Explain.pdw wrote:ATC is also to contribute to SMS implementations (the reporting of safety issues)
Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
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Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
They (ATC) are also at the airport. With SMS anyone at an airport that witnesses a safety issue is encouraged to report it ... ie so it doesn't escalate into a problem.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
They'll still let you land with a tailwind exceeding your aircraft limitation if you want to do so.
They don't care about it, and they certainly do not have to. It's the pilot's job to take that decision.
They don't care about it, and they certainly do not have to. It's the pilot's job to take that decision.
Think ahead or fall behind!
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Are you serious? You can't be. You can't expect a controller to know the limitation of every single airplane that might land at their airport. Give your head a shake. Pilots pilot period. It is your duty as a pilot to not accept a clearance that will put you in jeopardy, not the controllers. Never ever.pdw wrote: The airport's ATC on the other hand would need to know something about aircraft limitations for tailwinds, wouldn't they ? (seeing that here many aircraft's limitations are exceeded)
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Within reason I believe he/she needs to know this if they specialize in landings that require that information regularly. How many airports are there where it's one way in and the other-way out that you know of ? A handful ?justwork wrote:You can't expect a controller to know the limitation of every single airplane that might land at their airport.
Take for instance with "33kts" on the tail the plane comes racing down the valley approach and ATC requests the pilot reduce speed for any reason. This type of request in fact contributed to the cause in one Great Lakes accident I've studied, where a strong 20kt tailwind approach was in progress on the long base-leg yet the runway still had a 3kt headwind. There that pilot begins to comply while already fairly slow and briefly forgetting about icing and its increased stall speed ... realizing too late (Monroe MI 1997).
So in this case of the "33kts" you'd have to ask yourself if working for ATC if there's anything else to know about the aircraft arriving ... such as which aircraft are in the 30kts and over category if any ? So yes, they'd at least have to know some basics about their operations if they're specializing in the one-way in landings ... you would think (shaking my head just a little).
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
You couldn't be more wrong. If you're given a heading and altitude that will take you into terrain are you going to comply? If they tell you to slow to a speed that is unsafe for your particular airplane are you going to comply? If they clear you to land on a runway with a tail wind that exceeds your published limits are you going to comply? If they tell you to fly upside down, do a touch and go at Tim Hortons and pick them all up a coffee are you going to comply? You are the PIC, not the controller. The controller is never responsible for your compliance with SOP's, limitations, or any operating regulations. You are, and you better well know that. It is unrealistic, unfair, and really just passing the buck to think that a controller should know published limitations of every aircraft they control and then be expected to comply with those limitations. What is the pilot for in your world?pdw wrote:Within reason I believe he/she needs to know this if they specialize in landings that require that information regularly. How many airports are there where it's one way in and the other-way out that you know of ? A handful ?justwork wrote:You can't expect a controller to know the limitation of every single airplane that might land at their airport.
Take for instance with "33kts" on the tail the plane comes racing down the valley approach and ATC requests the pilot reduce speed for any reason. This type of request in fact contributed to the cause in one Great Lakes accident I've studied, where a strong 20kt tailwind approach was in progress on the long base-leg yet the runway still had a 3kt headwind. There that pilot begins to comply while already fairly slow and briefly forgetting about icing and its increased stall speed ... realizing too late (Monroe MI 1997).
So in this case of the "33kts" you'd have to ask yourself if working for ATC if there's anything else to know about the aircraft arriving ... such as which aircraft are in the 30kts and over category if any ? So yes, they'd at least have to know some basics about their operations if they're specializing in the one-way in landings ... you would think (shaking my head just a little).
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Certainly more than a go-for to get coffee.
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Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
I can guarantee you that any pilot operating a transport category airplane is very aware of it's tailwind limitations. This crew knew the limit I'm sure. The unfortunate part is they chose to ignore it, and the airplane bit them in the ass. If they didn't know they were grossly exceeding a limit, then they didn't deserve to be driving the company car, let alone the jet.pdw wrote:Pilots might never focus on such "10kt" info in a POH simply for the reason of never intending to land tailwind anywhere, thus never up for discussion.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Sustained was given as "9kts" just before that landing; not known how far southeast of the threshold that is being measured.
Seeing the runway and airport area are two miles long inside the valley, the still increasing components could be measuring much different at the far end of the airport than at the touchdown zone.
Seeing the runway and airport area are two miles long inside the valley, the still increasing components could be measuring much different at the far end of the airport than at the touchdown zone.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
A tale of a tailwind landing...
There were several other factors listed in the report including malfunctioning brakes, advanced treadwear, thrust management and runway conditions. I've sifted out and placed the tailwind references here, including the take on who is responsible for monitoring and taking action action. Obviously, not everybody has the tailwind information display that this crew had availible to them.
From Aviation Investigation Report A12A0082
There were several other factors listed in the report including malfunctioning brakes, advanced treadwear, thrust management and runway conditions. I've sifted out and placed the tailwind references here, including the take on who is responsible for monitoring and taking action action. Obviously, not everybody has the tailwind information display that this crew had availible to them.
From Aviation Investigation Report A12A0082
Factual Information: Tail wind
FDR data indicated that the aircraft landed with an actual tail wind of about 13 knots. Footnote 14 Although this information is available on the aircraft's multi-function display, Volga-Dnepr required crews to use the automatic terminal information service and air traffic control information during their pre-landing preparations.
In accordance with the AFM performance charts, with a 13-knot tail wind, the actual landing distance would be 5184 feet (1580 m), which includes a stopping distance of 3608 feet (1100 m). Landing with the 13-knot tail wind would have increased the stopping distance by 901 feet (275 m).
The IL-76TD-90VD aircraft is certified to a maximum tail wind component of 5 meters per second (about 10 knots).
Laboratory Reports: Tail wind
Using a projected landing weight of 140 tonnes, and based on the wind information provided by the automatic terminal information service (170°M at 3 knots), the crew calculated the landing distance to be 4068 feet (1240 m), which included a stopping distance of 2707 feet (825 m). While on final approach, the crew received updated wind information (260°M at 5 knots) from the tower. This direction and speed would have resulted in a 3-knot tail wind, which was within the aircraft’s limitations.
Based on data from the flight data recorder, the TSB determined that the aircraft actually experienced a 13-knot tail wind, which would have required a landing distance of 5184 feet, including a stopping distance of 3608 feet. The 13-knot tail wind would have increased the stopping distance by 901 feet.
Information on the tail wind was available to the crew via the multi-function display. This wind was in excess of the aircraft’s tail-wind limitation.
Findings as to causes and contributing factors
1. The occurrence aircraft landed with a tail wind that exceeded the aircraft manufacturer’s limitations.
2. The combination of the tail wind and the fact that power levers were not reduced to idle until the aircraft was about 2000 feet beyond the threshold resulted in the aircraft landing approximately 4220 feet from the threshold, which reduced the available runway length to stop.
Safety action taken
Volga-Dnepr
Volga-Dnepr introduced the following requirements: flight crews are to monitor the heading and wind speed using the multi-function indicator during the glideslope descent; a go-around is to be carried out whenever the tail wind limitations have been exceeded; and the captain will make a decision on the use of reverse thrust on all 4 engines in special cases.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Interesting that in this text they're potentially (or perhaps are) confusing the "feet remaining" limitation of a tailwind landing, the runway length issue, with an aircraft's own certified POH limitation of maximum tailwind for landing. This example is out of an overrun investigation, and they don't seem to be focusing on the aircraft's max POH speed for tailwind at all (at least not as any reason for the accident). It suggests go-around when exceeding the SDA, as if to mean try again "and the captain can use 4 engine reverse on discretion" despite the determination the tailwind is actuallly 13kts not the 3kts. (In NL could also have asked ask for a runway change.)... whenever the tailwind limitations have been exceeded;
Here in Aspen it is at the beginning of the runway, where contrarily the vulnerablilities of over-speed/higher-speed of ground-speed due to tailwind is known to affect respective airframes differently seeing that the POHes are printing a different tailwind-speed limitation for various aircraft. Here it's more about when to head to the alternate due to the manufacturers POH limitation once aircraft instruments showed a 33kt tailwind on the approach; IMO it depends on the proximity to the TDZE at which the "5-20kts" (LLWS) was active.
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Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Once you break a limitation, you are a test pilot, you do not have a C of A and your insurance is likely invalid. You are open to negligence prosecution, lawsuits and possible loss of license and perhaps your life. Somebody died here. Plus, they will probably find their training was flakey, you have have been trained to go into Aspen. I wrote a training course for Aspen and trained a number of GEX crews to go in there (cue clapping and sound of gongs).
"What's it doing now?"
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Yeah I'm sure the insurance company is going to tell the owner of that aircraft that their Certificate of Airworthiness was invalid and they aren't paying .
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Had a lot of experience with crashing private jets, Ahramin?
It's just like criminal negligence or drunk driving in your car, crash it and the insurance company will tell you to piss up a rope.
I wouldn't be surprised to see these pilots in the dock for this.
It's just like criminal negligence or drunk driving in your car, crash it and the insurance company will tell you to piss up a rope.
I wouldn't be surprised to see these pilots in the dock for this.
"What's it doing now?"
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
"Fly low and slow and throttle back in the turns."
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
Yeah, if the owner of the jet was the person flying it.tell you to piss up a rope
However, presuming that the owner was elsewhere at the time (hoping not aboard at all), I would expect that he would be promptly paid for the plane, and the pilots would have some 'splainin todo, and be looking at the scary end of a lawsuit from the insurance company, for the claim they'd just paid out to the owner.
Insurance is there to cover events which were unintentional, but not grossly negligent on the part of the insured. I don't think the owner of the jet was either, unless he was flying, or the pilot who was was not competent and trained.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
I think of Iit like running into a parked car because you didn't use your brakes... you mess up the insurance company will probably cover you. Now if you hit that car because you were going too fast in the wrong direction without training and I'm thinking they'd probably just get themselves out of tthe situation entirely and step away. At least that's what i would do... i mean they have staff lawyers specializing in this stuff and big deal if they have to fend of a lawsuit from outmatched competition.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
most retarded thread ever. From ridiculous suggestions like ATC knowing all aircraft limitations and being responsible for controlling them within those limits to people claiming to know anything about aircraft insurance.
Re: Deadly plane crash at Aspen airport
That's a real S T R E T C H.....suggestions like ATC knowing all aircraft limitations and being responsible for controlling them within those limits .....
No-one's made any suggestion here of an ATC having to know all aircraft limitations; some approach basics though, which can potentially be a repetetive hazzard, might be seen as more of a shared responsibility between the authority at an airport/runway and that on the flightdeck.