Air Tindi

[co-joe]

I'll chip in:

There's a couple of ways to handle this. You could just up and confess "Ya, Departure, we forgot to refuel so we'd like to return" but there's going to be a lot more embarrassment to go around than just your own (but you don't count because you deserve it all, Stupid!) You'll embarrass the Company, and that might just kill a lot of business or cause people to rethink inking that big contract... so you can't really go this route.

Absolutely, declaring an emergency if required, and executing a 180 was definitely on the table first and foremost. It was the first option that came to mind, it was the first one we discussed as an option, and initially it was the only option my FO thought was a good one. Fortunately for us we had enough gas to get to destination, but we definitely did not have IFR gas. I can't remember the exact numbers but I'm not ever sure we had VFR reserves. We did have time to spend 5 minutes talking about it.

[co-joe]

Not really enough info to make a decision such as the weather that day, possible route modifications, ability to make an enroute stop, etc.

We had a crew that didn't check their notams and went to a nearby destination expecting to fuel when no fuel was available. They were able to continue on and returned with VFR fuel.

Also fantastic, thank you for bringing a fuel diversion up. It's not a structured approach to decision making if you only consider the first solution. Unless you're out of gas, then I suppose you are down to your only choice. But we had time to at least discuss it as a crew. Turning around and going to a busy airport like YYC would mean a minimum 2 hour delay, and that's if I didn't get fired while there, and assuming the pax were still willing to forgive me and come for a second plane ride. You have to fly a STAR arrival, possible long taxi, wait for fuel truck. Unless you squawk 7700, but then that comes with it's own set of problems.

The weather that day was not a major factor. We were in VFR weather, and were expecting to stay that way at destination and alternate. I can't exactly remember the destination but it was somewhere small and uncontrolled so likely GFA weather no TAF, and likely an auto station. Rocky Mountain House, or Drayton Valley maybe? Red Deer as the alternate I'm guessing since they have a TAF.

You also brought up going VFR. That's a tough thing to get en route when you initially filed IFR. You can't cancel the IFR till below 12 500', and not till you have the field in sight. So technically we would have been breaking the law for the en route portion. You could call the FIC, file a VFR flight plan, and then ask centre to close the IFR one and open the VFR plan but they are going to ask questions. It's just not a normal thing to do.

There's one more option we discussed that we ended up taking that not only solved our problems, but did not compromise safety in any way (IMHO). There's probably lots of options I haven't even thought of as well.

[pelmet]

Not really enough info to make a decision such as the weather that day, possible route modifications, ability to make an enroute stop, etc.

We had a crew that didn't check their notams and went to a nearby destination expecting to fuel when no fuel was available. They were able to continue on and returned with VFR fuel.

You also brought up going VFR. That's a tough thing to get en route when you initially filed IFR. You can't cancel the IFR till below 12 500', and not till you have the field in sight. So technically we would have been breaking the law for the en route portion. You could call the FIC, file a VFR flight plan, and then ask centre to close the IFR one and open the VFR plan but they are going to ask questions. It's just not a normal thing to do.

FSS can open your VFR flight plan, if one is filed.

As for center, I wonder if they would accept Controlled VFR as it might avoid a descent.

[co-joe]

...

FSS can open your VFR flight plan, if one is filed.

As for center, I wonder if they would accept Controlled VFR as it might avoid a descent.

Good question. I've actually never used CVFR, but I suspect it only applies in Class B airspace, once you get above FL180 I'm pretty sure that's Class A airspace, so IFR only I believe. The King Air 200 needs to be around 180-230 ish to get decent TAS/ fuel burn.

Speaking of that, any student pilots on here? Anybody do Exercise 10 recently and want to suggest an alternative solution to my fuel problem (likely Air Tindi's problem just to stay on track for the thread)

[pelmet]

...

FSS can open your VFR flight plan, if one is filed.

As for center, I wonder if they would accept Controlled VFR as it might avoid a descent.

Good question. I've actually never used CVFR, but I suspect it only applies in Class B airspace, once you get above FL180 I'm pretty sure that's Class A airspace, so IFR only I believe. The King Air 200 needs to be around 180-230 ish to get decent TAS/ fuel burn.

Speaking of that, any student pilots on here? Anybody do Exercise 10 recently and want to suggest an alternative solution to my fuel problem (likely Air Tindi's problem just to stay on track for the thread)

I suspect the Tindi guys discovered their problem too late. But if close to equi-distant from airports and have a chance of making it, they might want to consider the winds and shutting down an engine to extend range.

If no chance of making it, perhaps head toward smoother terrain for the off airport landing. If terrain is similar in either direction, I would prefer to be heading toward rescue and medical facilities although weather should be considered as well.

[TeePeeCreeper]

...

FSS can open your VFR flight plan, if one is filed.

As for center, I wonder if they would accept Controlled VFR as it might avoid a descent.

Good question. I've actually never used CVFR, but I suspect it only applies in Class B airspace, once you get above FL180 I'm pretty sure that's Class A airspace, so IFR only I believe. The King Air 200 needs to be around 180-230 ish to get decent TAS/ fuel burn.

Speaking of that, any student pilots on here? Anybody do Exercise 10 recently and want to suggest an alternative solution to my fuel problem (likely Air Tindi's problem just to stay on track for the thread)

Range and endurance wouldn’t have helped them much if they weren’t doing fuel checks to begin with. I think that periodically monitoring ones fuel state (I jott mine down every 20 minutes or when crossing a way point which ever comes first) might have prevented this.

TPC

[co-joe]

Range and endurance wouldn’t have helped them much if they weren’t doing fuel checks to begin with. I think that periodically monitoring ones fuel state (I jott mine down every 20 minutes or when crossing a way point which ever comes first) might have prevented this.

TPC

You're probably right, In my case it saved my day. The King Air 200 trues out at 240-260, and in my time flying them you always ran best speed. This day, I passed control to the FO, reached under his seat, and pulled out the AFM. I found range power for our altitude, weight, and temperature and set it. It was a way lower power setting than I had thought. I think it was around 1000 'lbs, instead of the normal 2300 we would be setting at a mid altitude. The fuel burn difference was huge, somewhere around 400 Lbs/ hour instead of the normal 700 lbs/ hour you'd get a best forward speed. The drop in TAS was definitely noticeable but not anywhere near as much as the fuel burn difference, I think it was around 205 ktas. So basically a 43% reduction in fuel burn, for a 20% reduction in TAS give or take a bit.

The difference gave us full IFR fuel again. I ran the numbers twice, had the FO confirm them. Even still, CRM wise I had to sell it to him. I think he had basically decided we were going with plan A of an emergency return. Now originally we had planned to depart with return fuel, but now we had to fill up at destination. Once I confirmed in the CFS that fuel was available we had to ask for the lower TAS from centre. They actually asked if everything was OK. So one SMS report later, and a rather uncomfortable meeting with the chief pilot, I was back on line with a much better respect for procedures.

Shutting an engine down to stay airborne can work, but that's a hail Mary attempt. If you ever get yourself into that position, you're probably also praying out loud. I heard a story of a Dash 8 crew in Northern Quebec saving the day by shutting an engine down.

[pelmet]

Range and endurance wouldn’t have helped them much if they weren’t doing fuel checks to begin with. I think that periodically monitoring ones fuel state (I jott mine down every 20 minutes or when crossing a way point which ever comes first) might have prevented this.

TPC

Shutting an engine down to stay airborne can work, but that's a hail Mary attempt. If you ever get yourself into that position, you're probably also praying out loud. I heard a story of a Dash 8 crew in Northern Quebec saving the day by shutting an engine down.

It is something that is done when the alternative is crashing, which was nowhere close to your case. However, It may not work for all types.

[co-joe]

It is something that is done when the alternative is crashing, which was nowhere close to your case. However, It may not work for all types.

You're totally right. If crashing is a likely outcome from your current situation, shutting one down to save gas is absolutely an option to consider. That's thinking outside the box and I've never heard of a written procedure for it. The Boeing has an Eng Out cruise page on the FMC that tells you a bunch of information like drift down altitude with max continuous thrust, what power setting that is, and you can go to the prog page and see your fuel at destination and see if it changes, and by how much. If it showed you landing with more fuel and you knew you were in deep trouble it gives you more options to run through that structured decision making model.

In the Twin Otter, you just have to know your plane, know what single engine fuel burn and TAS look like. Almost guaranteed this crew's training was "on wing" so they should have had a pretty good idea of those numbers. That all only helps if you are paying attention and realise you are low on gas. Situation awareness is key here.

[pelmet]

It is something that is done when the alternative is crashing, which was nowhere close to your case. However, It may not work for all types.

You're totally right. If crashing is a likely outcome from your current situation, shutting one down to save gas is absolutely an option to consider. That's thinking outside the box and I've never heard of a written procedure for it. The Boeing has an Eng Out cruise page on the FMC that tells you a bunch of information like drift down altitude with max continuous thrust, what power setting that is, and you can go to the prog page and see your fuel at destination and see if it changes, and by how much. If it showed you landing with more fuel and you knew you were in deep trouble it gives you more options to run through that structured decision making model.

In the Twin Otter, you just have to know your plane, know what single engine fuel burn and TAS look like. Almost guaranteed this crew's training was "on wing" so they should have had a pretty good idea of those numbers. That all only helps if you are paying attention and realise you are low on gas. Situation awareness is key here.

I thought I read it in a Twin Otter manual but it might have been a different type. Remember reading it somewhere but couldn't find it again years later.

Not sure it would work too well in a jet with higher increased fuel burns and performance shortfalls.

Bottom line, I don't have any evidence to prove my point. Would welcome it if anybody has some.

[pdw]

Shutting an engine down to stay airborne can work, but that’s a Hail Mary attempt. If you ever get yourself into that position, you’re probably also praying out loud. I heard a story of a Dash 8crew in northern Quebec saving the day by shutting one engine down.

The news story was posted to a thread on this site. A headwind southbound increased until the crew realized ‘won’t make it’ to destination past the point of no return between two airports. A midflight turnaround decision gave enough groundspeed range to reach the other (edit … a different one than departure) airport with the one engine shut down to maximize slowflight economy for a huge tailwind range advantage.

That option worked as the extended time airborne on the one engine was high ground speed.

['97 Tercel]

[EPR]

If you were just hauling MT drums Southbound, and the upper winds were favourable, you could always go high and shut off the bleeds to conserve fuel burn...but it gets mighty cold!

[co-joe]

I thought there was a story about a Dash 8 missing in Cape Dorsett maybe, and then returning to somewhere in Nunavik like Kuujuak or Kangiksualujuak (spelling may be an issue here) and missing there and being on fumes and shutting one down to get somewhere else. I figured it was Air Inuit, but but maybe Canadian North? It's hard to find old incident reports if nobody was hurt and nothing got bent.

[pdw]

It's hard to find old incident reports if nobody was hurt and nothing got bent.

Nobody hurt, nothing bent, will be a lot less pressure to force all the details to light in some instances. That news narrative was fairly simple though too. You are correct that they were going from A to B and diverted to C (an optimal airport to divert to with that unexpected vector).

[Redneck_pilot86]

https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-repo ... w0098.html

[BTD]

I can’t believe this bs still goes on.

The first officer then sat down in the cockpit and asked the captain if he would like to commence the Before Start checks. The captain declined and started the engines at 1743.

The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.

[digits_]

Was any of the fuel they drained from the wreckage supposed to accessible in flight with one engine shutdown?

[UnionDrive]

I can’t believe this bs still goes on.

The first officer then sat down in the cockpit and asked the captain if he would like to commence the Before Start checks. The captain declined and started the engines at 1743.

The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.

Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.

[BTD]

I can’t believe this bs still goes on.

The first officer then sat down in the cockpit and asked the captain if he would like to commence the Before Start checks. The captain declined and started the engines at 1743.

The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.

Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.

And…..?

The practice of skipping checklists whether done only by the individual or if it is company culture is irrelevant to my argument. This attitude needs to go away.

If the other pilot is anticipating the checklist and you skip it, he is that much further removed from the loop.

Now if the company decides to make it a “flow” that is something different. In that case it is formalized and everyone does it the same way perhaps backed up by a checklist perhaps not depending on how it is developed.

If the sop, fcom, FOM, com or whatever says it is a read and do or challenge and response do it that way, or have it changed at the top. Nobody else needs to die to know that the half baked way of doing it eventually catches up to a sizeable portion of the population.

[Donald]

Given that management was unaware of non-use of checklists.

And management was unaware of crew departing with unserviceable instruments (re: king air 200 crash).

Perhaps the company culture needs further examination? IE time to leave the bush flying attitude in the bush.

[pelmet]

.

[UnionDrive]

I can’t believe this bs still goes on.



The attitudes of save 25 secs here and there need to change.

Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.

And…..?

The practice of skipping checklists whether done only by the individual or if it is company culture is irrelevant to my argument. This attitude needs to go away.

If the other pilot is anticipating the checklist and you skip it, he is that much further removed from the loop.

Now if the company decides to make it a “flow” that is something different. In that case it is formalized and everyone does it the same way perhaps backed up by a checklist perhaps not depending on how it is developed.

If the sop, fcom, FOM, com or whatever says it is a read and do or challenge and response do it that way, or have it changed at the top. Nobody else needs to die to know that the half baked way of doing it eventually catches up to a sizeable portion of the population.

I’m agreeing with you. Just pointing out that it is company culture. That’s all.

[BTD]

Read on. It was/is standard practice at Air Tindi. I find it hard to believe that management did not know that the captains were not using checklists. The cp’s all flew/have flown the twin at some point.

And…..?

The practice of skipping checklists whether done only by the individual or if it is company culture is irrelevant to my argument. This attitude needs to go away.

If the other pilot is anticipating the checklist and you skip it, he is that much further removed from the loop.

Now if the company decides to make it a “flow” that is something different. In that case it is formalized and everyone does it the same way perhaps backed up by a checklist perhaps not depending on how it is developed.

If the sop, fcom, FOM, com or whatever says it is a read and do or challenge and response do it that way, or have it changed at the top. Nobody else needs to die to know that the half baked way of doing it eventually catches up to a sizeable portion of the population.

I’m agreeing with you. Just pointing out that it is company culture. That’s all.

Roger that.

[pelmet]

I flew with a captain on the Twin Otter who didn't like the checklist. Typically, the copilot was in the back for the engine start and would get up into the cockpit while the aircraft was being taxied. Then that particular captain would do a flow(or would have already done the flow) and recite every challenge and response checklist item like an auctioneer in about an eight second time period after the copilot put on the headset.

I would simply do the checklist items myself, making sure to focus on the important items. That always included checking the fuel guages. Bad move by both pilots to not always check that item regardless of how the checklist was used.

What kind of captain doesn't read the fuel receipt combined with not bothering to look at the fuel guages? He assumed the receipt was for that flight but even if it was.......how can he confirm that the proper amount of fuel was uplifted? Sometimes a mistake is made in quantity. You have to make sure.

One should check their fuel quantity again soon after takeoff(I suggest as part of a flow/procedure at top of climb) to see if there is a leak. Then you are still close to the departure airport if a problem is discovered rather than potentially discovering a fuel issue at a significant range/time position from an airport. It does take a few seconds time from the time some prefer to spend gossiping.

I started a thread called A Top of Climb Check a couple of years ago suggesting a tailored flow for your type. Several posters took issue with it resulting in the thread being deleted. This flight is a good example of how one can save the day.