Just a purely technical observation, from the numbers given, for the newbees and not a comment on the why/where/how of the pilots involved:
data indicate a likely separation of the airflow over the wing and ensuing roll two seconds after the stick shaker activated while the aircraft was slowing through 125 knots and while at a flight load of 1.42 Gs.
The predicted stall speed at a load factor of 1 G would be about 105 knots.
You may remember from Ground School that the stall speed increases by the square root of the load factor.
In this case the New Stall Speed is given as SQRT(1.42) * 105kts = 125kts
The numbers work out. While the aircraft was 20kts above stall speed at 1 G and still flying, with the load of 1.42 G the stall speed increased and caught up to the aircraft's actual airspeed - causing it to stall/spin.
Why? The NTSB will say.
This is why your Instructor tells you not to yank the aircraft during your stall recovery/slow flight training.
This whole thing is getting more frightening by the day.
Whatever happened to standards? The Capt'n sounds inept, and the F/O terrified, how were these two paired as a crew? No SIM training to the stick pusher? Really? What's the point of recurrent then?
This is a serious business, and it seems to me people have started to take it for granted, I can't help but wonder how many more of these accidents are but a blink away from becoming reality?
It makes you wonder if incidents like this one happen often but disaster is narrowly avoided by chance. Seems like we have gone way too far into the cost cutting side of the money/safety ratio.
We're too busy testing people and not spending enough time training them. Does a ride make you a better pilot, not bloody likely!! Don't waste your time with a departure, return, hold, approach blah blah blah. Don't mark me, critique me!! Don't test me teach me!! Regulatory bodies are too concerned with tests. Lets focus on the real problem out there. TRAINING!! Teaching to a standard with proper oversight and auditing and you'll have a better calibre pilot in the end. It's not a free ticket but a lesson in saving your own life and the lives of others!
The problem with the website seems to be Shaw cable. I can't even view the http://www.ntsb.gov homepage. The solution is to use a proxy server (e.g. proxy.cg.shawcable.net port 80).
Also, the animation doesn't work on firefox - you need to use IE, but even then it just gets stuck and never finishes loading.
I found a youtube version here that seems to work better (but still doesn't seem to work on firefox for some reason):
From the animation, it looks as if they reduced the power to slow down and they just forgot about it. The speed kept decreasing with the power near idle, and after they put the gear down the speed decayed even more quickly and they didn't increase power until the stick shaker started. It looks like they pulled back on the stick as soon as the shaker started, putting them into the stall, and they kept pulling back on the stick right to the very end.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT to the 2 co workers who lost their lives. Companies in general only train to the standards required by the FAA/CAA/ JAR TC .
In the US the FAA only requires a Type rating for the Captain on large airplanes, dash 8Q400, B737 B747 matters not. The standards are what they are, training to the stick pusher is not done for the most part on any type and with 6 large types on my license it has always been at the first indication of stall; ie shaker, buffet , horn initiate recovery. I have yet to hear of anyone taking it to the pusher except in flight testing. Keep that in mind.
ALSO if the training was not up to standard who signed these pilots off on their ride or IOE/Line Indoc.
I wonder if their SOPs call for gear down at LOC alive? Obviously, every company has different procedures. I'm more familiar with lowering the gear and flaps once I start heading downhill on the glideslope. Being fully stabilized in level flight with little thrust, to expect to be able to drop the gear and flaps without adding substantial thrust isn't realistic. They had armed the approach; I wonder if they thought they were closer to glideslope capture than they actually were. I usually try to work it out so that I can fly the descent and most of the approach without required change in thrust--maybe they were trying to do the same thing?
ajet32 wrote:WITH ALL DUE RESPECT to the 2 co workers who lost their lives. Companies in general only train to the standards required by the FAA/CAA/ JAR TC .
In the US the FAA only requires a Type rating for the Captain on large airplanes, dash 8Q400, B737 B747 matters not. The standards are what they are, training to the stick pusher is not done for the most part on any type and with 6 large types on my license it has always been at the first indication of stall; ie shaker, buffet , horn initiate recovery. I have yet to hear of anyone taking it to the pusher except in flight testing. Keep that in mind.
ALSO if the training was not up to standard who signed these pilots off on their ride or IOE/Line Indoc.
Do you mean to say that you have never been shown the effects of the stick push in a sim in 6 type endorsements, how violent it is, and how the plane responds, and tried to overpower it? Not to mention practising the steps you can take to recover from it.
This is one of the big advantages of a sim - taking it to your, and the performance limits, of the aircraft.
swordfish, perhaps I didn't explain correctly. In 6 type s I have never been required to go to push and fight it, when it shakes or buffets you recover. That is essentially what the training standards are set to both demonstrate and evaluate. I have had the chance to do so in sim bit it was NOT required training. I wonder if it was for these folks.
The VP's of Flight Ops and Admin are on the 'hot seat' today... Hiring practices, experience levels, pay grades (the F/O earned about $22/hr), training bonds, sim evals. I'm feeling a little ill listening to the VP of Admin try to justify how they are industry standard and hire nothing but the best and safety is number one blah, blah, blah...
Sounds to me like all you need is two legs and a heartbeat to get a job at Colgan.
These people sound like morons up there on the stand today. They should be ashamed.
For those who have had problems with links to information regarding the hearings, below is a link to one of the Media outlets that seems to have all bases covered:
The airline is trying to blame the whole thing on the pilots, calling them unprofessional. That may be true, but the norms of a company is set by the CEO and if your going to pay peanuts your going to attract monkeys.
Another BIG issue with this accident that the inquiry is digging at is fatigue. The VP of Safety just had the audacity to tell everyone that he feels that a 16 hour duty day is acceptable. Debbie Hersman (one of the NTSB members) has asked some great questions today, especially regarding pay, experience level and fatigue. Even though they are generally pointing fingers at the crew (they screwed up), she (and all the board members actually) has done an excellent job of bringing it back to management.
I've said it before: It's ALL about the bottom line...
It is my belief after training and watching this new breed of pilots comeing up that many rely on automation far to much and to often. Some use it always and thus have a very poor feel for the aircraft when hand flown. This younger generation is excellent at GPS/FMS and building flight profiles but when you take it away they struggle. Perhaps this could be the case here.
I'm going to buy my own plane to take on family vacations because I have a hard time trusting who has been hired, with what experience to fly what equipment just so I can go by air across the country for $25.
If they can't afford to pay their pilots, they probably don't pay to have them trained in the sims, they probably cheap out on the maintenance as well. Once a cheap bastard, always a cheap bastard.
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Fotoflyer wrote:
Attorney Ronald Goldman told the Associated Press that the plane's de-icing system was "antiquated."
The system used on the Dash 8 uses strips of rubber-like material on the wings and tail that expand to break up ice, then contract and expand again to break up new ice.
"It's a system that cannot guarantee the safety of passengers on a commercial flight," Goldman said. "It should never be flown in these kinds of conditions."
Lawyers.
***EDITED*** You know better than that. stl Lawyers!
In defense of "modern training methods," 'most' modern aircraft have a vicious stall. When they are stalled in flight testing, the crew are wearing parachutes and have a very direct route to an exit. Few modern jets that I am aware of stall like the fun, docile little trainers we practice in, or any of the float planes I flew years ago. Besides, there are passengers wandering about in the rear and a full aerodynamic stall would kill off some of them.
So we practice to the shaker because that is as close to the real stall as can be considered safe. As it is not a 'real' stall but merely slow flight 'nearing' the stall, the recovery, for some, is to cob the power and hold the same attitude as the shaker/warning so as to not give up any altitude. It is only when you pooch the recovery that you get pusher.
When I do my training, I do a "landing stall" where we level at MDA, fully configured, and slow the a/c to shaker, on the autopilot, then recover.
The takeoff stall is a go-around with one of two engines inop, gear up but take-of flaps selected - level at 600 feet in a standard turn, use too-little thrust, then recover from shaker.
The clean stall is done at 35,000.'
If CRM breaks down to such a degree as has happened in the last three crashes I can think of, Amsterdam, this one and Indonesia (Adam Air?), all the stall practice and upset practice is pointless as there is nobody flying the plane anyway.
Having blathered on like this for a bit, I know nothing about the 400, I have only ever flown the Dash7 and that is light years away from the Dash8.
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"What's it doing now?"
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
According to the reports, the crew initiated the stall recovery with backpressure, the opposite to a normal recovery technique. Is it possible that they thought that the tailplane had stalled due to ice build up and that explains the reverse recovery method?
Especially considering the pilots were talking about ice buildup for several minutes before, if the Captain had the thought of a tailplane stall in the back of his mind, when the nose dropped due to the stick pusher, his reaction might have influenced by the thought of a tail-stall in the back of his mind.
Given the state of the aircraft, as soon as he hauled back on the stick it was pretty much over. One simple split second mistake, and now the everyone and their dog is making him look like a complete idiot. It's rather sickening.
The stall recovery taught for Dash 8 series A/C 100 thru 400 does NOT involve lowering the nose. You release back pressure add full power "STALL MAX POWER". Not sure they did the wrong recovery.
The stall recovery used on trainers and light Aircraft have no bearing on large Turboprops.
According to Bombardier the Dash 8 Q400 is not susceptible to tail stalls.
everyone and their dog is making him look like a complete idiot
Often this is the case. Sometimes it's the opposite, where the pilot is held out to be a "hero", as was the case initially with Mr. Tayfel. All of these initial judgements are speculation in the absence of factual information, and are typically revised as more information comes out.
My expectation is that the NTSB analysis will ultimately help explain why this crew's actions made sense to them at the time.
One simple split second mistake, and now the everyone and their dog is making him look like a complete idiot. It's rather sickening.
**** NEWSFLASH ****
That's the way it is. You don't choose fame. Fame chooses you.
Remember the old joke about the grandfather complaining to
his young grandson that no one remembers all the houses,
docks and boats that he built - "But you screw ONE goat ..."
If I ever screw up and dig a hole, I am quite certain that
everyone here will cheer and dance on my grave and claim
that I never had one tenth of the piloting ability that the
internet heros here claim to have
That's the way it is, child. If you don't like the heat, get out
of the kitchen (shrug).
ajet32 wrote:The stall recovery taught for Dash 8 series A/C 100 thru 400 does NOT involve lowering the nose. You release back pressure add full power "STALL MAX POWER". Not sure they did the wrong recovery.
"At the stick shaker, release a slight amount of back pressure and add max power while maintaining your pitch to minimize altitude loss". That is paraphrased from a 100 series book. This actually requires to you keep a noticeable amount of back pressure on the control column, but not too much. If the stick shaker goes off again, you know you are pulling back too much and you release a little more back pressure. Pitching 30 degrees nose up while the airspeed continues to bleed off and the stick shaker continues to shake is not a normal recovery.
