Capt. Underpants wrote: ↑Fri Mar 01, 2024 11:40 am
The NTSB preliminary report shows there were oil pressure warnings on both engines prior to the pilot's call to ATC about a dual power loss.
JHR wrote: ↑Sat Mar 02, 2024 1:10 pm
In general terms and from first hand experience
Ok. I still doubt the loss of oil pressure was the cause of the engine failure in this case though, as it happened on both sides simultaneously. Seems much more likely it was a symptom of the dual engine failure.
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As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
I will agree with you there. All I can think of is ice crystals blocking fuel screens. Although fuel/oil heat exchangers would warm the fuel, a couple hours at -50c (or colder) could cause any water in the fuel to freeze.
JHR wrote: ↑Sat Mar 02, 2024 2:22 pm
I will agree with you there. All I can think of is ice crystals blocking fuel screens. Although fuel/oil heat exchangers would warm the fuel, a couple hours at -50c (or colder) could cause any water in the fuel to freeze.
Isn't there usually one per engine though? Seems extremely unlikely both would freeze at the same time.
Unless there's one that affects fuel flow to both engines on a challenger. And even then, most high performance planes seem to have a filter bypass to prevent this from happening. It's better to attempt to burn unfiltered fuel than no fuel.
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As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
British Airways that crashed short of Heathrow was due to ice in the fuel. Different system obviously but I can't think of what else links the two Challenger engines except the pilots.
The BA38 accident wasn't a complete shutdown, and the engines didn't roll back at precisely the same moment. From the AAIB:
The engines initially responded but, at a height of about 720 ft, 57 seconds before touchdown, the thrust of the right engine reduced. Some seven seconds later, the thrust reduced on the left engine to a similar level. The engines did not shut down and both engines continued to produce thrust above flight idle, but less than the commanded thrust. At this time, and 48 seconds before touchdown, the co-pilot noted that the thrust lever positions had begun to ‘split’.
