I'm not implying anything. I don't know why they did what they did. I do fly the 737NG and have flown the MAX before it was grounded.
The first crew actually did a decent job of flying the plane. The flight data shows a corresponding manual electric trim nose up after each MCAS triggered nose down trim. I just checked my numbers and that airplane was in the air for 13 minutes so they were successfully dealing with this for longer than I initially thought. Control was only lost after the Captain handed control to the FO so he could look through the QRH. I don't understand why the Captain didn't call for the Runaway Stabilizer checklist or memory items.
The second crew did manage to get to the trim cutoff switches but never pulled back the thrust. It stayed at 94%. By the time the cutoff switches were used they were at Vmo. The other curious thing I just noticed is that when the flap handle is moved from the flap 5 position the airplane looks to be close to 250 knots (although it's hard to tell on such a small graph).
Our checklist instructions in the QRH state, "While every attempt is made to supply needed non-normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations."
I don't understand how a crew does not make the jump to the Runaway Stabilizer non-normal checklist in this case as the only significant difference is that they had an intermittent runaway stabilizer.
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"The ability to ditch an airplane in the Hudson does not qualify a pilot for a pay raise. The ability to get the pilots, with this ability, to work for 30% or 40% pay cuts qualifies those in management for millions in bonuses."
I've mentioned this many times before in previous posts....but for all the fighting the 2 crews did - they were both able to continue their climb and/or maintain altitude. Now the stick may have been in their laps or they had their feet on the dash - but they were still able to maintain control. So switch the damn thing off.
As pilots we are all taught from our first flight that you trim the airplane for level hands off flight. Why these crews did not do that is beyond me. Lion air did it - but never shut it off. ET did it - but not long enough. We all know MCAS will trim faster than the manual trim will - so why were they only trimming half as much? The ET crew did shut it off then turned it back on - I suspect this is because the nose was still very heavy so they switched it on to trim up - which is what the data shows. However they did not trim nearly long enough and then did not turn it off again, allowing the system to trim it down. Even with the heavy nose - the whole time the trim was shut off the ET crew managed to climb about 8000 feet. The aircraft was controllable and recoverable - the crews must share the blame in these accidents.
In all honesty, the first questions I asked myself after the dual Max crashes were, what were their experiences levels, what kind of training did they do, and what was the company culture like? This sh*t is important. It literally was as simple as pulling the electric trim circuit breaker to solve the problem. Huge can of worms but we’re lucky to have pretty top notch training environments in North America, plus in Canada we have the bush - makes you really think outside the box.
That being said, Boeing cut some corners and now they’re paying for it. Perhaps it’s a blessing in disguise - huge wake up call, don’t do it again.
It will be interesting to see what happens in their corporate structure because the share holders will be very concerned.
Yes...they are concerned now. They didn't seem very concerned as Boeing gradually switched from an engineering company to one that was focused on unlocking shareholder value. This is typical of short term investor outlook. Get the money now, quickly rather than concentrate on creating a superior product and letting value increase over time.
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"The ability to ditch an airplane in the Hudson does not qualify a pilot for a pay raise. The ability to get the pilots, with this ability, to work for 30% or 40% pay cuts qualifies those in management for millions in bonuses."
boeingboy wrote: ↑Fri Sep 06, 2019 4:37 pm
I've mentioned this many times before in previous posts....but for all the fighting the 2 crews did - they were both able to continue their climb and/or maintain altitude. Now the stick may have been in their laps or they had their feet on the dash - but they were still able to maintain control. So switch the damn thing off.
As pilots we are all taught from our first flight that you trim the airplane for level hands off flight. Why these crews did not do that is beyond me. Lion air did it - but never shut it off. ET did it - but not long enough. We all know MCAS will trim faster than the manual trim will - so why were they only trimming half as much? The ET crew did shut it off then turned it back on - I suspect this is because the nose was still very heavy so they switched it on to trim up - which is what the data shows. However they did not trim nearly long enough and then did not turn it off again, allowing the system to trim it down. Even with the heavy nose - the whole time the trim was shut off the ET crew managed to climb about 8000 feet. The aircraft was controllable and recoverable - the crews must share the blame in these accidents.
The airport is at 7625ft. The ET crew got a bit above 8000ft, they never climbed more than 1000ft from the ground.
Jet Jockey wrote: ↑Sat Sep 07, 2019 6:37 am
Europe's aviation safety watchdog will not accept a US verdict on whether Boeing's troubled 737 Max is safe.
Instead, the European Aviation Safety Agency (Easa) will run its own tests on the plane before approving a return to commercial flights.
L39Guy wrote: ↑Mon Sep 09, 2019 3:35 pm
And what expertise resides in Tower C in Ottawa that the Yanks don’t have? What value would a TC review add - none.
I purely political one, after the C-Series shenanigans.
L39Guy wrote: ↑Mon Sep 09, 2019 3:35 pm
And what expertise resides in Tower C in Ottawa that the Yanks don’t have? What value would a TC review add - none.
Not so much expertise, but credibility. The FAA is a little short on credibility at the moment.
And what expertise resides in Tower C in Ottawa that the Yanks don’t have? What value would a TC review add - none.
Political, After what happened between the FAA and Boeing, any great nation would be wise to score pathetic bonus political points AND remind Boeing AND the FAA not to play their little Russian Roulette games again !
Last we heard a couple of weeks ago is the FAA still will not require sim training for the Max - it's all computer based. However - we believe that TC will require sim training for it. Which is just fine with me.
For such a hot button topic - It seems like this would be the easiest of the issues to solve - but I guess Boeing and the FAA are going to leave it at that and if anyone else wants to do sim training - so be it. I suspect that's what most of the world's airworthiness people will do. I don't really see any other sticking points with the proposed fix.
if Canada requires all Max airplanes in their airspace to have aircrews who have demonstrated a MCAS recovery in the sim or be banned from the airspace you'll see all the majors in the US add it to their training
L39Guy wrote: ↑Mon Sep 09, 2019 7:28 pm
So no real value, just political points. Great.
Credibility and impartiality are good values when you have to judge any common situation.
But when you put into the equation the lives of thousands of people and the sale of billions dollars of aircrafts, theses values are, ironically, unvaluable.
One of the best articles I've ever read. About not only the airplane and what happen in each accident - but more importantly of the way stuff happens in other parts of the world.
One of the best articles I've ever read. About not only the airplane and what happen in each accident - but more importantly of the way stuff happens in other parts of the world.
Fantastic article indeed - especially the cultural aspects which will never make it into any final report. Glad to see the author ignores Political Correctness.
Having worked in Asia I've experienced the "Protect the National Carrier" mentality first hand. Numerous incidents were covered up with the co-operation of the local CAA. Virtually impossible to fire anyone no matter how incompetent.
The only thing that surprises me is that there aren't more accidents.
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Always fly a stable approach - it's the only stability you'll find in this business
It is not just the misinterpretation of information displayed to the pilots.
It is not just the lack of training specific to the MCAS.
It is not the just the pilot training records.
It is not just the maintenance practices.
It is not just Boeing's arrogance.
It is not just the variances in design.
It is not just the degradation of manual skill.
It is all these things together. We would be ignorant to think that this could not have happened on North American soil. We are not privy of the flaws of aviation's darkest corners solely because of where we are located in the world. I do not envy what these two crews were up against. It was a lot more than just a runaway.
The plane will fly again. There is much to be learned from this. From lessons in aerodynamics, skill and the ever fragile human factors at play in a high stress environment.
If there is a stand out quote from Langewiesche's article is the difference in philosophy between Airbus and Boeing... "The idea was that it would no longer be necessary to protect the public from airplanes if Airbus could get airplanes to protect themselves from pilots."
His writing has explored many accidents in which pure human frailty was the cause of accidents, he does so on both manufacturer's planes.
What isn't mentioned however is how a "runaway" of this magnitude is a once in a blue moon event, not 5 months apart on brand new airplanes.
"The idea was that it would no longer be necessary to protect the public from airplanes if Airbus could get airplanes to protect themselves from pilots."
That statement is a very dangerous one, and shows a very narrow minded vision. The debate of whether to include more automation or not is a contentious one and one that will be hotly debated probably forever. There are many instances the other way as well....where an Airbus aircraft has crashed or narrowly avoided a crash due to the software and the computers having a mind of their own. For that reason I've always liked the Boeing aircraft better. They leave the pilot in control to a larger degree than Airbus.
Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier, Embraer, Beechcraft, etc., it doesn’t matter; regardless of the degree of automation a professional pilot still has not know how to fly an aircraft without automation. Automation is not perfect and there are cases where the automation has to be turned off, i.e. the Boeing UAS NNC.
