YYZ RJ landing Accident

[digits_]

I'm wondering if perhaps the FO had bad experiences during training. I've had a couple of sim instructors that were ridiculous about speeds on approach. Quotes such as "If you exceed Vref +10 at any point on approach during your flight test it will be an immediate fail" without any nuance with regards to wind/gust/ATC conditions. I can imagine I would have been quite nervous if I would then be flying with such a sim instructor or even any instructor who I think might apply the same strict requirements. Especially as a low time pilot who might never be exposed to the nuances. It only takes one bad trainer to leave a sour taste in your mouth or to screw up something important. It might go undetected for a long time until it doesn't anymore.

While we don't think it will ever happen to us, we're often closer to such incidents than we would like to think.

Anyway, pure speculation, but it could be part of an explanation.

[BTD]

I am not letting this go. You went after me (and not only you) for simply saying the pax deserve a lot more empathy than this crew.

Still your position BTD? They deserve empathy?

Isn’t it evil to commence a flight that knowingly has a high probability of an accident?

You say — they had no idea or intention. This is a professional crew. There are supposed to know.

Why isn’t chopping the power at 200 feet arguably wilful negligence? And it was pretty obvious what happened before the latest update came out.

You want to go after me? Answer the questions.

I think a bunch of you guys are mental for defending this crew.

Then put your wife / children/ grandchildren on their next flight. In a winter storm.

You are such an asshole and you really do have main character syndrome. Yes I think this crew deserves some empathy. Reducing the thrust to idle at 150 ft is a bad decision, but I highly doubt it will be shown to be gross negligence. They no doubt did not intentionally crash the airplane.

I never said they should be coddled or given more empathy than the passengers. Nor did I say they should not be held accountable.

Now just in case you don’t know, here is the definition of empathy: “the ability to understand and share the feelings of another.” You seem to be confusing that with sympathy.

In your world I suppose they should be taken out back and shot?

So thanks for the straw man argument again. Even your quote of mine above is crystal clear, yet you somehow managed to (almost certainly intentionally) misunderstand it. Probably to make yourself centre of attention again.

Frankly I don’t give two shits what you think of me. I am simply engaging in this so that others can see our positions next to each other and come to their own conclusions.

As reference. Here is the original message.

I highly doubt they set out that morning to crash an airplane. You can still have empathy for those who made errors that led to bad outcomes. Doesn’t absolve their responsibility. But I certainly feel for them, unless it turns out to be gross negligence.

Hang em’ high.

Just so it’s crystal clear.

Lawyers gonna make them wish they had never been born. I will be cheering.

Clear enough?

Yup. But you can still empathize.

[pdw]

Anyway, pure speculation, but it could be part of an explanation.

I was hoping someone would have noticed by now, that as the FO has those 154kts (at 153agl) coming up so much, there will have already been a smaller mitigating nose up compensation underway … so not just the 33kts hwc … imo more like 38-39kts minimum. Just looking at the three to four seconds it took to lose 22ft from 175-153agl. IMO that flattening pitch reaction can mask the actual sh ar strength … so next pulling back the power became imperative so not to put it over target speed.

How much airspeedrise do those 22ft (slowed descent) in those three to four whole seconds (only 5.5 to 7feet per sec there) prevent. But still went to 154kts. My math could be wrong, but so far it tells me that as the air craft began entering the “increased performance shear” (tsb affirmation) any wary pilot would have already been checking the increasing surge with some pitch, since here it is a given that after an “uneventful” flight the autopilot had already been “disengaged”. So at which actual agl did pitch get pulled flat as as to reduce to 7 fps by 175agl (imo well before the 154kts registered to trigger a power cut) … and how much would groundspeed drop with such a pre-emptive pitchup adjustment.

[SpyPilot]

Have you considered applying to the TSB?

Perhaps they could better understand the unusual language you tap away in.

[pdw]

It was imo worth mentioning that an obvious shear bump (10-15kt increased performance gust registering a whole 10kt jump in airspeed at 153agl along with obvious brief reactive G/S -reducing pitchup / vs reduction) could have been easily confusing with the other “bump” mention (on ATC audio / at approx same timing).

[cdnavater]

It was imo worth mentioning that an obvious shear bump (10-15kt increased performance gust registering a whole 10kt jump in airspeed at 153agl along with obvious brief reactive G/S -reducing pitchup / vs reduction) could have been easily confusing with the other “bump” mention (on ATC audio / at approx same timing).

pdw,
Without the appropriate experience in the airline operating environment, you should refrain from analyzing any of the events that lead up to the crash!
From what I read the increased airspeed was quite temporary, the RJ to which I am very familiar, 6000 hours flying it and 10 years training on it, the thrust levers are the gas pedal only. If you pull off the thrust, Ie; flight idle and do nothing else you will simply lose airspeed until you have stick shaker and then stick pusher. It’s not like propeller driven aircraft that when you go to idle your rate of descent will increase if you don’t change pitch.
So, if you pull off the thrust, you have one option to increase or maintain airspeed, pitch the nose down, which for a constant airspeed will increase the rate of descent. At 150’ to maintain the 136 knots they did to touchdown, the pitch was adjusted to a descent rate of approximately 1100 fpm or 18fps. If this FO or Captain had simply added thrust and reduced pitch we would not be discussing this because no one would have ever known. It is really that simple.
The part of the equation that needs answers, is the gear and wing really that fragile or was there something else that contributed to this. I understand the gear certification standards were well exceeded but the gear collapse to me should not end with a wing ripped from the fuselage!

[goldeneagle]

pdw,
Without the appropriate experience in the airline operating environment, you should refrain from analyzing any of the events that lead up to the crash!

You are responding to a poorly trained chat bot that's been used for years to generate gibberish that is _almost_ coherent.

[cdnavater]

pdw,
Without the appropriate experience in the airline operating environment, you should refrain from analyzing any of the events that lead up to the crash!

You are responding to a poorly trained chat bot that's been used for years to generate gibberish that is _almost_ coherent.

Quite likely, then why have the mods not removed this bot!

[boeingboy]

The part of the equation that needs answers, is the gear and wing really that fragile or was there something else that contributed to this. I understand the gear certification standards were well exceeded but the gear collapse to me should not end with a wing ripped from the fuselage!

Really man?? Come on....

You admit the gear limits were exceeded - so with no gear the wing is next, and it sits what? 3 feet off the ground?
You think a wing should stay attached at 1100 fpm??? Give me a break.

[digits_]

The part of the equation that needs answers, is the gear and wing really that fragile or was there something else that contributed to this. I understand the gear certification standards were well exceeded but the gear collapse to me should not end with a wing ripped from the fuselage!

Really man?? Come on....

You admit the gear limits were exceeded - so with no gear the wing is next, and it sits what? 3 feet off the ground?
You think a wing should stay attached at 1100 fpm??? Give me a break.

After destroying the landing gear, a lot of that energy should already have been absorbed. The wings weren't touching down on the runway at 1100 fpm anymore.

It could be a design choice, albeit an interesting one, to shed the fuel filled wing during a crash. If it wasn't intentional, I would also be surprised that it broke off at the root of the wing. If it came down under an angle, it would make sense some of the wingtip would get shaved off, but the whole thing? That's very interesting.

[cdnavater]

The part of the equation that needs answers, is the gear and wing really that fragile or was there something else that contributed to this. I understand the gear certification standards were well exceeded but the gear collapse to me should not end with a wing ripped from the fuselage!

Really man?? Come on....

You admit the gear limits were exceeded - so with no gear the wing is next, and it sits what? 3 feet off the ground?
You think a wing should stay attached at 1100 fpm??? Give me a break.

My first thought was I sure as hell hope the wing can take a load of more than 3 gs, you know in case of severe turbulence or pulling out of an inadvertent dive, however while searching for wing specs I found this, seems it was designed this way!
Also, this incident had 18fps at touch down, the CRJ 200 had 20fps but landed on both gear, both collapsed however the wings stayed intact.
https://www.globalair.com/articles/crj- ... sh?id=8599
A Safe Design

The wings are attached to the fuselage section using a series of specialized bolts. Some attaching bolts are shear bolts that attach the wing structure to the fuselage section, while others are releasable bolts. The breakaway bolts allow stripping of the wing at a certain impact force, particularly when the aircraft goes sideways on the ground. The main support structure including the fuselage and wings is attached in such a way that there is some wiggle room with respect to the platform. Upon a sideways impact with sufficient force, like seen in the Delta CRJ crash, the wing is designed to strip off the support structure, allowing the fuselage section to continue moving and come to rest safely.

The design safeguards passengers in two ways: keeping the fuel-rich wing away from the fuselage section, and preventing the fuselage from tearing apart and dislodging the seats. Both of these implications may have played a vital role in saving lives at Toronto airport. It appears from the crash footage that the shedding of the wing minimized the impact force on the fuselage section. The fuselage remained intact as it continued to float upside down on the snowy runway

[co-joe]

Do you ever read PDW's words and think "ok those are all English words, why don't they make any sense to my brain?" Qu'est-ce que le fuk?

[rookiepilot]

The part of the equation that needs answers, is the gear and wing really that fragile or was there something else that contributed to this. I understand the gear certification standards were well exceeded but the gear collapse to me should not end with a wing ripped from the fuselage!

Really man?? Come on....

You admit the gear limits were exceeded - so with no gear the wing is next, and it sits what? 3 feet off the ground?
You think a wing should stay attached at 1100 fpm??? Give me a break.

My first thought was I sure as hell hope the wing can take a load of more than 3 gs, you know in case of severe turbulence or pulling out of an inadvertent dive, however while searching for wing specs I found this, seems it was designed this way!
Also, this incident had 18fps at touch down, the CRJ 200 had 20fps but landed on both gear, both collapsed however the wings stayed intact.
https://www.globalair.com/articles/crj- ... sh?id=8599
A Safe Design

The wings are attached to the fuselage section using a series of specialized bolts. Some attaching bolts are shear bolts that attach the wing structure to the fuselage section, while others are releasable bolts. The breakaway bolts allow stripping of the wing at a certain impact force, particularly when the aircraft goes sideways on the ground. The main support structure including the fuselage and wings is attached in such a way that there is some wiggle room with respect to the platform. Upon a sideways impact with sufficient force, like seen in the Delta CRJ crash, the wing is designed to strip off the support structure, allowing the fuselage section to continue moving and come to rest safely.

The design safeguards passengers in two ways: keeping the fuel-rich wing away from the fuselage section, and preventing the fuselage from tearing apart and dislodging the seats. Both of these implications may have played a vital role in saving lives at Toronto airport. It appears from the crash footage that the shedding of the wing minimized the impact force on the fuselage section. The fuselage remained intact as it continued to float upside down on the snowy runway

Interesting

[youhavecontrol]

Reading the report and the weather conditions, I seem to recall the runway had about 30' of snow covering the outside edges of the surface. With the blowing snow, I would not be surprised if the visual illusion of being higher than you actually are was a contributing factor. You have two pilots with very little experience flying together, and even less experience with snow-covered runways and associated visual illusions. Aside from referencing the radar altimeter (I don't know if it does altitude call-outs or not), they might have had no experience with the visual cues they encountered, with their eyes fixated on the blowing snow, not being aware of their descent rate and speed until it was too late.

I fly on 200' wide pavement and the next hour 75' wide gravel, and snow covered runways packed with ice and then returning to a nice clean paved runway. The illusions I see every day I am so familiar with that I almost forget to remind new FO's I fly with what to expect when they first attempt a landing up North.

I can only assume the two pilots in this case also had very little experience with the runway conditions they encountered, combined with the overall lack of experience in general.

[pelmet]

Reading the report and the weather conditions, I seem to recall the runway had about 30' of snow covering the outside edges of the surface. With the blowing snow, I would not be surprised if the visual illusion of being higher than you actually are was a contributing factor. You have two pilots with very little experience flying together, and even less experience with snow-covered runways and associated visual illusions. Aside from referencing the radar altimeter (I don't know if it does altitude call-outs or not), they might have had no experience with the visual cues they encountered, with their eyes fixated on the blowing snow, not being aware of their descent rate and speed until it was too late.

I fly on 200' wide pavement and the next hour 75' wide gravel, and snow covered runways packed with ice and then returning to a nice clean paved runway. The illusions I see every day I am so familiar with that I almost forget to remind new FO's I fly with what to expect when they first attempt a landing up North.

I can only assume the two pilots in this case also had very little experience with the runway conditions they encountered, combined with the overall lack of experience in general.

Thousands of crews each year encounter similar situations of little experience flying together in challenging conditions much worse that this situation. Things work out just fine.

[cdnavater]

Reading the report and the weather conditions, I seem to recall the runway had about 30' of snow covering the outside edges of the surface. With the blowing snow, I would not be surprised if the visual illusion of being higher than you actually are was a contributing factor. You have two pilots with very little experience flying together, and even less experience with snow-covered runways and associated visual illusions. Aside from referencing the radar altimeter (I don't know if it does altitude call-outs or not), they might have had no experience with the visual cues they encountered, with their eyes fixated on the blowing snow, not being aware of their descent rate and speed until it was too late.

I fly on 200' wide pavement and the next hour 75' wide gravel, and snow covered runways packed with ice and then returning to a nice clean paved runway. The illusions I see every day I am so familiar with that I almost forget to remind new FO's I fly with what to expect when they first attempt a landing up North.

I can only assume the two pilots in this case also had very little experience with the runway conditions they encountered, combined with the overall lack of experience in general.

The EGPWS will call out, “50, 40, 30, 20, 10’ “ even still the EGPWS calling out “sink rate” was also a clue, there is literally no excuse for what happened here! If flight idle is required at 150’ agl because of increase performance wind a go around is the only appropriate response, with the long runway and goodish vis, you could continue normal landing and expect to use more runway but absolutely never appropriate to go flight idle at that altitude.

[cdnavater]

to maintain the 136 knots they did to touchdown ….

Nope, it went down to 134kts in that last second. TSB’s data looks right. Now from 3.6 sec to touchdown times 18.3 fps is still 66feet up exactly (not “50 agl” as is written) … where that most rapid vs rate initiated from “145knots”. But there the G/S only drops 1 knot in 3 sec despite the 9knots ias lost 2.6sec to touchdown. (If elevator ineffective at that point due to right side slip bank 7.1deg would make perfect sense couldn’t get the nose up anymore).

The question I was trying to formulate there (co Joe) was … for the actual groundspeed numbers there at/after 153agl. “Groundspeed numbers did not change appreciably” makes it impossible to calculate the precise shear entry-strength properly for the most correct narrative. Take a look how close this lengthy gust is to a squall (check definition) … the RJ finally comes out the bottom of it eleven-fifteen seconds after entry … it lasts the better part of a mile.

What what make the elevator ineffective? They just simply didn’t flare, bank has very little to do with it, at VREF you are restricted to half bank or 15 degrees bank, at VREF plus 10 you can bank 30 degrees with stall margin protection of I believe 1.3 VS. The elevator was still effective at that speed, it is also worth noting, max bank angle for landing is 10, the bank angle call out goes from 45 above 150 to 10 at 10’.
136/134 is not a significant difference, the main thing is due to increased performance the ground speed remained constant but in order to keep from stalling, the ONLY option at flight idle is to pitch down. That is the single only factor that caused 700ish(normal decent rate on a 3degree slope at 120 knots ground speed) to go to 1100 fpm or 18 fps, the 18 fps at touchdown is because there was no flare. Had there been a flare of any kind it may have been the difference between a hard landing and the outcome we are discussing.
The preliminary report made no mention of stick shaker, that to me say the elevator was still flying and effective!
You are just absolutely wrong, the wind was a factor in the only sense that this crew mismanaged it, I’m telling you without hesitation, if the FO went to flight idle at 150’ a go around should have been called. There are a few things I watch for with FOs and flight idle above 50’ or not going to flight idle for touchdown are two of them, the other is this aircraft is susceptible to stick shaker on take off if you exceed three degrees per second on rotation, to prevent that my thumb is ready to prevent this over rotation and I’m not worried about hurting anyone’s feelings, these are things that can potentially kill you so I’m vigilant

[Hangry]

I'm wondering if perhaps the FO had bad experiences during training. I've had a couple of sim instructors that were ridiculous about speeds on approach. Quotes such as "If you exceed Vref +10 at any point on approach during your flight test it will be an immediate fail" without any nuance with regards to wind/gust/ATC conditions.

This directly contravenes the TC ACP manual. No one would ever fail for this. It would never be upheld in TATC. Did you make this up?

[digits_]

I'm wondering if perhaps the FO had bad experiences during training. I've had a couple of sim instructors that were ridiculous about speeds on approach. Quotes such as "If you exceed Vref +10 at any point on approach during your flight test it will be an immediate fail" without any nuance with regards to wind/gust/ATC conditions.

This directly contravenes the TC ACP manual. No one would ever fail for this. It would never be upheld in TATC. Did you make this up?

No I didn't make this up. I'm also not saying you would actually fail. Only that if an instructor with a bad personality (born-as-a-god-like-aviator-ego type) drills this into you during your training, be it post CPL or during your first 703/704/705 training, that it does make an impression that is going to be hard to shake until you get some experience. As a CPL student or holder, your first instinct when being confronted with such statements is not to look up the ACP manuals when you're still struggling to actually fly the plane.

[pdw]

K

[rookiepilot]

Reading the report and the weather conditions, I seem to recall the runway had about 30' of snow covering the outside edges of the surface. With the blowing snow, I would not be surprised if the visual illusion of being higher than you actually are was a contributing factor. You have two pilots with very little experience flying together, and even less experience with snow-covered runways and associated visual illusions. Aside from referencing the radar altimeter (I don't know if it does altitude call-outs or not), they might have had no experience with the visual cues they encountered, with their eyes fixated on the blowing snow, not being aware of their descent rate and speed until it was too late.

I fly on 200' wide pavement and the next hour 75' wide gravel, and snow covered runways packed with ice and then returning to a nice clean paved runway. The illusions I see every day I am so familiar with that I almost forget to remind new FO's I fly with what to expect when they first attempt a landing up North.

I can only assume the two pilots in this case also had very little experience with the runway conditions they encountered, combined with the overall lack of experience in general.

Ok.

[cdnavater]

What would make the elevator ineffective? They just simply didn’t flare ….

As said, from 66feet (3.6 seconds before touchdown) was way too high to have lost the healthy 145knots airspeed in same second to 136kts, so now could basically only aim it at those ”1114 feet per min” (19fps) down for 2.6 agonizing seconds. Having already squandered the chance to go around, it looks like one remaining chance was pulling aft on the yoke in a last second opportunity (one shot deal) hoping for a last gasp of nose higher with responding lift. What does it take for a highspeed-like stall … don’t these numbers look close?

You need to STOP, you are so outside your knowledge!

[SpyPilot]

rookiepilot: Please stop.

cdnavater: pdw's posts, though nonsensical, are most entertaining.

[pdw]

We were enjoying the holiday that day and someone pipes up there will be strong wind at 2 pm (was surprised) so while checking for peak wind around the horseshoe saw this accident right way at 2:12 local time (Pearson is a touch farther west than cysn) in so it was right as predicted. Then noticed deep LO towards Gaspe … drawing across Lake Ontario ..

[youhavecontrol]

The EGPWS will call out, “50, 40, 30, 20, 10’ “ even still the EGPWS calling out “sink rate” was also a clue, there is literally no excuse for what happened here! If flight idle is required at 150’ agl because of increase performance wind a go around is the only appropriate response, with the long runway and goodish vis, you could continue normal landing and expect to use more runway but absolutely never appropriate to go flight idle at that altitude.

For sure, I'm not excusing what happened, I'm wrapping my head around the human factors of how two people could be so fixated on the landing that they miss all the inside cues that it wasn't going well. It looks like they had some tunnel vision, which is why my thoughts were drawn to what they were seeing outside.