Sonicblue TSB Report to be Released

[2milefinal]

What people have to realize is that SEIFR is here to stay. There are more to come. A number of the VLJs are Single Engine. I am betting the VLJ does not glide much better then a 208.
They will crash. But so do twin-engine-aircraft.
With proper Maintenance, a well equipped cockpit AND GOOD TRAINING all types can be much safer.
What does it take to get this,,, MONEY and thats the kicker.

What if .....?

[CID]

TAWS uses GPS data though so if it becomes law to have TAWS, you'll likely be legally required to update the database.

TAWS only uses the GPS for position. It doesn't care how old the GPS navigation database is. It also uses an internal terrain database (at minimum) which doesn't neccessarily need to be current however its recommended as newer databases usually contain more airport data and higher resolution terrain information.

The rules for SEIFR commercial operations apply to all aircraft so if the PT6 reliability is not good enough for the C208 that means it is also not good enough for other aircraft types that use it, such as the PC12.

Only the PC12 and Cessna 208 meet the criteria to date for SEIFR in Canada.

[Go Guns]

I would hazard a guess that if the system requires an airport and terrain database, it'll be required to be current.

I see what you're getting at though, two different databases and I was referring to the GPS.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

SEIFR is value based.

The certification is based on a numbers criteria matrix.

The decision makers at puzzle palace determine how many lives can be traded for the money savings gained by flying single engine airplanes over more expensive multi engine airplanes.

You don't see any single engine heavy jets flying to Europe or Asia yet.

[2R]

It does not matter how well built an engine is if it is operated outside of manufactures written recomendations.If it is operated outside of the TC approved maintenanace programmes.
The data is missing for a reason ,that reason is probably the main cause of the failure .
The airplane had more than one maintenance issue.Maintenance issues that nothing to do with Cessna or P&W but solely on the operator of the aircraft .
When you allow yourself to get side tracked in debate about equipement not installed in the plane .You obfuscate the simple fact that the operator failed to maintain the airplane to the manufactures standards .No one else is responsible but the operator.Plain and simple if they had of done the required maintenance the airplane would have been airworthy .
The maintenace was not done in accordance with the manufactures recomendations therefore the airplane was not airworthy and should not have been released for dispatch by the operator .
When you consider the maintenance history of the operator.And the general reputation of the operator .It would be safe to say that it is not an honest mistake that anyone could make and that it is a specific limited risk of that operator and should not adversly affect the other honest safe operators of that well built safe airplane.

But if you want to debate equipment not installed why not one of those ballistic parachute systems or a flir camera to provide zero zero landing capability ???If the operators first fatal caravan crash had of had a flir system they might have missed that little island that fateful night enroute to Victoria low level VFR at night .

When all else fails read the instructions .

[Widow]

Does anyone remember Clarenville? A98A0067

There were quite a number of recommendations (Communique A04/2000) with respect to SEIFR which, if I'm interpreting correctly, could have prevented this accident had they been acted upon.
But it appears they have not been. Or at least, much has been caught up in the beaurocratic process. TSB Assessment of Responses to A04/2000 Recommendations

[ballsac]

SEIFR is value based.

The certification is based on a numbers criteria matrix.

The decision makers at puzzle palace determine how many lives can be traded for the money savings gained by flying single engine airplanes over more expensive multi engine airplanes.

You don't see any single engine heavy jets flying to Europe or Asia yet.

That's true, but many of the VLJs are going to be single engine. And while they're not intended to be trans-oceanic, obviously if you're going down in a jet due to an engine failure it's not going to make much difference whether you're over land or water. Neither are survivable impacts at 100+ kts, generally speaking. That doesn't mean they won't sell a shitload of them. Once again, a calculated risk.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Once again, a calculated risk.

But should the general public be subjected to two different levels of " Calculated risk " when they buy an airline ticket to go from A to B?

obviously if you're going down in a jet due to an engine failure it's not going to make much difference whether you're over land or water.

That is pure B.S.

[twotter]

Interesting conversation, however my main concern would be why the defect in the CT blade was not detected prior to its installation at overhaul.. That I think is where the blame game should be looking.

[2milefinal]

SEIFR is value based.

The certification is based on a numbers criteria matrix.

The decision makers at puzzle palace determine how many lives can be traded for the money savings gained by flying single engine airplanes over more expensive multi engine airplanes.

You don't see any single engine heavy jets flying to Europe or Asia yet.

The whole industry is set up that way. If you want to have more then 19 passengers on board you need a flt attendant, if you want to fly single pilot IFR, you can only have up to 9 passengers, and so on. Its ALL a numbers game.

As far as single-engine heavy jets, no thats not going to happen, put I can see single-pilot airliners coming.

[snaproll20]

a lot of intesting opinions here, as usual.

I don't believe any kind of terrain warning system would be effective in a scenario like Ed H faced. Still, it would be just like TC to mandate installation of such to cover their asses. Might as well paste over the problem with more garbage.

If trend monitoring was not done per P & W, then the company has a problem.

Since the cause of this was mechanical failure, I would wonder why TC did not mandate an onboard computer trend system that would likely give advance warning of a problem (should Mainenance choose to pay attention.) This should have been a certification action, I believe. Such a system would red flag a hot start, something some pilots may no own up to.

The Caravan and Pilatus are much nicer aircraft to fly than your typical twin 9 passenger type, but they are still one engine. The consequences of an engine failure thus lurk in the back of the mind of any responsible pilot.

It is also interesting that the accusation is out there that TC tried to interfere with the TSB report. Hmmm.

[Carrier]

There have been similar discussions regarding the safety of SEIFR in the past on this and other sites. On 27 December 2004 I added the post below to a thread entitled “Pilatus PC-12s” in the Biz Jets, Ag Flying, GA etc. forum of PPRuNe. I see no reason to change my thoughts on this issue. It is extremely likely that had the Sonicblue aircraft been a King Air, 99 or even a piston engined Chieftain all occupants would have survived and we would long ago have forgotten the incident. It was reckless to permit SEIFR for paying pax in the first place. TC should admit its mistake and immediately withdraw SEIFR for paying pax. The travelling public deserves better!


“Panama Jack, and any others interested, I suggest you look at some other threads on PPRuNe.

First look at “Van has engine failure in Tanzania” in the African Aviation forum. In particular look at Shenzi Rubani’s post in that thread on 21 October 2004. Eight Caravans going down in a one year span because of engine failure indicates that the PT6 is not as reliable as P&WC and some operators would have us believe. You will note that the aircraft belonged to different operators in different countries so blame cannot be attached to one outfit’s operating procedures or maintenance standards. The only common factor is the PT6. You might also look at the thread earlier this year entitled “Van down in Tanz”. In addition to the Caravans, there have been other single turbine engined aircraft, such as the PC12 you mentioned, going down in the same time frame because of engine failure. In the face of this evidence in only single engined aircraft it is difficult to see how Pilatus can claim that PT6 powerplant failures are pretty much unheard of!

If you have only one engine, when it all goes quiet at the front it does not matter what fuel that engine was using. You are still going down and are dependant on there being a suitable landing site within gliding range and on the pilot’s skill to get you safely on to that site! This assumes the pilot is able to see the landing site, which is most unlikely at night or in serious IMC. As Shenzi Rubani mentions, there have been engine failures in King Airs, etc in the same time frame but they do not show up in the accident statistics because the second engine enabled their pilots to get them safely back to a proper airfield.

To give credit where it is due, the PT6 is a wonderfully reliable engine. However, it is not infallible and its failure rate is high enough to be of serious concern for single engined passenger carrying use, such that single turbine (as well as piston) engined aircraft should not be permitted to carry fare paying passengers in IMC, at night or over water or inhospitable terrain. I see no problem with the use of single turbine engined aircraft by freight or private operators, whose pilots and occupants presumably know of and accept the additional risk. Similarly, I have not heard anything negative on either the PC12 or the Caravan. Both seem to be great aircraft that do an honest job. There has been some mention of airframe icing on Caravans but I suspect this is due to Caravans being regularly used in some pretty harsh climates. Any other type of aircraft used regularly in such climates will also suffer icing more often than if used in a mild climate. The only problem I have with both aircraft is that they have only one engine, which to me indicates that their operations when carrying the paying public should be limited as outlined above.

Second, look at the thread earlier this year on the Canada forum regarding Bearskin Airlines and the PC12. Some years ago Bearskin introduced some PC12s to replace some of their King Airs and similar aircraft. Now it seems they have been getting rid of the PC12s. There must be a reason. Perhaps it would be worth your while to contact Bearskin management or pilots, perhaps initially via a post on the Canada forum, to find out why this change is happening. If you find out by means other than PPRuNe, please post it on PPRuNe. I have also been wondering why this change is taking place at Bearskin.

Hope the above helps.”

[Red Line]

LOL Bearskin did NOT leave the PC-12 market because they were single-engine! In fact they did rather extensive customer acceptance surveys before they acquired them! There were other factors to their removal from the fleet, but mainly they'd have no use for them after selling their northern routes to Wasaya!

[Navajo-dude]

No one else is responsible but the operator.Plain and simple if they had of done the required maintenance the airplane would have been airworthy .
The maintenace was not done in accordance with the manufactures recomendations therefore the airplane was not airworthy and should not have been released for dispatch by the operator .

Having read the report, perhaps someone can explain something to me that doesn't make sense.

The quote above is self explanatory. I read in the TSB report that the PT-6 is 3600 TBO. Beyond that, trend monitoring is required for an extension of TBO to 6000 hours. Below quotes are from the report.

The installation of an engine parameter recording system and use of an engine condition trend monitoring (ECTM) software is a condition of SB 1703 and must be fulfilled before allowing an extension to the TBO.

If an operator chooses not to use trend monitoring, they can fly up to 3600 hours. Theoretically, then, the compressor turbine blades should be good for those 3600 hours in order to meet the .01 failure per 1,000 hours parameter.

The engine was manufactured in 1995 by Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) and is assigned a basic time between overhaul (TBO) of 3600 hours.

The engine had been overhauled twice since new. The first overhaul was done in the United States and was completed at 3528 hours. A hot section inspection was done on 22 October 2003, at 7677 hours, and all 58 CT blades were replaced with new blades. A TBO extension to 6000 hours was requested at that time and was granted in accordance with P&WC Service Bulletin (SB) 1703.

The second (most recent) engine overhaul was completed on 07 November 2005, at 9528 hours. During that overhaul, the CT blades that had been installed new in October 2003 were inspected and re-installed in accordance with approved P&WC overhaul procedures. At the time of the accident, the engine had accumulated about 140 hours of flight time since the most recent overhaul. The failed blade had been in operation for about 1991 hours since new.

There's been much talk about the operator's trend monitoring not being in compliance. BUT, if the blades are supposed to last 3600 hours on engines without any trend monitoring, and one fails at 1991 hours, why should the operators trend monitoring make any difference?

[Go Guns]

I think you have to be on one program or the other right from the get go. Otherwise there would be no previous data to compare to after the TBO.

Also, I don't think anybody has brought up the trend monitoring.

[Navajo-dude]

Sonicblue Airways was not providing downloaded engine parameter data for engine condition trend monitoring (ECTM) evaluation at appropriate intervals.

A small but significant quote from the report .If they are not doing what is required to satisfy the engine TBO extension. Then the aircraft is not being maintained as required by the manufacture requirements and the aircraft is not airworthy and should not have left the ground until the airworthy requirements have been satisfied.

The missing trends will let P&W off the hook as the engine was not being operated as per their written instructions.


The missing trends are a significant contribution to that accident .Ask anyone who has used an engine trend for engine TBO extensions.

The out of date GPS card could be misinterpreted as corporate culture .Rather than a sign that the maintenace was not being carried out in a correct or timely manner.

[Navajo-dude]

It does not matter how well built an engine is if it is operated outside of manufactures written recomendations.If it is operated outside of the TC approved maintenanace programmes.
The data is missing for a reason ,that reason is probably the main cause of the failure .
The airplane had more than one maintenance issue.Maintenance issues that nothing to do with Cessna or P&W but solely on the operator of the aircraft .
When you allow yourself to get side tracked in debate about equipement not installed in the plane .You obfuscate the simple fact that the operator failed to maintain the airplane to the manufactures standards .No one else is responsible but the operator.Plain and simple if they had of done the required maintenance the airplane would have been airworthy .
The maintenace was not done in accordance with the manufactures recomendations therefore the airplane was not airworthy and should not have been released for dispatch by the operator .
When you consider the maintenance history of the operator.And the general reputation of the operator .It would be safe to say that it is not an honest mistake that anyone could make and that it is a specific limited risk of that operator and should not adversly affect the other honest safe operators of that well built safe airplane.

But if you want to debate equipment not installed why not one of those ballistic parachute systems or a flir camera to provide zero zero landing capability ???If the operators first fatal caravan crash had of had a flir system they might have missed that little island that fateful night enroute to Victoria low level VFR at night .

When all else fails read the instructions .

[2R]

Anyone got a copy of the SB 1703 ???

[2milefinal]

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/200 ... 6p0010.asp

..is that what you looken for?



Therefore, the Board recommends that:

The Department of Transport take into account all propulsion system failures when assessing the safety of single-engine commercial operations.

Did they MEAN Single-engine or Single-Engine-Instrument-Flight-Rules. ?

[2R]

Read that thanks .
I was looking for the Service Bulletin 1703

[Go Guns]

Wow, how bout that. It was the first thing Google came up with..

http://www.altairavionics.aero/altairho ... SB1703.pdf

[the_professor]

There's been much talk about the operator's trend monitoring not being in compliance. BUT, if the blades are supposed to last 3600 hours without any trend monitoring, and one fails at 1991 hours, why should the operators trend monitoring make any difference?

Glad you mentioned that. I thought I was reading the report incorrectly. And the report states that the crack began where there was an anomaly (not an exact quote) in the metal. No trend monitoring will matter there.

Non-compliance with trend monitoring is only relevant in that it helps to show how the operator was lax -- not following trend monitoring practices, databases 7 years out of date, etc... Regardless, their practices had nothing whatsoever to do with this accident.

[seniorpumpkin]

There's been much talk about the operator's trend monitoring not being in compliance. BUT, if the blades are supposed to last 3600 hours without any trend monitoring, and one fails at 1991 hours, why should the operators trend monitoring make any difference?

It is my understanding that one or more hot starts could cause this type of fatigue that could lead to a failure. I'm thinking abnormally high temperatures under normal operations could also lead to fatigue cracks and eventually failure. Trend monitoring is typically designed to record hot starts, as well as higher than normal temperatures. Would trend monitoring have prevented this accident? Maybe, maybe not. I think it's worth being strict about though.

[golden hawk]

It is my understanding that one or more hot starts could cause this type of fatigue that could lead to a failure. I'm thinking abnormally high temperatures under normal operations could also lead to fatigue cracks and eventually failure.

Did the operator have any hot starts with this engine in the 1991 hours since the blades were installed?

[xsbank]

Without monitoring, you will never know.

CAN WE PLEASE DROP THE QUOTE THINGY? It just fills up the pages with stuff we've already read! If you have no reading comprehension at all, then go ahead and do it for yourself, THEN ERASE IT!

Sheesh!