All Nippon Airways grounds its bombardier fleet. There have been reoccuring gear problems with the dash 8 type aircrafts.
http://video.sympatico.msn.com/v/en-ca/ ... =37&fg=rss
ANA Grounds Dash 8s
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Golden Flyer
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ANA Grounds Dash 8s
"Aviation is proof that given, the will, we have the capacity to achieve the impossible"
Edward Vernon Rickenbacker
All Pilots & Prospective Pilots Should Have Read:
http://walter.freefuelforever.com
Walter Gilles
Emirates: B-777
Edward Vernon Rickenbacker
All Pilots & Prospective Pilots Should Have Read:
http://walter.freefuelforever.com
Walter Gilles
Emirates: B-777
Go back to 1990: City Express Dash 7 (Newark NJ) landed with the nose gear up....They raised it and flew it back. Eventually it did fly again (and is still flying today... Africa in fact for the UN). There seemed to a pilot problem....Mechanically it was proved to be ok....
As far as ANA goes they are trying to blame Bombardier for a production line error. Ya right..... then again let's wait and see if an unbaised report is ever published.......
As far as ANA goes they are trying to blame Bombardier for a production line error. Ya right..... then again let's wait and see if an unbaised report is ever published.......
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Golden Flyer
- Rank 7
- Posts: 550
- Joined: Sat Jul 22, 2006 8:46 pm
"Aviation is proof that given, the will, we have the capacity to achieve the impossible"
Edward Vernon Rickenbacker
All Pilots & Prospective Pilots Should Have Read:
http://walter.freefuelforever.com
Walter Gilles
Emirates: B-777
Edward Vernon Rickenbacker
All Pilots & Prospective Pilots Should Have Read:
http://walter.freefuelforever.com
Walter Gilles
Emirates: B-777
Ok so they grounded their fleet. Inspected the planes. Did the gear swings. I assume they found nothing. And if they did replaced the missing/wrong/worn/broken part(s). Notified Bombardier of their findings.
Now they have another incident and put the gear down manually. Followed procedure. Excellent.
I recall Dehavilland having many many problems when the 8 first came out. Mechanical as well as electrical/electronic. The Q400 was also no exception (but some of those problems were related to operator experience). But the reliability has come a long way.
So did Bombardier lose face (again?)? Or did ANA?
Now they have another incident and put the gear down manually. Followed procedure. Excellent.
I recall Dehavilland having many many problems when the 8 first came out. Mechanical as well as electrical/electronic. The Q400 was also no exception (but some of those problems were related to operator experience). But the reliability has come a long way.
So did Bombardier lose face (again?)? Or did ANA?
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Elliot Moose
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And the planes were back in the air in about a day and a half--but there isn't much story in that so the low life reporters don't bother to publish that! 
They also don't bother to point out that the problem was a simple bolt and bushing that came loose and jammed the door, which was likely an installation problem by ANA, or that a nose gear up landing is not exactly a high danger manoeuvre.
They also don't bother to point out that the problem was a simple bolt and bushing that came loose and jammed the door, which was likely an installation problem by ANA, or that a nose gear up landing is not exactly a high danger manoeuvre.You can't make honey out of dog sh!t
dashx you sound like an inexpericed AME.dashx wrote:Go back to 1990: City Express Dash 7 (Newark NJ) landed with the nose gear up....They raised it and flew it back. Eventually it did fly again (and is still flying today... Africa in fact for the UN). There seemed to a pilot problem....Mechanically it was proved to be ok....
As far as ANA goes they are trying to blame Bombardier for a production line error. Ya right..... then again let's wait and see if an unbaised report is ever published.......
Well as a pilot, I can't let those remarks go unchallenged. We, as the guys on the pointy end of the airplane certainly would prefer not to have to deal with these issues. But when they do surface, we deal with them as taught and then follow the QRH to its completion. However there is not a checklist that deals with this scenario as described.
At that point is when all of the published stuff that is completed you have to rely on the experience that you have amassed to make your best decision.
Cheers
Hi Pratt,
In regards to the 1990 Dash 7 incident, it was definetly pilot error. A perfectly serviceable airplane was landed with the nose gear retracted. The D3 circuit breaker as I recall was the culprit. As most of my time is in the quad, this particular scenario has been covered in many groundschools. We all have bad days. Just trying to clarify the previous post which mentioned this incident.
In regards to the 1990 Dash 7 incident, it was definetly pilot error. A perfectly serviceable airplane was landed with the nose gear retracted. The D3 circuit breaker as I recall was the culprit. As most of my time is in the quad, this particular scenario has been covered in many groundschools. We all have bad days. Just trying to clarify the previous post which mentioned this incident.
Thanks for the clarification, if that is the case, then for that incident I will retract my comments, but unfortunately it isn't always that straight forward.Daart wrote:Hi Pratt,
In regards to the 1990 Dash 7 incident, it was definetly pilot error. A perfectly serviceable airplane was landed with the nose gear retracted. The D3 circuit breaker as I recall was the culprit. As most of my time is in the quad, this particular scenario has been covered in many groundschools. We all have bad days. Just trying to clarify the previous post which mentioned this incident.
cheers
dashx you sound like an inexpericed AME
Flattery will get you nowhere.
Thank you Elliot Moose and Daart for the back up.
From what I saw in the video the pilot(s) landed the A/C exactly as it should have been. I am sure (especially since it was the Japanese) that they followed ALL the procedures.
And in regards to the City Dash 7 its was GGXS S/N 064. It is currently in the Ivory Coast as UN454. Check this month's issue of Airliner magazine and you will see its partner UN 451. If you happen to like Dash-7's.
And ANA did report its findings to Bombardier and Bombardier has notified its operators.
Anfd I sure ANA checked their maintenance records to see who the (unlucky) schmuck was working on the nose gear.
Hmmm....remember the Japanese 747 that lost its tail???? The maint. guy in charge committed suicide over that one......
If I choose not to divulge all the facts it's to protect my arse, and my sources. And if that makes me sound "inexperienced" then so be it.
Thank you Elliot Moose and Daart for the back up.
From what I saw in the video the pilot(s) landed the A/C exactly as it should have been. I am sure (especially since it was the Japanese) that they followed ALL the procedures.
And in regards to the City Dash 7 its was GGXS S/N 064. It is currently in the Ivory Coast as UN454. Check this month's issue of Airliner magazine and you will see its partner UN 451. If you happen to like Dash-7's.
And ANA did report its findings to Bombardier and Bombardier has notified its operators.
Anfd I sure ANA checked their maintenance records to see who the (unlucky) schmuck was working on the nose gear.
Hmmm....remember the Japanese 747 that lost its tail???? The maint. guy in charge committed suicide over that one......
If I choose not to divulge all the facts it's to protect my arse, and my sources. And if that makes me sound "inexperienced" then so be it.
Dashx your posts are biased and uninformed. The 747 that crashed was greatly the fault of Boeing for a repair that came from them and was never gone over by their stress engineers. Once the crash happened and Boeing's stress engineers did go over what was done it was a glaring error. The Japanese engineer did commit suicide as he was partially to blame.
As for your thoughts on the Q400 there are many Bombardier production errors, past and recent. If you indeed have any "sources" I would say they are removed from the actual information of this incident as your opinions on blame you posted are as erroneous as the "aviation experts" that emerge to talk to the press. You attempt to make yourself out to be someone of knowledge while at the very most you took a 10 second glance at the issued AOM or more likely know someone that did.
Pretentiousness is not a good attribute.
As for your thoughts on the Q400 there are many Bombardier production errors, past and recent. If you indeed have any "sources" I would say they are removed from the actual information of this incident as your opinions on blame you posted are as erroneous as the "aviation experts" that emerge to talk to the press. You attempt to make yourself out to be someone of knowledge while at the very most you took a 10 second glance at the issued AOM or more likely know someone that did.
Pretentiousness is not a good attribute.
The official cause of the crash according to the report published by the Japanese Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission, is as follows:
The aircraft was involved in a tailstrike incident at Itami Airport on June 2, 1978, which damaged the aircraft's rear pressure bulkhead.
The subsequent repair performed by Boeing was flawed. Boeing's procedures called for a doubler plate with two rows of rivets to cover up the damaged bulkhead, but the engineers fixing the aircraft used two doubler plates with only one row of rivets. This reduced the part's resistance to metal fatigue by 70%. According to the FAA, the one "doubler plate" which was specified for the job, (the FAA calls it a "splice plate" - essentially a patch), was surprisingly cut into two pieces parallel to the stress crack it was intended to reinforce, "to make it fit".[2] This negated the effectiveness of one of the two rows of rivets. During the investigation Boeing calculated that this incorrect installation would fail after approximately 10,000 pressurizations; the aircraft accomplished 12,319 take-offs between the installation of the new plate and the final accident.
The Japanese public's confidence in JAL took a dramatic downturn in the wake of the disaster, passenger numbers on domestic routes dropping by one-third. Rumours persisted that Boeing had admitted fault to cover up shortcomings in the airline's inspection procedures and thus protect the reputation of a major customer.[4] Without admitting liability, JAL paid 780 million yen to the victims' relatives in the form of "condolence money". Its president, Yasumoto Takagi, resigned, while a maintenance manager working for the company at Haneda committed suicide to "apologize" for the accident.
So because of a "glaring error" and he was "partially to blame" Mr. Takagi committed suicide???? Was that not the honourable thing for him to do? what kind of a choice was he given (back in 1978.....)?????
Here is a quote from flightglobal.com:
http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/20 ... ident.html
Advisory issued after ANA Q400 incident
A landing incident in Japan involving an All Nippon Airways Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 has led the manufacturer to advise all Q400 operators worldwide to inspect the aircraft's nose landing-gear door mechanism, writes Leithen Francis.
Bombardier says in the circular issued the day after the 13 March ANA incident that "operators are strongly advised to perform a visual check of the nose landing gear door mechanism on, or before, the next A check to ensure the cotter pin is present".
The advisory comes after the incident in which an ANA Q400 had to land at Kochi airport with its nose landing gear retracted. None of the 56 passengers or four crew was injured.
"Despite repeated attempts [before the landing to] use the alternate extension system, the flightcrew were unable to extend the nose landing gear," says Bombardier.
An "investigation has determined that a bolt, nut and cotter pin joining the two halves of the door over centre linkage were missing", it adds.
"This allowed the spacer to partially migrate from the hole, which may have caused contact with a fitting to which the debris shield is attached.
"It is likely that this prevented the doors from opening, stopping the nose landing gear" from deploying.
Japan's construction and transport ministry has also issued a directive. Ministry officials have told local journalists that Japanese carriers were only required to inspect the bolt on the Q400's nose landing gear door device once every 4,000h, but now the requirement will be once every 400h.
ANA group has 13 Q400s and five Q300s, while JAL group has nine Q400s, one Q300 and four Dash 8-100s.
Here is another link dealing with concerns the Japanese have had with ther 400 model:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... ility.html
I stand by what I said. Ansd some of the items in the posts were actually questions. Looking for answers. If you want to ream me out for my pretentiousness then so be it.
Obviously I struck a nerve (maybe personal maybe professional). I promise to think more and say less in the future. Ah so sorry so sorry .
The aircraft was involved in a tailstrike incident at Itami Airport on June 2, 1978, which damaged the aircraft's rear pressure bulkhead.
The subsequent repair performed by Boeing was flawed. Boeing's procedures called for a doubler plate with two rows of rivets to cover up the damaged bulkhead, but the engineers fixing the aircraft used two doubler plates with only one row of rivets. This reduced the part's resistance to metal fatigue by 70%. According to the FAA, the one "doubler plate" which was specified for the job, (the FAA calls it a "splice plate" - essentially a patch), was surprisingly cut into two pieces parallel to the stress crack it was intended to reinforce, "to make it fit".[2] This negated the effectiveness of one of the two rows of rivets. During the investigation Boeing calculated that this incorrect installation would fail after approximately 10,000 pressurizations; the aircraft accomplished 12,319 take-offs between the installation of the new plate and the final accident.
The Japanese public's confidence in JAL took a dramatic downturn in the wake of the disaster, passenger numbers on domestic routes dropping by one-third. Rumours persisted that Boeing had admitted fault to cover up shortcomings in the airline's inspection procedures and thus protect the reputation of a major customer.[4] Without admitting liability, JAL paid 780 million yen to the victims' relatives in the form of "condolence money". Its president, Yasumoto Takagi, resigned, while a maintenance manager working for the company at Haneda committed suicide to "apologize" for the accident.
So because of a "glaring error" and he was "partially to blame" Mr. Takagi committed suicide???? Was that not the honourable thing for him to do? what kind of a choice was he given (back in 1978.....)?????
Here is a quote from flightglobal.com:
http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/20 ... ident.html
Advisory issued after ANA Q400 incident
A landing incident in Japan involving an All Nippon Airways Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 has led the manufacturer to advise all Q400 operators worldwide to inspect the aircraft's nose landing-gear door mechanism, writes Leithen Francis.
Bombardier says in the circular issued the day after the 13 March ANA incident that "operators are strongly advised to perform a visual check of the nose landing gear door mechanism on, or before, the next A check to ensure the cotter pin is present".
The advisory comes after the incident in which an ANA Q400 had to land at Kochi airport with its nose landing gear retracted. None of the 56 passengers or four crew was injured.
"Despite repeated attempts [before the landing to] use the alternate extension system, the flightcrew were unable to extend the nose landing gear," says Bombardier.
An "investigation has determined that a bolt, nut and cotter pin joining the two halves of the door over centre linkage were missing", it adds.
"This allowed the spacer to partially migrate from the hole, which may have caused contact with a fitting to which the debris shield is attached.
"It is likely that this prevented the doors from opening, stopping the nose landing gear" from deploying.
Japan's construction and transport ministry has also issued a directive. Ministry officials have told local journalists that Japanese carriers were only required to inspect the bolt on the Q400's nose landing gear door device once every 4,000h, but now the requirement will be once every 400h.
ANA group has 13 Q400s and five Q300s, while JAL group has nine Q400s, one Q300 and four Dash 8-100s.
Here is another link dealing with concerns the Japanese have had with ther 400 model:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... ility.html
I stand by what I said. Ansd some of the items in the posts were actually questions. Looking for answers. If you want to ream me out for my pretentiousness then so be it.
Obviously I struck a nerve (maybe personal maybe professional). I promise to think more and say less in the future. Ah so sorry so sorry .
Biased and uninformed fits your posts
Are you trying to tell me that the information I had was from the wrong source? Are you telling me that you have all the correct information?
Because as I see it you have not offered anything except your obvious dislike for me.
And the Japanese were (apparently) not happy with "4000 hours" since they changed it to 400 hours.
So shut the post down with an unbiased and intelligent response. Please.
Because as I see it you have not offered anything except your obvious dislike for me.
And the Japanese were (apparently) not happy with "4000 hours" since they changed it to 400 hours.
So shut the post down with an unbiased and intelligent response. Please.
Apparently you did not understand my point.
You implied that the operator was at fault with; "As far as ANA goes they are trying to blame Bombardier for a production line error. Ya right"
and
"Anfd I sure ANA checked their maintenance records to see who the (unlucky) schmuck was working on the nose gear."
But my favourite was; "If I choose not to divulge all the facts it's to protect my arse, and my sources. And if that makes me sound "inexperienced" then so be it." This has the tone of the "aviation expert" coming out to tell anyone that will listen, and imply blame with the general knowledge all people have in the industry.
Going from 4000 hours to 400 also coincides with the level of checks prescribed for the Q400. Rational or not.
You can figure out how the time is siginificant in relation to your posts.
You implied that the operator was at fault with; "As far as ANA goes they are trying to blame Bombardier for a production line error. Ya right"
and
"Anfd I sure ANA checked their maintenance records to see who the (unlucky) schmuck was working on the nose gear."
But my favourite was; "If I choose not to divulge all the facts it's to protect my arse, and my sources. And if that makes me sound "inexperienced" then so be it." This has the tone of the "aviation expert" coming out to tell anyone that will listen, and imply blame with the general knowledge all people have in the industry.
Going from 4000 hours to 400 also coincides with the level of checks prescribed for the Q400. Rational or not.
You can figure out how the time is siginificant in relation to your posts.
