JohnnyHotRocks wrote:
Changing Altimeter Setting Reference
7.1. ICAO PANS-OPS1 requires that the altimeter pressure setting should be changed to the new reference when crossing the transition altitude/level.
7.2. Some national authorities stipulate that, when an aircraft has been cleared to climb from an altitude to a flight level, vertical position will be reported in terms of flight level unless intermediate altitude reports have been specifically requested by ATC. Similarly when a pilot is descending from a flight level to an altitude the pilot will change to the aerodrome QNH unless further flight level vacating reports have been requested by ATC, in which case the QNH will be set following the final flight level vacating report.
The altimeter setting procedures in the event I described earlier were done as per 7.1. This was company SOP and required by the CAA of the country.
Transition Level was FL70 - it was incorrectly entered as 70 instead of 7000 in the PERF APP page. This resulted in no flashing Altimeter scale passing FL70.
I've flown for companies that use 7.2 - much safer imho.
---------- ADS -----------
Always fly a stable approach - it's the only stability you'll find in this business
Superfriendlyav8er...quite the first post...brevity does not seem to be your forté
This fin did not have any sort of predictive wind shear protection.
Also, I will delve deeper into the manuals, but as I said before, I am almost positive that an aircraft on this profile would not have produced a TAWS warning. Standby and I will get back to you on this, but I am 99% sure.
Here is the METAR for that night, note special issued 0313, followed by 0400 with G54kts and vis from 1/2 to 3/4sm VV300ft@0313 to 700ftbkn@0400. I am not an AC pilot nor have any knowledge on A320 although have some FMS(UNS-1B) C550 time with TC in the mid 90's - this doesn't qualify me for anything needless to say. Between 0300 and 0400 was the time as I understand it this airplane was conducting it's approach. Before the noose comes out for these pilots, as it stands now who knows what they were up against based on wx sequence in a very very short time. Translation: cut them some slack but those bottom feeding tort lawyers have no idea.
For those of us who have flown on the east coast and have had the experience of what kind of turbulence and wind shear one can experience there - I can remember going into Sydney and most of the aircraft abandoning the the approach for turbulence -- for now, I for one am reserving judgement. I will stay faithful to my colleges until proven otherwise --
I also must admit to being slightly horrified how quickly the German crash information was leaked out so quickly. It now has tainted any objectivity and while the allegations might prove be true what if they are not. This was a trial by news media and social media pure and simple. The mob mentality now has amazing powers and tools at it's disposal - ropes are being redundant.
Larry Vance, a former safety board investigator, former pilot and now accident consultant, said the fact the flight hit the ground does not necessarily mean this was an unstable approach.
"It could have been stable until it hit."
What am I missing here? At what point do we say the approach was unstable? One would think, if on approach you hit objects, that it was unstable.
Stabilized means constant descent rate at a constant airspeed. I think what the article is getting at is the aircraft could have been stabilized but not necessarily on profile, ie. Wrong altimeter setting with low vis. In theory you could fly a constant descent rate into the ground without seeing it at night in hard imc. If this is the case, was the wrong altimeter setting passed to the pilots, or did the set it wrong on the flight deck?
Given that it was so short of the runway regardless of if it was stabilized or not would the egpws be inhibited as it was on the approach and very near the runway or would it not have given some sort of indication that they were low?
Didnt someone else get very low on this approach some years back?
Given that it was so short of the runway regardless of if it was stabilized or not would the egpws be inhibited as it was on the approach and very near the runway or would it not have given some sort of indication that they were low?
Didnt someone else get very low on this approach some years back?
Think it was a 37 on 33... I had the same thoughts and hope it's nothing to do with a nav shift or whatever. Might rapidly put a lot of handy approaches out of use.
-baro ref flashes on the airbus if you descend through transition level without deselecting STD and setting the local QNH. Given that they spend at least :40 below FL180 it seems unlikely that they could have missed that
-FPA is set to one decimal place so -3.08 charted would be set as -3.1. AC procedures prohibit changing or adjusting this inside the FAF
-factual statements about the weather; it was fluctuating above and below minimums for the approach, it was fluctuating above and below x-wind limits for the aircraft type, it was stated however to be at or above legal limits for the approach at the time they conducted it. Regardless, the weather sucked and was very challenging which is probably why they spend :30 holding prior to starting the approach, determining their approach requirements and waiting for it to become legal
-TC permits conducting approaches below the charted visibility in certain circumstances. Given that the approach was conducted during a window where it was below the charted minimum but still legal as per the 'approach ban', perhaps those limits need to be revisited. In other jurisdictions charted vis is limiting
-it was very windy, and the terrain at YHZ is hilly. Gusty winds and hilly terrain produce moderate turbulence (always) and can produce windshear (sometimes)
-darkness
-0100 local
-another runway at YHZ was almost straight into-wind but it was unavailable or not in use for some reason
-the approach to the unavailable runway required GPS, which the aircraft did not have
-chicken/egg scenario: another runway would have been better, but it was unavailable, but even if it was available the aircraft couldn't have used the approach because it didn't have the correct equipment. I expect a fair amount of ink to be spilled on this topic in the Recommendations section of the final report
The job of airline pilot is easy to underestimate and denigrate as all automatic, and just "ILS to ILS." This accident shows otherwise. I have no doubt in my mind that these pilots conducted the approach with strict adherence to the law and to company procedures. Nobody is perfect and in hindsight it is easy to think that different decisions could have been made. I'm glad that they and the other crew and passengers are all still alive to tell the tale one day.
Any idea what kind of duty day these pilots were on? It said they were coming back from a southern destination so would it have been a long pushing 14 hour duty day with a down there and back turn?
fish4life wrote:Any idea what kind of duty day these pilots were on? It said they were coming back from a southern destination so would it have been a long pushing 14 hour duty day with a down there and back turn?
I calculate the total duty of just over 10 hours when they crashed.
---------- ADS -----------
Last edited by Lost in Saigon on Wed Apr 01, 2015 6:29 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Am I correct in assuming AC can't utilize RNAV(GNSS) LNAV/VNAV(baro) and WAAS LPV IAPs in some of their aircraft fleets like the A320. How about others like EMB90, A330 B767/777/787, surely the newer stuff like B777/787 possess all capabilities and utilize such.
The Transportation Safety Board investigation into the Air Canada crash will take months, perhaps years, before conclusions are reached and a final report is published.
It will make safety recommendations, not assign blame.
And in the end Canadians will know less about what went on in the cockpit than would be the case in many other countries. Unlike U.S. investigations, where a transcript of the cockpit voice recorder is part of the public record, Canadian pilots have successfully lobbied to keep them secret and only terse summaries are published.
I did not know that. I would have thought that CVR transcripts would be made public, not hushed up, by the TSB.
Interview the pilots, analyze CVR and FDR and you have your answer. The TSB most likely knows the cause already as they have been talking with the crew. Add another 8 months to do the paper work then another 6 months for the french version. Then they will let the public know what happened 14 months after they had the answer.
The flying public should demand quick answers to this. There may be a system or organization problem that, if delaying in correction, is putting more people at risk every day.
FICU wrote:Interview the pilots, analyze CVR and FDR and you have your answer. The TSB most likely knows the cause already as they have been talking with the crew. Add another 8 months to do the paper work then another 6 months for the french version. Then they will let the public know what happened 14 months after they had the answer.
Accidents happen in other areas of the globe, answers are sometimes shared with the public within days. Sometimes, within hours. Not so in Canada. TSB is in the business of dragging their feet.
Illya
MrWings wrote:The flying public should demand quick answers to this. There may be a system or organization problem that, if delaying in correction, is putting more people at risk every day.
The flying public still thinks it lost a wing and flew after ATC "ordered" them to land. Screw the public if they want answers now. All of us would rather a well documented, calculated, and thought out report that's correct and detailed. If it takes years then that's what it takes. We don't need the TSB to turn into the CASB.
