NexJet runs into trouble with TC
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Is R.V. really back up and running? What is the company name and where are they operating from? Leopards don't change their spots, and this guy is aviation's worst liability when it comes to safety. If you even get a sniff of this guy's name linked to any operation..RUN FOR YOUR LIFE.......!!!!!!!!!!!!
Four in trail of my big brother....
That function is Class B TAWS. That's a major mod and requires approved data. If you do that without an approval, your airplane doesn't conform to its type design and the C of A is invalid.No just adding terrain functions to our current GPS.
Furthermore, document changes need to be made to the flight manual and maintenance manual.
When changes like that are made there definitely should be log book entries as well. Sorry but it sounds like TC had a legit reason to scold you folks.
Significant safety improvements are always a good thing. Unfortunately sometimes they are installed in a manner that makes them dangerous.
Did you know for instance, the GNS 530 TAWS had some serious software issues that caused suspension of approvals for awhile? The unit spuriously spouted alerts on ILS approaches.
Do you think it's responsible to install a system without providing the pilot with the airworthiness limitations and procedures?
How come its bad to do unapproved repairs to Beaver floats but its OK to install new equipment without the proper approvals in place?
Did you know for instance, the GNS 530 TAWS had some serious software issues that caused suspension of approvals for awhile? The unit spuriously spouted alerts on ILS approaches.
Do you think it's responsible to install a system without providing the pilot with the airworthiness limitations and procedures?
How come its bad to do unapproved repairs to Beaver floats but its OK to install new equipment without the proper approvals in place?
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No. The database has to be produced to a standard. It's not the same thing at all.So, updating the database card in an IFR GPS is a major mod, requiring a 24-0045? Same argument applies.
That statement is quite telling of your inexperience in these matters widow. Installing a TAWS system without an approval is an illegal modification. If done improperly like repairs to floats, it can have unfortunate results.Ridiculous to compare illegal repairs to an improvement in technology.
Improvement in technology is a wonderful thing. Doing unapproved modifications or repairs to your airplane can be dangerous. I'm a little surprised by your statement widow.
In this case TC just enforced the regulations. You and widow are usually all over TC for lack of oversight. Why are you changing your minds now?aaaahhh, but TC can do no wrong in CID's mind.
Only pilots, engineers and operators are corrupt, TC is without flaw.
Last edited by CID on Mon Jun 11, 2007 8:29 am, edited 2 times in total.
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furious george
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tired of the ground
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I know everyone loves to argue. If you read the post again it looks like TC was pissed about there being no SNAG entry i.e. "During last flight, pilot suddenly realized that GPS did not have TAWS function". Im sure there was a mtce log entry otherwise TC wouldn't have know they had made the upgrade. I've never seen an inspector turn on a box to make sure there were no unapproved mods done to it.
Either an error in the data, or an error in the executable can result in erroneous operation of a embedded computer such as GPS.
Not sure why one would be considered as more acceptable than the other - they both can have dire consequences.
Ah well, as we all know, as long as the paperwork is in order, nothing can go wrong.
Not sure why one would be considered as more acceptable than the other - they both can have dire consequences.
Ah well, as we all know, as long as the paperwork is in order, nothing can go wrong.
That's true but there's only one way to update the database. There is no way to deviate from the accepted procedure and there is no impact on the flight manual or other aircraft documents.Either an error in the data, or an error in the executable can result in erroneous operation of a embedded computer such as GPS.
There are several ways to install TAWS systems. The software upgrade is just the beginning and there certainly is an impace on aircraft documents.
Doesn't sound to me as if anyone could have died as a result of this "problem".
CID, could you please explain the potential dire consequences associated with the issue as described by flybaby?CID wrote:That statement is quite telling of your inexperience in these matters widow. Installing a TAWS system without an approval is an illegal modification. If done improperly like repairs to floats, it can have unfortunate results.Ridiculous to compare illegal repairs to an improvement in technology.
Improvement in technology is a wonderful thing. Doing unapproved modifications or repairs to your airplane can be dangerous. I'm a little surprised by your statement widow.
Former Advocate for Floatplane Safety
Exactlytired of the ground wrote:I know everyone loves to argue. If you read the post again it looks like TC was pissed about there being no SNAG entry i.e. "During last flight, pilot suddenly realized that GPS did not have TAWS function". Im sure there was a mtce log entry otherwise TC wouldn't have know they had made the upgrade. I've never seen an inspector turn on a box to make sure there were no unapproved mods done to it.
Maybe it's just me being a skeptic or even an optimist, but it definitely sounds like their is more to the story here. Or else, something has been lost in translation.
How would you snag the install of vortex generators (for example)?
"Passengers too fat/airplane won't lift off when 300 lbs overweight"
"Vortex generators installed/passengers put on diet"
???
How would you snag the install of vortex generators (for example)?
"Passengers too fat/airplane won't lift off when 300 lbs overweight"
"Vortex generators installed/passengers put on diet"
???
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furious george
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The problem as I see it is that the word "snag" is being misused. But when maintenance or pilots with appropriate training add or remove something from the airframe or change avionics it's supposed to be entered in the J.L.
Goes the same for Donald's Vortex Generators.
And it would go something like:
Vortex Generators pn 123456 installed IAW whatever STC.
Signed by AME #123456
Goes the same for Donald's Vortex Generators.
And it would go something like:
Vortex Generators pn 123456 installed IAW whatever STC.
Signed by AME #123456
Sure. First though, it appears that’s there’s some information missing. I’m having a tough time believing TC would scold and operator for what Flybabe is telling us. It makes no sense. No written snag is required to enable someone to modify an airplane.CID, could you please explain the potential dire consequences associated with the issue as described by flybaby?
Perhaps my comment about them deserving a scolding was premature since the reason makes no sense. I thought Flybabe meant that the installation wasn’t approved.
If that’s the case, as far as the installation of TAWS goes it’s a major mod and it must be done in accordance with approved data. That has nothing to do with whether or not the avionics shop is “approved”. An “approved” shop still needs approved data to install major modifications. We’re talking about two different “approvals” there.
Approved data has engineering oversight to ensure the proper airworthiness standards are applied and the aircraft’s level of safety is maintained. For the purposes of TAWS, the relevant guidelines are ACPL 18 and FAA AC 23-18 or 25-23. If it’s a “little” airplane, an FAA STC would be acceptable as “approved” data.
http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/certi ... acpl18.htm
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_an ... C23-18.pdf
Although the equipment manufacturer provides installation guidelines, it’s impossible to predict the variables in each airplane. The interfaces and requirement for additional equipment can change dramatically from airplane to airplane. Furthermore, airplane models have different certification requirements. What may be acceptable for a 737 may not be acceptable for a 767. Or what may be acceptable for a Beech 200 may not be acceptable for a Pilatus PC-12.
The systems must also be installed so critical faults are indicated somehow and any latent failures are detected by an appropriate maintenance program.
The maintenance manual should be supplemented to include specific maintenance instructions for the system and the flight manual must also be supplemented to include procedures and limitations for use by the pilot.
So the risk here is that the pilot may have no operational or limitations information for the installed safety equipment and the equipment may not even work or may provide erroneous information when it’s in operation. Of course many here will argue that having an approval in place of course doesn’t guarantee perfection but it does guarantee engineering oversight so the chances of an installation fault is reduced drastically. Airplanes are type certified under engineering oversight in the first place after all.
It seems to me widow that perhaps you aren’t familiar with how major modifications or major repairs are supposed to be done. The procedures are spelled out in CAR 571.06 if you’re interested.
http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/RegSe ... htm#571_06
http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/RegSe ... s/571s.htm
You can’t just bolt stuff to an airplane willy nilly. Some modifications require formal engineering oversight because the operator and/ore the installer may not be aware of the certification issues. When operators ignore that simple fact, airplanes end up with unapproved repairs that may (or may not) endanger the airplane and it’s occupants. At the very least without a proper approval in place, the airplane will not meet the definition of “airworthy” and the C of A will be out of force.
FYI, the definition of "airworthy" is "in respect of an aeronautical product, means in a fit and safe state for flight and in conformity with its type design". That means a whole lot more than wings, engines and landing gear.Floats are take-off and landing gear. You kind of need your take off and landing gear to be airworthy in order to take off and land.
Last edited by CID on Mon Jun 11, 2007 3:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
I have. If you have an FMS on your airplane and you're doing a checkride, and your AFMS for the FMS says you have to verify that the software is 603.X and your FMS says it has 604.X, your check ride ends very quickly and M&M may be advised.I've never seen an inspector turn on a box to make sure there were no unapproved mods done to it.
You have to be careful with software these days. Some of the boxes out there are capable of a hell of alot. Software upgrades sometimes introduce additional capability or even new functions.
The GNS-530 can be a real trap. Especially with the WAAS boxes that are available now. You can pretty much have an approved non-WAAS/non-TAWS approval but you can shove in a WAAS/TAWS capable GNS-530w and think you've done nothing wrong until TC catches it or your insurance company finds out that when you crashed you were trying to do an LPV approach in mountainous terrain with an unapproved GPS/TAWS system. No valid C of A means no insurance money.
Sorry CID, I fail to understand what "dire consequences" could result from this upgrade.
Illegal repairs to floats may have resulted in death. Those illegal repairs should also have invalidated the OC and therefore the insurance.
Could a GPS upgrade similarly result in fatal consequences?
Illegal repairs to floats may have resulted in death. Those illegal repairs should also have invalidated the OC and therefore the insurance.
Could a GPS upgrade similarly result in fatal consequences?
Former Advocate for Floatplane Safety
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furious george
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It won't be dangerous in of itself. But if I'm doing an approach in the mountains (or anywhere for that matter) in hard IFR the TAWS becomes an important backup. For a GPS approach, well the GPS is pretty much indispensable.
I know it's not vital to the actual flying of the airplane and one should be able to do with out it- but when the excrement hits the air circulation device it all better be working right.
It's another story as to whether the paperwork's in order-but then as CID alluded to is that we can't just make changes to the avionics or airframe with out following the rules.
I know it's not vital to the actual flying of the airplane and one should be able to do with out it- but when the excrement hits the air circulation device it all better be working right.
It's another story as to whether the paperwork's in order-but then as CID alluded to is that we can't just make changes to the avionics or airframe with out following the rules.
If done improperly yes. As a matter of fact a Sowind EMB-110 was involved in a fatal accident a few years ago under similar circumstances that we see in Flybabe's example.Could a GPS upgrade similarly result in fatal consequences?
There were more mitigating factors and the role of the GPS was never officially fully understood or acknowledged in the report but in general the GPS in the accident airplane was broken so they borrowed a different older model from a Beaver on the ramp that just happened to have the same tray and electrical connector.
The capability of the replacement older GPS was less than the normally installed unit and it didn't have a navigation database. It just had a user database and when the accident pilot found a pilot programmed waypoint in the unit that had the same identifier as the airport, he assumed it would take him to the airport. Unfortunately the Beaver was a float plane and the waypoint was for the float base.
The airplane crashed in the trees in bad weather and it appears he was at low level looking for the airport while in fact he was over the float base.
You can check out the official report here:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/199 ... 7c0236.asp
Notice that one of the systems that could have helped was a GPWS but the TSB figured that if the pilot knowingly broke altitude minima he would probably have done it with or without the safety equipment shouting out "Too Low Terrain".
The copilot involved in the crash suffered severe brain damage and will obviously never fly again. The last I heard (in a documentry on TV about the safety of aviation in northern Manitoba) he was in an almost vegitative state and 100% dependant on his parents.
There are quite a few other possible installaltion errors that can cause serious problems.Sorry CID, I fail to understand what "dire consequences" could result from this upgrade.
I don't doubt that you don't undersand how and I'm not so sure how much time I should spend convincing you. It's obvious to me that you don't understand the function and criticality of various aircraft systems. You seem to be more fixated on recovery than prevention. Why so much concern about ELTs, flight recorders and ULBs and less concern about proper installation of communciations, navigation and hazard avoidance systems?
Obviously your husband's accident airplane was supposed to be flying VFR so it really didn't need any of the navigation/communication or hazard avoidance systems we're talking about so perhaps you haven't done as much research but rest assured that airplanes that DO require these systems can certainly be affected severely by installation errors or equipment failures.
I don't need to have done extensive "research" in order to understand that incorrectly installed equipment, or a pilot using equipment with which he/she is unfamiliar, can have dire consequences.
The situation as described by flybaby does not indicate that the equipment upgrade was performed incorrectly or was unauthorized, nor didt the required logs fail to reflect the changes. Although, it does seem that "something" in the paper trail did not satisfy TCCA.
It is this obsession with paper by TCCA which disturbs me.
And quite frankly, CID, I am insulted by your assertion that I am "more fixated on recovery than prevention". You clearly have chosen not to remember my many "concerns" regarding methods of prevention.
The situation as described by flybaby does not indicate that the equipment upgrade was performed incorrectly or was unauthorized, nor didt the required logs fail to reflect the changes. Although, it does seem that "something" in the paper trail did not satisfy TCCA.
It is this obsession with paper by TCCA which disturbs me.
And quite frankly, CID, I am insulted by your assertion that I am "more fixated on recovery than prevention". You clearly have chosen not to remember my many "concerns" regarding methods of prevention.
Former Advocate for Floatplane Safety
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furious george
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Having been in management, I know that TC's "obsession" with paperwork can be rather tedious. But at the same time, the paperwork is a necessity especially in larger companies. We as pilots need to know what maintenance is doing to the airplanes.
Our company had a DOM who wanted to do everything verbally, no snagging no paperwork. Not only did this present some possibly dangerous situations, it was illegal.
Flybaby you don't want to know what maintenance is doing to the a/c you fly?
Our company had a DOM who wanted to do everything verbally, no snagging no paperwork. Not only did this present some possibly dangerous situations, it was illegal.
Flybaby you don't want to know what maintenance is doing to the a/c you fly?



