AAIB UK report; Click here AAIB pdf.
Occurred Dec 13 2013 - report just released.
Damage; Structural damage to left and right wings, broken HF antenna, dent to fin leading edge.
As the aircraft approached its cruising altitude of FL430, the pilot was not monitoring the
indicated airspeed and the aircraft stalled, departing from controlled flight in a series of five
360° rolls to the right.
The pilot briefly regained control before the aircraft stalled again and
in the following recovery, the aircraft’s wings were damaged in overload.
The pilot made a successful landing and examination of the aircraft’s recorded data revealed that the angle of attack (AOA) sensing system had ‘stuck’ in flight and the aircraft’s stall warning system
did not operate prior to the stall onset.
N380CR .. Pilot stalls Citation CJ2+ at FL430
Moderators: sky's the limit, sepia, Sulako, lilfssister, North Shore
-
bizjets101
- Rank 10
- Posts: 2105
- Joined: Fri Sep 17, 2010 7:44 pm
Re: N380CR .. Pilot stalls Citation CJ2+ at FL430
Oh boy must have been a fun flight. How many degrees of attitude change would there have been between "normal" and "stall" in this situation ?
As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
Re: N380CR .. Pilot stalls Citation CJ2+ at FL430
Not much, when a light Citation is trying to punch above its weight it's maybe 4 or 5 nose-up. Nose-down for recovery is maybe 10 or 15. The rolls would have been a bad time.
Re: N380CR .. Pilot stalls Citation CJ2+ at FL430
A new poster to the forum. This accident is near and dear to my heart and I could not resist a response. There have been a number of accidents exactly like this and everyone was preventable. This accident is not unique to the Citations. The others I reference are from a Boeing 727 to HS 125s. Usually the result is fatal to all aboard. This accident report is why we read them; so we can learn from other's misfortunes.
In my view, and confirmed by the AAIB, the base cause of this accident was the asking the airplane to do something it was not possible to do; that is asking it to climb at a rate by the use of the Vertical Speed mode of the Flight Director/Autopilot and inattention to the IAS. When pointing out that the margin of error between climb speeds and the stall at the higher altitudes on the way to the low to mid 40's I have told on a number of occasions that would not be possible in an aircraft crewed by 2 professional pilots. My response is that until this accident every event every event was in fact an aircraft multi crewed with professionals.
Ladies and gentlemen, please review your operating procedures with a view to preventing this type of situation from ever happening again. There are options to using the Vertical Speed mode in the higher altitudes. It only takes a moment of inattention or distraction when the aircraft is operating n the thinner margins for this to happen.
Please fly safe.
In my view, and confirmed by the AAIB, the base cause of this accident was the asking the airplane to do something it was not possible to do; that is asking it to climb at a rate by the use of the Vertical Speed mode of the Flight Director/Autopilot and inattention to the IAS. When pointing out that the margin of error between climb speeds and the stall at the higher altitudes on the way to the low to mid 40's I have told on a number of occasions that would not be possible in an aircraft crewed by 2 professional pilots. My response is that until this accident every event every event was in fact an aircraft multi crewed with professionals.
Ladies and gentlemen, please review your operating procedures with a view to preventing this type of situation from ever happening again. There are options to using the Vertical Speed mode in the higher altitudes. It only takes a moment of inattention or distraction when the aircraft is operating n the thinner margins for this to happen.
Please fly safe.
-
goingmach_1
- Rank 3
- Posts: 104
- Joined: Wed Jan 18, 2006 3:54 pm
Re: N380CR .. Pilot stalls Citation CJ2+ at FL430
Totally agreeCelticman wrote:A new poster to the forum. This accident is near and dear to my heart and I could not resist a response. There have been a number of accidents exactly like this and everyone was preventable. This accident is not unique to the Citations. The others I reference are from a Boeing 727 to HS 125s. Usually the result is fatal to all aboard. This accident report is why we read them; so we can learn from other's misfortunes.
In my view, and confirmed by the AAIB, the base cause of this accident was the asking the airplane to do something it was not possible to do; that is asking it to climb at a rate by the use of the Vertical Speed mode of the Flight Director/Autopilot and inattention to the IAS. When pointing out that the margin of error between climb speeds and the stall at the higher altitudes on the way to the low to mid 40's I have told on a number of occasions that would not be possible in an aircraft crewed by 2 professional pilots. My response is that until this accident every event every event was in fact an aircraft multi crewed with professionals.
Ladies and gentlemen, please review your operating procedures with a view to preventing this type of situation from ever happening again. There are options to using the Vertical Speed mode in the higher altitudes. It only takes a moment of inattention or distraction when the aircraft is operating n the thinner margins for this to happen.
Please fly safe.
Re: N380CR .. Pilot stalls Citation CJ2+ at FL430
The Pinnacle Flt 3701 (CRJ200) high altitude stall/double flameout incident is a good read. A wealth of what not to do. http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Acci ... AR0701.pdf
So much stuff there; poor judgement, bad airmanship, ignorance, lying to ATC... they kept driving more nails into their coffin all the way down.
One bit of fallout from that event was the realization that the standard stall training in the RJ, which was based on achieving minimum altitude loss after shaker onset at low altitude, does not prepare anybody for stall recovery in the upper flight levels. New training introduced shaker events at around FL350-370, hammering home the need to pitch over aggressively and sustain the nose down attitude until speed builds up, and none of this teasing the shaker stuff. This results in an altitude loss of several thousand feet vs a few hundred feet when doing a shaker recovery below 10,000 ft.
So much stuff there; poor judgement, bad airmanship, ignorance, lying to ATC... they kept driving more nails into their coffin all the way down.
One bit of fallout from that event was the realization that the standard stall training in the RJ, which was based on achieving minimum altitude loss after shaker onset at low altitude, does not prepare anybody for stall recovery in the upper flight levels. New training introduced shaker events at around FL350-370, hammering home the need to pitch over aggressively and sustain the nose down attitude until speed builds up, and none of this teasing the shaker stuff. This results in an altitude loss of several thousand feet vs a few hundred feet when doing a shaker recovery below 10,000 ft.
