Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[Curiousflyer]

The technical recertification of this airplane was a long time ago; the issue has been political and optics for months now.

Well think what you like, but the evidence suggests otherwise.
“ Boeing still must finish the software package, conduct one or more demonstration flights with FAA experts on board, and bring in airline pilots to test the changes it is making.”

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... e-737-max/

[L39Guy]

This has nothing whatsoever to do with MCAS and is not considered to be safety critical.

The 787 is currently having a software issue that will be rectified in the next update. The fleet has not been grounded nor should it.

Just because there is a software issue that doesn’t make an aircraft unsafe. An SB, an AD or an emergency AD handles most situations rather than a grounding.

[Curiousflyer]

This has nothing whatsoever to do with MCAS and is not considered to be safety critical.

The 787 is currently having a software issue that will be rectified in the next update. The fleet has not been grounded nor should it.

Just because there is a software issue that doesn’t make an aircraft unsafe. An SB, an AD or an emergency AD handles most situations rather than a grounding.

This situation is the aircraft was a able to boot up, or start up the computers at all, they all crashed.
It’s actually quite hilarious when you think about it.

[Raymond Hall]

From CNN this morning...

Boeing has officially stopped making 737 Max airplanes

The assembly line in Renton, Washington, has stopped building Boeing's bestselling plane, the company confirmed late Monday. Boeing announced plans to temporarily halt production for an undetermined period in December, but it had not previously announced a precise day for the shutdown.

Boeing will not furlough or lay off workers because of the shutdown, but pain will ripple through its supply chain and could hurt America's economic growth. The shutdown will make restarting production and recovering from the crisis more difficult for Boeing once it finally gets permission for the plane to fly again.

The 737 Max has been grounded since March following two fatal crashes that killed all 346 people on board. Although Boeing couldn't deliver the 737 Max planes to customers, the company continued to build the jets, albeit at a slightly reduced pace of 42 a month. It now has about 400 completed jets parked in Washington and Texas, waiting to be delivered to airlines around the world.

But Boeing (BA) doesn't get most of its money from the sale of the jets until they are delivered, and it could not indefinitely continue to incur the costs of building them without being able to deliver them.

Boeing would not release a headcount for people who had been working on the plane. The company said the employees will be reassigned to other duties during the shutdown, and there are a number of reasons for that.

…

In his email to Boeing employees a week ago, new CEO Dave Calhoun said the company would "keep taking steps to maintain our supply chain and workforce expertise so we're ready to restart production."

But Boeing's largest supplier, Spirit AeroSystems (SPR), which makes the fuselage and other parts for the Max, announced on January 10 that it would lay off 2,800 employees in Wichita, Kansas. Spirit's shutdown will probably last longer than Boeing's, because it has continued making 52 fuselages a month since March, more than than the the reduced pace at which Boeing was building. So Boeing has about 100 completed fuselages waiting for it to resume production.

Other Boeing suppliers have also laid off staff without making public announcements. At least seven other Boeing suppliers got 10% or more of their revenue from the 737 Max program, according to credit rating agency Moody's. The Max accounted for about 50% of Spirit's business, and the suspension of the line resulted in its debt being downgraded to junk bond status.

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/21/business ... index.html

[Daniel Cooper]

Boeing stock trading was temporarily halted Tuesday after shares fell by almost 6 percent on reports that regulators plan to keep the company's fleet of troubled 737 Max airplanes grounded until July, far longer than originally planned.

https://www.nbcnews.com/business/busine ... t-n1119586

[Raymond Hall]

Ninth delay...From today's Winnipeg Free Press...

WestJet removes grounded Max from schedule until June 24 on advice from Boeing

CALGARY - WestJet Airlines Ltd. says is removing Boeing's grounded 737 Max jet from flight schedules through June 24 following the manufacturer's latest guidance about regulatory approval for the plane to fly again.

The Calgary-based airline says the change marks the ninth delay of the plane's return to service after regulatory authorities across the globe banned the Max from the skies last March following two fatal crashes in five months.

Boeing advised customers and suppliers Tuesday that it currently estimates that the plane will remain grounded until mid-year.

It says the forecast is based on its experience with the certification process, its ongoing attempts to address known schedule risks and developments that may arise in connection with the certification process.

Further details are to be presented during Boeing's quarterly results to be released next week.

WestJet CEO Ed Sims says the airline is confident in the regulatory process undertaken by the Federal Aviation Authority and Transport Canada to ensure the safe return of the aircraft.

The airline says it has completed more than 98 per cent of planned departures even while its 13 Max aircraft remain on the ground.

Air Canada, which has so far pulled the grounded jet from its schedules through March 31, says it is still awaiting decisions from relevant regulatory authorities who will determine the plane's safe return to service.

https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/busin ... 76222.html

[Raymond Hall]

Delayed to June 30th...



Air Canada, WestJet scrub Boeing 737 Max from schedules until June

MONTREAL - Canada's two biggest airlines pushed back the return of the beleaguered 737 Max after airplane maker Boeing Co. said it did not expect regulators to green-light the jet for takeoff until the middle of the year.

The delay until late June by Air Canada and WestJet Airlines Ltd. follows similar moves by American Airlines, United Airlines and Southwest Airlines, further jeopardizing routes and profit margins.

The airlines' decision marks the latest in a series of delays that have hampered growth plans, reduced revenue and capacity and bumped up costs for the carriers, which have had to spend more on leases for aircraft that are less fuel-efficient.

Air Canada had been on track to have 36 Max 8s — one-quarter of its narrow-body fleet — by the end of 2019, with 14 more scheduled to arrive this year. WestJet was slated to receive two last year and two in 2020 on top of the 13 now sitting idle.

Air Canada said Wednesday that scrubbing the Max from its schedule for the second time in three weeks was based on operational considerations and meant to provide customers with certainty around planning and booking travel.

Earlier this month the Montreal-based airline opted to push back the return of the aircraft until March 31, with the new re-entry date pegged at June 30.

WestJet announced Tuesday that it will remove the plane from its flight schedule until June 24.

https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/busin ... 4422.html

[Raymond Hall]

Today's New York Times:

Boeing Pushes Back 737 Max Return Again

The company told airlines it did not expect regulators to approve the plane to fly until June or July, the latest in a string of setbacks.

The return of Boeing’s 737 Max has been delayed again. On Tuesday, the company said it did not expect regulators to approve the jet to fly again until the middle of the year. American Airlines, United and Southwest had already taken Max flights off their schedules until June, and if this new timeline holds, it would further push back when the plane will be available for commercial flights.

The announcement reflects Boeing’s new appreciation for the challenges facing the company in its effort to persuade regulators that the Max is ready to fly. Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration have continued to find new flaws with the Max that go beyond an automated software system known as MCAS. The software contributed to two accidents, in late 2018 and early 2019, that killed 346 people and led to the worldwide grounding of the Max in March.

But the new estimate is conservative and intended in part to give Boeing some leeway with airline customers, who became frustrated over the past 10 months after the company repeatedly missed its own optimistic deadlines for the plane’s return to service, according to three people familiar with the matter. If regulators find no new problems with the plane, they could lift the grounding by the spring, the people said.

,,,

Boeing is also working through a separate software problem that prevented its flight control computers from turning on. And this month, the company told airlines that it would recommend flight simulator training for pilots before flying the Max. That could delay the return of the plane even after regulatory approval since it will take longer than the iPad lesson the company was originally planning to give pilots.

…

Mr. Muilenburg’s replacement, David Calhoun, formally stepped into the chief executive role last week. For its part, the F.A.A. said it was continuing with the process of getting the plane approved to fly again. “We have set no time frame for when the work will be completed,” the agency said in a statement.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/busi ... 7-max.html

[plausiblyannonymous]

So, Boeing said that the new status quo should remain.

I thought they were going to stop giving dates?

[L39Guy]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

[Raymond Hall]

Finally, a little light at the end of the tunnel:

Boeing 737 Max could be recertified before midyear, FAA says

The head of the Federal Aviation Administration has told airlines that it could lift a flight ban on the Boeing 737 Max before midyear, ahead of the manufacturer’s new timeline that it shared with its customers this week. The news sent Boeing’s shares higher.

FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told carriers that it could recertify the planes before the middle of the year if no new issues are discovered, according to a person familiar with the conversations.

“While the FAA continues to follow a thorough, deliberate process, the agency is pleased with Boeing’s progress in recent weeks toward achieving key milestones,” the FAA said in a statement. “Safety is the top priority, and the FAA continues to work with other safety regulators to ensure that Boeing has addressed all known issues with the aircraft.”

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/24/boeing- ... says.html

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Guardian:

Ryanair warns it could shut bases and cut jobs after 737 Max delays

Airline says Boeing will not deliver aircraft until autumn, missing peak summer months

Ryanair has warned pilots and cabin crew it could close bases and cut jobs after the date for delivery of its first 10 of Boeing’s grounded 737 Max aircraft slipped into the autumn.

The Irish low-cost airline said Boeing would not deliver the first aircraft until September or October at the earliest, as Ryanair does not take deliveries during its peak summer months of June, July and August, according to a memo dated 27 January.

Two months ago Ryanair said it hoped to get the first of the 135 new 737 Max planes it has ordered in March or April, already two months after their original due date.

The memo said the airline’s commercial team would be drafting plans for job cuts over the coming week, with staff to be informed in the first or second week of February. Ryanair declined to give details on the number or location of the redundancies.

Boeing’s 737 Max aircraft have been grounded worldwide since March 2019, following two deadly crashes which were blamed on the model’s faulty systems. A total of 346 people died in the two crashes.

In the memo Ryanair executive Eddie Wilson wrote that the airline’s summer schedule relied on the delivery of the 10 planes. He apologised for the uncertainty and said the airline would try to prioritise cuts in flight frequencies over the closure of bases.

Boeing, the world’s largest aerospace company, has repeatedly pushed back its estimate for when the 737 Max will be allowed to fly again. Last week, it said that deliveries would recommence in “mid-2020” as it awaits US regulators to recertify the plane’s safety following software updates.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ing-summer

[goingnowherefast]

Ryan Air pilots should follow the example and sue Boeing for lost wages and now jobs.

Aren't there any 737 NGs and classics (400/500 series) that they could pull out of the desert somewhere and use for a year while waiting for the MAX? Common type rating and all...

[Raymond Hall]

Boeing posts first annual loss in more than two decades as 737 Max crisis drags on

Boeing on Wednesday reported its first annual loss in more than two decades as costs from the 737 Max crashes rise sharply.

Boeing said it lost $636 million in 2019, marking the company’s first annual loss since 1997. That’s in stark contrast to the $10.46 billion profit it posted in 2018 — before a second crash grounded its best-selling planes worldwide.

The stock price gained nearly 3% in early trading.

In its earnings statement, Boeing reported a loss of $2.33 per share for the fourth quarter. Revenue in the last three months of the year dropped 37% to $17.91 billion from $28.34 billion in the year-earlier period.

The debacle’s costs to Boeing are rising to more than $18 billion, the company said, roughly double what it outlined in the previous quarter. That amount includes an additional $2.6 billion pretax charge to compensate airlines and other 737 Max customers because of the grounding. Boeing had taken a $5.6 billion pretax charge in the second quarter to compensate its customers.

The company recently reported its worst annual sales figures in decades and it handed the crown to the world’s biggest aircraft manufacturer to its rival, Europe’s Airbus.

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/29/boeing- ... -2019.html

['97 Tercel]

They'll be fine...probably soon to be lifted up by a fresh round of government subsidies, I mean, contracts.

[boeingboy]

Aren't there any 737 NGs and classics (400/500 series) that they could pull out of the desert somewhere and use for a year while waiting for the MAX? Common type rating and all...

Nope. Your about a year too late for that.

After the max was grounded - practically every available airplane was leased or spoken for. That's why you see so many companies leasing whatever they can find to fill in. Air Canada with 767's from Omni, Sunwing with 767's, 737 classics, and even an A340, everyone everywhere has been scrambling to extend leases or find other lift.

[yycflyguy]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

What are you talking about? This episode was relatively well done (small nuance errors) as it's objective was to convey the technical issues to Joe Public with an emphasis on the human element. You think the AA Captains were sensationalizing or explaining? It was not as sensational as other media reports. The episode has nothing to do with politics or CBC.

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times:

Boeing Expects 737 Max Costs Will Surpass $18 Billion

The grounding of the 737 Max jet continues to drag on the company’s results.

Boeing said on Wednesday that the costs associated with the grounding of the 737 Max were likely to surpass $18 billion, a significant increase over earlier forecasts.

The new estimate, announced during Boeing’s quarterly earnings report, is the company’s most recent approximation of just how expensive it will be to return the Max to service, compensate airline customers and restart the shuttered 737 factory.

Boeing continues to grapple with the fallout from the crashes of two Max jets in 2018 and 2019, which killed 346 people, leading to the worldwide grounding of the plane in March. In addition to the rising costs, the company is contending with a new chief executive, the temporary shutdown of the 737 factory and a range of challenges in other parts of the business.

Boeing said on Wednesday that the costs associated with shutting down and restarting the factory would amount to some $4 billion. The decision to temporarily halt production of the Max was made only last month, and Boeing had not previously given guidance on what the move would cost.


The company also said that the cost of compensating airlines that had lost sales as a result of the grounding of the Max was now expected to reach $8.3 billion, up from a previous estimate of $5.6 billion. That figure represents a mixture of cash payments to airlines and discounts on future sales.

And Boeing said that as a result of the grounding, which has lasted nearly a year now, it expected the overall cost to produce the 737 Max to rise to $6.3 billion in the years ahead, up from an earlier estimate of $3.6 billion.

In total, the anticipated costs now equal more than $18.6 billion, or nearly 20 percent of Boeing’s annual sales before the Max was grounded.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/busi ... osts.html

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times:

Boeing Expects 737 Max Costs Will Surpass $18 Billion

It sure makes the cost of an AOA comparator and a couple of hours of simulator training regarding MCAS pale in comparison to the ultimate cost of not providing same, n'est-ce pas?

[L39Guy]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

What are you talking about? This episode was relatively well done (small nuance errors) as it's objective was to convey the technical issues to Joe Public with an emphasis on the human element. You think the AA Captains were sensationalizing or explaining? It was not as sensational as other media reports. The episode has nothing to do with politics or CBC.

What’s wrong with this news piece? Allow me to explain.
First, bear in mind that this was aired fully 3 months after the Indonesian accident report was released.
Here is what I really don’t like:

- The simulator assessment was a little bogus. It is well known that the APA pilots (this guy in particular is a little annoyed about the lack of MCAS info. Offended is probably a good way to put it.

- The airspeeds and altitudes were not were not “wildly wrong” at all. They disagreed by a few knots and feet, repectively.

- Startle factor. Ok, there is a startle factor, not doubt about it. But they Lion Air accident Captain overcame that and called for the Airspeed Unreliable drill. He didn’t now it so he asked the FO to do it. He didn’t know it either and the transcript reveals the sound of pages turning. Finally, the Captain says “10.2”, i.e. page 10.2 of the checklist. These are memory drills and were never done before the flaps were retracted and the “beast” MCAS kicked in. Moreover, how is it that the crew of that same aircraft the previous day with the same problem overcame the “startle factor” and did the drill (and flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with MCAS)?

- Lots of drama about the nose down pitching with MCAS activating. But how is it that the Captain of the accident aircraft managed to manually trim the aircraft to neutral 26 times before handing control to the FO who promptly lost control of the aircraft? How is it that the crew of the incident aircraft the previous day not only controlled the longitudinal trim of the aircraft but they also recognized it as a stab trim runaway, did the drill (turn off the stab trim) then flew the aircraft for an hour and a half to the destination?

- The AA pilots were offended about not being informed about MCAS. Fair enough. But would it have changed the outcome. The Lion Air accident crew could not do the unreliable airspeed drill by memory nor could they do the stab trim runaway drill, despite the trim running away 26 times. Following the Lion Air accident, all MAX pilots were informed about MCAS, including the Ethiopian pilots. I didn’t change the outcome did it?

- 4 seconds to recognize a failure and 10 seconds to react. Ok, so how did the Lion Air incident crew do it? The Lion Air accident crew flew the aircraft for minutes after the MCAS did its thing – the had plenty of time to react, 26 six times the aircraft was retrimmed to neutral then MCAS pitched the aircraft nose down. They could have had all day to react but they never were going to get it right because they were never going to recognize this as a stab trim runaway and turn off two switches on the center console. Same for the Ethiopian crew.

- The accident report describes the decision process in allowing MCAS with a single sensor. Boeing assumed that type-rated pilots could do a UAS drill and a Stab Trim Runaway drill. Bad assumption.

- And, yes, that meant no requirement for extra simulator training as these are well known emergencies, the Stab Trim one going back to the 707 days and present on every Boeing since. The UAS drill has been in existence for years too. Yet, despite all of the neither the Lion Air accident crew nor the Ethiopian did them (although the Lion Air incident crew did).

- The Ethiopian crew only had 10 seconds to perform the procedure? B.S. McKenna is quoting that figure out of context. They had plenty of time as they were airborne for 6 minutes and not during any of that did anyone do the UAS drill and at least pull the throttles back to control the aircraft. Even worse, they turned the Stab Trim back on!

- I could go on about the public hearings, etc.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not a heartless SOB; I have every sympathy for the victims and families. I have lost enough friends in airplane accidents to know how they feel.

I am pissed off as a professional aviator as these accidents were entirely preventable, as the Lion Air incident proved. I am pissed off with the regulators in these countries for not regulating; the airlines for providing crappy training and not insisting on their pilots to manually fly their aircraft (as their manual flying skills were non-existent); and, yes, the pilots for not knowing their emergencies drills. If the accident aircraft crews had done nothing but pulled the power back from take-off thrust and controlled the airspeed of the aircraft, neither of these accidents would have occurred. But they couldn’t even do that.

Boeing makes great airplanes and, yes, Boeing is culpable for these accidents with the crews, the airlines, the regulators, the maintainers, and the component overhaul shop. But this documentary does not reflect this story accurately and completely. But that is Terrance McKenna’s style.

[L39Guy]

From today's New York Times:

Boeing Expects 737 Max Costs Will Surpass $18 Billion

It sure makes the cost of an AOA comparator and a couple of hours of simulator training regarding MCAS pale in comparison to the ultimate cost of not providing same, n'est-ce pas?

As detailed above, I doubt if simulator training would have changed the outcome. Simulator training didn't do anything for the fatal accident crews in recognizing and executing unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway. What makes you think simulator training for MCAS, which would involve the unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway drills, would change things?

[Raymond Hall]

What makes you think simulator training for MCAS, which would involve the unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway drills, would change things?

Training, to first, recognize the onset of the problem, then second, to habituate the appropriate response.

Could have prevented both prior accidents.

No guarantee, but there is nothing like experience, and simulated experience is much less costly than real experience.

Even Boeing now agrees that there should have been training provided, and the FAA apparently is mandating it for any re-certification.

[HavaJava]

L39guy,

Your summary is spot on. It scares me how many so called professional pilots don’t think that a transport category jet pilot should be expected to handle an emergency that they have not been explicitly trained for (or for which there isn’t a perfectly designed checklist). And, as you so eloquently pointed out, if these crews had just followed the associated drills they would still be alive today.

Don’t get me started on the “startle factor” either. Unreliable Airspeed is confusing by definition. The whole point of the drill is to get the plane into a safe config until the problem can be sorted out. Of course that involves manually flying the plane and the Ethiopian crew were stabbing at the A/P like their life depended on it...sad state of affairs in the industry.

I have not heard one valid or convincing argument that somehow the MAX is a death trap. I will happily fly it if I get the chance in the future.

[yycflyguy]

I disagree that L39guy's post is "spot on". There is a lot there I, and many others, could debate but won't bother as it has been done ad nauseam for almost a year now. My questions was why the CBC should be defunded as the report was geared towards a simplified explanation to the public, not a technical review.

[Duke Point]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

What are you talking about? This episode was relatively well done (small nuance errors) as it's objective was to convey the technical issues to Joe Public with an emphasis on the human element. You think the AA Captains were sensationalizing or explaining? It was not as sensational as other media reports. The episode has nothing to do with politics or CBC.

What’s wrong with this news piece? Allow me to explain.
First, bear in mind that this was aired fully 3 months after the Indonesian accident report was released.
Here is what I really don’t like:

- The simulator assessment was a little bogus. It is well known that the APA pilots (this guy in particular is a little annoyed about the lack of MCAS info. Offended is probably a good way to put it.

- The airspeeds and altitudes were not were not “wildly wrong” at all. They disagreed by a few knots and feet, repectively.

- Startle factor. Ok, there is a startle factor, not doubt about it. But they Lion Air accident Captain overcame that and called for the Airspeed Unreliable drill. He didn’t now it so he asked the FO to do it. He didn’t know it either and the transcript reveals the sound of pages turning. Finally, the Captain says “10.2”, i.e. page 10.2 of the checklist. These are memory drills and were never done before the flaps were retracted and the “beast” MCAS kicked in. Moreover, how is it that the crew of that same aircraft the previous day with the same problem overcame the “startle factor” and did the drill (and flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with MCAS)?

- Lots of drama about the nose down pitching with MCAS activating. But how is it that the Captain of the accident aircraft managed to manually trim the aircraft to neutral 26 times before handing control to the FO who promptly lost control of the aircraft? How is it that the crew of the incident aircraft the previous day not only controlled the longitudinal trim of the aircraft but they also recognized it as a stab trim runaway, did the drill (turn off the stab trim) then flew the aircraft for an hour and a half to the destination?

- The AA pilots were offended about not being informed about MCAS. Fair enough. But would it have changed the outcome. The Lion Air accident crew could not do the unreliable airspeed drill by memory nor could they do the stab trim runaway drill, despite the trim running away 26 times. Following the Lion Air accident, all MAX pilots were informed about MCAS, including the Ethiopian pilots. I didn’t change the outcome did it?

- 4 seconds to recognize a failure and 10 seconds to react. Ok, so how did the Lion Air incident crew do it? The Lion Air accident crew flew the aircraft for minutes after the MCAS did its thing – the had plenty of time to react, 26 six times the aircraft was retrimmed to neutral then MCAS pitched the aircraft nose down. They could have had all day to react but they never were going to get it right because they were never going to recognize this as a stab trim runaway and turn off two switches on the center console. Same for the Ethiopian crew.

- The accident report describes the decision process in allowing MCAS with a single sensor. Boeing assumed that type-rated pilots could do a UAS drill and a Stab Trim Runaway drill. Bad assumption.

- And, yes, that meant no requirement for extra simulator training as these are well known emergencies, the Stab Trim one going back to the 707 days and present on every Boeing since. The UAS drill has been in existence for years too. Yet, despite all of the neither the Lion Air accident crew nor the Ethiopian did them (although the Lion Air incident crew did).

- The Ethiopian crew only had 10 seconds to perform the procedure? B.S. McKenna is quoting that figure out of context. They had plenty of time as they were airborne for 6 minutes and not during any of that did anyone do the UAS drill and at least pull the throttles back to control the aircraft. Even worse, they turned the Stab Trim back on!

- I could go on about the public hearings, etc.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not a heartless SOB; I have every sympathy for the victims and families. I have lost enough friends in airplane accidents to know how they feel.

I am pissed off as a professional aviator as these accidents were entirely preventable, as the Lion Air incident proved. I am pissed off with the regulators in these countries for not regulating; the airlines for providing crappy training and not insisting on their pilots to manually fly their aircraft (as their manual flying skills were non-existent); and, yes, the pilots for not knowing their emergencies drills. If the accident aircraft crews had done nothing but pulled the power back from take-off thrust and controlled the airspeed of the aircraft, neither of these accidents would have occurred. But they couldn’t even do that.

Boeing makes great airplanes and, yes, Boeing is culpable for these accidents with the crews, the airlines, the regulators, the maintainers, and the component overhaul shop. But this documentary does not reflect this story accurately and completely. But that is Terrance McKenna’s style.

I've got to agree with this 100%. Most aviators with decades in the industry will.

As has been said hundreds of times, Boeing really dropped the ball badly after the first accident. They should have immediately recognized the varied training standards and experience levels that exist throughout the world and immediately mandated dual AOA in all aircraft, neutered the MCAS to a single cycle per event and combined that with a comprehensive training amendment that would cover an MCAS malfunction scenario. If national aviation authorities forced their airlines to mandate this training or not, at least Boeing would have covered themselves. However, they likely felt their share price and rep of the Max would be too badly affected, so hush-hush. They get what they deserve.

The bright side is that there will be drastic changes that will likely prevent further catastrophic "sloppy self-certification related" events that would have occured unchecked.

DP.