Resolute Bay Accident - Pilots Discussion Thread

[Beefitarian]

That picture is haunting. I think I can see the runway but I'm sitting at a computer and can look for it without distractions. Is there nothing good they can use to mark the sides? Do they ever dye the snow when they get covered?

[Ref Plus 10]

Beefitarian:
Usually by the time the runway is covered in snow, it's getting dark and the lights are on. But yea, it is pretty common practice to dye the centreline blue. Most of the time our green hangar is the first thing you'll see, and can usually be spotted from 50 miles...unfortunately the landscape does a pretty good job of disguising the runway, and even with the lights on in the summer, you could have a tough time spotting it if you don't know where to look.

Ref

[Beefitarian]

That's intense. I've looked at the picture a bunch of times I know where it is and it's still a bit tough to spot.

[URC]

Latest from the TSB, January 5 ...

First Air Flight 6560, Boeing 737 Accident, 20 August 2011, Resolute Bay (A11H0002)

On 20 August 2011, a First Air Boeing 737-210C aircraft (registration C-GNWN, serial number 21067) was being flown as a charter flight from Yellowknife, North West Territories, to Resolute Bay, Nunavut. As is often the case for aircraft operating in the arctic, the cabin was partitioned to allow a combination of cargo and passengers, this configuration is known as a combi.

At 1142 Central Daylight Time, during the approach to Runway 35T, First Air Flight 6560 impacted a hill at 396 feet above sea level (asl) and about 1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay Airport runway which, itself, is at 215 feet asl. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and an ensuing post-crash fire. Eight passengers and the four crew members suffered fatal injuries. Three passengers suffered serious injuries and were rescued by Canadian military personnel who were in Resolute Bay as part of a military exercise.

Investigation Team Work
The investigation team is led by the Investigator-in-Charge, Brian MacDonald. Mr. MacDonald has 31 years of aviation experience; 23 years as a pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force and eight years with the TSB. He has been an air accident investigator for the past 15 years. Mr. MacDonald is assisted in this investigation by experts in flight operations, air traffic services, weather, aircraft structures, aircraft systems, aircraft engines, and human performance.

Some of these experts come from within the TSB, but assistance is also being provided by the following organizations: Bradley Air Services Limited (First Air), Transport Canada, NAV CANADA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of National Defence, The Boeing Company, Pratt and Whitney (engines), and the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. This is a normal part of any investigation, as these experts play a key role in helping the team uncover and understand all of the underlying factors which may have contributed to the accident.

The investigation team continues its work which is in Phase 2 of this 3-phase investigation. The three phases of every investigation include: the Field Phase, the Post-Field Phase and the Report Production Phase. While continuing to gather the information it needs, the team has now begun the work of analyzing the considerable amount of data in order to determine what happened, why it happened and, what can be learned to help ensure it does not happen again.

Work Completed to Date
A significant amount of work has been completed so far, but much remains to be done. Dozens of interviews have been conducted. Hundreds of technical and operational documents, weather reports, air traffic control communications, studies and research papers have been gathered, and the analysis of this material is well underway.

A detailed survey of the accident site was completed and a comprehensive plot of the aircraft components constructed. The TSB completed an extensive study of the wreckage and removed some of the components for further laboratory analysis.

The flight recorders were located on the first day and shipped to the TSB lab for data download and analysis. The recorders contain much needed data and will assist investigators in the understanding of what happened during the approach phase of the flight.

What We Know
In the hours before the accident, the weather in Resolute Bay was variable with fluctuations in visibility and cloud ceiling. Forty minutes before the accident, the visibility was 10 miles in light drizzle with an overcast ceiling at 700 feet above ground level (agl). A weather observation taken shortly after the accident, reported visibility of 5 miles in light drizzle and mist with an overcast ceiling of 300 feet agl.

The weather conditions required the crew to conduct an instrument approach using the aircraft flight and navigation instruments. The crew planned to conduct an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 35T. This instrument approach provides guidance down to weather minimums of 1⁄2 mile visibility and a ceiling of 200 feet agl.

The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds before impact. At this time, the flaps were set to position 40, the landing gear was down and locked, the speed was 157 knots and the final landing checklist was complete.

Another aircraft successfully completed an ILS approach to Runway 35T approximately 20 minutes after the accident. NAV CANADA conducted a flight check of the ground based ILS equipment on 22 August 2011; it was reported as serviceable.

The Resolute Bay Airport is normally an uncontrolled airport (no Air Traffic Controllers). A temporary military control zone had been established to accommodate the increase in air traffic resulting from Operation Nanook, a military exercise taking place at the time. Information from the military radars that had been installed for the exercise was retrieved for TSB analysis.

The technical examination of the aircraft at the accident site revealed no pre-impact problems. Analysis of the flight data recorder information and examination of the engines at the site indicate the engines were operating and developing considerable power at the time of the accident. Analysis of the aircraft flight and navigational instruments is ongoing.

Currently, the TSB is classifying this occurrence as a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident. CFIT occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight crew is flown unintentionally into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no prior awareness by the crew. CFIT is one of the issues identified in the TSB Watchlist.

Investigation Activities in Progress
The TSB is proceeding with several concurrent avenues of investigation in order to understand why the aircraft struck terrain 1 nautical mile east of the runway. Aircraft navigation in the final phase of flight is certainly a key area that the investigation team is pursuing. To that end, the TSB Engineering Laboratory, assisted by specialists of the aircraft and components manufacturers, is conducting exhaustive testing on the aircraft's navigational equipment.

As with any accident investigation, investigators are looking at all aspects of training and procedures to determine if this can shed light on what may have transpired during the approach phase of the flight. Additionally, the team is studying the establishment of the temporary control zone and the coordination and operation of the airspace between civilian and military control agencies.

Communication of Safety Deficiencies
Should the investigation team uncover a safety deficiency that represents an immediate risk to aviation, the Board will communicate without delay so it may be addressed quickly and the aviation system made safer.

The Families
The TSB investigation team is mindful of the survivors and the families who lost loved ones on Flight 6560 and of their desire for answers. As we continue our work, our hope is that it will lead to the prevention of similar accidents and a safer transportation system for all Canadians.

The information posted is factual in nature and does not contain any analysis. Analysis of the accident, along with the Findings of the Board will become available when the final report is released. The investigation is ongoing.

The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/m ... 120105.asp

[URC]

The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds before impact. At this time, the flaps were set to position 40, the landing gear was down and locked, the speed was 157 knots and the final landing checklist was complete.

157 knots. Anyone have the typical approach speeds at flap 40 ? Maximum flap 40 operating speed is 170 KIAS.

For those into conspiracy theories, what was the real reason First Air's President and CEO recently resigned ?

http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/a ... s_dec._14/

[EastCoaster]

The real reason Scott resigned has nothing to do with the accident. He remains the Accountable Executive in the eyes of the law, and had no trouble shouldering that title and what comes with it. Please wait for the report and avoid speculation. We know this was a CFIT accident. That's what people need to focus on.

Fly Safe.

[cncpc]

The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds before impact. At this time, the flaps were set to position 40, the landing gear was down and locked, the speed was 157 knots and the final landing checklist was complete.

157 knots. Anyone have the typical approach speeds at flap 40 ? Maximum flap 40 operating speed is 170 KIAS.

Don't know the landing weight, but a general table I found says 129 knots.

It seems the radar was working at the time. Is it fair to assume that would be PAR capable and able to see the aircraft was a mile east of the localizer? And nobody said anything, or did 4 seconds before impact?

And the lockdown on information is not a lockdown anymore. Well done, TSB.

[Diadem]

First Air Flight 6560 impacted a hill at 396 feet above sea level (asl) and about 1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay Airport runway which, itself, is at 215 feet asl.

396-215=181 feet AGL, or, in other words, below the DH after commencing the missed...

[BEFAN5]

First Air Flight 6560 impacted a hill at 396 feet above sea level (asl) and about 1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay Airport runway which, itself, is at 215 feet asl.

396-215=181 feet AGL, or, in other words, below the DH after commencing the missed...

I've had many discussions over this... Each with different outlooks/opinions from the pilots involved in the convo. The general consensus is that DH or decision height is the point above ground at which you make the land, go-around "decision". So if you hit 200agl, then GO-AROUND, by the time you are in a positive rate of climb, you have descended below the 200agl. This of course differs from the MDA which is the MINIMUM altitude to be flown at.

[URC]

396-215=181 feet AGL, or, in other words, below the DH after commencing the missed...

The Decision height (DH) is referenced to the threshold elevation. The published DH for the ILS runway 35T was 397 feet ASL, the threshold elevation (or TDZE) of runway 35T is 197 feet ASL. Ground contact was essentially right at minimums.

[55+]

Actually the 40:1 Missed Approach OIS(Obstacle Identification surface) commences at DH- ROC(Required Obstacle Clearance). The ROC is calculated from the GPI(Ground Point of Interception) which is aprx 958ft from THLD with a 3 deg GS(or a 34:1 slope) and a 50ft TCH. As you get closer in on a sloped IAP(ILS), the ROC is reduced.

[URC]

Actually the 40:1 Missed Approach OIS(Obstacle Identification surface) commences at DH- ROC(Required Obstacle Clearance). The ROC is calculated from the GPI(Ground Point of Interception) which is aprx 958ft from THLD with a 3 deg GS(or a 34:1 slope) and a 50ft TCH. As you get closer in on a sloped IAP(ILS), the ROC is reduced.

Can you explain what this means in practical terms ? Source ?

[plhought]

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/nat ... le2294026/

Navigation equipment may hold clues in fatal Nunavut plane crash
RESOLUTE, Nunavut— The Canadian Press
Published Friday, Jan. 06, 2012 1:24PM EST
Last updated Friday, Jan. 06, 2012 1:29PM EST

The lead investigator of a deadly plane crash in Nunavut last summer says the aircraft’s navigation equipment may reveal the accident’s cause.

Brian MacDonald with the Transportation Safety Board says the First Air jet was equipped with instruments to help crew locate the ground and land in bad weather.

It was raining and there was too much cloud for the crew to see the runway at the Resolute airport in August.

Mr. MacDonald says it’s not yet known why the plane was preparing to land when it was still more than a kilometre from the runway.

He also doesn’t know why the plane aborted its landing just two seconds before crashing into a hill.

The plane burst into flames, killing 12 people on board, including all four crew members; three passengers survived.

© 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Small minor update via the Globe and Mail although it doesn't really add much to the TSB update posted above.

[cncpc]

This accident didn't happen over a few feet one way or the other in relation to DH. It happened because the aircraft was a mile east of the localizer and there was terrain at DH on that flight path.

This release makes it plain that the investigation is about why the aircraft was there, instead of on the ILS for 35.

"Aircraft navigation in the final phase of flight is certainly a key area that the investigation team is pursuing. To that end, the TSB Engineering Laboratory, assisted by specialists of the aircraft and components manufacturers, is conducting exhaustive testing on the aircraft's navigational equipment."

To me, it seems likely that the navigation equipment was unlikely to be damaged to the extent that the nav frequency and OBS setting couldn't be determined within minutes. Same with the killer switch selection. But perhaps it was. It would be almost certain that the OBS setting would be correct. If the mistuned VOR theory is correct, then the OBS setting (for the inbound track of the ILS) would have to be correct for the impact and debris trail to be as it was, heading towards the VOR.

The speed seems unusually high. Something caused the decision to go around. If one assumes a flat overcast base to the 300 overcast observation, then the aircraft breaks cloud at 515 feet. It should be clear at that point that the airport is 9-10 o'clock and the ground is right in front of the aircraft. I do agree that it can't necessarily be assumed the overcast had a flat bottom.

There is also the issue of military radar. The TSB says it is looking at data from that radar. That implies it was operational at the time of the accident. If it was operational, why would the military be asking for DME and radial for aircraft position information? It could be that the radar was operating and that the request for DME and radial was a check on the accuracy of the radar returns. I don't have the chart handy, but isn't there DME on the Resolute ILS?

If the tracking the VOR theory is correct, there would be no glide slope indication and they would have been flying to a LOC minimum of 540. In that case, they were 150 feet below minimums. Which would seem to indicate they were getting a glide slope indication.

There's an interesting thread here at PPrune. http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/358117-i ... se-gs.html

Surely you'd have be tuned to the correct ILS frequency to get a false GS?

[55+]

Actually the 40:1 Missed Approach OIS(Obstacle Identification surface) commences at DH- ROC(Required Obstacle Clearance). The ROC is calculated from the GPI(Ground Point of Interception) which is aprx 958ft from THLD with a 3 deg GS(or a 34:1 slope) and a 50ft TCH. As you get closer in on a sloped IAP(ILS), the ROC is reduced.

Can you explain what this means in practical terms ? Source ?

Source is TP-308 - Criteria for the Design of Instrument Approach procedures and in practical terms it means if flown correctly as depicted and strict adherence to ALL published altitudes and/or MDA/DH/DA, you won't hit anything. That is the best I can offer without going into detail on IAP design - which I won't do even though I am qualified on the criteria.

Best
55

[swordfish]

TSB:

At 1142 Central Daylight Time, during the approach to Runway 35T, First Air Flight 6560 impacted a hill at 396 feet above sea level (asl) and about 1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay Airport runway which, itself, is at 215 feet asl.

Wonder where that came from? There's no "215"ft altitude on any of the Resolute CAP charts. It's 222 ft, and there's no TDZ elev of 215' either.

[Sidebar]

TSB:

1 nautical mile east of the midpoint of the Resolute Bay Airport runway which, itself, is at 215 feet asl.

Wonder where that came from?

I think they're saying that the midpoint of the Res Bay runway is at 215 ft asl.

[swordfish]

222' in the approach plates. The midpoint of the runway is near the highest point of the runway. You take off in either direction and all you see is hill in front of you.

[Vickers vanguard]

Dual Universal FMS with integrated waas GPS sensors
PBA to select the nav source that drives the capt HSI
one of the TAWS display format on the CDU ( showing the 3D format in here)

[cncpc]

Dual Universal FMS with integrated waas GPS sensors
PBA to select the nav source that drives the capt HSI
one of the TAWS display format on the CDU ( showing the 3D format in here)

Ok, interesting pictures. PBA to select the nav source. What are you saying then in relation to this accident? Isn't PBA database software?

Thanks.