How am I out of the loop Frosti? Even back in the dark ages when I flew the jet we were able to be directed to a target without using our own radar. In fact once during an exercise I "killed" an AWACS protected by 4 F-15's without using my own radar at all until it was time to shoot.
In your experience as a maintainer how could that be possible 25 years before the F-35?
Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Moderators: sky's the limit, sepia, Sulako, lilfssister, North Shore, I WAS Birddog
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Came across this and found it to be a good read:
SOLVING THE FIGHTER DILEMMA A Full Competition is the Only Way By Paul Manson
Back in March, 1977, Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal Government, seeking to replace the Air Force’s three existing fighter fleets with a single aircraft type, ordered a full scale competition. The Cabinet directive specifically called for five American and two European fighters to be evaluated.
A New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) program office was quickly established, with full time representatives from three key government departments: National Defence, Supply and Services, and Industry. To make a long story short, less than three years later, following an extremely thorough evaluation of the contenders, the reduction to a short list of two finalists, the rigours of two intervening federal elections and two changes of government, plus intense negotiations with both finalists, the newly reelected Trudeau Government selected the CF18 Hornet as Canada’s new fighter aircraft. Within two months a contract was signed with the aircraft’s manufacturer McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing), and deliveries of the CF18 began in 1982.
The ultimate success of that competition is widely acknowledged today; the CF18 has served Canada superbly well for more than thirty years, and is expected to do so for another decade or so.
Compare that success story with the sorry mess confronting the current government regarding the replacement of the CF18 with a new fighter. The Conservative Government’s attempt to acquire the new fifth generation F35 directly through participation in a multinational program, without a formal competition, failed miserably, the result of widespread criticism based of rising costs and an array of technical problems.
Then in the course of the 2015 election campaign the Liberals, capitalizing on the controversy surrounding the F35, made an equally controversial campaign promise: that they would not permit the F35 to be a candidate to replace the ageing CF18s. And in a stunningly contradictory pronouncement, the Liberals declared that, if elected, they would “launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF18 aircraft”. Today, having won the election, they face the impossible task of reconciling these two mutually exclusive promises.
Recently, carefully managed leaks to the media from government sources indicated that the Liberals believed they had found a way out of their dilemma. Citing a suddenly appearing “capability gap” and a previously unheralded urgency to replace the existing fighters for technical reasons, they indicated that they had decided upon an “interim” purchase of F18E/F Super Hornets, these being an upgraded version of the current fighter. It is a solution that, however attractive politically, would have serious consequences for the Air Force and Canada’s future security posture. In the first place, it would result in the Air Force having to operate and manage two quite different fighter fleets, with unfortunate consequences in regard to the duplication of training, maintenance, logistic support and operating cost. It also raises the suspicion that the government would, after a few years, convert the supposedly interim buy into
a full replacement program by purchasing more and more Super Hornets over the next decade or so, eventually producing a full fleet of Super Hornets. This would allow them to eliminate the F 35 from contention, while neatly sidestepping the need for a competition. It is a superficially clever plan, but one not marked by the sort of transparency that the Liberals had proclaimed.
From every strategic and operational perspective, the gambit would be disastrous. Facing a future where fifth generation fighters such as the F35 and Russian and Chinese equivalents will dominate military aviation, Canada’s Air Force would be relegated to third world status. Our nation’s ability to defend itself would be seriously degraded, and our status as a reliable ally severely diminished.
To make matters worse, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recently stated before the House of Commons that “The F35 doesn’t work”, an absurd and indefensible allegation, given that almost two hundred F35s are currently flying, and these have already flown more than 60,000 hours, that eleven nations have ordered the aircraft and with more in the offing, that the US Marine Corps’ F35s have been combat ready since last year, with the United States Air Force following suit later this year. Furthermore, the technical problems routinely identified in the F35’s early years have been resolved or soon will be, as one would expect in the process of developing and testing a highly complex new fighter aircraft. Trudeau’s remark raises serious questions about the level of factual knowledge that underlies the government’s policy on the fighter file. Moreover, it reveals a willingness to deprive Canada’s aerospace industry of huge opportunities to participate in the enormous F35 production program, which has already resulted in more than $800M of contracted work for Canadian industry. Any further such industrial participation would dry up were the F35 to be eliminated from contention.
A remarkable story is told in the recent formal evaluation conducted by Denmark in its search for a new fighter. An independent evaluation team, looking at the F35, the Super Hornet and the Eurofighter against four criteria, namely strategic, operational, cost, and industrial factors, concluded that the F35 was superior in all four areas. Notably, the evaluation team stated that the F35 was considerably cheaper than the Super Hornet (quoting $80M vs $122M), reflecting the significant (and expected) reduction in F35 price as the program matured. Of particular interest is the fact that the Royal Danish Air Force, like all who will be flying the aircraft over oceans and in Arctic regions, discount the single engine fallacy raised by the airplane’s critics.
These facts, and numerous others, make it clear that the Liberal Government could not in all honesty exclude the F35 from consideration in the Canadian case. Nor could they dare attempt to manipulate the operational requirements in such a way as to ensure a certain outcome, which would be grossly dangerous, irresponsible, costly and possibly illegal.
In all of this, the fact remains that there is one, and only one, viable option in the search for a suitable successor to the venerable CF18 Hornet, and that is a genuinely open and transparent competition. To initiate the process would not be a loss of face for the Liberals. On the contrary, it would show the Canadian people that their government truly seeks the best solution for replacing our old CF18s, in a way that will give the Air Force the equipment it needs to effectively defend the nation, while showing our allies that we remain a reliable partner.
Like the New Fighter Aircraft program that gave us the CF18 thirtysix years ago, the new competition could be initiated quickly and conducted thoroughly and fairly. The RCAF would then receive its new fighters expeditiously, thereby precluding any need, real or imaginary, for interim aircraft, while eliminating concerns about a “capability gap”.
Most importantly, it would demonstrate that Canada foregoes political expediency in favour of national security.
Retired General Paul Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff. From 1977 to 1980 he led the New Fighter Aircraft program which resulted in the selection of the CF18.
SOLVING THE FIGHTER DILEMMA A Full Competition is the Only Way By Paul Manson
Back in March, 1977, Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal Government, seeking to replace the Air Force’s three existing fighter fleets with a single aircraft type, ordered a full scale competition. The Cabinet directive specifically called for five American and two European fighters to be evaluated.
A New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) program office was quickly established, with full time representatives from three key government departments: National Defence, Supply and Services, and Industry. To make a long story short, less than three years later, following an extremely thorough evaluation of the contenders, the reduction to a short list of two finalists, the rigours of two intervening federal elections and two changes of government, plus intense negotiations with both finalists, the newly reelected Trudeau Government selected the CF18 Hornet as Canada’s new fighter aircraft. Within two months a contract was signed with the aircraft’s manufacturer McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing), and deliveries of the CF18 began in 1982.
The ultimate success of that competition is widely acknowledged today; the CF18 has served Canada superbly well for more than thirty years, and is expected to do so for another decade or so.
Compare that success story with the sorry mess confronting the current government regarding the replacement of the CF18 with a new fighter. The Conservative Government’s attempt to acquire the new fifth generation F35 directly through participation in a multinational program, without a formal competition, failed miserably, the result of widespread criticism based of rising costs and an array of technical problems.
Then in the course of the 2015 election campaign the Liberals, capitalizing on the controversy surrounding the F35, made an equally controversial campaign promise: that they would not permit the F35 to be a candidate to replace the ageing CF18s. And in a stunningly contradictory pronouncement, the Liberals declared that, if elected, they would “launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF18 aircraft”. Today, having won the election, they face the impossible task of reconciling these two mutually exclusive promises.
Recently, carefully managed leaks to the media from government sources indicated that the Liberals believed they had found a way out of their dilemma. Citing a suddenly appearing “capability gap” and a previously unheralded urgency to replace the existing fighters for technical reasons, they indicated that they had decided upon an “interim” purchase of F18E/F Super Hornets, these being an upgraded version of the current fighter. It is a solution that, however attractive politically, would have serious consequences for the Air Force and Canada’s future security posture. In the first place, it would result in the Air Force having to operate and manage two quite different fighter fleets, with unfortunate consequences in regard to the duplication of training, maintenance, logistic support and operating cost. It also raises the suspicion that the government would, after a few years, convert the supposedly interim buy into
a full replacement program by purchasing more and more Super Hornets over the next decade or so, eventually producing a full fleet of Super Hornets. This would allow them to eliminate the F 35 from contention, while neatly sidestepping the need for a competition. It is a superficially clever plan, but one not marked by the sort of transparency that the Liberals had proclaimed.
From every strategic and operational perspective, the gambit would be disastrous. Facing a future where fifth generation fighters such as the F35 and Russian and Chinese equivalents will dominate military aviation, Canada’s Air Force would be relegated to third world status. Our nation’s ability to defend itself would be seriously degraded, and our status as a reliable ally severely diminished.
To make matters worse, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recently stated before the House of Commons that “The F35 doesn’t work”, an absurd and indefensible allegation, given that almost two hundred F35s are currently flying, and these have already flown more than 60,000 hours, that eleven nations have ordered the aircraft and with more in the offing, that the US Marine Corps’ F35s have been combat ready since last year, with the United States Air Force following suit later this year. Furthermore, the technical problems routinely identified in the F35’s early years have been resolved or soon will be, as one would expect in the process of developing and testing a highly complex new fighter aircraft. Trudeau’s remark raises serious questions about the level of factual knowledge that underlies the government’s policy on the fighter file. Moreover, it reveals a willingness to deprive Canada’s aerospace industry of huge opportunities to participate in the enormous F35 production program, which has already resulted in more than $800M of contracted work for Canadian industry. Any further such industrial participation would dry up were the F35 to be eliminated from contention.
A remarkable story is told in the recent formal evaluation conducted by Denmark in its search for a new fighter. An independent evaluation team, looking at the F35, the Super Hornet and the Eurofighter against four criteria, namely strategic, operational, cost, and industrial factors, concluded that the F35 was superior in all four areas. Notably, the evaluation team stated that the F35 was considerably cheaper than the Super Hornet (quoting $80M vs $122M), reflecting the significant (and expected) reduction in F35 price as the program matured. Of particular interest is the fact that the Royal Danish Air Force, like all who will be flying the aircraft over oceans and in Arctic regions, discount the single engine fallacy raised by the airplane’s critics.
These facts, and numerous others, make it clear that the Liberal Government could not in all honesty exclude the F35 from consideration in the Canadian case. Nor could they dare attempt to manipulate the operational requirements in such a way as to ensure a certain outcome, which would be grossly dangerous, irresponsible, costly and possibly illegal.
In all of this, the fact remains that there is one, and only one, viable option in the search for a suitable successor to the venerable CF18 Hornet, and that is a genuinely open and transparent competition. To initiate the process would not be a loss of face for the Liberals. On the contrary, it would show the Canadian people that their government truly seeks the best solution for replacing our old CF18s, in a way that will give the Air Force the equipment it needs to effectively defend the nation, while showing our allies that we remain a reliable partner.
Like the New Fighter Aircraft program that gave us the CF18 thirtysix years ago, the new competition could be initiated quickly and conducted thoroughly and fairly. The RCAF would then receive its new fighters expeditiously, thereby precluding any need, real or imaginary, for interim aircraft, while eliminating concerns about a “capability gap”.
Most importantly, it would demonstrate that Canada foregoes political expediency in favour of national security.
Retired General Paul Manson is a former Chief of the Defence Staff. From 1977 to 1980 he led the New Fighter Aircraft program which resulted in the selection of the CF18.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Hahahaha. Like the Sea Kings that have been on one replacement project or another since 1982? Canadian defense procurement is a joke. Until the public outrage ensues from someone dying who could've been saved if SAR had serviceable equipment less than 40 years old, this and most other procurements won't actually become a real priority. Just an endlessly politicized pawn for 15 second sound bites and a cash cow for lobbyists.dhc# wrote:Speaking of 'effed up' procurement contracts isn't the FWSAR one due to be announced by the feds in the next while
url]http://www.casr.ca/id-fwsar-project-timeline.htm[/url]
Oct 2003 – FWSAR announced as Liberal government priority by MND John McCallum.
2003 – DND announces the existence of a project to replace in-service CF FWSAR aircraft.
[??] 2003 – DND begins work on FWSAR Project Statement of Operational Requirements.
2004 – FWSAR Project presented to Treasury Board Secretariat for government approval.
March 2004 – $1.3B is allocated in the 2004 Federal budget to kick off the FWSAR Project. (Deliveries of new FWSAR aircraft is expected to begin within 12 to 18 months, ie: in 2006.)
March 2004 – FWSAR Project is submitted to DND's Program Management Board (PMB) for approval (Program Management Board answers to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff ).
26 March 2004 – PMB approves a FWSAR Project Office to proceed with definition phase. (Alenia C-27J and CASA (Airbus Military) C295 already understood to be lead candidates.)
Spring 2004 – First Statement of Operational Requirements for FWSAR Project developed. (Ultimately controversial, no draft of the FWSAR SOR is ever made available to the public.)
April 2004 – PM Paul Martin promises his government will fast-track the FWSAR Project.
April 2004 – FWSAR Requests for Proposals anticipated sometime in 2006 but already the Air Force is being accused of pushing for a sole-source purchase of Italian C-27J Spartans.
June 2004 – DND delays the issuing of FWSAR Project Request for Proposals notice.
Sept 2004 – DND's PMB approves transfer of 'definition' funding to the FWSAR Project. Allocated funds are to allow FWSAR aircraft "deliveries [to] begin within 12 to 18 months."
Sept 2004 – Initial planned FWSAR Project competition starts with Request for Proposals.
Oct 2004 – Second DND delay in the issuing of FWSAR Request for Proposals notice.
2005 – DND revises Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) for existing FWSAR aircraft.
31 March 2005 – Revised date for planned issuance of FWSAR Request for Proposals
June 2005 – Bombardier claims that its Dash 8 series can meet the FWSAR requirements.
July 2005 – Planned contract award date for 15 new FWSAR aircraft (1st deliv. Feb 2006).
Sept 2005 – Statement of Support Intent on life-cycle support approach for FWSAR fleet.
Oct 2005 – First draft of FWSAR In-Service Support Framework (revised in May 2008)
Fall 2005 – Anticipated issuing of formal Request for Proposals for FWSAR Project
Dec 2005 – FWSAR aircraft to be based at Yellowknife, Conservative campaign promise.
Summer 2006 – FWSAR Project officially put on hold by Harper Conservative gov't.
June 2006 – The FWSAR Project Office is dissolved (to work on higher priority projects).
Oct 2006 – Another revised FWSAR Statement of Operational Requirements ('version 4.1')
Oct 2006 – Former ADM (Materiel) Alan Williams admits that failure to fast-track FWSAR was due to DND developing "specifications [which allow only] one company to compete."
Oct 2006 – Senate SCONSD interim report Managing Turmoil urges fast-tracking FWSAR, as promised, but advocates buying 20 - 24 new FWSAR aircraft with first deliveries by 2007.
Fall 2006 – Anticipated date (2005) for announcement of FWSAR Project contract winner.
Late 2006 – Anticipated date (2004) of first delivery of new FWSAR aircraft.
Jan 2007 – The Ottawa Citizen reports Lockheed Martin may enter C-130J for FWSAR.
Jan 2007 – DND documents again advocate sole-sourcing C-27Js (Globe and Mail ATI ).
April 2007 – DND's Chief Review Services lists FWSAR Project as requiring an audit.
June 2007 – FWSAR Project competition delayed 4 more years (reported by Aero News).
Summer 2007 – Original expected date of FWSAR Project IOC (initial operating capability).
2008 – Revised (2005) anticipated date for the first delivery of new FWSAR aircraft.
Jan 2008 – Viking Air Ltd CEO offers new-build DHC-5NG Buffalo aircraft for FWSAR.
May 2008 – Revised FWSAR In-Service Support Framework (second Draft, Oct 2005 first draft SSI hadn't anticipated DND's then-pending In-Service Support Contracting framework).
June 2008 – Tories' Canada First Defence Strategy advocates 17 FWSAR aircraft by 2015.
Summer 2008 – FWSAR Project Management Office established (The Ottawa Citizen)
Dec 2008 – Viking Air Ltd proposes a staged replacement of BC FWSAR aircraft including updating the existing CC-115 Buffalo aircraft with 'glass' cockpits and new PW150A engines.
Dec 2008 – MND Peter MacKay claims "there is no greater priority right now for the [CF]" than FSWAR. C-27J Advance Contract Award Notice reported but no such ACAN issued.
Early 2009 – Purchase date for new FSWAR aircraft (as vowed by Peter MacKay in 2008).
April 2009 – Estimated cost of 15 FWSAR aircraft procurement raised from $1.3B to $1.55B (according to a statement by former Director of Aircraft Requirements BGen Gregory Matte). Other sources claim 15 FWSAR aircraft would cost $1.5B (+ another $1.5B for 20-years ISS).
May 2009 – Heavily redacted DND Chief Review Services FWSAR Project audit published.
14 July 2009 – FWSAR Project officially re-launched with an Industry Day consultation.
Fall 2009 – National Research Council asked to review DND's SOR for the FWSAR Project.
05 Oct 2009 – Lockheed Martin officially launches production of CSAR HC-130J for USAF.
2010 – (2005) Anticipated date of the final delivery of new FWSAR replacement aircraft.
2010 – (2007) Scheduled end of CC-115 Buffalo West Coast FWSAR aircraft's service life.
(FWSAR behind scedule, annouced CAS LGen Steve Lucas in 26 Feb Senate testimony.)
Jan 2010 – Reports anticipate FWSAR being put forward again for approval by May 2010.
05 Feb 2010 – Interim report by National Research Council on FWSAR Project SOR.
12 March 2010 – Final report by National Research Council on FWSAR Project SOR.
15 Dec 2010 – DND Revised Statement of Operating Requirements ( 'version 6.0' )
11 Apr 2011 – Scheduled FWSAR Industry Workshop "to resume industry engagement".
May 2011 – In the aftermath of the 2011 Federal election, MND Peter MacKay and CAS, LGen André Deschamps, reiterate that the FWSAR Project is the top procurement priority.
12 May 2011 – Canada signs binding Arctic Council treaty on Arctic search-and-rescue.
20 July 2011 – Letter of Interest issued for a 16 Aug 2011 FWSAR Project Industry Day.
July 2011 – GoC reveals willingness to consider the possibility of mixed aircraft-type fleet, alternatives to the current Main Operating Bases, and privatization of FWSAR capability.
16 Aug 2011 – PWGSC/DND Industry Day on FWSAR Project procurement strategy.
Fall 2011 – Discovery Air Innovations briefs Parliament's FINA committee: Fixed Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) Alternative Service Delivery – A Better Deal for Canada.
16 Sept 2011 – Discussion paper submission deadline for FWSAR Procurement Strategy.
11 Oct 2011 – Boeing-Bell informally offers VTOL V-22 Osprey for the FWSAR contest
Jan 2012 – Harper Cabinet signs off on FWSAR Project to launch the program once again.
Feb 2012 – Rona Ambrose sets up a PWGSC FWSAR Secretariat to consult with industry.
March 2012 – Budgary approval by Treasury Board Secretariat for Implementation Phase of the FWSAR Project (reportedly $3.8B including $1.9B for 20-years of In-Service Support).
09 March 2012 – Letter of Interest invites industry to FWSAR Workshop (11 April 2012)
11 April 2012 – FWSAR Secretariat hosts 'Industry Day' workshop in Gatineau, PQ.
May 2012 – Media reports Treasury Board $3.8B approval (Michael Den Tandt/Postmedia).
30 May 2012 – Lockheed Martin & Cascade Aerospace, Abbotsford, BC team for FWSAR.
19 June 2012 – Search and Replace: The Case for a Made-in-Canada Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Fleet CCPA/Rideau Institute report released (Michael Byers and Stewart Webb)
12 July 2012 – LOI to announce availability of 11 April 2012 Industry Workshop summary. The Ottawa Citizen reports private contractor-operated Alternative Service Delivery option eliminated. Not surprisingly – MND Peter MacKay also heads the National SAR Secretariat!
12 July 2012 – Flight reports Viking Air studying restarting of DHC-5 Buffalo production.
13 July 2012 – LOI (amendment 003) for invitation to 17-19 Oct 2012 Industry Engagement.
14 July 2012 – LOI (amendment 004) to publish FWSAR Project 'Essential Elements V2.0'.
21 July 2012 – LOI (amendment 005) to publish additional FWSAR Project documents.
27 July 2012 – LOI (amendment 006) aircraft availability details and notice that proposals including MOB changes "... must account for all associated costs, including infrastructure" (referring to both existing CF Main Operating Base and any proposed new FWSAR bases .
Sept 2012 – Alenia announces that any FWSAR C-27Js would be 'missionized' in Canada.
13 Sept 2012 – LOI amendment 003 (99% availability req't for mixed-type FWSAR fleet, etc).
14 Sept 2012 – LOI amendment 004 (updated schedule + notice that, in the summer of 2012, "FWSAR Secretariat will start sharing elements from the Draft Request for Proposal (RFP)."
21 Sept 2012 – 5th amendment LOI invite ( " " " notice of additional FWSAR documents).
27 Sept 2012 – 6th amendment LOI invite ( " " " notice of additional info and documents).
10 Oct 2012 – Airbus Military and Discovery Air sign MoU for joint C295 FWSAR pitch.
17-19 Oct 2012 – FWSAR Secretariat's 'Industry Engagement' sessions in Gatineau, PQ.
Nov 2012 – FWSAR Secretariat adds sensor package and mandatory rear ramp to FWSAR.
16 Nov 2012 – Feedback submission deadline for 17-19 Oct 2012 'Industry Engagement'.
Dec 2012 – Lockheed Martin partner, Cascade Aerospace, bought by IMP Group, Halifax.
13 Jan 2013 – DND advertizes for 4 x Senior Engineers to assist with the FWSAR Project.
29 Jan 2013 – FWSAR Secretariat's issues its 'Industry Engagement Strategy' LOI notice.
31 Jan 2013 – LOI (Amendment 001) A day in the life of a FWSAR crew video for industry
Jan - July 2013 – A series of draft concept papers shared with industry for their feedback.
22 Mar 2013 – GoC and Canadian industry reps visit Turin facility of Alenia Aermacchi.
25 Mar 2013 – LOI (Amendment 002) clarifies the FWSAR Project timeline for industry.
28 Mar 2013 – LOI (Amendment 003) extends Contractual Inherency Concept review.
April 2013 – FWSAR Secretariat announces a planned draft RFP release in late summer.
22 Apr 2013 – LOI (Amendment 004) FWSAR capability delivery risk evaluation concept..
May 2013 – Airbus Military introduces improved C295W (winglets & uprated PW127s).
02 May 2013 – LOI (Amendment 005) FWSAR Project team CANSEC 2013 announcement.
09 May 2013 – LOI (Amendment 006) draft Statement of Support Intent (SSI) document.
22 May 2013 – LOI (Amendment 007) draft Statement of Operational Intent (SOI).
27 May 2013 – Alenia, General Dynamics Canada, and DRS TCL sign teaming agreement.
28-30 May 2013 – CANSEC 2013 appearance with one-on-one meetings with industry.
29 May 2013 – Airbus Military & Discovery Air Defence Services sign teaming agreement.
31 May 2013 – LOI (Amendment 008) current estimated price request for proposed aircraft.
31 May 2013 – LOI (Amendment 009) Feedback request on Integrated Logistics Support.
10 June 2013 – LOI to request feedback on Industrial and Regional Benefits requirements.
10-19 July 2013 – 'Team Spartan' cross-country tour to pitch C-27J for FWSAR Project.
16 July 2013 – ILS LOI (Amendment 001) feedback on Performance Management Plan.
23 July 2013 – ILS LOI (Amendment 002) controlled goods/technical data of US origin.
Late Summer 2013 – Anticipated FWSAR Project Request for Proposals (March 2013).
Aug 2013 – Following DND procurement tradition, ex-CAS LGen Steve Lucas joins Alenia.
30 Aug 2013 – The FWSAR Secretariat releases a draft Request for Proposals to industry.
30 Aug 2013 – Closing date for FWSAR Project Letter of Interest/Request for Information.
Fall 2013 – (August 2013) Anticipated full GoC approval for the FWSAR Project.
Fall 2013 – (Oct/Nov 2013) Likely FWSAR bidders tour SAR main operating bases.
Sept 2013 – GoC issues new draft RFP (Request for Proposals) for the FWSAR Project.
12 Sept 2013 – One-on-one meetings with industry to review FWSAR Project draft RFP.
13 Sept 2013 – FWSAR Main Operating Base (MOB) site visit announcement for industry.
16 Sept 2013 – FWSAR Project draft RFP overview/executive summary released online.
20 Sept 2013 – FWSAR Secretariat announces Airworthiness Program training program.
02 Oct 2013 – Revised FWSAR Draft – RFP IRB Evaluation and IRB Requirements.
17 Oct 2013 – Revised FWSAR Draft RFP LOI – deadline extended to 30 Dec 2013.
21 Oct 2013 – FWSAR IRB evaluation approach and requirements released to industry.
28 Oct 2013 – TAA advisory on Performance Based Navigation (PBN) for FWSAR.
29 Oct 2013 – FWSAR Project US Trade Agreements Act (TAA) advisory.
06 Nov 2013 – Revised FWSAR Draft – IRB Proposal Requirements (PWGSC date).
07 Nov 2013 – Revised FWSAR Draft – IRB Proposal Requirements. (DND date)
07 Nov 2013 – Revised FWSAR Draft – IRB Requirements (amended version).
14 Nov 2013 – Revised FWSAR Draft – High Value Work (HVW) Requirements.
29 Nov 2013 – Response and clarification to a supplier question (on the IRB proposal?).
02-06 Dec 2013 – FWSAR Secretariat meeting to discuss any HVW and IRB questions.
20 Dec 2013 – New Letter of Interest request issued for the FWSAR Project requirement.
20 Dec 2013 – Potential FWSAR Project vendor Source List LOI/RFP request published.
'Early' 2014 – Anticipated issuing of Request for Proposals for the FWSAR Project (2013).
Jan 2014 – C295 submitter Airbus Military becomes Airbus Defence and Space division.
(Airbus Military division was merged with Airbus Group divisions Astrium and Cassidian.)
24 Jan 2014 – Deadline for potential FWSAR Project suppliers' Statement of Capabilities.
28 Jan 2014 – LOI extension "in order to continue sharing information with industry."
31 Jan 2014 – (Dec 2013) Original closing date for new FWSAR Project LOI/RFP request.
28 Feb 2014 – (28 Jan 2014) Revised closing date for the new FWSAR LOI/RFP request.
03 Mar 2014 – Second FWSAR Project vendors source list LOI/RFP request published.
03 Mar 2014 – Second FWSAR Project Draft RFP – Two Step Evaluation Process.
12 Mar 2014 – FWSAR Project potential bidders' Source List published (PWGSC date).
17 Mar 2014 – Team Spartan announced Kelowna Flightcraft as partner for C-27J ISS.
18 Mar 2014 – FWSAR Project Draft RFP – Updated Source List - Potential Bidders.
26 Mar 2014 – FWSAR Project Draft Technical Requirements – Updates.
31 Mar 2014 – FWSAR Project – Update to Draft High Value Work (HVW) Requirements.
25 Apr 2014 – FWSAR Project – Update to Draft Training Requirements Specification.
28 Apr 2014 – FWSAR Project – Revised LOI for the FWSAR Project's 'Source List'.
Spring 2014 – (August 2013) Anticipated contract award for the FWSAR Project
26 May 2014 – Alenia announces Esterline CMC to provide the FMS for a FWSAR C-27J.
(NB: US-based Esterline Corporation acquired CMC Electronics of Montreal back in 2007.)
28 May 2014 – Lockheed Martin displays model of 'SC-130J Sea Herc' at CANSEC 2014.
29 May 2014 – Airbus announced MOU with Provincial Aerospace for C295 ISS work.
30 May 2014 – CP ATIP request reveals DND attempt to buy ex-USAF C-27J Spartans.
(Murray Brewster reported lack of IRBs as the anticipated objection but note, Alenia later announced that it would not support an operator who purchased the former USAF C-27Js)
June 2014 – (March 2010) Anticipated complete delivery date for all new FWSAR aircraft.
02 June 2014 – Team Spartan exhibits the C-27J for FWSAR at CANSEC 2014 in Ottawa.
31 Dec 2014 – (Apr 2014) Closing date for revised FWSAR Project's Source List LOI.
Spring 2015 – (Feb 2015) Rumoured FWSAR Project Request for Proposals release date.
03 Feb 2015 – First flight by potential FWSAR submission Embraer KC-390 prototype.
31 Mar 2015 – Yet another FWSAR Project Request for Proposals (RFP) notice issued.
(aka Capability ACQ & in Serv Supp-FWSAR, W847A-150179/A)
31 Mar 2015 – Provincial Aerospace and Airbus sign MOU "beyond the FWSAR Project".
April 2015 – (Mar 2015) Rumoured FWSAR Project Request for Proposals release date.
(PWGSC beat the rumours by a day, perhaps deciding April Fool's wasn't the best idea.)
21 May 2015 – General Dynamics Canada announces CANSEC 2015 Team Spartan exhibit.
June 2015 – Embraer confirms intention of FWSAR Project bid for KC-390 SAR derivative.
04 Sept 2015 – FWSAR Project RFP submission deadline postponed until 11 Jan 2016.
24 Sept 2015 – Only Airbus and Alenia participation in current FWSAR RFP confirmed.
(Industry sources expect Embraer and Lockheed Martin to also respond.)
28 Sept 2015 – (March 2015) 31 March 2015-issued FWSAR RFP submissions due date.
11 Dec 2015 – Steve Lucas confirms Team Spartan Canada C-27J submission for FWSAR.
Winter 2015 – (2011-2012) Anticipated FWSAR Project approval (Implementation).
Winter 2015 – (2011-2012) Anticipated FWSAR Project contract award.
11 Jan 2016 – Formal proposals deadline from industry on FWSAR Project RFP bids.
11 Jan 2016 – PSPC* announces three received submissions for the FWSAR RFP:
– Airbus Defence's C295W, Alenia's C-27J Spartan, and Embraer's KC-390.
(* Public Works has been rebranded Public Services and Procurement Canada)
11 Jan 2016 – AirPro SAR Services formed to back C295W submission for FWSAR RFP
(Airpro is a Airbus Defence and Space/Provincial Aerospace joint venture.)
15 Jan 2016 – Lockheed Martin confirms no C-130J submission for FWSAR RFP.
March 2016 – Anticipated (Feb 2016) start testing of FWSAR candidate aircraft.
Testing to be held "at bidders' facilities" and of approximately six months duration.
Future Dates in Current FWSAR Project Planning (mostly Treasury Board estimates)
April 2016 – (March 2015) GoC choice based on 28 Sept 2015 FWSAR RFP submissions.
July 2016 – Anticipated (Jan 2016) GoC response to FWSAR RFP submissions.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Please explain to me how the F-35 could participate in an official competition without Canada having to withdraw from the JSF MoU?Rockie wrote: I maintain there needs to be a proper, realistic competition starting from a zero baseline involving all the appropriate government departments, using all appropriate considerations and without any predisposition toward any of the contenders. It is the only way to avoid the corralling effect toward a predetermined choice, and if that process chooses the F-35 so be it. But that hasn't happened yet.
Think ahead or fall behind!
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
A parallel process, one having nothing to do with the other. It's what should have happened to begin with or something like it if they insisted on being part of the MOU.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Yeah, who needs a second wing anyway. Sissies
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Looks like the brass is once again uninterested in playing ball with the Fiberal's politics.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/liberals ... -1.3181149
Manufacture a crisis in order to fast track YOUR chosen solution.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/liberals ... -1.3181149
Manufacture a crisis in order to fast track YOUR chosen solution.
https://eresonatemedia.com/
https://bambaits.ca/
https://youtube.com/channel/UCWit8N8YCJSvSaiSw5EWWeQ
https://bambaits.ca/
https://youtube.com/channel/UCWit8N8YCJSvSaiSw5EWWeQ
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
The real story here is that Canada cannot honour both the NATO and NORAD commitments with only 77 jets that they want to replace with 65. That leaves the inescapable conclusion of either getting more jets or dropping one of the commitments.teacher wrote:Looks like the brass is once again uninterested in playing ball with the Fiberal's politics.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/liberals ... -1.3181149
Manufacture a crisis in order to fast track YOUR chosen solution.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
This is the same government that pulled the fighters back from bombing ISIS, but now extremely committed to NATO deployments. The irony is delicious.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
I remember when the US pulled out of Vietnam how they ended their NATO commitment. It was a very dark time in imaginary land.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Uh oh. DND committee report states that an interim purchase is a bad idea for several reasons including cost. What do you do when the truth hits the Internet? Make it classified and pull it from public view.
Open and transparent my @$$!!
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/ ... -18-report
Open and transparent my @$$!!
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/ ... -18-report
https://eresonatemedia.com/
https://bambaits.ca/
https://youtube.com/channel/UCWit8N8YCJSvSaiSw5EWWeQ
https://bambaits.ca/
https://youtube.com/channel/UCWit8N8YCJSvSaiSw5EWWeQ
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goingnowherefast
- Rank (9)
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Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
So in 20 years, we're going to have 50 F-35s and 18 bastard child Super Hornets flying around. Going to be higher fleet operating costs due to not operating one type.
Lockheed is going to have a grudge against us and charge more per plane. Canadian industry is going to loose the R&D and manufacturing contracts from Lockheed. When all tallied up, this whole gong show will cost tax payers 100 billion.
I'm in no position to decide which plane is better for Canada, but for f**k sakes, neither are politicians. I'm really getting tired of all the petty crap surrounding this. Let the military guys pick a plane and just buy it, and buy enough to support our needs until 2055.
Lockheed is going to have a grudge against us and charge more per plane. Canadian industry is going to loose the R&D and manufacturing contracts from Lockheed. When all tallied up, this whole gong show will cost tax payers 100 billion.
I'm in no position to decide which plane is better for Canada, but for f**k sakes, neither are politicians. I'm really getting tired of all the petty crap surrounding this. Let the military guys pick a plane and just buy it, and buy enough to support our needs until 2055.
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Old fella
- Rank 10
- Posts: 2402
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- Location: I'm retired. I don't want to'I don't have to and you can't make me.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Generals Hood and Vance, top DND folks are sending out contradictory info in the public forum about the so-called gap and the resulting purchase of 18 SH fighters, not to mention commentary from Ministers of the Departments involved. If these people can’t seem to get it together, guess the poor beleaguered taxpayer has no hope whatsoever.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/procurem ... -1.3187510
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/procurem ... -1.3187510
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Moose47
- Rank (9)
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- Location: Home of Canada's Air Defence
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
“I remember when the US pulled out of Vietnam how they ended their NATO commitment. It was a very dark time in imaginary land.”
Hmmmm, me thinks you know not of what you speak. S.E.A.T.O. not N.A.T.O. during the Viet Nam war. The U. S. military is still very much in Europe and a major player and contributor to N.A.T.O. Incidentally, is this the same imaginary land that over 58, 000 Americans died in?
Cheers...Chris
Hmmmm, me thinks you know not of what you speak. S.E.A.T.O. not N.A.T.O. during the Viet Nam war. The U. S. military is still very much in Europe and a major player and contributor to N.A.T.O. Incidentally, is this the same imaginary land that over 58, 000 Americans died in?
Cheers...Chris
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/ ... y-gun.html
The programs to extend and improve the F-15, F-16's and now the close air support A-10 tank killer .
The A-10 destroyed 150,000 soldiers and 500 pieces of armour in 32 minutes in the first gulf war .
Taking away that fighting ability and the ability of that aircraft to destroy an enemies will to fight would be silly.
You could argue that helicopters can take out tanks and offer close air support ,but nothing will scare the poop out an enemy before he dies like a flight of A-10's .
If we spent anywhere close to the two percent of GNP suggested by NATO obligations we would have enough in the budget for lots of new toys and noisemakers .
We could turbo charger the northern ski doo regiments as well , or we could convert them to solar power as nobody would attack the artic in the dark of winter , would they ?
The programs to extend and improve the F-15, F-16's and now the close air support A-10 tank killer .
The A-10 destroyed 150,000 soldiers and 500 pieces of armour in 32 minutes in the first gulf war .
Taking away that fighting ability and the ability of that aircraft to destroy an enemies will to fight would be silly.
You could argue that helicopters can take out tanks and offer close air support ,but nothing will scare the poop out an enemy before he dies like a flight of A-10's .
If we spent anywhere close to the two percent of GNP suggested by NATO obligations we would have enough in the budget for lots of new toys and noisemakers .
We could turbo charger the northern ski doo regiments as well , or we could convert them to solar power as nobody would attack the artic in the dark of winter , would they ?
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
No, imaginary land was where NATO and the Vietnam War had anything to do with each other. That was in response to a comment that asserted that Trudeau ending the bombing of ISIS while possibly increasing NATO support would somehow be ironic.Moose47 wrote:“I remember when the US pulled out of Vietnam how they ended their NATO commitment. It was a very dark time in imaginary land.”
Hmmmm, me thinks you know not of what you speak. S.E.A.T.O. not N.A.T.O. during the Viet Nam war. The U. S. military is still very much in Europe and a major player and contributor to N.A.T.O. Incidentally, is this the same imaginary land that over 58, 000 Americans died in?
Cheers...Chris
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Moose47
- Rank (9)
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- Joined: Sat Apr 19, 2008 2:45 pm
- Location: Home of Canada's Air Defence
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
Glasnots
I don't know if it is because I have been up for more than 24 hours, but your comment makes no sense to me.
I don't know if it is because I have been up for more than 24 hours, but your comment makes no sense to me.
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
150,000 soldiers in 32 minutes. Seems a little high to me2R wrote:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/ ... y-gun.html
The programs to extend and improve the F-15, F-16's and now the close air support A-10 tank killer .
The A-10 destroyed 150,000 soldiers and 500 pieces of armour in 32 minutes in the first gulf war .
Taking away that fighting ability and the ability of that aircraft to destroy an enemies will to fight would be silly.
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tailgunner
- Rank 7
- Posts: 501
- Joined: Mon May 17, 2004 4:03 pm
Re: Canadian Govt buys 18 Super Hornets
The Russian/Chinese air defence technology has rapidly advanced and improved in since the First Gulf war. The vaunted Soviet layered air defence was quite easily defeated by the fighters and bombers of the day. As of right now, there are legitimate concerns over whether any legacy fighter would have a freedom of action in contested airspace. That is why the A10 is being earmarked for retirement. It has little to do with its offensive capabilities, it still is very lethal, but rather its limited defensive capabilities. Flying the A10 against the latest Russian SAM umbrella is akin to charging the Maxim machine guns of WWI. Some may survive, but the losses would be horrific.
The Cf18, has severe defensive liabilities as well, with the SH only slightly better.
Cheers.
The Cf18, has severe defensive liabilities as well, with the SH only slightly better.
Cheers.
