, and I did not intend that in the more advanced aircraft with sophisticated yaw damper input and control that pilots need to augment those systems by use of manual input to the rudder. In fact, although I was not explicit in my previous suggestion, I was referring primarily to my pre-Boeing experience (23 years on the DC-9) where almost every single pilot that I worked with, both Captains and F/O's retracted their feet on rotation. Result—almost every turn was slipped.

My main comment was to the effect that if we do not hand fly the aircraft sufficiently enough to maintain our skills as professional pilots, our skills will atrophy, just like our muscles will atrophy when we are bed ridden.

And I did not mean to intend that every SID should be hand flown, especially critically complex SIDs. My principle point was that as professional pilots, we must never forget that we are at the controls of an airplane, not a computer. Lose track of the situational awareness at one's own peril. Place too much trust in confidence in the automation at one's own peril. Hands and feet are still important. But even more important is the constant awareness of the flight profile and one's requirement to be in control of the aircraft's flight characteristics, at all times.

Recent design imperatives, such as those in the Max evolution, have attempted to minimize the role of pilots and training with respect to the more advanced software implementations, to the point of designing systems in order to avoid any pilot training costs whatsoever, and to the point of not even providing information in the aircraft flight manuals of systems such as MCAS.

Those imperatives have impeded pilots' abilities to recognize and control the primary flight characteristics of their own aircraft. This is particularly acute in the case of pilots who have no hands and feet experience whatsoever, such as the 200-hour F/O charged with the responsibility of passenger safety in the most recent accident.

Those imperatives must be challenged.
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Raymond Hall
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Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

Today's Washington Post:

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — The Ethiopian Airlines pilots performed all the procedures recommended by Boeing to save their doomed 737 Max 8 aircraft but could not pull it out of a flight-system-induced dive, a preliminary report into the crash concluded Thursday. ...

While she never mentioned MCAS by name during a news conference despite repeated questions from journalists, Moges’s comments suggested that the system was activated during the flight and that the pilots were not able to use Boeing’s recommended methods to disable it. ...

Ethiopian Airlines said immediately after the news conference that the report absolves the pilots, who “followed the Boeing recommended and FAA-approved emergency procedures.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/af ... 73e766b62c
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Re: 737 max

Post by Daniel Cooper »

If true, Boeing's in a world of hurt. But I don't trust the media to get the facts right.
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yycflyguy
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Re: 737 max

Post by yycflyguy »

Ray,

Although just in preliminary reporting phase, it looks like you might need to apologize for the comment you made 2 days earlier where you implied that these were inexperienced pilots who have no hands and feet;
Those imperatives have impeded pilots' abilities to recognize and control the primary flight characteristics of their own aircraft. This is particularly acute in the case of pilots who have no hands and feet experience whatsoever, such as the 200-hour F/O charged with the responsibility of passenger safety in the most recent accident.
For accuracy - According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the captain has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 8122
 Total hours in B737: 1417
 Total hours in B737-8 MAX: 103
 Flight time in previous 90 days: 266 hours and 9 minutes
 Flight time in previous 7 days: 17 hours and 43 minutes
 Flight time in previous 72 hours: no flight time
The pilot in command was 29 years old. According to Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA) records, the Captain’s most recent simulator training experience was September 30, 2018, and his most recent simulator proficiency check was October 1, 2018. The captain completed the Ethiopian Aviation Academy on July 23, 2010. A review of the captains training records indicated that he received his 737-800 First Officer type rating on January 31, 2011 and completed his PIC type rating for the 737-800 October 26, 2017. 737MAX differences training on 3 July, 2018.
According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the First-Officer has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 361
 Total hours in B737: 207
 Total hours in B737-8 MAX: 56
 Flight time in previous 90 days: 207 hours and 26 minutes
 Flight time in previous 7 days: 10 hours and 57 minutes
 Flight time in previous 72 hours: 5 hours and 25 minutes
The first-officer was 25 years old. According to ECAA records, the first-officer’s most recent simulator event was listed as a proficiency check and occurred on December 3, 2018. His line training/check (conducted in the B737 aircraft) was completed on January 31, 2019.
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Last edited by yycflyguy on Thu Apr 04, 2019 12:26 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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'97 Tercel
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Re: 737 max

Post by '97 Tercel »

I should follow this too sometimes but it's better to be thought a fool than type something on your keyboard and remove all doubt :)
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Raymond Hall
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Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

yycflyguy wrote: Thu Apr 04, 2019 8:43 am Ray,

Although just in preliminary reporting phase, it looks like you might need to apologize for the comment you made 2 days earlier where you implied that these were inexperienced pilots who have no hands and feet;


According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the First-Officer has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 361
 Total hours in B737: 207
 Total hours in B737-8 MAX: 56
 Flight time in previous 90 days: 207 hours and 26 minutes
 Flight time in previous 7 days: 10 hours and 57 minutes
 Flight time in previous 72 hours: 5 hours and 25 minutes
The first-officer was 25 years old. According to ECAA records, the first-officer’s most recent simulator event was listed as a proficiency check and occurred on December 3, 2018. His line training/check (conducted in the B737 aircraft) was completed on January 31, 2019.
I was not referring to the two pilots. I was referring to what I understood to be the 200 hours total time of the F/O. 361 hours is not much different, in the circumstances.

Subtract the 207 hours B737 time from the 361 hours total time and it would appear that he commenced flying the 737 with only 154 hours. Less than 200. That is what Sully Sullenberger refers to as an airplane crew of "1 Captain, 1 Apprentice."

My point was simply that that level of experience won't even get one a commercial licence in Canada, let alone put one in the seat of a $150 million aircraft with 149 people on board.

Low time and lack of experience, despite the PPC certification in a simulator, is a very serious issue that ought to be considered in the design of aircraft systems, especially ones that, on failure, require consummate pilots skills on an extremely time-limited basis.
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Re: 737 max

Post by FL320 »

For accuracy - According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the captain has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 8122
The pilot in command was 29 years old. According to Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA) records, the Captain’s most recent simulator training experience was September 30, 2018, and his most recent simulator proficiency check was October 1, 2018. The captain completed the Ethiopian Aviation Academy on July 23, 2010.
🤔 Their FTL is 1000h/year

I will never complain again that I am flying too much at 500hrs/year! :?
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Last edited by FL320 on Thu Apr 04, 2019 6:14 pm, edited 1 time in total.
yycflyguy
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Re: 737 max

Post by yycflyguy »

Raymond Hall wrote: Thu Apr 04, 2019 2:42 pm
yycflyguy wrote: Thu Apr 04, 2019 8:43 am Ray,

Although just in preliminary reporting phase, it looks like you might need to apologize for the comment you made 2 days earlier where you implied that these were inexperienced pilots who have no hands and feet;


According to Ethiopian Airlines records, the First-Officer has the following flight experience:
 Total hours: 361
 Total hours in B737: 207
 Total hours in B737-8 MAX: 56
 Flight time in previous 90 days: 207 hours and 26 minutes
 Flight time in previous 7 days: 10 hours and 57 minutes
 Flight time in previous 72 hours: 5 hours and 25 minutes
The first-officer was 25 years old. According to ECAA records, the first-officer’s most recent simulator event was listed as a proficiency check and occurred on December 3, 2018. His line training/check (conducted in the B737 aircraft) was completed on January 31, 2019.
I was not referring to the two pilots. I was referring to what I understood to be the 200 hours total time of the F/O. 361 hours is not much different, in the circumstances.

Subtract the 207 hours B737 time from the 361 hours total time and it would appear that he commenced flying the 737 with only 154 hours. Less than 200. That is what Sully Sullenberger refers to as an airplane crew of "1 Captain, 1 Apprentice."

My point was simply that that level of experience won't even get one a commercial licence in Canada, let alone put one in the seat of a $150 million aircraft with 149 people on board.

Low time and lack of experience, despite the PPC certification in a simulator, is a very serious issue that ought to be considered in the design of aircraft systems, especially ones that, on failure, require consummate pilots skills on an extremely time-limited basis.
It appears that it was the "apprentice" who first identified the situation and called to flip the Stab Cutoff Switches. It was also the Captain who was flying.
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Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

yycflyguy wrote: Thu Apr 04, 2019 5:27 pmIt appears that it was the "apprentice" who first identified the situation and called to flip the Stab Cutoff Switches. It was also the Captain who was flying.
In that case, perhaps I was a little hasty in my assumption regarding this particular First Officer and this particular accident. Nevertheless, the issue is a generic one, namely that systems should be designed to account for the lowest common denominator, including flight crews with remarkably low flight time.

In this case, apparently, one of the system design imperatives was to prohibit any crew training, whatsoever.

There was a report on CNN this afternoon that Boeing had made a guarantee of a seven figure rebate to airlines if they were not able to meet the requirement of no additional crew training for this model of aircraft. Stunning, given the inherent weaknesses in the design and the fact that Boeing made the AOA comparator function an add-on option available only for a price.
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Re: 737 max

Post by yycflyguy »

Raymond Hall wrote: Thu Apr 04, 2019 6:55 pm
yycflyguy wrote: Thu Apr 04, 2019 5:27 pmIt appears that it was the "apprentice" who first identified the situation and called to flip the Stab Cutoff Switches. It was also the Captain who was flying.
In that case, perhaps I was a little hasty in my assumption regarding this particular First Officer and this particular accident. Nevertheless, the issue is a generic one, namely that systems should be designed to account for the lowest common denominator, including flight crews with remarkably low flight time.

In this case, apparently, one of the system design imperatives was to prohibit any crew training, whatsoever.

There was a report on CNN this afternoon that Boeing had made a guarantee of a seven figure rebate to airlines if they were not able to meet the requirement of no additional crew training for this model of aircraft. Stunning, given the inherent weaknesses in the design and the fact that Boeing made the AOA comparator function an add-on option available only for a price.
Boeing and the FAA are exposed to future litigation. More because of the certification process and the omission of the MCAS from original AOMs. The MAX sales were heavily reliant on selling the fact that it was still a common type, hence the lower training/maintenance costs. Boeing and the FAA will have to answer for that. I was amazed that the Boeing CEO issued an apology. In the most litigious country in the world an apology is really going to cost them.

The AoA never had, and still does not have a comparator function. That's why these planes crashed. One bad AoA sensor led the plane to believe it was stalling and the MCAS kicked in. The patch was going to address that. The "add-on" was the AoA indicator on the PFDs. At AC we didn't have these indicators until after the Lion Air crash. Then they magically appeared with no training and no guidance. It's also worth pointing out that because AC doesn't have any older B737s it was a full training course for all the MAX pilots so there were no cost savings using only a differences course at AC.
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Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

yycflyguy wrote: Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:11 am The AoA never had, and still does not have a comparator function. That's why these planes crashed.
If that is the case, why did the A.D. of November 7th require adding the line "AOA Disagree (If Option is Installed)" to the manual?
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Re: 737 max

Post by yycflyguy »

Raymond Hall wrote: Fri Apr 05, 2019 11:07 am
yycflyguy wrote: Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:11 am The AoA never had, and still does not have a comparator function. That's why these planes crashed.
If that is the case, why did the A.D. of November 7th require adding the line "AOA Disagree (If Option is Installed)" to the manual?
I'll try to clarify; I was referring to the fact that there is no electronic comparison of AoA information before MCAS activation. Just one erroneous air data sensing out of two would activate the MCAS trimming - also with no indications to the pilot other than the trim wheel spinning forward. The AoA Disagree annunciation now appears on the PFD (not prominently) but it does not inhibit MCAS from trimming. The "software patch" was supposed to address that.
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Re: 737 max

Post by Raymond Hall »

yycflyguy wrote: Fri Apr 05, 2019 12:15 pm I'll try to clarify; I was referring to the fact that there is no electronic comparison of AoA information before MCAS activation. Just one erroneous air data sensing out of two would activate the MCAS trimming - also with no indications to the pilot other than the trim wheel spinning forward. The AoA Disagree annunciation now appears on the PFD (not prominently) but it does not inhibit MCAS from trimming. The "software patch" was supposed to address that.
Therein lies the rub. There is a comparator function, but it does not (as yet) stop the MCAS from engaging. So difficult decisions must be made. If the warning is valid (i.e. the aircraft is approaching a stall), immediate intervention is required. Hence, MCAS activation. But if the warning is false, MCAS activation leads to a miserable almost immediate consequence.

Boeing is capable of much better than letting aircraft operate without managing the resolution of that information conflict. As late as one day prior to the USA grounding of the aircraft, Boeing's public position was that the aircraft were still safe by reason of the AOM's existing procedures, that the pilots were expected to know and to implement.

The reality, in practice, was much different. 40 degrees pitch down. Airspeed over 500 kts on impact, and the F/O unable to overcome the forces in the trim wheel (in a timely manner) to avert the CFIT. The jackscrew was found to be in the full nose down position on impact.

Houston. We have a problem. And that problem is in the flawed design of the system, among other factors.
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Re: 737 max

Post by florch »

LOC-I not CFIT. UFIT maybe.
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Re: 737 max

Post by aV1aTOr »

By definition these events were the furthest thing from CFIT possible.
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Re: 737 max

Post by The Hammer »

Even a cheaply made Metro 23 needs both AOA systems to agree before the pusher comes on. You only get the Stall warning (audible and annuniciator on glareshield) if they don't agree.

Pretty odd decision by Boeing.
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Re: 737 max

Post by corethatthermal »

perhaps 1 fix would be to attach a string to the mcas cb and affix to the pilots teeth . pilot pulls hard on the yoke, body moves fwd, mcas disconnects problem over,,,,, just sayin,,
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Re: 737 max

Post by fruitloops »

2 INITIAL FINDINGS
On the basis of the initial information gathered during the course of the investigation, the following
facts have been determined:
 The Aircraft possessed a valid certificate of airworthiness;
 The crew obtained the license and qualifications to conduct the flight;
 The takeoff roll appeared normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack
(AOA).
 Shortly after liftoff, the value of the left angle of attack sensor deviated from the right one
and reached 74.5 degrees while the right angle of attack sensor value was 15.3 degrees;
then after; the stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the flight.
 After autopilot engagement, there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by
lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes; these oscillations also
continued after the autopilot disengaged.
 After the autopilot disengaged, the DFDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND)
trim command four times without pilot’s input. As a result, three motions of the stabilizer
trim were recorded. The FDR data also indicated that the crew utilized the electric manual
trim to counter the automatic AND input.
 The crew performed runaway stabilizer checklist and put the stab trim cutout switch to
cutout position and confirmed that the manual trim operation was not working.
3 SAFETY ACTIONS TAKEN
The day of the accident, the operator decided to suspend operation of B737-8MAX.
On 14th March 2019, Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority issued NOTAM regarding “The operation of
Boeing B737-8 ‘MAX’ and Boeing B737-9 ‘MAX’ aircraft from, into or over the Ethiopian airspace,
which is still active at the date of this report publication.
4 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
 Since repetitive un-commanded aircraft nose down conditions are noticed in this
preliminary investigation, it is recommended that the aircraft flight control system related
to flight controllability shall be reviewed by the manufacturer.
 Aviation Authorities shall verify that the review of the aircraft flight control system related
to flight controllability has been adequately addressed by the manufacturer before the
release of the aircraft to operations.
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Re: 737 max

Post by fruitloops »

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Re: 737 max

Post by HavaJava »

A couple quick questions for the airline pilots out there. I’m trying to get a general feeling for the experience/airmanship level of my colleagues around the world. For any transport category jet, how many of you would:

1. Engage an autopilot with a stick shaker active or any other signs of unreliable airspeed on departure?
2. Retract flaps with a stick shaker active or any other signs of unreliable airspeed on departure?
3. Be uncomfortable manually controlling thrust at any point during the flight.
4. Be uncomfortable manually flying the aircraft during an emergency?
5. Distrust the average pilot in your company to accurately fly manually during an emergency.
6. Not use the electric trim system to relieve control column pressure (if it is having a positive effect, such as was the case in the Lion-air and Ethiopian accidents)
7. Fly the #$&* airplane?!?
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