The Wrong Way to Teach Force Landings

[Big Pistons Forever]

How we train students for engine failures does not IMO reflect the reality of how engine failures actually occur in the real world.

Specifically:

1) Looking at the accidents statistics approximately 2/3rds of all engine failures are directly caused by the actions or inactions of the pilot. The best way to deal with an engine failure is to not cause the engine to fail in the first place. IMO far too little emphasis is placed on this fact in flight training. Instead students are led to believe that engines are most likely to just stop on their own with no warning

2) A complete engine failure in an airplane that has sufficient uncontaminated fuel properly selected, with appropriate precaution taken to guard against carb icing, with the mixture control properly set, and normal indications on the engine gauges, represents the least likely to happen actual real world engine failure scenario. Yet this is exactly the scenario that is represented in flight training when the instructor pulls the throttle back and tells the student "the engine just failed"

3) The "cause checks", that is the immediate drills performed after the engine fails are at best given short shrift in flight training. Typically the students mumbles his/her way through a short list so they can get on with flying the forced landing, because they need to get a good score on the flight test. This inculcates an unfortunate mindset of that after the engine fails it won't start so students should concentrate on flying the forced landing pattern. I personally know of two forced landings which wrecked the aircraft, where engine power could have been restored if appropriate immediate action drills had been completed. I make sure that on some of the forced landing exercises if the drills are properly carried out the student gets the engine back as a way to emphasize their importance. I also mix it up with a scenario where the pilot has to shut down the engine themselves, with a scenario like the vibration from the engine is so heavy you can't read any gauges or the fact the engine is on fire. Both of those scenarios happened to pilots I trained after they got their PPL

3) For every actual total engine failure there are probably 3 partial engine failures, yet this possibility is almost never mentioned in flight training yet alone actually practiced. It is actually a more difficult scenario as there will be lots of ambiguity as to what is happening and what is the best course of action.

4) When the engine fails the insurance company just bought the airplane. What it looks like after it comes to a stop is absolutely irrelevant, the only factor that matters is nobody gets hurt. Yet many light schools spend an inordinate amount of time on elaborate exercises to determine the "best" field. I tell my student Close, Open, and Flat in that order of importance, are the only things that matter. A 9 Gee deceleration from 60 knots to stop takes 25 feet. You can smash the aircraft into the ground in control with the wings level and a level pitch attitude into pretty much any patch of flat ground and everyone lives. You stall/spin trying to maneuver into that perfect field, into wind, parallel to the furrows with the right kind of animals on it etc etc and you die.

[photofly]

Could you put your thoughts to how to rewrite the stated aims of the forced approach exercise in the PPL and CPL flight tests better to suit your improved training goals?

How much of your critique is due to a badly drafted flight test guide, and how much is due to instructors misinterpreting that guide?

[rookiepilot]

Outstanding post.

[Bede]

Great thread.

How we train students for engine failures does not IMO reflect the reality of how engine failures actually occur in the real world.

Agree 100%

1) Looking at the accidents statistics approximately 2/3rds of all engine failures are directly caused by the actions or inactions of the pilot. The best way to deal with an engine failure is to not cause the engine to fail in the first place. IMO far too little emphasis is placed on this fact in flight training. Instead students are led to believe that engines are most likely to just stop on their own with no warning

I've always covered this thoroughly in my PGI. What 3 things does an engine need to run? (spark, fuel, air). What can cause each of these to cease to be eliminated? It turns into a brainstorming session making a list of every reason you may not have "fuel".

3) For every actual total engine failure there are probably 3 partial engine failures, yet this possibility is almost never mentioned in flight training yet alone actually practiced. It is actually a more difficult scenario as there will be lots of ambiguity as to what is happening and what is the best course of action.

I often introduce the forced approach starting with what would be a precautionary: engine running rough, continuous RPM drop, etc. If the student can troubleshoot their way through it, they get their engine back. If not, the engine eventually quits and there's a forced approach.

One of my first students had an engine failure on his PPL flight test. A gear in the reduction gearbox let go (Rotax 912) and they lost oil pressure. A couple minutes later the engine seized.

4) When the engine fails the insurance company just bought the airplane.

Sometimes, but not always. I had a policy once that had an exclusion for hull loss/damage as a result of mechanical failure. I took this to mean that if the engine quits and I end up in trees, I don't get paid.

What it looks like after it comes to a stop is absolutely irrelevant, the only factor that matters is nobody gets hurt.

Agree 100%

Yet many light schools spend an inordinate amount of time on elaborate exercises to determine the "best" field. I tell my student Close, Open, and Flat in that order of importance, are the only things that matter. A 9 Gee deceleration from 60 knots to stop takes 25 feet. You can smash the aircraft into the ground in control with the wings level and a level pitch attitude into pretty much any patch of flat ground and everyone lives. You stall/spin trying to maneuver into that perfect field, into wind, parallel to the furrows with the right kind of animals on it etc etc and you die.

Generally I agree, but pilots/passengers rarely die from too great a deceleration (>40G in the x-axis is considered fatal). Often the structure is compromised (by a tree) and impinges the passenger compartment, or they get hit with unsecured cargo, etc. Sadly there's a lot of things that can kill you in car's and planes. This is why sometimes in car accidents you often see one person dead and the other person walking around the accident without a scratch.

[Squaretail]

3) For every actual total engine failure there are probably 3 partial engine failures, yet this possibility is almost never mentioned in flight training yet alone actually practiced. It is actually a more difficult scenario as there will be lots of ambiguity as to what is happening and what is the best course of action.

The problem is still binary though. While one could train for an infinite possible partial failure scenarios, all that matters is either a) the airplane can still maintain altitude and speed, so it become more a matter of perhaps a diversion, or b) the airplane can't maintain altitude, so its a forced approach and the same procedure applies. It just may have a better glide ratio, so the techniques to judge gliding distance still apply.

While there may be type specific likely causes to be discussed, technique wise, there isn't any practice material. If one feels that students should be well versed in various different levels of power loss, you should also be worried about losses with different flap configurations, weights and balance scenarios, density altitude, wind and terrain. Which to cover all of would make training grossly more than what it is.

[Tbayer2021]

3) For every actual total engine failure there are probably 3 partial engine failures, yet this possibility is almost never mentioned in flight training yet alone actually practiced. It is actually a more difficult scenario as there will be lots of ambiguity as to what is happening and what is the best course of action.

The problem is still binary though. While one could train for an infinite possible partial failure scenarios, all that matters is either a) the airplane can still maintain altitude and speed, so it become more a matter of perhaps a diversion, or b) the airplane can't maintain altitude, so its a forced approach and the same procedure applies. It just may have a better glide ratio, so the techniques to judge gliding distance still apply.

While there may be type specific likely causes to be discussed, technique wise, there isn't any practice material. If one feels that students should be well versed in various different levels of power loss, you should also be worried about losses with different flap configurations, weights and balance scenarios, density altitude, wind and terrain. Which to cover all of would make training grossly more than what it is.

There is nothing that says training has to end after receiving your PPL though. A basic groundwork is laid out so almost anyone can get their license and enjoy some recreational flying. I agree with you that they can't make the syllabus so extensive as to make a private license become a 100-200 hour ordeal. But everyone would benefit from practising abnormal situations more often than their insurance or flight school makes them. As well as going outside the box like BPF says. That's the crux of his point I believe, that a pilot needs to be a bit more engaged and proactive about honing their skills and not just rely on the TC curriculum.

My previous employer did a great job with LOFT scenarios. Many of the situations they designed had different paths one could take purposefully built in. Nothing wrong with taking an experienced instructor with you to practise everything that's not covered during training. It will make you a sharper pilot and may just save your life, and others one day.

[Squaretail]

There is nothing that says training has to end after receiving your PPL though.

Of course, but that's usually type specific stuff though. Well beyond the realm of the PPL flight test and associated training which seems to be BPF's beef.

[Tbayer2021]

There is nothing that says training has to end after receiving your PPL though.

Of course, but that's usually type specific stuff though. Well beyond the realm of the PPL flight test and associated training which seems to be BPF's beef.

At this point its up to the individual pilot to take initiative and seek further training in whatever they're flying. From the flight schools 172 that they rent every few weeks/months. To something more sporty like a 240knot Cessna TT and everything in between. Unfortunately, we all know a large swath of GA fliers don't really do any other training apart from whats legally required.

[Bede]

While there may be type specific likely causes to be discussed, technique wise, there isn't any practice material. If one feels that students should be well versed in various different levels of power loss, you should also be worried about losses with different flap configurations, weights and balance scenarios, density altitude, wind and terrain. Which to cover all of would make training grossly more than what it is.

I don't think that's what BPF is after. How about diagnosing contaminated fuel and trying to fly on 1 tank only? What about a mag that has failed and trying L and R mag and see if one of them works?

[Squaretail]

While there may be type specific likely causes to be discussed, technique wise, there isn't any practice material. If one feels that students should be well versed in various different levels of power loss, you should also be worried about losses with different flap configurations, weights and balance scenarios, density altitude, wind and terrain. Which to cover all of would make training grossly more than what it is.

I don't think that's what BPF is after. How about diagnosing contaminated fuel and trying to fly on 1 tank only? What about a mag that has failed and trying L and R mag and see if one of them works?

It was my impression that those were already parts of the cause check portion already in the training syllabus, or at least it was when I was teaching. I was operating on the basis that BPF thought that wasn't enough detail.

[Bede]

While there may be type specific likely causes to be discussed, technique wise, there isn't any practice material. If one feels that students should be well versed in various different levels of power loss, you should also be worried about losses with different flap configurations, weights and balance scenarios, density altitude, wind and terrain. Which to cover all of would make training grossly more than what it is.

I don't think that's what BPF is after. How about diagnosing contaminated fuel and trying to fly on 1 tank only? What about a mag that has failed and trying L and R mag and see if one of them works?

It was my impression that those were already parts of the cause check portion already in the training syllabus, or at least it was when I was teaching. I was operating on the basis that BPF thought that wasn't enough detail.

Yes but the engine won't just quit in those cases, it's a drawn out affair. We should be training how to avoid the failure in the first place before it quits.

[photofly]

We should be training how to avoid the failure in the first place before it quits.

Spending a lot of time training how to avoid the failure in the first place is not a substitute for training how to deal with a failure that has occurred.

I think it's an error to consider "how to avoid an engine failure" as part of training for a forced landing. In fact keeping the engine running is part of every-day flying, and it should be taught as part of every day flying. To the extent that more students fail flight tests by screwing up exercise 22 than any other exercise, we should find better ways to teach this, rather than de-emphasize the skills needed to manage it should it occur.

If there needs to be more training on how to keep the engine turning (and I'm open to that idea) it doesn't belong under a consideration of "forced landings". They are what they say they are.

[TG]

4) When the engine fails the insurance company just bought the airplane. What it looks like after it comes to a stop is absolutely irrelevant

I would put it this way:
"When the engine fails your (Single engine) Aircraft becomes a survival capsule"


Nothing else!

[PilotDAR]

I think of engine failure events in four phases:

(1) While I'm flying, am I flying in a way which gives me the best opportunity to handle an engine failure? (airspeed to allow a good glide entry, altitude to give me time to cause check and resolve if possible, and over the more suitable forced landing area if I cannot resolve. I consider this "normal" piloting, rather than handling an emergency. Decision making - normal flying.

(2) It's not running right - potential emergency. Get to the glide speed, and point it to the more suitable area. Now, do I have enough of (1) to spend on a cause check and possible resolution? Decision making - emergency.

(3) I've optimized the glide - in case.... and determined that I do have [some] time to cause check and action. Is it running well enough I can extend a glide? To an airport? Do that, , continue to re-evaluate, up to the point if/when I must revert to (4). Calm, Systems knowledge, emergency memory items.

(4) I'm committed to a power off landing - assure occupant safety, communicate, then just fly the plane well without distraction (cause check and fiddling around stopped - just fly it). Piloting skill - abnormal flying - but I don't think it's an emergency to just land an airplane power off, it's just a different technique. Where you're going to land may bring in emergency elements, but that really should not change how one flies a power off landing.

When I have trained power off landings, with a briefing, I have nearly always given the candidate the "failure" within easy gliding distance of a suitable landing area, and soon into the event directed that this will be a power off landing to a touchdown. I've already trained the systems, and discussed a cause check. I've already trained the factors in choosing a spot during discussion during enroute flying; ("If I had to put it down, I'd be thinking of that area because of ....". "I'd avoid flying the route over there, because of the limited choices were it to quit"). The time spent in the power off training will be reminder only for cause/action/area. The time spent doing those will be finite. The purpose of the power off landing practice will be building skills power off flying and handling of the type - which I don't really think of as "emergency", just different flying, adding in some decision making.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Yet many light schools spend an inordinate amount of time on elaborate exercises to determine the "best" field. I tell my student Close, Open, and Flat in that order of importance, are the only things that matter. A 9 Gee deceleration from 60 knots to stop takes 25 feet. You can smash the aircraft into the ground in control with the wings level and a level pitch attitude into pretty much any patch of flat ground and everyone lives. You stall/spin trying to maneuver into that perfect field, into wind, parallel to the furrows with the right kind of animals on it etc etc and you die.

Generally I agree, but pilots/passengers rarely die from too great a deceleration (>40G in the x-axis is considered fatal). Often the structure is compromised (by a tree) and impinges the passenger compartment, or they get hit with unsecured cargo, etc. Sadly there's a lot of things that can kill you in car's and planes. This is why sometimes in car accidents you often see one person dead and the other person walking around the accident without a scratch.

My review of fatal light airplanes suggest that survivability is highly correlated to the attitude of the aircraft when it hits the ground. On most fatal accidents the airplane impacted in a steep nose down and/or highly banked attitude. This will almost invariably produce un-survivable Gee forces during the sudden stop. There was an interesting study done in the US. They looked at at every forced landing crash. If the airplane hit in control and approximately level there were fatalities in only 8%. Significantly this included every possibility including crashing into into bridge abutments, into the side of a house, dense forest, the ocean, etc etc. In other words a lot of people survived a crash in very unfavorable conditions if the airplane hit in control and level

[Big Pistons Forever]

3) For every actual total engine failure there are probably 3 partial engine failures, yet this possibility is almost never mentioned in flight training yet alone actually practiced. It is actually a more difficult scenario as there will be lots of ambiguity as to what is happening and what is the best course of action.

The problem is still binary though. While one could train for an infinite possible partial failure scenarios, all that matters is either a) the airplane can still maintain altitude and speed, so it become more a matter of perhaps a diversion, or b) the airplane can't maintain altitude, so its a forced approach and the same procedure applies. It just may have a better glide ratio, so the techniques to judge gliding distance still apply.

While there may be type specific likely causes to be discussed, technique wise, there isn't any practice material. If one feels that students should be well versed in various different levels of power loss, you should also be worried about losses with different flap configurations, weights and balance scenarios, density altitude, wind and terrain. Which to cover all of would make training grossly more than what it is.

My personal experience is if you asked a random PPL student, or their Class 4 Instructor for that matter; has anyone every discussed partial engine failures with you, the answer would most likely be no.

I think there is a few simple strategies that you can teach students to help prepare them for dealing with a partial engine failure.

1) you need to be prepared for the fact that it is very easy to get distracted from flying the airplane when the engine starts to do something weird. A great way to demonstrate this is on a trip to the practice area just slowly but continuously vary the rpm's plus and minus 500 rpm. I find that usually the pilot stops flying the airplane as soon as any simulated trouble shooting occurs and the airplane starts pitching uncontrolled up and down.

2) There is not that many ways an engine can betray you. On the day the student is at the airport and the flight gets scrubbed discuss how you would trouble shoot common problems like
a) A un-commanded reduction in RPM with smooth running engine and with a rough running engine
b) A rough running engine that is still making cruise RPM
c) Intermittent RPM reductions ( i.e. the engine is stumbling or surging)

I really like this because it makes students use system knowledge in a practical way and makes the point that understanding how the airplane works is important. If the first time a low time pilot has to think about dealing with say a surging engine, is when it is actually happening, I think they are less likely to effectively deal with it than those pilots who have already worked through some problems.

3) I often hear talk about using the partial power to "help" the force landing when there is not enough power to stay level or engine failure is likely immanent, but without any context. Personally I am not in favour of this approach. I think you use what power you have to position the airplane in an advantageous position to start the forced approach and then shut down the engine.

[Big Pistons Forever]

We should be training how to avoid the failure in the first place before it quits.

Spending a lot of time training how to avoid the failure in the first place is not a substitute for training how to deal with a failure that has occurred.

I think it's an error to consider "how to avoid an engine failure" as part of training for a forced landing. In fact keeping the engine running is part of every-day flying, and it should be taught as part of every day flying. To the extent that more students fail flight tests by screwing up exercise 22 than any other exercise, we should find better ways to teach this, rather than de-emphasize the skills needed to manage it should it occur.

If there needs to be more training on how to keep the engine turning (and I'm open to that idea) it doesn't belong under a consideration of "forced landings". They are what they say they are.

I never said deemphasize the forces approach lesson. What I said was starting every forced approach by pulling the throttle to idle simulating a sudden total loss of power with no cause is effective at teaching the student to pass the flight test, but is not IMO providing enough context into how they could have an engine failure or partial failure in everyday flying. There are ways to achieve the flight test aim but also better prepare the student for every engine failure scenario; not the least likely one a total loss of power for no reason.

Finally it is a fact that 2/3 rds of engine failures are directly caused by the actions or inactions of the pilot. It would seem to me the best but obviously not the only way, is when teaching EX 22 is to start by making sure that pilots understand that if the engine stops it will most likely not be because it just blew up it is because of something they did or did not do, so an effective cause check is vitally important as it may restore engine power obviating the need to do a forced approach.
I never hear that kind of discussion at FTU's.

[Aviatard]

Finally it is a fact that 2/3 rds of engine failures are directly caused by the actions or inactions of the pilot.

Is it? I don't disagree with that but I wonder where the number comes from.

[photofly]

I never hear that kind of discussion at FTU's.

You're spending time at the wrong FTUs then.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I never hear that kind of discussion at FTU's.

You're spending time at the wrong FTUs then.

Sadly my personal experience is that the “right” FTU is pretty much a unicorn. I am told they exist but I have never seen one…..

[photofly]

Start your own then. Lead by example and show everyone how it should be done. It would make a better impression than sniping from the sidelines. Then you can say "At the FTU where I'm CFI, we teach this ... and this ... and this .."

[Bede]

I never hear that kind of discussion at FTU's.

You're spending time at the wrong FTUs then.

Sadly my personal experience is that the “right” FTU is pretty much a unicorn. I am told they exist but I have never seen one…..

You should come visit my wife's FTU

[photofly]

You know what, this, more than any other kind of thread, really pisses me off.

Instructors and FTUs: You're all doing it all wrong. You're all stupid. You're all incompetent, uninterested in your students' success, lazy, unthinking, worthless good-for-nothings. Not a single flight school gets this right. I heard of one, once, but it turned out to be a unicorn. A flight school that teaches in a way that meets my high standards has never existed, and never will.

Marvellous post. Agree 100%. Amazing that everyone doesn't die the first flight out after their PPL.

Frankly - I've had enough. @#$! you all.

[Squaretail]

I don't mean to say, but BPF don't you work for the regulator? If you feel FTUs aren't up to snuff, don't you have the power to do something about it?

Personally I disagree with your assessment of the cause check. In my experience, unless you are into more complex types, power losses in little airplanes are pretty binary problems that are presented. The keeping it simple premise of flight training, especially at the ab initio stage means that one gives the student basic tools of survival that will most widely apply. If it holds altitude, concentrate on keep flying. Diverting is probably more important than cause checking. I don't expect neophytes to have knowledge or skill to make the perfect decision. In your OP you say:

I personally know of two forced landings which wrecked the aircraft, where engine power could have been restored

but then say:

When the engine fails the insurance company just bought the airplane. What it looks like after it comes to a stop is absolutely irrelevant,

Its easy to say with hindsight what could have been done to keep the airplane flying, but to expect a new PPL to have that kind of elite decision making capacity in the moment, but in the moment, they need some really simple stuff to remember. And the priority needs to be get on the ground alive, than thinking about what will save the airplane.

While I'm guilty of railing at what I think are the failings of FTUs too, I also think that some need to take a step back and really see what the training is designed to do. 45 hours and 200 hours are enough to be considered pinnacle of flying ability, otherwise we'd have a totally different aviation industry.

In reality, in my experience, I find when power is lost, I either know immediately what it is, and rectify that or act appropriately if I can't, and if I don't know what it is, then fall back to the binary decision of flying or not flying, and let the mechanics find out the problem. The usual TC mandated procedure like many things, doesn't reflect reality, but discussing all the possibilities, is best for class room talk, again, I wouldn't expect a new student to absorb all of it.

[rookiepilot]

Finally it is a fact that 2/3 rds of engine failures are directly caused by the actions or inactions of the pilot.

Is it? I don't disagree with that but I wonder where the number comes from.

Fuel, oil, well maintained, (even passes proper run up and pre flight inspection) usage of carb heat, mixture……
I’d guess 95%
I’d guess from anecdotally reading running out of fuel alone is greater than 2/3.