Continental Flt 3407 Crash at Buffalo/Niagra Intr'nal

[_dwj_]

The stall recovery taught for Dash 8 series A/C 100 thru 400 does NOT involve lowering the nose. You release back pressure add full power "STALL MAX POWER". Not sure they did the wrong recovery.

"At the stick shaker, release a slight amount of back pressure and add max power while maintaining your pitch to minimize altitude loss". That is paraphrased from a 100 series book. This actually requires to you keep a noticeable amount of back pressure on the control column, but not too much. If the stick shaker goes off again, you know you are pulling back too much and you release a little more back pressure. Pitching 30 degrees nose up while the airspeed continues to bleed off and the stick shaker continues to shake is not a normal recovery.

And if you watch the animation, it looks like there is no backpressure on the stick (it's neutral) before the stick shaker activates. Then as soon as the stick shaker starts, he starts pulling back on the stick and pushes the throttles to max. Then a few seconds after that the stick pusher activates and it all goes horribly wrong.

So it looks like he added backpressure instead of releasing it. Perhaps he thought adding full power would do the trick, but obviously not.

[Finn47]

When the wing dropped, at the latest, he should have realized it was a fully developed "normal" stall and let go the back pressure, instead of trying to correct with aileron only...

[airway]

The stall recovery taught for Dash 8 series A/C 100 thru 400 does NOT involve lowering the nose. You release back pressure add full power "STALL MAX POWER". Not sure they did the wrong recovery.

The stall recovery used on trainers and light Aircraft have no bearing on large Turboprops.

The "Stall Recovery" taught in simulators for large aircraft should actually be called "stick shaker recovery", because at stick shaker you are not stalled, you are approaching the stall.

Standard "approach to the stall recovery" or "stick shaker recovery" is: full power/max thrust, level wings, and attempt to maintain altitude as long as the speed does not decay any further. This applies to any conventional airplane, large and small. This is the same as the range/endurance/slow flight recovery.

Standard "stall recovery" is: release back pressure/ lower the nose (a stick pusher will help you do this, usually resulting in a descent), full power/max thrust and level wings, then recover back to a slight nose up attitude to minimize altitude loss. This applies to any conventional airplane, large and small.

[goldeneagle]

When the wing dropped, at the latest, he should have realized it was a fully developed "normal" stall and let go the back pressure, instead of trying to correct with aileron only...

Maybe, but think it thru.

If you got your ppl back in the days when demonstration of a full spin was still required, you learned an appreciation for the full spin. You also learned (by trying it) how BAD things get trying to use ailerons to recover. You filed a little mental note in the back of your mind, and it's been with you ever since, when you feel the first onset of stall buffet, pucker up in the seat, get both feet solidly on the RUDDER PEDALS, column to the center, and use RUDDER.

Now wind the clock ahead, take a pilot that got the ppl after spins were done away with in the ppl training requirements. That person has NEVER been exposed to the 'ailerons make things worse' scenario. That person has flown for thousands of hours, and, aileron input has always been the ONLY way they have levelled wings. Now place this person at a relatively low altitude, in an airplane entering a stall, with a wing starting to drop. What is going to be the reaction ? Remember, this person has NEVER been exposed to the effects of aileron input while a wing is fully stalled and the aircraft is entering a spin, so, they dont have the little mental note sitting there that says 'when you feel a buffet, pucker back into the seat and get both feet solidly on the pedals, with column centered'. Aggrivate this scenario a bit, make it dark, and put some aphrehension into the person by putting a small amount of ice on the plane, and remember, the person has little exposure to flying in ice.

You guys can go on and on about CRM, and all the fancy buzzwords, and continue to do so all day long, but, the real issue for this incident goes directly back to removing full spins from the basic licensing requirements. When FAA took it out, and later TC did so too, it became inevitable that eventually one day there would be an accident where a transport category aircraft was mishandled during an arrival stall/spin scenario, simply because that initial foundation knowledge just simply was not present in the crew's mindset, going back to initial ppl training.

The folks from bombardier said it all with the statement 'this was a garden variety stall spin'. That's what it was, and it happened to a crew that didn't have the background to understand the scenario. Both of the pilots were products of the system from after the time spins were removed from the ppl training. It's very likely that neither of them had ever seen an airplane (from the inside) in a fully developed spin, and had no clue as to how the controls would actually react in that scenario. When a wing drops, the ONLY recovery they have ever been exposed to, is to use ailerons to level it, except in this scenario, those ailerons aggrivate the problem.

The system today assumes, since the training is all about avoiding the stall, there is no need to train for the 'what if' scenario of a stalled airplane entering a full spin. End result, this accident. The aircraft ended up beyond the 'training point' of 'stall onset', was in a fully developed stall, and, the crew didn't know how the controls would react in this condition. It was dark, probably not a lot of outside reference. I'm sure if there was a 'freeze' button, they could have taken 30 seconds, analyzed, thought back to theory, and realized the recovery was going to be unusual, but, there wasn't a freeze button, and they had no foundation experience with the full spin on which to draw.

Spin training was removed from training because it was deemed to hazardous, the training itself would cause more accidents than it would prevent. If indeed that rationale was correct back then, and still today, then this accident is simply the back side of that statistical anlaysis. Years of no spin training has in theory saved a lot of lives from training accidents. This flight was the 'cost' side of that 'cost benefit analysis' done years ago.

[xsbank]

Wrong. This is a CRM issue. "Check speed." "Correcting." What's so hard about that? Maybe there was a fatigue component, but that needs to be proven.

How many passenger a/c have you been on where the aircraft entered a stall at transition to the ILS?

This has nothing to do with spin training and everything to do with nobody flying the airplane.

Whether the guy was a screw-up and some day, something else would have punched his clock, there was nobody flying. All these comments about spins etc. must come from pilots who have never flown two-crew.

[Old fella]

Lost in all of this(from my prospective), the Capt and F/O had wives/sons/daughters/husbands/parents listening to all of the media attention focused on their late partner's actions or lack there of and, the final seconds of their lives.

Now throw in the tort lawyers who are already lining up against them.........

[Intentional Left Bank]

How many passenger a/c have you been on where the aircraft entered a stall at transition to the ILS?

How many passenger a/c have you been on where the gear and flaps were lowered at "LOC alive", rather than when on glideslope or within a dot?

[EPR]

I'm in agreement with Goldeneagle....if you watch the flight control input animation retrieved from the FDR, you can see that their was little to no input on the rudder pedals.
That being said, like xsbank mentioned,their was also no CRM.

[Valhalla]

A huge contributing factor to this accident has to be the terrible pay at Colgan. How can you expect to attract experienced crew when you pay peanuts?? Can you be expected to be well rested when you can't afford a hotel room, and have to sleep in the crew room or on the plane commuting to work??

The system failed these pilots and put them in a situation they should not have been - inexperienced, underpaid, disgruntled, and very tired. It's no wonder they could not focus on their job.

[SaskStyle]

One simple split second mistake, and now the everyone and their dog is making him look like a complete idiot. It's rather sickening.

**** NEWSFLASH ****

That's the way it is. You don't choose fame. Fame chooses you.

Remember the old joke about the grandfather complaining to
his young grandson that no one remembers all the houses,
docks and boats that he built - "But you screw ONE goat ..."

If I ever screw up and dig a hole, I am quite certain that
everyone here will cheer and dance on my grave and claim
that I never had one tenth of the piloting ability that the
internet heros here claim to have

That's the way it is, child. If you don't like the heat, get out
of the kitchen (shrug).

Hedley....I agree with you 100%.....reality is what it is.

And reality with this situation...is regardless of all the chatter re stall recovery and tailstall and whether or not he thought he had a tail stall....

That's all nonsense really...

The discussion should be on why they were so slow passing the beacon...why situational awareness had been lost....

Why?

I venture that with a lack of experience they became fixated on "ice" or let their nerves get in the way of actually flying the plane.

One simple split second mistake? Sickening???

I think your attitude is what is sickening. It wasn't a split second mistake....like I said, by the time they'd stalled, it was over.

What makes me sick is that we bitch and whine and moan about lack of pay and lack of respect and demand professional status equal to doctors lawyers etc.....

Yet here was a blatant example of a lack of professionalism...butter it up how you will...but your number one job as captain of a plane is to get it on the ground safely. Blame lack of training, standards, current state of aviation...pick one.

At the end of the day...Take some pride in your job...pick up a book...teach yourself if you're not getting what you need from the company....

Be focused on task at hand....think ahead of the plane...

For chissake folks...if you're afraid of the situation you're in, go around. keep airspeed.

It wasn't one simple mistake. You don't get paid to make simple mistakes. You get paid to have a boring career and make the right decisions so you don't put yourself in a situation where you have to do a stall recovery at 500 feet.

[FlaplessDork]

From the FDR animation my guess is that it was the autopilot that stalled it. He threw the gear down and flaps 15 holding altitude with no increase in power. The speed degraded to stall. Only then did he add power. He held it in the stall and she brought the flaps up too early in the stall and too quickly. Only speculation however. I don't know the airplane.

[Snagmaster E]

Wow,

There were a lot of things pointing to inexperience in conditions, handling of aircraft, etc. I haven't read all of the posts...

Like some people said.. lot of chatter in the cockpit.. but that happens.

Looks like there was some fixation on icing.

F/O seemed to have low operational knowledge on turbines from what I can gather in the CVR transcript. I don't know her Q400 knowledge, but I imagine it was lower.

Captain didn't seem to have a lot of time on type. Paired with an inexperienced F/O... He should have been only flying with well experienced pilots in the right seat. I'm not saying that it would have prevented it, but it might have helped. How many people have been new on type and totally overwhelmed at first?

Watching the FDR video: Wow. 76 kts. Last time I checked an aircraft in level flight with some flaps and almost idle power will not maintain airspeed. Add in the full fine props and you can see that nobody was watching the airspeed. and when the stick shaker goes off... the PF pulled back? The EHSI was showing the red push down arrows. It looks like to me that there were several stalls and the proper recovery was never executed. Sure the power was up but he kept pulling back!

Icing related? Not directly. It may have been a distraction, but definately not the cause, at least from what I can see. It looks like inexperience and poor training.

I don't think pay has anything to do with it. Were they underpaid? We all are to some extent. If they were paid $500,000, would it have made a difference? Would he have known what to do? Should he have been flying the aircraft is what's really important. Having said that, pay is a big motivator. Scheduling is a big motivator. If companies treated their employees better, people wouldn't be willing to jump ship as soon as something better comes along, thereby allowing your pilot pool to have more experience.

Hey, this is my opinion. Opinions are like ***holes: We all got one.

[aerodude]

I don't think pay has anything to do with it. Were they underpaid? We all are to some extent. If they were paid $500,000, would it have made a difference?

Yes it would have. With the sub-industry pays at colgan, you're not going to attract the best and brightest. Just shows no matter what the pay: pilots will line up like ducks to "live the dream..."

[Pratt]

From the FDR animation my guess is that it was the autopilot that stalled it. He threw the gear down and flaps 15 holding altitude with no increase in power. The speed degraded to stall. Only then did he add power. He held it in the stall and she brought the flaps up too early in the stall and too quickly. Only speculation however. I don't know the airplane.

I don't know about the comment of the autopilot stalled it, if you don't have auto throttles and you have a level altitude set you are the throttles to maintain a given airspeed, what does that have to do with the autopilot?

A point that you mentioned that nobody else commented on is the fact that the f/o brought the flaps up, which in their current configuration was a definite no no. And the fact that the f/o brought them up without being directed so by the flying pilot.

This might not have been the reason that the stall went into a spin but it certainly did not help the possibility of a successful stall recovery if the flying pilot had been using normal/correct stall recovery procedures.

[FlaplessDork]

I don't know about the comment of the autopilot stalled it, if you don't have auto throttles and you have a level altitude set you are the throttles to maintain a given airspeed, what does that have to do with the autopilot?

Auto was holding alt, gear and flaps came down but he didnt bring the throttles up to maintain speed cause of the extra drag.

A point that you mentioned that nobody else commented on is the fact that the f/o brought the flaps up, which in their current configuration was a definite no no. And the fact that the f/o brought them up without being directed so by the flying pilot.

I wondered about that too. She brought them up deep in the stall.

[BTD]

I think a possible reason she brought the flaps up, was a case of

"if the shit hits the fan, undo what you just did"

She had just selected 15 flap when the aircraft went to hell. It is possible that she was attempting to do undo what she did. I simply state it as a possiblity. Whether it was the correct action, in that aircraft, I'm not sure the stall procedure.

In our 704 aircraft the procedure, is "stall" "max power" "gear up, flaps 1/4" V2+5, flaps come up.

BTD

[Lost in Saigon]

In our 704 aircraft the procedure, is "stall" "max power" "gear up, flaps 1/4" V2+5, flaps come up.

BTD

I am curious. What aircraft is that? I find it hard to understand how it is preferable to retract flaps in a stall recovery.

[Tim]

http://news.sympatico.msn.cbc.ca/abc/wo ... robe051409

The final day of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board's inquiry in Washington focused its attention on fatigue, distraction and inadequate training as possible contributing factors to mistakes made by the pilot in the Feb. 12 crash of Continental Airlines Flight 3407.

During his testimony Thursday, Robert Key Dismukes told board members that flight data and transcripts of cockpit recordings show Capt. Marvin Renslow failed to realize the plane was about to stall as it approached Buffalo Niagara International Airport in wintry weather.

"I don't see any evidence he knew the situation he was in," said Dismukes, a pilot and scientist at NASA's Ames Research Center who has spent decades studying fields such as pilot attention and cockpit distractions.

The Dash 8-Q400 Bombardier twin-engine turboprop experienced an aerodynamic stall, rolled over and crashed into a house in the Buffalo-area town of Clarence Center, killing all 49 people aboard and one person inside the house. One Canadian was among the victims.

"I think the crew went from complacency to catastrophe in 20 seconds," Deborah Hersman, a National Transportation Safety Board member, said while questioning Dismukes.

Some aircraft already have audible warning systems to alert pilots when the aircraft slows too much, but not the Q400, which has a stick-shaker to indicate when the aircraft is on the verge of stalling.

Dismukes said he agreed with Hersman's suggestion that a "fire alarm" system to indicate when a plane is rapidly losing speed would make sense to prevent similar tragedies from unfolding in the future.

"You'd want a very distinctive alert, but not one that is not so dramatic," he said. "It's well worth looking at."

Pilot had 'low-time' captaining aircraft type

Renslow reportedly had little hands-on experience with a stick-pusher - a critical component in a system used in emergencies. It automatically kicks in when a plane is about to stall, pointing the aircraft's nose down into a dive so it can pick up enough speed to allow the pilot to guide it to a recovery.

According to flight data records recovered from the crash, the captain put the stick-pusher in the wrong position when the plane began to nosedive.

NASA'S Dismukes said repeated training is the only way for pilots to learn to respond to such events properly. He noted Renslow logged just 109 hours as captain in the Q400 and earned most of his flight time in a similar, but different type of aircraft.

"I'm hesitant to make a judgment, but it was obvious he was low-time in this aircraft in the captain's seat," he said.

But Dismukes conceded it was "conceivable" that Renslow might have mistaken the situation for a tail stall, which requires the pilot to push the control forward to recover.

The inquiry has heard Renslow failed three proficiency checks on general aviation aircraft administered by federal aviation officials. Representatives from the aircraft's operator, Colgan Air Inc., have said Renslow did not fully disclose the failures when he applied for his job.

The airline says it has boosted its minimum requirement for new pilots to 1,000 hours of flight experience.

Released transcripts of cabin recordings of the moments before the stall also show Renslow and his first officer, Rebecca Shaw, casually chatting about their lack of experience flying in wintry conditions of the U.S. Northeast. In the transcripts, Shaw also said she felt congested and considered calling in sick the day of the crash.

The NTSB hearing has already heard testimony that Renslow commuted from his home near Tampa to fly out of Newark, while Shaw took a cross-country red-eye flight the night before the crash to get to her $16,000 US-a-year job.

The airline acknowledged that some of its pilots commute from cities across the United States to their workbases, but are expected to show up rested and ready to perform their duties.

With files from The Associated Press

[CP]

Putting the stick shaker in the wrong position will get you every time!

[CP]

It would make sense to at least wait for a positive rate of climb before raising flaps. I cant imagine the 400 is much different in that respect.

[petpad]

Flight times for these pilots were low but OK, and low-time for the FO on a Dash-8 is to be expected and will likely not change in the future. So we have to accept that it is part of the structure. The Captain was relatively new on the type but he had plenty of hours. So total flight hours is not the real problem here.

The pay is really bad, true enough. $16,000US per year as an FO should be outlawed. How can airlines get away with this I dont know. Still, low pay was not the primary culprit here either.

IMHO, there are two main problems here :

1. OPERATOR : Horrendous cockpit discpline due to marginal [or no] culture. Anyone who has flown crew long enough know that cockpit discipline is a must, at all times, and the only time crews should be allowed to yip yap is on cruise level flight and before the start of the descent. While we all engaged in useless chit-chat, this was obviously no time for it. From a human factor perspective, and chastise me if you want for being the first to suggest this, a relatively young and normal male Captain flying with a young and attractive female first officer could invite extra motivation for the Captain to engage in that useless chatter. This male-female natural attraction can equate to a desire ito interact more. It happens a lot, but it rarely is seen as an issue, unless an accident happens. To get back to culture, it is the operator's responsibility to train their pilots on cockpit discipline and to ensure it is followed. In fact, had this company had a strong SMS in place, the pilots may have been more focused and may have avoided the mishap.

2. Captain : his training and skills. This Captain was by all account a middle-achiever, failed a few flight tests, passed some, upgraded to Captain on a Dash-8 - not bad in terms of aviation progress. He was the typical pilot who can do everything up to standard as long as everything works fine. Pilots are not paid to meet the standard when everythng works fine. pilots are paid to perform when the shit hits the fan. Like Sully. Like the DC10 Captain. Like many others. Anyone can fly a Dash 8 or even a Challenger when the a/c performs and the weather in fine. While he was the last one with the hands on the stick, the operator and the system as a whole failed him.

[BTD]

In our 704 aircraft the procedure, is "stall" "max power" "gear up, flaps 1/4" V2+5, flaps come up.

BTD

I am curious. What aircraft is that? I find it hard to understand how it is preferable to retract flaps in a stall recovery.

Metroliner. Flaps beyond 1/4 causes significant drag with little benefit in lift. So our procedure calls for max power while adjusting the attitude, gear up flaps 1/4 for a landing config stall

Keep in mind this is at the first indication of a stall. Horn, shaker. The aircraft should still be a few knots above a stall at this point.

It would make sense to at least wait for a positive rate of climb before raising flaps. I cant imagine the 400 is much different in that respect.

We do wait for V2+5 and a positive rate before the flaps come up from 1/4. However, if you sit and wait for a positive rate with flap full and gear down before pulling the flap up, you may never get it.

BTD

[CP]

if you sit and wait for a positive rate with flap full and gear down before pulling the flap up, you may never get it.

BTD
Thats one under powered a/c!

[Sidebar]

How can airlines get away with this

Simple. Pilots accept it.

[BTD]

if you sit and wait for a positive rate with flap full and gear down before pulling the flap up, you may never get it.

BTD
Thats one under powered a/c!

I should clarify the above. Depending on your altitude you may not get a positive rate before you impact the ground. Full flap provides limited lift for a large penalty in drag, as does gear. All the gear and full flap are going to do is prolong the acceleration and recovery at least in the Metro.