Hawker?

[Doc]

I'd be very interested in knowing how many of you, dear posters, have actually had an "apres" V1 failure, while still on the runway, if you continued the takeoff, if you rejected. In what, where and why? I've had two actual rejects below V1 on T category aircraft. Never had anything go wrong between V1 and VR though...today, I fly airplanes that if you're on the ground, you stay there.
On Hawkers.....I've seen them (flap7.5 and wet) use up a truck load of runway just getting to V1! On most of the places (all, actually) that I used to fly 748s, the V1 was a big GO!

Rejecting at 30 kts because your co-pilot says "Shit man, I forgot the log book....." does NOT count!

[Doc]

That few of you? Thought so. Everybody has an opinion, but it's all based on fantasy.

[adster1989]

I completely agree with you Doc... About your comment on taking a full runway to reach V1.. That was normal ops on summer days loaded up.. I just finished from 2 years on a 748.. Been times v1 never came around... Fortunately never had to deal with a rejected T/O or real V1 cut, wouldnt wish that on my worst enemy in that machine, but it was the best 2 years of flying for me so far...

[Liquid Charlie]

It's very difficult to know how people will react to a V1 failure on these old airplanes since it's not taught anymore -- the solution that TC came up with -- we did V1 engine cuts for years with no hull loss or loss of life -- even on a DAK we would cut engines as soon as the aircraft left the ground -- now it's done "at altitude" and it's just on the plus side of useless -- again TC sets the standards for the lowest common denominator and play the percentages that turbine engines seldom quit --

[Doc]

LC, I was counting on you for a V1 failure.. If you haven't had one, and I haven't had one...Paging Cat Driver. Pick up the white courtesy phone....
Thankfully, these are very rare. I guess.

[xsbank]

V1 cuts are very rare indeed (cue the Thompson 757 at Manchester) but the purpose of hard rules for V1 are to try to get the maneuver as common and as much of a non-event as any other maneuver. We know that won't happen because the maneuver is only practised in the sim. I have done hundreds of V1 cuts in the sim, having to maintain 3 airplanes and 2 licenses for quite a while. Luckily I have not had one for real but you can bet your butt I will nail it!

V1 engine quits stop the yaw roll aileron to the extended leg V2 rotate positive rate gear up 320 flaps up 400 AP on what happened is it a good one or a bad one? Bad? Memory items I'll take the radios.

For the credentials I also taught 3000+ hours of Level D and I saw, maybe, 2 guys pull off a successful reject after V1. They almost always left the runway or forgot their memory items and left engines running or burning or whatever. Fail. Do what you're trained or at least do what you briefed!

[pelmet]

I'd be very interested in knowing how many of you, dear posters, have actually had an "apres" V1 failure, while still on the runway, if you continued the takeoff, if you rejected. In what, where and why?

Chances are that you will not find anyone on the forum who has had this happen in real life.

[Doc]

I'd be very interested in knowing how many of you, dear posters, have actually had an "apres" V1 failure, while still on the runway, if you continued the takeoff, if you rejected. In what, where and why?

Chances are that you will not find anyone on the forum who has had this happen in real life.

You're correct of course. I've had more engines calve than anybody I know. I've had them let go early on a take off, but nowhere even close to V1. I had the tread come off the nose tyre on the F27 in CVG. Big BANG. I rejected, but I was only doing about 80 kts. That's the fastest one I've done. Every second take off in the 733 sim in HOU was a V1 cut, so we got pretty good at them. Of course, we were pretty ready for it. Kind of threw us off our game if we got off the ground with two still running. We train for it. Brief for it. We'll still probably stain the seat if we ever have one happen.

[Liquid Charlie]

LC, I was counting on you for a V1 failure

Close but no cigar -- happened twice -- airborne both times - once in a hawker once in a DAK both failures were just after rotation with the gear down but neither one was at V1 and still on the ground --

[pelmet]

Frequently V1 and VR are very close to each other so the chance of having an engine failure in a turbine aircraft(or really any aircraft) at this very small moment in time is extremely small. The spread between these two airspeeds seems to be much bigger on wet/slippery runways where V1 has been reduced and bigger jets with higher numbers of engines when very heavily loaded. Maybe other scenarios as well.

Anyways, the bottom line in my opinion is.....a blanket statement that I will reject a takeoff in a transport category turboprop on a somewhat long runway if I get an engine failure after V1 but before VR is not a good message to be sending out. There are a lot of variables that are reasonably possible in terms of weight, environmental conditions and runway conditions that could make you wish you had continued.

[Liquid Charlie]

I have witnessed rejects after V1 both on 748 -- one off the end of a 9000 ft runway and the other so close that the crew went home and quit flying for the day with their pants full of shit -- both on perfectly serviceable aircraft and of course the classic --- DC-10 in yvr -- strangely enough I have noticed that the concept of V1 is difficult for guys transitioning from 703/4 to 705 - I have even had 2-Otter captains reject a take off in the air and land straight ahead when presented with an engine failure during training -- no -- not on floats

The problem with V1 failures now as I tried to point out before is that on grandfathered airplanes with no simulators V1 cuts are no longer being taught unless you have someone from the bygone era willing to demonstrate it and even that is difficult because the candidate will turn you -- so now when a pilot in a 748 or a 580 is presented with the problem it is outside of his training "hands on" experience

My first encounter with V1 engine failure training and actual simulation was on a CV44 -- holy crap -- but after the concept was digested and the push-pull finished and the significance of V1 and where you could end up was explained the whole thing became logical and reasonable and the thought of reject was never in your mind after the V1 call was made -- oh ya -- for the NFP -- make your calls correctly and accurately -- makes no sense to call - and I have seen it many times -- rotate comes out at +10 because the V1 call was made late --

[pelmet]

and of course the classic --- DC-10 in yvr --



My first encounter with V1 engine failure training and actual simulation was on a CV44 -- holy crap -- but after the concept was digested and the push-pull finished and the significance of V1 and where you could end up was explained the whole thing became logical and reasonable and the thought of reject was never in your mind after the V1 call was made -- oh ya -- for the NFP -- make your calls correctly and accurately -- makes no sense to call - and I have seen it many times -- rotate comes out at +10 because the V1 call was made late --

Depending on circumstances, there has been serious study into the concept of calling V1 a bit earlier than actual V1. But it is not an approved method and there are certain variables that you may not be considering which could make things worse. It actually gets kind of complex with V1 being able to be increased or decreased depending on circumstances and being limited by VMCG(with no crosswind) at the low end and VR at the high end.

The DC-10 overrun in Vancouver was a good example of how loud a compressor stall can be on the big engines. Really loud, with the captain thinking a bomb had gone off(apparently, there had been some sort of bomb alert earlier) so he rejected above V1 and it was a heavy loaded flight. I have only heard a CFM-56 make compressor stalls on one occasion which was an A-320. I was on the ramp outside and it was just climbing through about 100 feet and I was quite close. Multiple bangs with a narrow flame out the back each time.

[glcx]

Cadors: 2011C3566

Not sure if it adds to the conversation but that Cadors was an engine failure with autofeather at V1, with the gear still on the runway. Granted it was a half loaded DH8 on a nice day, but it flew better than the sim. Training kicked in, we followed SOPs, just like a sim session. The only difference was that flight attendant that kept calling and ATC that likes to interrupt. That adrenaline kick made me think I was superman PF. I hand flew the whole thing including that 20 minute checklist ordeal and took the radios from the Captain.

Hopefully never again! Fly safe!

[Doc]

What caused the failure, and what check list could take 20 minutes? My thought is that on a nice VFR day, I'd have been on the ground inside of 5 minutes (on the outside) and figure it out on the ground. Not a criticism, just curious.

[pelmet]

What caused the failure, and what check list could take 20 minutes? My thought is that on a nice VFR day, I'd have been on the ground inside of 5 minutes (on the outside) and figure it out on the ground. Not a criticism, just curious.

5 minutes? It might take a couple of minutes just to get to your acceleration altitude, then slowly accelerate and retract flaps now totalling perhaps three minutes from engine failure. Then the Engine Failure Checklist will likely take a minute. Then the after takeoff checklist(Doc just landed in his scenario). Perhaps a one-engine inoperative landing checklist. Then a quick discussion about weather, approach in use(if returning) and landing weight. Further communication with ATC about intentions after the initial PAN or MAYDAY call. Contact F/A to brief, PA passengers, advise company=another couple of minutes at least but probably more. Cockpit setup=1 minute such as bug speeds, getting approach plates, etc is at least a minute maybe more. Brief the approach even if visual=one minute. So we are up to at least 10 minutes. Then when all is complete, advise ATC of intentions to start approach which could take up to another 5 minutes on a nice day to position to depending on where you start from which should have been out of the way while you dealt with your procedures.

The last thing that is required is to rush in such a situation. Do things calmly and deliberately. 20 minutes is entirely realistic and expected by most operators. 5 minutes....not a good idea for a simple engine failure. Even if a large circuit is done, it still takes more time than you might expect if you actually timed it.

[Doc]

Well Pelmet, I've lost one or two engines shortly after take off. On the occasions where we were in VFR or VMC conditions, we dealt with each one of them during an extended circuit, and landed quite safely, thank you, on every single occasion. So, while I'm sure everything I post is total BS to you, why not try and cease using me as an example of how not to do everything......
If however, you enter IMC shortly after take off, everything you have mentioned is totally correct......and BTW, I've had those scenarios as well, again I've landed as intended without incident.
My comments were qualified by my initial remarks about a "nice VFR" day. In which case, I would "clean it up" and land asap. There is no need to wander about the sky VFR on one engine.....again, as the OP pointed out....it was a lightly loaded DH8 on a "nice day".


//confrontational content removed by Sulako. Play nice. Seriously.

[oldtimer]

On the ground in 5 minutes may be a noble thing but could also lead to problems. In a single or a twin of less that 6000 lbs MTOW, 5 minutes is about right and the crash will be off the end of the runway, hopefully controlled. An "airborne V1" is something the Air Force does but the FAA says that is something that is too risky to attempt. Now if the airplane is a twin with an MTOW greater than 6000 lbs, the airplane has to be able to maintain a 1.5% climb gradient (about 75 feet per nautical mile if I am correct) but ONLY AFTER configured for a OEI climb. So get the gear up and the prop feathered while in a descent, otherwise, there is a bar under each seat that helps you bend over and kiss your sweet ass good bye. This is assuming the airplane is operated, not at the published max gross weight but at the gross weight for the ambient conditions present that will allow a OEI climb. Over that weight and you need the bar under the seat.
In an airplane with more than 9 seats certified as a small airplane, use the procedures the manufacturer developed, such as in the Metro 2 which is to stay in ground effect between 8 to 10 feet AAE until the gear is up. Nothing is said about how much room is required.
Now to a Transport Category airplane, older ones over 12,500 MTOW or now more than 19 seats such as the DH8 and things change a whole bunch. The airplane has to be able to take-off with both engines operating until the pilot passes V1 without any action to stop the airplane, which means the pilot has made the decision to continue. At Vr, the aircraft is rotated and an accelerating climb is established to V2. At 35 feet, the airplane is allowed to climb if able, otherwise altitude is held and the landing gear is retracted. once the landing gear is up climb is made with no configuration change to 400 feet AAE, there altitude is level while the propeller is feathered, the flaps are retracted and then a OEI climb to 1500 feet AAE is made. From there on it becomes a OEI climb.
Certification standards say if an engine catches fire, the structure must remain intact for 5 minutes with an 1100C fire and components aft of the firewall must still operate as required after 15 minutes of thr same fire. Most pilots are taught now to do nothing below 400 feet AAE. All flight planning and critical decision making is done in the flight planning room. Have you ever done an emergency procedures briefing with your other pilots in the flight planning room? I have. Now, with airplanes loke the King Air 350, Beech 1900D and Metro 23, thy are still small airplanes but certified to Commuter Category so they must also meet the same performance and safety requirements, unless the Ops Manager/owner says no. only to disappear when shit hits the fan and reappear with the spin doctors, leaving the crew to fend for themselves. That is why it could take 20 minutes to run the chacklists. Unfortunatly the old Hawker was designed before all this shit came down the pipe and why regulators (and lawyers) would like to see these old birds head for the boneyard.
IMHO and I am open to any constructive criticism.

[Doc]

Without knowing the immediate cause of an engine failure, in VMC conditions, it is my opinion that the best course of action is to get the aircraft back on the ground in the most expeditious manner safely available to the pilot. In other words, secure it, and land it. Forget warm and fuzzy, until YOU are warm and fuzzy. Ie. SAFE!
I would rather be down here, wishing I was up there, than the reverse.
Our company had an engine failure in a twin Commander, followed by, you guessed it, a second engine failure. They were very lucky lads! Ice crystals in the fuel system.
Flame away!

I'm not talking transport jets here. I hope that's obvious to all?

[CID]

So...follow the published procedures.

[BTD]

In regards to the air Canada accident. The captain had rotated nose up and applied full thrust before they hit the ground. With the bounce a go around was probably going to happen no matter what. Bad situation to be in.

Btd

[giligan]

Doc, I understand that you realize there is no definite answer for any situation as do I but let me throw a couple of scenarios out there to ponder:

You reject a take off just after rotation on a long runway(after v1):

You MAY have enough runway left and be ok, but you likely pitched the nose to around 8-10 degrees and have a high power setting and a low flap setting. I would think that a tail strike would be something to ponder, It's been a while but in the DH8-300 9 degrees rings a bell as tail strike material and 165 knots I believe is the max tire speed. I assume a Q400/ATR 72 would be less than 9 and a tail strike more probable in the above. If you're above 165 knots your tires could fail.

In the aircraft I fly now 7.5 degrees pitch is the max nose up allowed for landing to prevent tail strike. (would the above be considered a take off or a landing?)

As for continuing a landing with the needles centered on a VFR day when a problem comes up. You may be correct. However,
Our SOP's state that if you have a master caution illuminate inside the FAF you will conduct a missed approach unless it if for an engine failure-in which case you may continue at Captain's discretion.

A Hydraulic failure going into Thunder Bay or Deer Lake NFLD in a heavy 737 comes to mind here. You elect to ignore the master caution and land (because you're better off on the ground), your ground spoilers don't deploy and you sail off the end into the Valhalla Parking lot.

Now all of the above may turn out just fine, which would be great, but lets consider liability. If you bend some tin or worse, hurt someone then you'll be famous, and if you do something contrary to SOP's or your aircraft's FOM then you're on your own. The company will move their chair to the other side of the table at the inquiry, a lawyer will throw every sop, fom, etc that you operate under on the table and have you explain why and how you decided to make up your own procedure to operate the aircraft and why it was safer than the procedure tested and or approved for certification. Anyone involved who was injured, has reoccurring nightmares or broke a finger nail will go after you or your estate personally. Needless to say your company will likely have a hard time standing behind a pilot who knows better than the manufacturer so you'll be looking for work.

Ok, enough with the doom and gloom and back to the first statement about recognizing every situation as being different. I'm just pointing out that going outside the norm, or exercising your Captain's emergency authority can have more dire consequences than one may have time to consider between "V1" and "positive rate"
gil

[Doc]

First scenario: rejecting "after" rotation?

Nope. unless it's fully loaded Navajo (which I never intend to actually fly) or a single engine (where I'd sort of have to?) I would not reject after rotation.

Second scenario: I think my comments were something like "needles centred inside the FAF (IMC especially) continue and deal with it on the ground?
Of course again, circumstances alter cases, and nothing is "correct" for every situation (as you stated) however, IMHO that's an SOP that should be discussed with your training department and CP. If a Master Caution light up prior to V1 on a takeoff, I'd reject. Inside the FAF with "needles centred" (my needles are only centered in the flare) you should have time to ascertain the reason for the MC? If it's indeed hydraulics you may need to go missed (depending on equipment, again nothings always "correct" all the time). Other factors enter into this though. How's wx? How's your petrol? How's your alternate? And, whatever you do, you'll be second guessed by the "Doc", but that's half the fun of it isn't it?
Keep in mind here, many SOP's and checklists were not arrived upon by pilots. Many are the result of hours spent with the manufacture's legal department. Checklists at least. I'll take a hit for this, but some SOP's were put in place so that monkeys could fly. I've seen it!
Example. On something REALLY simple, like the pre start checklist on a Caravan at FSI. If you use the Cessna version of the checklist to the letter, it takes almost 20 minutes to start the bloody thing! Pretty sure it requires you to check that your fly is all the way up?
Thanks for the thoughts.