Another Transport Canada Debacle
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Not sure I would anymore. Just look at all the recent threads trying to place blame on ATC for accidents that clearly have nothing to do with us.cpl_atc wrote: One engine out -- ok, bad day, but shit happens... However, if you tell me that *both* your engines are out, I'm probably going to suggest pointing you at an airport RIGHT NOW.
I figure if we keep going down this road, (in no small part to frivolous lawsuits) my reaction to protect myself would be, "ABC check you are declaring an emergency, you're on your own."
I have seen numerous postings on this board from irate pilots when it is stated that an accident has occurred because of pilot error, but the posters seem to have no problem placing blame on the controllers and even TC when there is no evidence to support their theories.
Does "no evidence" include ignoring collision alarms?
http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.php?t=26349
Or how about this accident, where ATC told the pilot to do exactly OPPOSITE what his TCAS was telling him, thus resulting in a mid-air?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bashkirian ... light_2937
http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.php?t=26349
Or how about this accident, where ATC told the pilot to do exactly OPPOSITE what his TCAS was telling him, thus resulting in a mid-air?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bashkirian ... light_2937
I'm still reading the first situation but as for the second are you saying that ATC should have been psychic and known what the TCAS RA was instructing the pilots to do?Hedley wrote:Does "no evidence" include ignoring collision alarms?
http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.php?t=26349
Or how about this accident, where ATC told the pilot to do exactly OPPOSITE what his TCAS was telling him, thus resulting in a mid-air?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bashkirian ... light_2937
The controller saw the confliction and issued in his view the most expeditious instruction to the Russian a/c to avoid the collision. The Russian flight crew chose to ignore the TCAS RA and follow the ATC instruction instead. The ATC instruction wasn't the problem, it was the failure of the flight crew to follow their RA when the RA and ATC instruction were contrary to one another. That is not to say the controller didn't make mistakes which led to the situation, but his instruction wasn't one of them.
I am not saying ATC doesn't make mistakes. And when we do we should be held accountable. However, trying to blame ATC when the evidence absolves them is ridiculous. You think Nav Canada covers it's ass now, just wait. If ATC is blamed for every incident/accident by some lawyer trying to make a name for himself/herself, you may end up with ATC unwilling to take responsibility for your flight at all.
When you divorce authority and responsibility, you get a Monty Python sketch.You may end up with ATC unwilling to take responsibility for your flight at all.
Many people and organizations on the ground seek to diminish the authority of the pilot in command - like the good socialists that they are, they want to share in the authority.
Alas, when something bad happens, they all scuttle for the woodwork like cockroaches when the light is turned on - they have no responsibility at all, in either the legal or practical sense.
Reminds me of the BA 747 captain that took off from LA, lost an engine and continued across the Atlantic on THREE engines. Of course, he ran low on fuel and had to make an unscheduled stop before his planned destination so it was all for nought anyways.
Interestingly, the FAA charged the BA pilot with careless and reckless - not the people on the ground who ordered him to continue the flight.
And, if he had gone for a swim, the people on the ground would have been safe and sound - as they always are ... secure in their high paying jobs.
Back to the ATC issue ... when ATC makes a mistake, the pilot pays for it, possibly with his life. ATC is safe and sound, and drives home from their high paying job at the end of their shift as always.
Don't get me wrong, I think ATC is a great gig. High pay, always safe on the ground.
Part of your last post sounds like Hedley egomania. I do agree with your statement about the BA captain. If the FAA charges the captain with recklessness/carelessness, then some blame should also be placed on the ground ops for their role in the decision.
As for the first situation, from the limited knowledge I have gained from the media article it sounds like the controllers are at fault.
If this is accurate then they should be held accountable. Again my problem is not with placing blame when it is due. It is with taking a shotgun approach to see who has the deeper pockets when it comes time for litigation.
As for the first situation, from the limited knowledge I have gained from the media article it sounds like the controllers are at fault.
If this is accurate then they should be held accountable. Again my problem is not with placing blame when it is due. It is with taking a shotgun approach to see who has the deeper pockets when it comes time for litigation.
Hate to be the one to clue you in as you are normally a little more perceptive than this atc but most notable??? Get out from under your rock and give your head a shakeatc_cpl wrote:The most notable thing from this report is the fact that the pilots misled (lied) to ATC about the nature of their emergency when asked. They stated that they had lost one engine (not both), and were trying to relight.
Minimizing the nature of an emergency, while typical of many pilots in distress, probably did nothing to help the outcome of this incident.
One engine out -- ok, bad day, but shit happens... However, if you tell me that *both* your engines are out, I'm probably going to suggest pointing you at an airport RIGHT NOW. Like, when you're vacating FL390, not when you're going through 9,500' as in their case. RIGHT NOW, when you've got at least 70-90 miles to work with, as opposed to a handful.
At the risk of sounding callous, this looks like a case of Darwin in action if you ask me. These guys were a couple of f*cking morons. Thank god there was nobody on board to take with them. It will be interesting to see the TT of these idiots when the final report comes out.
Lying to ATC was one very small part of this chain of excrement than wrecked that airplane. Most notable was that i meet goofs like this flying airplanes every week. But that is a different rant.
When things start to go wrong ATC goes to the bottom of the priority pile. Very, very bottom of the pile other than a quick "GABC declaring emergency". While i have high hopes of getting the rest of the priorities done well enough that i do have time to get the rest of the info to atc and solicit whatever i need from them, it is certainly not a requirement.
Flying the airplane is much more important than working the radio. What is ATC going to do? Crawl through the mike and superhero the engines back on? Get a big air cushion laid out just right at the site of the accident? Oh right, tell the guy to make a turn for the nearest airport. Guess what, anyone smart enough not to lie to ATC is smart enough to make the turn on their own. We don't need any prompting. If we don't have the map out (which again, we should), we'll ask you for vectors to nearest without any prompting.
Hopefully the most notable comment was just a brain fart. The rest of this accident has already been beaten to death and unfortunately there is not a whole hell of a lot to learn from it.
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sportingrifle
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Notwithstanding the fact that the crew appeared to run a pretty slapdash operation and that they initiated the events that led to their own demise, this accident raises a serious issue. There is a disturbing trend in recent airline accidents - namely that we are flying airplanes around without important information or knowledge concerning the standards that the airplanes themselves are certified to.
Before American Airlines in NY, I like every other commercial pilot, I believed that you couldn't overstress an airplane with a control input below maneuvering speed. (Back in private pilot days, that was the definition of maneuvering speed.) Before Fredricton, with the exception of test pilots, most of us were under the impression that a Go Around could be safely completed at any point prior to touchdown. (Why not, it was even written that way in our FOM) Before Pinnacle, neither myself nor anyone else I had ever talked to had even heard of the term "core lock."
What the hell else is hidden in the fine print of the certification standards that will reach out and bite us in the ass one night? Should we all go out and spend $400K to go to test pilot school so we can know all this? This trend of common knowledge and published materials being insufficient is starting to cause me to re-evaluate my confidence in the material we have to rely on in our day to day decision making. I am not saying that the Pinacle crew were a stellar example of our profession but I think that our smugness and confidence is grossly misplaced.
Cheers Sportingrifle.
Before American Airlines in NY, I like every other commercial pilot, I believed that you couldn't overstress an airplane with a control input below maneuvering speed. (Back in private pilot days, that was the definition of maneuvering speed.) Before Fredricton, with the exception of test pilots, most of us were under the impression that a Go Around could be safely completed at any point prior to touchdown. (Why not, it was even written that way in our FOM) Before Pinnacle, neither myself nor anyone else I had ever talked to had even heard of the term "core lock."
What the hell else is hidden in the fine print of the certification standards that will reach out and bite us in the ass one night? Should we all go out and spend $400K to go to test pilot school so we can know all this? This trend of common knowledge and published materials being insufficient is starting to cause me to re-evaluate my confidence in the material we have to rely on in our day to day decision making. I am not saying that the Pinacle crew were a stellar example of our profession but I think that our smugness and confidence is grossly misplaced.
Cheers Sportingrifle.
Sportingrifle, the point is that there is no simple and cheap way to educate pilots to the same standard as a $400 000 test pilot school.
This is why following the procedures in the flight manual are so important. A procedure may be there for a reason completely unkown to the pilot. If the pilot modifies or omits this procedure then all bets are off.
Manufacturers put the information required in the manuals. Not the engineering details. If you want to be able to modify procedures then go to engineering school, read all the certification rules, go to test pilot school, talk to the guys who designed the plane and have at er.
However, it is not necessary to wait for an accident to find out about things like flight loads and core lock. Anyone who has done a basic aerobatics course understands that Va will not protect you from all possibilities. Anyone reading the RJ flight manual and seeing the 300 kts minimum 2 engine out speed could wonder why the speed is so high. With enough digging they just might find out about core lock. From the CVR it sounds like those buffoons never did get to 300 kts, let alone maintain it from the point of failure. Maybe if they had spend more time learning about their aircraft and less time partying it up with the dudes they would have flown the procedure instead of whatever speed they happened to get. We had quite a discussion right here on AvCanada about engine out speeds and glide ratios for an airbus which finally ended with a phone call to one of the engineers who designed it.
Be pro-active, learn more than just the basics. For example, if you fly an aircraft that is certified for flight into known icing, do you know what that means? There is no reason you cannot look up the certification rules which were in effect when the type certificate for your airplane was granted. No reason you can't look up the current certification rules and see how they have been improved and how this might affect your aircraft.
This is why following the procedures in the flight manual are so important. A procedure may be there for a reason completely unkown to the pilot. If the pilot modifies or omits this procedure then all bets are off.
Manufacturers put the information required in the manuals. Not the engineering details. If you want to be able to modify procedures then go to engineering school, read all the certification rules, go to test pilot school, talk to the guys who designed the plane and have at er.
However, it is not necessary to wait for an accident to find out about things like flight loads and core lock. Anyone who has done a basic aerobatics course understands that Va will not protect you from all possibilities. Anyone reading the RJ flight manual and seeing the 300 kts minimum 2 engine out speed could wonder why the speed is so high. With enough digging they just might find out about core lock. From the CVR it sounds like those buffoons never did get to 300 kts, let alone maintain it from the point of failure. Maybe if they had spend more time learning about their aircraft and less time partying it up with the dudes they would have flown the procedure instead of whatever speed they happened to get. We had quite a discussion right here on AvCanada about engine out speeds and glide ratios for an airbus which finally ended with a phone call to one of the engineers who designed it.
Be pro-active, learn more than just the basics. For example, if you fly an aircraft that is certified for flight into known icing, do you know what that means? There is no reason you cannot look up the certification rules which were in effect when the type certificate for your airplane was granted. No reason you can't look up the current certification rules and see how they have been improved and how this might affect your aircraft.
Exactly. We should all realise how little we know and spend time every day trying to limit the gaps. It is not the responsibility of others to spoon feed this to the pilots, it is the responsibility of the pilots to learn as much as possible and know the limits of their knowledge.our smugness and confidence is grossly misplaced.
I would like to add (at the risk of annoying Cat), that is the reason why we have to follow SOPs. If we have to reinvent the wheel every time we fly, we run the risk of crossing the boundaries that are delineated by the limitations section. Given that we cannot have the depth of knowledge of the test pilots, we are taught to fly the aircraft a certain way and discouraged from making it up as we go along.
Routinely, we fly the 604 to 410 to get over weather, but it takes a lot of finessing to get it there. You have to have the correct amount of fuel and OAT to get there, the engines are perilously close to the red line and need constant tweeking.
Sadly, the two deceased have to be two of the Three Stooges of aviation.
Routinely, we fly the 604 to 410 to get over weather, but it takes a lot of finessing to get it there. You have to have the correct amount of fuel and OAT to get there, the engines are perilously close to the red line and need constant tweeking.
Sadly, the two deceased have to be two of the Three Stooges of aviation.
"What's it doing now?"
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
But pilots are not usually engineers. How can they be expected to know everything about everything? I'm neither a pilot, nor an engineer, but like most people am more apt to follow the rules if it's understood why they exist. Maybe the manuals should say something like, "don't do this because it might cause that", at least giving the reader the opportunity to do research. Maybe when an aircraft is certified, it should come with a list of all the potential problems found so the pilots are aware.
I may be an idiot, but it seems like a bit of a problem to me.
I may be an idiot, but it seems like a bit of a problem to me.
Former Advocate for Floatplane Safety
I certainly don't think you're an idiot; in many cases there is not a definitive answer to the question of what will happen if you go outside the limitations. In most cases, going past the limitation leads you into uncharted territory where you are now the test pilot. If you survive your excursion, tell the rest of us about it! There is normally no reason to exceed a limitation and your training and your professionalism should prevent that happening.
I flew with a guy, who, in a BE20, regularly exceeded the barber pole in descent by about 30 knots. He would not listen to my complaints so I refused to fly with him again. If Beechcraft felt their a/c was safe to fly 30 knots faster, believe me they would advertise it, but as the results of over-speeding (control flutter? Spar damage? Skin problems? Who knows?) are not readily apparent, he thought he was getting away with it.
Core lock has been identified as a problem, (perhaps) but to avoid it, don't fly the airplane so badly that both engines flame out; but if you do, maintain the re-light envelope and it is not a problem!
Every Garrett operator knows about 'shaft bow,' that annoying process that has the (FO usually!) pulling the prop through 30 blades to cool off the core of the engine after stopping it, to prevent the shaft cooling crooked and ruining the carbon oil seals (and locking up the engine 'til it cools). Pulling the prop through religiously will save you $100,000 at overhaul time. What's the point of all this? Most engines have their peculiar handling requirements, such as starting a large radial, but we learn to operate them within their peculiarities and we don't have problems.
I flew with a guy, who, in a BE20, regularly exceeded the barber pole in descent by about 30 knots. He would not listen to my complaints so I refused to fly with him again. If Beechcraft felt their a/c was safe to fly 30 knots faster, believe me they would advertise it, but as the results of over-speeding (control flutter? Spar damage? Skin problems? Who knows?) are not readily apparent, he thought he was getting away with it.
Core lock has been identified as a problem, (perhaps) but to avoid it, don't fly the airplane so badly that both engines flame out; but if you do, maintain the re-light envelope and it is not a problem!
Every Garrett operator knows about 'shaft bow,' that annoying process that has the (FO usually!) pulling the prop through 30 blades to cool off the core of the engine after stopping it, to prevent the shaft cooling crooked and ruining the carbon oil seals (and locking up the engine 'til it cools). Pulling the prop through religiously will save you $100,000 at overhaul time. What's the point of all this? Most engines have their peculiar handling requirements, such as starting a large radial, but we learn to operate them within their peculiarities and we don't have problems.
"What's it doing now?"
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
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Cat Driver
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86583 , you forgot to mention what most pilots know about the mechanical workings of an airplane.
When they meet on the ramp the airplane sometimes knows as much about the pilot as the pilot knows about the airplane.
Do you remember when you were going to paint the wheels on each airplane a different colour so the pilots could find the airplane they were supposed to fly that day??
When they meet on the ramp the airplane sometimes knows as much about the pilot as the pilot knows about the airplane.
Do you remember when you were going to paint the wheels on each airplane a different colour so the pilots could find the airplane they were supposed to fly that day??
Last edited by Cat Driver on Thu Jan 18, 2007 6:11 pm, edited 1 time in total.
The hardest thing about flying is knowing when to say no
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
After over a half a century of flying no one ever died because of my decision not to fly.
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Cat Driver
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yak driver
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Maybe this will help.Widow wrote:But pilots are not usually engineers. How can they be expected to know everything about everything? I'm neither a pilot, nor an engineer, but like most people am more apt to follow the rules if it's understood why they exist. Maybe the manuals should say something like, "don't do this because it might cause that", at least giving the reader the opportunity to do research. Maybe when an aircraft is certified, it should come with a list of all the potential problems found so the pilots are aware.
I may be an idiot, but it seems like a bit of a problem to me.
I am a pilot, and not an engineer. I don't profess to know everything about the airplanes that I fly. I fly for a living, and I enjoy it. When trained on a new airplane, we learn the limitations and emergency procedures for that airplane.
The reason that there are limitations on an airplane, is because test pilots, and engineers went through a test program to determine the limits for each parameter. It might be that you should not go faster that so and so because the wing will come off, or don't go slower than .. or the flu flu valve won't wobble the thingme. It doesn't really matter.
As a pilot, flying somebody elses airplane you do not EVER fly it outside of those limiations. If you do, you are a test pilot, hope you are qualified.
Somebody did, and something bad happened. Then instead of flying the airspeed that the test pilots and engineers set out for that condition (and everybody that flies for a living should be able to give you the magic # for the airplane they fly) unfortunately more bad things happened, and nobody walked away. Thankfully nobody else was on the airplane.
In the world of lawsuits, if anything, the airline, and manufacturer should be going after the estate of the pilots.
