Milan October 8 2001 runway collision between CJ2 and MD-87

[bizjets101]

Wikipedia Linate Airport disaster.

Aviation Safety Network report of 1991 collision of a SAS MD-87 (SAS retired click here their MD-87's Sept 1 2012, though 1 will remain in service as a backup aircraft until Sept 20 2012) and a recently delivered Cessna CJ2 after the CJ inadvertently taxied onto an active runway in heavy fog - at Milano-Linate Airport, Italy.

All on board both aircraft perished, 4 on the CJ and 110 on the MD-87, and 4 on the ground after the MD-87 collided with a building.

Accident Report Italian Report

Accident Report German Report translated to English *read this one*

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......................................Artist rendition of collision between SAS MD-87 SE-DMA and Cessna Citation 525

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.................................................................... Remains of Cessna CJ2 D-IEVX

[grimey]

Wow. Talk about an accident waiting to happen.

The following list highlights immediate and systemic causes that led to the accident:

...

- the Cessna crew was not aided properly with correct publications (AIP Italy - Jeppesen), lights (red bar lights and taxiway lights), markings (in deformity with standard format and unpublished, S4) and signs (non existing, TWY R6) to enhance their situational awareness;
- official documentation failing to report the presence of unpublished markings (S4, S5, etc) that were unknown to air traffic controllers, thus preventing the ATC controller from interpreting the unambiguous information from the Cessna crew, a position report mentioning S4;
- operational procedures allowing high traffic volume (high number of ground movements) in weather conditions as were current the day of the accident (reduced visibility) and in the absence of technical aids;
- radio communications were not performed using standard phraseology (read back) or were not consistently adhered to (resulting in untraced misunderstandings in relevant radio communications);
- radio communications were performed in Italian and English language;

...

Furthermore:
- the aerodrome standard did not comply with ICAO Annex 14; required markings, lights and signs did either not exist (TWY R6) or were in dismal order and were hard to recognize especially under low visibility conditions (R5-R6), other markings were unknown to operators (S4);
- no functional Safety Management System was in operation;
- the competence maintenance and requirements for recent experience for ATC personnel did not fully comply with ICAO Annex 1;
- the LVO implementation by ENAV (DOP 2/97) did not conform with the requirements provided in the corresponding and referenced ICAO DOC 4976.

[swordfish]

Wow. Talk about an accident waiting to happen.

Yes, let's talk about "TALK".

• 1. Universality of English language communications in Air Traffic Control
  2. ICAO standardized phraseology.
  3. Minimize communications in the domestic language of the country you are operating in, specifically information that other aircraft on frequency should be aware of, and particularly all clearances in English.
  4. Mandatory read-backs exactly as they are given...not some colloquial version expediently convenient to the situation.
  5. Compulsory minimum standards of English in speech and understanding for ground-based personnel, particularly tower, terminal, and enroute ATC in all countries.

You probably have to have flown in Europe to understand how appalling English communications are in the Slavic countries, and how you almost have to undertake training in the various accents and expressions of the controllers to even partially understand them, and even then predict or anticipate what they are saying, and how they say place- and fix-names.

And is this directed at the Montreal Centre, FIR, and Towers in Quebec? You bet it is.