CBC The National: Report on SMS this Wednesday

[Meatservo]

On a related story...

Northern News Services - Dene chiefs call for hearing on air safety
Dene chiefs call for hearing on air safety

Public meeting with Transportation Safety Board wanted

Paul Bickford
Northern News Services
Published Tuesday, November 8, 2011

THEBACHA/FORT SMITH

Dene chiefs are calling on the federal board responsible for airline safety to hold a special meeting in Yellowknife as a result of recent fatal plane crashes in the NWT and Nunavut.

The chiefs, gathered in Fort Smith for their fall meeting Oct. 25 to 27, unanimously passed a resolution requesting the public meeting.

Bill Erasmus, national chief of the Dene Nation, said there was a very good discussion in Fort Smith about the problems residents of smaller communities are seeing with regular flights and scheduled service.

"It's not pointing fingers at any of the airlines," he said. "It's saying that this is a real issue in the North and people want to have their opinions brought forward."

Among the concerns expressed by the chiefs, Erasmus noted many flights don't have co-pilots and not all planes carrying passengers have twin engines.

Another concern of the chiefs is that freight and passengers are often on the same planes flying into communities.

"They think the two should be separated because freight is very heavy and people don't feel comfortable in a scheduled plane that has a lot of freight on it," he said.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is responsible for the safety of airline operations and for the investigation of airline accidents. That body is investigating a crash near Lutsel K'e that killed two people on Oct. 4, an incident with a Twin Otter in Old Town on Sept. 22 that resulted in two deaths and a flight that left Yellowknife for Resolute on Aug. 20 that went down, killing 12 of 15 people on board.

Erasmus said airline safety is an important issue for many smaller communities, particularly the ones that are only accessible by air.

He noted the recent accidents have caused concern.

"People are not as eager to get on a plane as they were," he said.

For example, he noted more people than usual drove to the meeting in Fort Smith instead of flying. However, he could not say for sure that could be attributed to the recent accidents.

Erasmus himself flies often.

"I have a particular belief when I'm flying," he said. "I have to trust the pilot and airlines, and, if I didn't, I wouldn't fly as much. But saying that, the planes have to be in good condition."

This is a real step in the right direction. For years, I have been calling for a return to the more traditional ways of flying, such as eagles.

[Meatservo]

My favourite quote was when it was mentioned that "SMS is like a RCMP officer standing next to the road with a sign that states: if your speeding pull over and tell me how fast so I can ticket you." Bang on.

If I were to improve on Moshansky's analogy, I would put it like this:

The RCMP stops using radar to catch speeders. Instead, they pull over randomly selected drivers, whether they are speeding or not. Compliant drivers will produce a printed copy of their "speeding management system", which contains written reports from the driver to himself, in which he reports some instances of speeding to himself, and then replies to himself with an experimental strategy to try and reduce speeding in the future. If this is all in order, the driver is allowed to speed off.

Another driver, who may or may not have been speeding at the time, is unable to demonstrate compliance with his "speeding management system", and so earns himself a ticket, or indeed a license suspension. This driver will be encouraged to consider the factors which may have led to his speeding (or not speeding), and develop a plan for the non-punitive reporting of speeding (to himself) and the development of a speeding management system which takes into account all the financial, regulatory, operational, and corporate factors which led to speeding in the first place, with an eye to reducing the overall instances of speeding, and a proactive feedback system in which the success or failure of previous strategies to reduce speeding are assessed, and altered as seen fit by the person managing the speeding management system and the accountable executive, until compliance is demonstrated to the regulator.

[Widow]

My personal thanks to Mr. Winter, and a heartfelt hug to Mrs. Wolsey.

Stay safe.

[Gorgons]

Meatservo...

Your take on things reads like you have been through an SMS PVI, I appreciate the analogy.

Widow...

I hope all is well with you and yours, nice to know your still lurking.

[The Old Fogducker]

Meatservo .... you've captured the essence of the SMS role in a PVI, but left out the requirement of the CAP content which requires the description of the personal emotional devastation caused by the realization that the company had fallen below the record keeping requirements.

Further, the extensively documented analysis of the various possible answers to the question of "How many fairies can dance on the head of a pin?" is central to the whole direction of the Staff Instruction.

OFD

[stopsquawk]

Meatservo and ODF have me searching for the LIKE button.

[whipline]

Another thing I took out of the show, after researching the Transwest crash. Companies should be allowed to give an accurate account of past employees when asked. Obviously based on recorded and factual information.

[NO LINK*]

Hey Whip this article came out after the TWA accident:

http://www2.canada.com/saskatoonstarpho ... 6ce874&p=2

I had a laugh when it was said on the program that if TC was still involved in oversight of TWA (at the time of the accident), they would be able to identify and fix the relationship between the two pilots. Bullshat! Course the public should know that oversight has increased in the last 16 months--reference the PVI pain comments.

[atwork]

While I feel horrible for Mrs. Wolseys loss it would be somewhat refreshing if just once someone would admit that possibly just possibly it wasn't all somebody else's fault.

[ahramin]

While I feel horrible for Mrs. Wolseys loss it would be somewhat refreshing if just once someone would admit that possibly just possibly it wasn't all somebody else's fault.

People love their delusions.

[MacStork]

I thought this Report was a tad one sided, especially regarding the TransWest Air Accidents. Perhaps it would have been more presentable if they had interviewed the co-pilot of the Sandy Lake accident. Neither she nor TransWest Air spoke about this accident. The only person who spoke about it, was the wife of the deceased pilot and that is somewhat biased. I am not saying I disagree with her, but I am pointing out that there is another side to this story. I believe there is merit in this Report, but it was not presented in fair and unbiased manner. We only heard one side of the story. More people have to become involved and speak out.

More to the point, I believe that Transport Canada does not really care about SAFETY. TC is very concerned about LIABILITY and COST. This whole SMS thing is really all about these two issues, LIABILITY and COST. Take a good look at any recent accident or incident. When all the dust has settled, TC cannot be held LIABLE or accountable for anything because of the SMS System that is now in place. The company or the individual (pilot, engineer or dispatcher) will probably wear the blame because of the CAR's and because of the SMS System that we currently have in place in Canada. The SYSTEM is not working, but the TC is not LIABLE and that is the problem. The SYSTEM demands that someone must be liable, and as it stands right now, it will be either the company or the individual, most likely, the individual.

With this SYSTEM firmly in place, TC does not require Inspectors to go out in the field and confirm that companies and individuals are operating strictly according to the CAR's. Retired TC Inspector Dave Winters eloquently and professionally presented this observation. There is a huge COST saving in this SYSTEM to the Government. They have effectively eliminated themselves from any LIABILITY and they are saving big dollars as well. Think about the scenario of the traffic cop holding up the sign that says, "Tell me how fast you are going so I can issue you the ticket." Mr. Moshansky made reference to this exact point. The SYSTEM is not working but who cares? Only a few brave individuals who are not afraid to speak out.

In the current SYSTEM, nothing will happen, until something happens. When the something happens, some one will be accountable and held liable, but not Transport Canada. We have a totally reactive system that is not working, and it is hurting all of us.

Just my thoughts, Fly SAFE people.

[Go Juice]

Things must have changed at TWA. Otherwise they wouldn't advertise for Navajo Capt every months....

[atwork]

Well said Mac.....Liability is more important than safety apparently

[whipline]

Thanks for the link. That was precisely what I was thinking. Condolences to the widow. I hope everyone had a speedy recovery. And I hope the FO doesn't feel like this accident was their fault and has moved on. I'll leave it at that.

[Prairie Chicken]

Well done Dave. Accurate, concise, and professional. You done good!

It's nice to see you still lurking Widow. Love the cartoon! I hope you're doing well.

I liked the program--a bit one-sided on the Wolsely accident but I'm guessing they couldn't convince the co-pilot or company to talk to them. It seemed pretty accurate to me. Eley's points about financing the old systme validated what we all believed. Sadly, I doubt if anything will come of this article until maybe when someone pulls it out in future to say "We told you so."

Eley said. "We're going to come in and look at those systems but it's not our job to make sure you’re compliant."

This bothered me. I did believe and still believe it is TC's job to ensure compliance. I went looking for TC's mandate and it looks to me like both their Vision and their Mission Statement have been amended since I last looked at them.

A VISION for Civil Aviation:
An Integrated and Progressive Civil Aviation System that Promotes a Pro-Active Safety Culture

MISSION STATEMENT for Civil Aviation:
To develop and administer policies and regulations for the safest civil aviation system for Canada and Canadians using a systems approach to managing risks.

Anyone here within TC to bring us up to date? Is TC starting to get it yet?

[CID]

Moshansky's analogy is flawed. You can make all the traffic laws you want and put a stop sign and speed radar at every corner but you will still have people running stops signs and speeding and being involved in car accidents.

There is no such thing as a 100% solution so this business of analyzing specific crashes "post SMS" makes no sense unless you consider the big picture. Is aviation safety overall better? Is the accident trend improving? Are certain sectors in aviation at higher risk? Why?

I know of some sketch operators in the past that would need a Transport Inspector in the right seat on every flight to prevent them from breaking the rules. I also remember the chorus of operators that declared the end of aviation safety when the CARS were introduced.

And most of all, I remember all the operators directing TCCA, practically begging, to be self policing. I'm not suggesting that SMS is a free-for-all self policing policy but maybe operators should be careful what they ask for.

[The Hammer]

I buried all my coworkers and had my worst experiences pre-SMS, the old system didn't work very well either. Companies like Transwest weren't any better pre-SMS.

TC front-line workers need more people to handle the 604 backlog and to process paperwork of the commercial operators who do "give a damn" in a timely fashion. Better QA training and the ability to provide reasonable expectations would greatly assist the industry. "The statement "I am a not a consultant " helps no one.

TC spot checks to make sure your flight crew completes their flight preparation in the exact order stated in the COM (ie you checked the wx before doing the walk-around but COM stated the opposite order) is not going to improve safety (don't laugh, it has happened). The COM now lists flight prep duties in alphabetical order with a "all duties must be completed prior to flight but do not have to be completed in the order they have been listed"

A hybrid system of enforcement and SMS would likely serve the industry better. If the operator discloses an issue and deals with it thru SMS then fine but if you get ramp checked and have violations then too bad for you.

I really think experienced man power is an issue that will only get worse with retirements.

[Sidebar]

Eley said. "We're going to come in and look at those systems but it's not our job to make sure you’re compliant."

This bothered me. I did believe and still believe it is TC's job to ensure compliance. I went looking for TC's mandate and it looks to me like both their Vision and their Mission Statement have been amended since I last looked at them.

TC is definitely still in the compliance monitoring business. SMS assessments are one of the primary oversight tools currently in use by TC. Here's the description of an assessment:

An assessment is the evaluation of effectiveness and level of compliance with the CARs.

See: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/o ... 7.htm#e7-0

[YYZSaabGuy]

A hybrid system of enforcement and SMS would likely serve the industry better. If the operator discloses an issue and deals with it thru SMS then fine but if you get ramp checked and have violations then too bad for you.

This approach is probably the most common-sensical one proposed yet. TC's approach should be a combination of "Trust..." (the Operator to do things right) "...But Verify!" (to confirm that they do!).

[atwork]

Seems like a low blow to Transwest, they could have named any other smaller airline that has had an accident in the last 5 years and used them as the example.
Why would the National news and a reporter based out of Quebec single out TW? BTW I'm not a TW employee and never will be.

[The Hammer]

My guess is because TW is a 705 carrier so it was in the process of implementing an full SMS system when the accident happened. Not many other examples of that (and the grieving vengeance seeking widow helped add flash I am sure).

I wonder what the article would have been like a year or so from now when the First Air, ASW, and Air Tindi accident causes should be published. They are all Full SMS 705 airlines. Maybe we will get an update next year.

[KK7]

I don't have a problem with SMS specifically, just how Transport Canada is implementing it as a cost saving measure to scale back the regulatory oversight. SMS is a tool to improve safety, and I believe it can do that. But the operative word in there is that is is a tool, and should supplement the current method of policing the industry.

The other problem with how SMS is implemented, is that overall its design is aimed for large operators such as an airline, where in many cases much of the pieces of SMS were already in place, and SMS implementation simply brought these pieces together into one contiguous system. But for small operators such as a flight school of 2 or 3 airplanes or a charter company with a single aircraft, SMS does little except produce enough paperwork that sometimes the business requires hiring a full time person just to implement and maintain the system. SMS doesn't differentiate between the size of an operation, and essentially the same system that applies to Air Canada, applies to Joe's Flight Instruction on his single aircraft already compliant with an FTUOC and all maintenance being performed properly.

It is and will be very difficult to ever positively pin an accident on SMS. The reality is that no matter what we do, there will always be accidents. We have humans flying human made and human maintained machines, and errors are going to happen. We can try to build in as many checks, warnings and redundant systems, but ultimately at the end of the day there is a limit to what we can do in the name of safety while still being able to afford to do what we do. Accidents aren't caused by paperwork or the lack thereof, they are caused by people making mistakes and parts failing. Determining whether or not SMS could have prevented these things from happening will always be up for debate.

When I first learned about SMS 6 years ago, my first impression was that this just can't work as a standalone system as TC intends. But I decided to wipe the slate clean and go in with an open mind. I've taken SMS courses, helped design a company's SMS, and have worked within the SMS structure in a 705 company. But the further I go along the less convinced I am that this is the right direction to move in. SMS seems to function adequately at my company, but I see exactly where things can be swept under the carpet if they wanted to and TC would never know. Fortunately my company doesn't do it. The big question is if it were swept under the carpet, would it have been caught by more regulatory oversight? I think sometimes yes, sometimes no.

[Prairie Chicken]

I fully agree SMS should have been added as an additional layer of safety; not as a replacement for regulatory oversight.

Too bad CBC couldn't interview management of the company featured in Ice Pilots. I can just imagine what the owner would (candidly) have to say about SMS ...

[CD]

Considering that most businesses in Canada want less government interference, the elimination of intrusive, disruptive and unnecessary inspections is likely welcomed ... and the Harper Government is listening:

Red Tape Reduction Commission - Cutting Red Tape…freeing business to grow

[Jimmy_Hoffa]

One of the few real tools for safety reporting in the whole system that is effective and is available to everyone is C.A.I.R.S (Civil Aviation Issues Reporting System)
http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/o ... nu-209.htm
This process works outside SMS And directly involves TC. TC is REQUIRED investigate every report and IS held liable for the outcome. This system has personally proved quite effective and useful after I had raised an issue several times with the company I was working for through our SMS. The company reply, which satisfied all the regulatory requirements, was "We are monitoring the situation." Throughout the 9 month process leading up to it's eventual resolution the standard line of BS was all that was required. The final tipping point was the threat of a CAIRS being sent to TC. The company knew it could no longer chose to ignore the complaints because with all the documentation that had been presented to them their answer of "We are monitoring the situation" would never stand up to an investigation, even though it met all that was required of them by SMS.
Without going into too much detail, the issue was something that was eventually solved in 20 mins which actually saved the company a ton of money. But regardless of the outcome of this situation, SMS at 703 and 704 operators simply empowers them to ignore safety concerns and do it legitimately with the blessing of TC because their paperwork looms good.
I am not saying CAIRS is the snake oil miracle cure, but it is one of the very few effective tools we have left at our disposal that few people know about.


Edited for my poor grammar.