Tim Hortons co-founder reported to be OK after plane crashes

[fogghorn]

To bad the dude didn't get sucked into an engine. Sounds like a real prize, thx for the info.

[pelmet]

For a picture of the plane, see this link....


http://www.airdisaster.com/forums/showt ... hp?t=86715

[Inverted2]

Ouch, dont think they'll be fixing that, the fuselage is all crumpled, on the other hand they are being quite careful in lifting it.....

[GVFlyer]

The airport in Nevis is almost 1000' shorter than Fox Harbour
TKPN
Runway Ident: 28 /10
Runway Length: 3996
Runway Width: 98

And there is a hill on short final making it even tougher.

I don't think my boss would buy that excuse if I bent a G550.

[the original tony]

I genuinely feel sorry for the pilots who were flying and most of the passangers.
Approx 7 years ago i was offered a job with this company,
I was quickly contacted, how they got my # i have no idea, but i was warned not to take it by a few workers that had left, and a few that were still there.
There has to be some accountablity regardless of stature and wealth, to companies forcing pilots to fly when they know full well they shouldn't be and probably don't want to be.
Very true that if the outcome had been different, all these posts would be very solemn and sympathetic, well most of them atleast............
Some have to learn the hard way, hopefully he is alone when it happens.

Tony.

[Widow]

Crash report expected by late summer
TSB continues to look into Fox Harb'r crash
BY DARRELL COLE
The Amherst Daily News

AMHERST - It could late summer before a report on last November’s plane crash at Fox Harb’r is made public.
Transportation Safety Board lead investigator Yves Jolicoeur said the actual investigation is pretty much wrapped up and the information gathering phase has also been completed. At present, he said, the process has moved into the report writing stage.

“Until we have gone through the process of validating all the information we really don’t want to give out too much information,” Jolicoeur said. “Once something goes out in the news and there’s an error people take that as the gospel. We want to make sure everything is correct before it’s released to the public.

“I’d like to say late summer, but we’re more concerned about the accuracy than the speed that it comes out.”

Officials from the Transportation Safety Board were called to the luxury resort near Wallace on Nov. 11 when a Bombardier Global Express 5000, carrying Tim Hortons co-founder Ron Joyce, crashed upon landing at the resort’s private airstrip.
While wind and rain were key factors in the crash, Jolicoeur said there were a number of other variables involved that have all been investigated.

In the crash, the jet landed short of the runway, catching a small lip before the pavement. The impact caused the front landing gear to collapse, sending the plane skidding on its belly 300 metres down the runway.

Both the pilot and co-pilot spent time in hospital after the crash while Joyce himself underwent surgery in Hamilton, Ont. to repair two fractured vertebrae less than a week after the incident.

Jolicoeur said the plane remains at the Fox Harb’r resort where it has pretty much been torn down with the most of the plane’s interior having been removed along with the cockpit avionics. He also believes the engines have been removed.
“The TSB has been doing a lot of interviews with the pilots, the company, with Transport Canada and Bombardier to get an understanding of the operation of the aircraft,” he said, adding that once the draft report is approved by the board it will be sent to Transport Canada, the operator and the crew involved in the mishap. “The reason we send it to them is to ensure the accuracy of the report.”

http://www.amherstdaily.com:80/index.cf ... 4899&sc=58

[hawker driver]

The airport in Nevis is almost 1000' shorter than Fox Harbour
TKPN
Runway Ident: 28 /10
Runway Length: 3996
Runway Width: 98

And there is a hill on short final making it even tougher.

Sometimes you have to remind the boss that it is an airplane and not a magic carpet.

[pelmet]

.

[Widow]

Is this report STILL not out? That article is dated March '08 and says it was expected by late summer ... and another year + later???!?

[_dwj_]

If you look in this month's Aviation Safety Letter you'll see that a lot of the investigations take 3 years, so it could be another year. I have no idea why they take so long.

[Tibor]

It was supposed to be released Monday, but I havent seen it yet

[teacher]

This was in the aviation safety letter a while ago.

TSB Communications on Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI) Issues
The following are two Aviation Safety Advisories recently submitted to Transport Canada (TC) by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)

Background
On November 11, 2007, a Bombardier Global 5000 departed Hamilton, Ont. (CYHM), for Fox Harbour, N.S. (CFH4), with two crew members and eight passengers onboard. On approach to Runway 33, the crew followed the visual glide slope indications from an abbreviated precision approach path indicator (APAPI) to guide their descent. At 14:34 Atlantic Daylight Time (ADT), the aircraft touched down seven feet short of Runway 33 at Fox Harbour. The landing gear was damaged when it came in contact with the edge of the runway, and directional control was lost when the right main landing gear collapsed. The aircraft departed the right side of the runway and came to a stop 1 000 ft from the initial touchdown point. All occupants evacuated the aircraft. One crew member and one passenger suffered serious injuries, while the others suffered only minor injuries. The aircraft suffered major structural damage. The TSB investigation into this occurrence (A07A0134) is ongoing.

The Fox Harbour Runway 33 VGSI is an APAPI system and is designed for use by aircraft with eye-to-wheel height (EWH) of up to, but not including, 10 ft (3 m). The crew had flown into the Fox Harbour aerodrome on at least 80 occasions and were familiar with the runway environment. They had relied on the Runway 33 APAPI guidance in the past to complete approaches, normally touching down within the first 500 ft of runway. However, previous flights were with smaller aircraft, such as the Challenger CL604 with an EWH of 12.1 ft (3.7 m). The crew had little overall experience on the larger Global 5000 with an EWH of 17.2 ft (5.2 m) and it was only their third time landing this aircraft at Fox Harbour.

Flight crew awareness of VGSI system limitations
VGSI information can be found in many different publications used by operating flight crews, such as the Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual (TC AIM), as well as in the Canada Air Pilot General Pages (CAP GEN) and the Canada Flight Supplement (CFS), both published by NAV CANADA.

For example, the CAP GEN describes the different types of precision approach path indicator (PAPI) systems available. A table provided in the Approach Lights Legend section gives the following information:

P1 PAPI for aircraft with eye-to-wheel height up to 10 ft.

P2 PAPI for aircraft with eye-to-wheel height up to 25 ft.

P3 PAPI for aircraft with eye-to-wheel height up to 45 ft.

AP Abbreviated PAPI for aircraft with eye-to-wheel height up to 10 ft.

Following visual guidance from a visual approach slope indicator system not appropriate for the type of aircraft operated can result in an unsafe threshold crossing height. This is especially critical when operating to a runway not served by an electronic glide path, when visual illusions might be present, or at night. Flight crew knowledge of the limitations associated with the different types of visual approach slope indicator systems in use is therefore essential in order to assess the appropriateness of the system to the type of aircraft operated.

Many small community aerodromes across Canada are serviced by aircraft with EWH exceeding the limitations of the aerodrome’s visual approach slope indicator systems. Furthermore, compared to older aircraft, newer aircraft, such as the Global 5000, now have landing and take-off performance capabilities allowing them to operate using short runways. Those short runways are often equipped with visual approach slope indicator systems appropriate for aircraft with EWH of less than 10 ft. This situation increases the exposure to the risk of landing with reduced threshold crossing height safety margin.

Even though information related to VGSI systems is available in multiple publications, the investigation has determined that while pilots are aware that different systems are in use, they are not aware of their associated limitations, nor are they aware of the significance of following guidance from a system that is not appropriate to the aircraft type operated. For example, it is not critical for a small aircraft to follow visual guidance from a P2 or P3, as it would only provide a greater threshold crossing height; however, any aircraft with an EWH greater than 10 ft following visual guidance from a P1 or an AP would not be assured a safe threshold crossing height.

The TC Flight Instructor Guide—Aeroplane (TP 975E) lists the topic of VGSI as a teaching point under the night flying section. Although instructors cover the different types of equipment and their associated limitations, the emphasis is put on the significance of VGSI system indications to the pilots, without discussing the risks associated with following VGSI guidance not appropriate for an aircraft type. This limited emphasis results in pilots relying on VGSI guidance not suitable for some of the aircraft types they are operating. The investigation has determined that a RED/WHITE on-slope indication on approach would be perceived by pilots as a confirmation that they were on a safe flight path to landing. Without considerations for the type of VGSI system generating the visual guidance, following an on-slope indication could result in a large aircraft not having a safe threshold crossing height.

Furthermore, the only related topic addressed in TC flight crew examinations is the interpretation of the different visual indications provided by VGSI equipment. There are no questions with regards to the limitations of the different types of VGSI currently in use (PAPIs).

Due to flight crew limited knowledge of the different VGSI systems in operation and the significance of their limitations on the safety of flight operations, flight crews will continue to follow visual guidance that may not be appropriate for the aircraft type they are operating. Those flight crews will therefore not be assured safe threshold crossing height.

Therefore, TC may wish to review the pilot training requirements so that flight crews are made aware of VGSI limitations as well as its impact on the safety of flight operations for their aircraft type.

Availability of aircraft EWH information
VGSI system guidance is important when approaching a runway not served by an electronic glide path, when visual illusions might be present, or at night. However, knowledge of an aircraft’s EWH is necessary in order to assess whether a VGSI system is appropriate for the aircraft type being flown.

At the time of the above-mentioned occurrence, the crew was not aware of the EWH of either the Challenger CL604 or the Global 5000. The Global 5000 EWH was not published in the aircraft flight manual (AFM), or otherwise available to the crew. Although information relevant to the operation of an aircraft is usually published in the AFM, the investigation has determined that EWH information is generally not available in the AFM.

In the past, large aircraft performance characteristics precluded operations from short runways such as Fox Harbour’s 4 885-ft Runway 33. Modern large aircraft with better short field performance are now able to operate from shorter runways, where they are more likely to encounter VGSI designed for smaller aircraft. A large aircraft with an EWH greater than 10 ft following visual guidance from a VGSI designed for a smaller aircraft is not assured a safe threshold crossing height. Without EWH information, this situation increases exposure to the risk of landing with a reduced threshold crossing height safety margin.

On November 26, 2007, the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Information Letter to TC, informing them that the approach was flown with reference from an APAPI that was not designed for a Global 5000 with an EWH that, at the time, was suspected to be greater than 10 ft. TC’s response stated that EWH information is not normally stated in the AFM, nor is there a requirement to do so. TC also pointed out that, should an operator require this information, the type certificate holder can provide it to the operator on request. The investigation has determined that even the type certificate holder may not have this information readily available.

Because aircraft EWH is not available to pilots, crews may continue to conduct approaches with an aircraft mismatched to the VGSI system, increasing the risk of an unacceptable threshold crossing height safety margin.

Therefore, TC may wish to review the requirements to have aircraft EWH information available for use by flight crews in aircraft publications.

http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/publi ... flight.htm

[tedcuthbert]

I was curious about this one + allot of other seemingly delayed reports. How long can it really take???? I always figured it was because the report could have an impact on the insurance payout and there was lobbying from both sides delaying the decision. Just wondering.... Can anyone shed light on how the process works?? Within the TSB, and in determination of fault wrt insurance payouts (assuming there is insurance).

[xsbank]

Wonderful to be the first crew to ever write off a Global.

I have nothing nice to say about this "accident."

[orbit]

I was thinking of the pressures joyce and the golfers put the crew under; ergo saying it was a bit bumpy they where probably doing aerobatics on approach more of a reality?
As I seen/hear of it so many times .....

[Canoehead]

Is it possible that Mr. Joyce, being who he is (wealthy/influential), could have the ability to make this potentially damaging/humiliating report 'disappear'?

Just a thought, and I bet it wouldn't be the first time.

[xsbank]

Ummm, no, he can't make it go away.

An interesting story told to me: for all of you who wish to make a career in aviation, there are other ways. The wreckage was purchased from the insurance company by a scrap dealer. The scrap dealer immediately severed the nose and sold the cockpit to a simulator constructor. The engines were sold back to RR who now uses them to lease "power by the hour" to whomever wants them. The rest has gone to a warehouse where the junk is being dismantled further. The parts sales and component sales from this virtually new aircraft will eventually double the cost of a new airplane ($40+ million, depending upon interior finishings) and the scrap dealer will make about 800% on his investment.

There is money in aviation!

[Widow]

I was curious about this one + allot of other seemingly delayed reports. How long can it really take???? I always figured it was because the report could have an impact on the insurance payout and there was lobbying from both sides delaying the decision. Just wondering.... Can anyone shed light on how the process works?? Within the TSB, and in determination of fault wrt insurance payouts (assuming there is insurance).

The short answer is, Yes. Delays may be caused by lobbying for changes in the findings.

The long answer is, the time frame depends on the complexity and depth of the investigation. What begins as a seemingly innoccuous investigation can become much more difficult depending on the initial findings. "Interested parties" (e.g. Transport Canada, the owner/operator, product manufacturers, AME/AMO, etc.) may have "independant observers" during the investigative process (this may include an expert hired by the insurer). Once the draft report is produced (say 6-18 months), it is sent to "interested parties" for their responses. The TSB then analyzes the responses and may or may not change parts of the report to reflect the comments made on the draft by those "interested parties" (am aware of this taking 3-18 months). Once the report is finalized, it seems to depend on the public interest in the findings whether or not it is immediately translated and put on the TSB website. In at least one case I can think of, translation and web publication took over two years. Of course, publication requires a "Class 3" or higher investigation. A "Class 4" will be used for a safety study involving other incidents/accidents with similar findings, so does not have an individual report (I haven't found any published "safety studies" in aviation since the 90's). A "Class 5" will result in no public findings.

The TSB does not apportion "blame", but makes findings as to cause and contributing factors (I have difficulty understanding how "blame" and "cause/contributing factors" can be separated).

As there is a limited time frame in which any court proceedings can be initiated (two years, in most cases), Statements of Claim will often be submitted immediately, in case any findings show liability during the investigation, or with the production of the final report.

[Widow]

"Effective Oversight Vital to Aviation Safety," says the TSB

GATINEAU, QC, Nov. 10 /CNW Telbec/ - Citing ineffective oversight by the Canadian Business Aviation Association (CBAA), the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has released its final report into the 2007 landing accident in Fox Harbour, Nova Scotia. The accident injured 10 people when the private jet skidded off the runway, stopping 1000 feet from its initial touchdown point, close to neighbouring homes.

In its investigation (A07A0134), the TSB reported that private operators regulated by the CBAA were not held to the same standard that Transport Canada (TC) implemented for commercial operators. TC regulations require commercial airline companies to implement safety management systems (SMS) in stages, on a fixed timeline, while the CBAA was free to implement SMS for its operators on its own terms with no fixed timeframe.

In 2003, TC transferred regulatory responsibility for some aviation operators to the CBAA but prior to this accident failed to exercise effective oversight of the CBAA programs.

"This is a serious problem," said Kathy Fox, Board Member for the TSB. "Safety can be compromised when SMS plans are vague, deadlines are flexible, and critical oversight is lacking. Without proper milestones or auditing," she added, "SMS cannot function properly and the risks increase."

In two key recommendations, the Board calls for the CBAA to set SMS implementation milestones for its certificate holders and for TC to ensure the CBAA has an effective quality assurance program in place to audit its certificate holders.

In the course of the investigation, the TSB also found that many pilots were not aware of the limitations of the visual guidance systems used to conduct safe approaches and landings. These guidance systems, known as visual glide slope indicators (VGSI), use ground-based light beams to show pilots when they are too high or too low on approach but many pilots don't realize that some VGSI should not be used when flying larger aircraft.

Information on the distance between the cockpit and the landing gear (eye-to-wheel height) is needed to know which VGSI to use but the Board revealed this information is not readily available to pilots.

To address these issues, the Board made two additional recommendations requiring TC to make eye-to-wheel height information available to pilots, and that better training also be provided to them on VGSI so they have the information they need to land safely.

"Although both TC and the CBAA have taken steps since the accident," added Board Member Fox, "raising the safety standard will take an ongoing commitment from TC, the CBAA and the operators. The recommendations we've made today are the next step in this direction."

The complete text of the four recommendations from the TSB report can be found on the attached backgrounder sheet.


The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/arch ... c7689.html
TSB Report A07A0134

[Intentional Left Bank]

Interesting....

[Old fella]

Heard from a good source the both pilots were dismissed by Ron J.

[tedcuthbert]

Well, like I've always been told, it's all about about the attitude.

Quite the detailed report, no wonder it took so long. I think I could land a 5000 at that airport after reading it all.

Still wondering why the aircraft wasn't replaced, if it was insured? and they were paid out.

[xsbank]

Did you do that illustration Intentional L.B? That's an excellent depiction.

OK, I've read the report and I see where the illustration came from.

EWH perhaps, but they were below the APAPI anyway.

[CD]

It is photo 7 from the report.

[Rockie]

No doubt the CBAA is regretting the day they let TC con them into taking over certification responsibility for private operators.