Mandatory Retirement to be Eliminated in Parliament

[Brick Head]

The rationale is sentence two of the ruling. Section 15(1)(c) is not a reasonable limit in the CHRT's determination.

So you believe the rational the CHRT used was.........because they said so? Your really going to leave that in print?

Are you not even the slightest bit concerned that you are doing all this posting and don't even know the basic facts?

I'll spoon feed you a little more. The rational is based on a test. specifically the Oakes test. Pages are devoted to how the CHRT came to the conclusion they did, based on the aforementioned test.

CAN SECTION 15(1)(C) BE JUSTIFIED UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER?

[11] To be saved under s. 1 of the Charter, the onus is on the respondents to establish that
s. 15(1)(c) is a “reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The test for determining this was articulated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.

[12] The Oakes test requires that two criteria be satisfied. First, the objective of the law must
relate to a societal concern that is “pressing and substantial.”

B. Are the Objectives of the Legislation Pressing and Substantial?

[44] The first step of the Oakes test demands a clear articulation of the objective of the
legislation. The Federal Court found that the purpose of s. 15(1)(c) of the Act is to allow for the negotiation of mandatory retirement arrangements between employers and employees,
particularly through the collective bargaining process (Vilven and Kelly, at para. 247).

[45] In the light of the above-noted considerations, can it be said that the goal of permitting
mandatory retirement to be negotiated in the workplace continues to be of pressing and
substantial importance? The alternatives to mandatory retirement, which are in use in other
jurisdictions, effectively preserve the benefits of the current system without infringing a
constitutionally protected right. How then can the goal of permitting freedom of contract in this
area be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutional right?

[49] Given that the benefits associated with mandatory retirement can be achieved without mandatory retirement, it is difficult to see how permitting it to be negotiated in the workplace is important enough to warrant the violation of equality rights that was identified by the Federal Court in the present case.



Second, the means used to attain the objective must be “proportional.” Proportionality requires that the measures chosen must be rationally connected to the objective and should impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question. It also requires that there be proportionality between the objectives and the effects. (Oakes, at para. 70.)

[59] Far less intrusive options can be contemplated.

At the end of the Oakes test.

[71] For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the Respondents have not met their onus under section 1 of the Charter. Section 15(1)(c) of the CHRA is not a reasonable limit on the Complainants’ equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter. Therefore, we refuse to apply it to the facts of the present case.

[F-16]

Rockie,

Lay-off's from the top are already starting and have been successfully argued in other juristictions.

I'll leave that for you to research because you seem to have a lot of time to hang out here.

As for the rest, you did hit the nail on the head - throwing junior guys under the bus. If you think the most junior members are going to take career hits of $500,000 or more (when factoring in pension reduction, etc.), stagnate in PG or low paying positions for fun, get the worst vacation and days off for an additional 5 years and be happy about it - you are mistaken.

This is also discrimination as the junior pilots happen to be the youngest. So, who is it more fair to discriminate against?

Looks like the dog is going to chase its tail for a while...



As for what's up

[DocAV8R]

Just a little more info.

Summary of Evidence by Dr. Jonathan R. Kesselman
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
(Thwaites et al./Air Canada and ACPA)
November 6, 2009

I am appending hereto my curriculum vitae and publications record, my study on
mandatory retirement policies in Canada published by the C.D. Howe Institute
(Toronto), and the transcript of my testimony, direct examination, and crossexamination
as expert witness for the Canadian Human Rights Commission in the
2007 hearing of Vilven et al. v. Air Canada et al. I adopt the evidence that I gave at
that time and do not wish to change any part of it.
• What are reasonable expectations about the impact of removing mandatory
retirement at age 60 for Air Canada pilots on the actual ages of retirement?
And how useful are the questionnaire responses gathered from the 68 Air
Canada pilots who were ordered by the CHRT to answer related questions?
o Evidence from other jurisdictions that have abolished mandatory
retirement at age 65 is that the impact on actual retirement is very
small, and in some cases the estimated impact is insignificant. The
average age of retirement for workers even without mandatory
retirement is less than 65 years, typically around age 61. No direct
evidence is available for impacts on the airline pilot occupation.
Moreover, the availability of generous pension plans has been found
to induce earlier retirements than for workers without such pensions,
particularly for those workers who have “maxed out” their pension
benefit entitlements. For those who have not maxed out their pension
benefit entitlements, there may be some inducement to work longer in
order to increase their future monthly entitlements. However, those
workers also face offsetting incentives to retire and start drawing
their pension earlier, particularly where they can find alternative
well‐paying employment to collect both the pension and another
salary, as is the case with many Air Canada pilots.
2
o Some indirect albeit limited evidence about potential impacts on the
retirement ages of Air Canada pilots from eliminating the age 60
barrier can be gleaned from actual retirement ages of Air Canada
pilots over a recent four and a half years (2005 to around mid‐2009).
Based on data supplied by Air Canada, over that full period 21% of
pilots (107 out of 515) retired early, that is, prior to attaining age 60.
Over the shorter but more recent period of part‐year‐2009 covered in
the data, 38% of pilots (24 out of 63) retired early. At a minimum, one
can conclude that pilots who retire prior to age 60 under a regime that
enforces retirement at age 60 are unlikely to choose to work longer if
mandatory retirement at age 60 is eliminated. That leaves as open
questions what proportion of pilots now retiring at age 60 would then
choose to work longer and, for those choosing to work longer, exactly
how much longer on average. Evidence that I present later suggests
that the natural incentives of Air Canada’s defined benefit pension
system would impel many pilots not to work much beyond age 60.
o The cited October, 2009, questionnaire was distributed only to those
pilots who were complainants—that is, they had already been forced
to retire at age 60 but expressed a desire to work longer. That group
was a minority of all Air Canada pilots who retired in the previous five
years—only about 12 percent of the total retirees. To survey only
those pilots who had already expressed a desire to work longer is
faulty research design and yields biased results: namely, much higher
estimates of the desired retirement age than if the survey had been
administered to all pilots who had retired from Air Canada. One might
presume that most pilots who retired at age 60 without complaint did
not desire to work beyond that age, but without surveying all retirees
any conclusion would be purely speculative.
• What are the likely impacts of removing mandatory retirement for pilots at
age 60 on Air Canada’s ability to schedule flight crews while respecting the
current preferential bidding system (PBS) and complying with ICAO’s
3
“over/under” rule concerning the ages of crew members on international
flights?
o I have examined materials describing the operation of Air Canada’s
PBS, as well as associated factual evidence. I have examined the
“accommodation experiments” by James Tarapasky for Air Canada in
a report dated October 23, 2009, and I conclude that its findings are
unfounded because of several erroneous assumptions:
 1. The model assumes that the pilots at the top of the seniority
in each classification will be the ones over age 60, which will
not necessarily be true, given the varying ages at hiring and
other factors affecting promotions.
 2. The model assumes that First Officers today will remain First
Officers indefinitely and not get promoted to Captain,
especially as they approach age 60; this assumption is totally
contradicted by observations about the ages of retiring pilots
at retirement events in 2008 and 2009: in Vancouver 87% (of
54) were Captains; in Toronto 96% (of 50) were Captains; and
in Winnipeg 100% (of 6) were Captains; and if they could work
beyond age 60, even the few who had been forced to retire as
First Officers would likely attain Captain rank.
 3. Consequently, the percentages of First Officers assumed to
be over age 60 if mandatory retirement age were relaxed is
much too high, with problems in accommodating over‐60‐yearold
First Officers arising in most cases only when 30%, 40%, or
50% of First Officers are assumed to be over 60; these
requisite percentages are far higher than realistic figures.
 4. Moreover, these problem cases further require that
unrealistically high proportions of all Captains are also over
age 60, typically 60% or 70% or even higher percentages; this
assumption is contradicted by my earlier evidence on the
impacts on retirement ages, and it is further undermined by
4
the natural incentive for pilots to retire when they can do so
without a pension reduction, on which I present evidence later.
 5. Even apart from all of the preceding deficiencies in the
model’s factual assumptions, the model’s operation suffers
from a more basic logical error. Namely, its “optimizer”
proceeds in a sequential manner that fails to recognize the
ICAO regulatory constraint that requires at least one of the
First Officers to be under age 60 if the pilot‐in‐command is
over age 60. However, the optimizer has apparently been
programmed in Mr. Tarapasky’s model in a sequential manner
that does not properly reflect the ICAO provision and that
therefore unnecessarily constrains the bid options. It allows
for bidding by Captains in seniority sequence; it then proceeds
to bidding by First Officers in seniority sequence; if the Captain
is over age 60, it is assumed that the operating First Officer
must be under age 60, and pairs that cannot satisfy this
constraint are deemed to be infeasible. What this approach
ignores is that bidding for pairings that involve an augment
First Officer could have an individual under age 60, which
would “save” combinations of ages of the Captain and
operating First Officer that had been rejected as inadmissible
(both over age 60) in the previous stage of the optimization.
Given that First Officers are more likely to be under age 60, by
virtue of their lesser seniority and experience, this logical
deficiency of the optimizer is a serious one. (Note further that
the “over/under” rule applies only to international flights, not
to flights that are solely domestic or that have overflight of US
territory but begin and end in Canada. The international flights
tend to include larger aircraft and longer flight times that
require a larger flight crew including an augment Flight Officer,
5
further reducing the incidence of any problems from the
“over/under”rule.)
• What are the predicted impacts on Air Canada’s costs for its pension plan
from removing mandatory retirement at age 60 for its pilots?
o An individual’s retirement response to the removal of mandatory
retirement at age 60 results from a combination of several factors: 1)
the formula for determining pension benefits; 2) his characteristics at
age 60 (years of tenure with Air Canada, average pay for highest‐paid
60 consecutive months, likelihood of attaining a better‐paid position if
he works longer); and 3) differential pay between continuing with Air
Canada versus moving to work with another airline. If most Air
Canada pilots at age 60 have not reached their maximum pension
benefit entitlement (likely in that the current average age at hiring is
34 years, and 35 years of working tenure are needed to reach the
maximum benefit, contingent also on the individual’s highest‐earning
consecutive 60 months), then the individual will have to weigh these
offsetting factors in making a purely financial decision about whether
to retire from Air Canada. By working longer, such a worker accrues a
higher pension entitlement and may increase his pay by bidding on a
higher position; offset against this are the loss of years of receipt of
pension benefits and foregone earnings from retiring with Air Canada
and working for another airline. For the few workers who have
“maxed out” their pension benefit entitlement with Air Canada by age
60, the calculation is simpler: if the annual pension benefit plus the
earnings at an alternative airline exceed his Air Canada salary, retire
from Air Canada and work elsewhere.
o From the standpoint of the Air Canada pension plan, most of these
considerations facing the individual are immaterial, assuming that few
pilots have attained the maximum pension at age 60. The number of
pilot positions at the various ranks (Captain, First Officer, etc.) and
aircraft type is fixed, independent of how long each of the pilots works
6
with Air Canada. If some pilots chose to work beyond age 60, the
airline would need correspondingly fewer individuals to employ as
pilots over time, but at any point in time its total salary bill would be
unchanged. However, its total pension costs would be reduced for
two reasons: 1) those pilots retiring at an age beyond 60 would
receive pension benefits for a correspondingly lower number of years
before their death; and 2) over the long run Air Canada would have
fewer pilots retiring in any given year, further reducing total pension
costs. Pilots working beyond age 60 who had not already maxed out
their monthly pension benefit entitlements would increase those
entitlements, which would partially offset but not eliminate the cost
savings to Air Canada’s pension plan. And for pilots who have maxed
out their pension benefit entitlement but still choose to work beyond
age 60 with Air Canada (which they would do if their Air Canada
salary exceeds their Air Canada annual pension benefit entitlement
plus their potential earnings with another airline), then the Air
Canada pension plan reaps an unambiguous saving from the fewer
years that the pension benefits will be paid for those pilots.
• What are the predicted impacts on Air Canada’s costs for training pilots from
removing mandatory retirement at age 60 for its pilots? What about the
impacts on Air Canada’s post‐retirement benefit costs?
o Removing mandatory retirement at age 60 means that, over the
longer run, Air Canada needs fewer distinct individuals for pilots to
cover the same number of pilot positions, because on average each
pilot will work more years. For each pilot who chooses not to retire at
age 60 but to work an additional one year, Air Canada saves on
training costs. The magnitude of these training costs due to
retirements is inflated by the requirement that seniority be
maintained among Air Canada’s workforce. Hence, the savings to Air
Canada from one additional pilot not retiring is about $30,000 on
average for each lower‐seniority pilot needing training upgrading
7
multiplied by seven times for the number of levels of job shifting—for
a total of about $200,000. By having fewer individuals as pilots with
somewhat longer average working years, Air Canada’s overall training
costs will be reduced.
o Air Canada provides its retirees with limited post‐retirement benefits
in the form of life insurance and extended health care insurance. For
the same reason that Air Canada will save on training costs if some
pilots work beyond age 60—the need for fewer distinct individuals
working as pilots—the company’s costs for post‐retirement benefits
will also be reduced over time, since those benefit costs are
proportional to the number of retirees.
o One can compute the impact of abolishing mandatory retirement at
age 60 on the total numbers of individual pilots employed by Air
Canada over any given period; this also proportionately affects the
number of retirees on average per year. Assuming that 15 percent of
pilots attaining the age of 60 would choose to work longer, and that on
average each would choose an additional five years, the average
increase in working lives for all pilots would be 0.75 years (0.15 x 5 =
0.75) or 9 months. (These assumptions are fairly conservative given
the responses to the cited October, 2009 questionnaire.) Since the
current average age at hiring by Air Canada is 34 years, this leaves 26
years of working life to age 60. Nine months (0.75 year) divided by 26
years equals 2.9 percent, which is the implied reduction in numbers of
distinct individual pilots required by Air Canada. If one believes that
the impact on average working lives of Air Canada pilots will be
larger, then the implied reduction in numbers of individual pilots will
be correspondingly larger. For example, if average working lives were
to rise by two years, then Air Canada would need 7.7 percent fewer
individual pilots (2 years divided by 26 years). These reductions in
numbers of individual pilots are important, since they proportionately
affect Air Canada’s total costs for training costs, pension payments,
8
and post‐retirement benefits. Pension payments and post‐retirement
benefits are proportional to both the numbers retiring and the
number of years remaining in their lifetimes; later average ages of
retirement therefore would further reduce those costs for Air Canada.
• What are the anticipated general impacts on younger pilots at Air Canada
from removing mandatory retirement at age 60 for its pilots? And what
about the impacts on young pilots who are deemed redundant but remain on
the Air Canada list for future hiring?
o Without mandatory retirement, some pilots will choose to work
beyond age 60, and this will influence the speed of promotions for
younger workers. However, this impact will be quite small and will be
offset by the opportunity that younger pilots will themselves have
when they reach age 60 to choose to work longer. I earlier computed
that reasonable figures imply an estimate of about 9 months longer
average working lives for Air Canada pilots, given that many already
choose to retire before age 60, most of the others do not express any
complaints about retiring at age 60, and those wishing to work
beyond age 60 express varying views about how much longer they
would choose to work. The implication is that the promotion times
for younger pilots would on average be delayed by about 9 months.
Similarly, young pilots currently on Air Canada’s list for future hiring
will have to wait an additional 9 months on average until they are
hired. Of course, this delay in promotions and hirings will be offset by
the option to continue working and earning beyond age 60 if the
current mandatory retirement age of 60 is lifted. And since the total
number of individuals required as pilots by Air Canada over the long
run will be diminished, while the total salary bill for all pilots will be
approximated unchanged, on average each pilot’s lifetime total
earnings will be increased.

Yes, short term pain... for long term gain. You may not like it, but it is coming your way soon.

[Brick Head]

Docav8r,

As if the answer to this isn't obvious. Why are you only portraying one side of the impact? That whole commentary is directed at only the negative impact. And only to play it down. Where is the positive impact for the few lucky ones? Why didn't your expert witness address that side? Did he forget? Not important? doesn't look good? Don't want to attract attention? You ask him not to?

Sorry I forgot. Expert doesn't mean impartial. Particularly when they have been hired to do a job.

You can't hide from the fact that what you want, will take a dollar value resembling a lottery number, and transfer it to one individual in a very short time frame.

And that my friend is the positive impact to just one individual staying five extra years.

I guess your hoping they just don't look right? I mean are you not going to feel even the slightest bit uncomfortable presenting Dr. Kesselmans testimony knowing full well that ACPA will follow suit with the other side of the impact story? You know the side you have done everything you can to avoid discussing? I mean if you feel that uncomfortable discussing it here?

I wonder how the CHRT feels about being asked to transfer that sum of money to a lucky few on the basis of human rights?

[Rockie]

So you believe the rational the CHRT used was.........because they said so? Your really going to leave that in print?

Are you not even the slightest bit concerned that you are doing all this posting and don't even know the basic facts?

I'll spoon feed you a little more. The rational is based on a test. specifically the Oakes test. Pages are devoted to how the CHRT came to the conclusion they did, based on the aforementioned test.

Please don't be condescending. I give you credit for having a brain and it is the least you could do to return the courtesy. The ruling spent paragraphs 11 to 71 discussing if 15(1)(c) passed the Oakes test. Paragraph 50 says this about whether or not it passes the first part of the test:

[50] Based on the above analysis, we have concluded that it can no longer be said that the goal
of leaving mandatory retirement to be negotiated in the workplace is sufficiently pressing and
substantial to warrant the infringement of equality rights.

The final test (proportionality) is a bit more drawn out but is summarized in paragraph 70.

[70] In the Tribunal’s view, the negative effects of the infringement of depriving individuals of
the protection of the Act outweigh the positive benefits associated with s. 15(1)(c). As a final
observation, perhaps one of the most disturbing aspects of this provision was the one first noted
by the Court in Vilven: it allows employers to discriminate against their employees on the basis of
age so long as that discrimination is pervasive in the industry.

You posted paragraph 71 that gives the final judgement on 15(1)(c).

See...I can read.

Where is the positive impact for the few lucky ones? Why didn't your expert witness address that side? Did he forget? Not important? doesn't look good? Don't want to attract attention? You ask him not to?

ACPA and their attack dogs do a pretty good job of assigning blame and derision to the people who started this whole thing and they don't need any help there. What has been sorely lacking is the other side of the argument and that is finally being provided.

The benefits to the membership, and I mean the entire membership, has not been addressed before now. And those benefits will be felt long after the guys who started this are dead and buried. You only deflect peoples attention away from the ball if you insist on pursuing the blame game.

[Rockie]

Lay-off's from the top are already starting and have been successfully argued in other juristictions.

If you want to turn the seniority system upside down or throw it out completely you will have to convince the membership. I wouldn't count on it though.

If you think the most junior members are going to take career hits of $500,000 or more (when factoring in pension reduction, etc.),

Don't believe the scaremongering. You will take no such hit.

This is also discrimination as the junior pilots happen to be the youngest. So, who is it more fair to discriminate against?

You don't need to convince me that junior pilots need to be treated better, at least when it comes to pay. But discrimination? I don't think so. Certainly the CHRT wouldn't agree with you. This is part and parcel of a seniority system and the nature of our industry. Presumably you knew about this before you came here. The PG sucks and should be ditched for sure, but nobody promised you regular advancement up the seniority ladder and you are unrealistic if you think you are entitled to it. Many, many things can and will stall your progress up the list that are much worse than eliminating mandatory retirement. It is not the epitome of evil ACPA and some of your peers want you to believe. Someday you will be glad it is gone and you have the option of staying past 60.

[Brick Head]

Please don't be condescending. I give you credit for having a brain and it is the least you could do to return the courtesy. The ruling spent paragraphs 11 to 71 discussing if 15(1)(c) passed the Oakes test. Paragraph 50 says this about whether or not it passes the first part of the test:


See...I can read.

Your right. My attitude has been poor. But the cookie monster was a little funny right? A little frustrating locking heads with someone as stubborn as yourself. And don't even try and tell me I am the first to say it. Not to say I can't be painted with the same brush.

But you didn't answer the question really. Why did the CHRT rule that 15(1)c was not a reasonable limit on the charter in this case? You regurgitated one paragraph. This one.

[50] Based on the above analysis, we have concluded that it can no longer be said that the goal of leaving mandatory retirement to be negotiated in the workplace is sufficiently pressing and substantial to warrant the infringement of equality rights.

Based on the above analysis? Very interesting. What would that analysis be?

The benefits to the membership, and I mean the entire membership, has not been addressed before now.

So is that a fact, or a sales job? I don't see any benefit for anyone who wishes to retire at 60. Please explain? I mean no one has ever denied that benefit exist. They just appear to exist exclusively for those who wish to stay past 60. Unfortunately staying past 60 sounds more like the removal of a benefit to many of us. But,..... in the interest of improved attitude. Please explain.

[Rockie]

A little frustrating locking heads with someone as stubborn as yourself. And don't even try and tell me I am the first to say it. Not to say I can't be painted with the same brush.

I'm told it just about every day. We are both convinced the end result will be the same, but as you say we differ in how we arrive there. I once again must express my appreciation for the level of conduct you and for the most part others have displayed here. It is far and away better than the ACPA forum, and although we differ, we can at least discuss it without it turning into a slanderous character assassination.

But you didn't answer the question really. Why did the CHRT rule that 15(1)c was not a reasonable limit on the charter in this case? You regurgitated one paragraph. This one.

I did answer the question. Paragraph 11 to 71 is the analysis of the Oakes test and the paragraphs I quoted were simply the conclusions. I didn't think pasting all that information was appropriate since anybody at Air Canada can look it up themselves.

So is that a fact, or a sales job? I don't see any benefit for anyone who wishes to retire at 60. Please explain? I mean no one has ever denied that benefit exist. They just appear to exist exclusively for those who wish to stay past 60. Unfortunately staying past 60 sounds more like the removal of a benefit to many of us. But,..... in the interest of improved attitude. Please explain.

In contrast to the financial impact propaganda put out by ACPA, other expert testimony (some of it commissioned by ACPA but conveniently denied to the membership) says that any career progression will likely be delayed by only 9 months. As you know most people delay their own career progression themselves for much longer than that because they don't want to sit toward the bottom of any airplane list, so getting their faces twisted in such a knot over this is a little much.

The pension plan will be healthier the more people delay retiring by even one year. People who choose to stay will benefit by topping up their pension for the additional time spent on the job (I've been saying this all along for the benefit of newhires who will never get a full pension). And not that anybody really cares, but it will save the company money as well. Money we may be able to negotiate into the pay package directed at those very same starving newhires.

Those are just off the top of my head.

ACPA has done such a good job convincing everybody this is a bad thing that nobody is willing to consider the longterm benefits. You will notice I haven't even mentioned the fact that we won't be discriminated against any longer because of our age. It surprises and disappoints me that nobody seems to care about that, at least not until it actually happens to them.

[tailgunner]

Rockie, how in your skewed logic can you reply to F - 16 and say that he or she" knew the part and parcel of the senority system and the(sic) nature of the industry". before they came to AC. Are you not ALSO implicating all of you who are now fighting the VERY SYSTEM THAT YOU YOURSELF SIGNED UP UNDER?
You are fighting to change a long defined system, yet you seem to challenge/flaunt the idea that other parts of the system will not or cannot be changed.

[Rockie]

Rockie, how in your skewed logic can you reply to F - 16 and say that he or she" knew the part and parcel of the senority system and the(sic) nature of the industry". before they came to AC. Are you not ALSO implicating all of you who are now fighting the VERY SYSTEM THAT YOU YOURSELF SIGNED UP UNDER?
You are fighting to change a long defined system, yet you seem to challenge/flaunt the idea that other parts of the system will not or cannot be changed.

Yes, I knew someone would make that comparison. There is a difference between a legal seniority system, and a practice that was once considered normal but in today's society is illegal age discrimination. I'm sure you can see the difference. If you can't...too bad. That only means you should pay more attention to how our society is evolving or you will find yourself behind the curve like our union and some pilots are here. ACPA and its pilots can rail and complain all they want but they are not going to prevent Canadian society from changing its values.

Someday Canadian society may come to regard seniority based job conditions a form of discrimination too. If that happens then I will be first in line to ensure Air Canada complies with that as well. But until then there is no comparison.

You must also remember that although I agree that mandatory retirement is discrimination, 80% of the reason I am so vocal about it is because of the union's response. Not only is the union out of step with society, but they are out of step with the law and they will not win. Failing to accept that fact is foolish, and manipulating the membership to support them in a fight they cannot possibly win by denying information is irresponsible in the least.

In the process they are doing a massive disservice to the members they are supposed to represent.

[Brick Head]

But you didn't answer the question really. Why did the CHRT rule that 15(1)c was not a reasonable limit on the charter in this case? You regurgitated one paragraph. This one.

I did answer the question. Paragraph 11 to 71 is the analysis of the Oakes test and the paragraphs I quoted were simply the conclusions. I didn't think pasting all that information was appropriate since anybody at Air Canada can look it up themselves.

So we are in agreement then as to why ACPA did not prove the first part of the Oakes test? I didn't think that day would ever come.

The alternatives to mandatory retirement, which are in use in other jurisdictions, effectively preserve the benefits of the current system without infringing a constitutionally protected right. How then can the goal of permitting freedom of contract in this area be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutional right?

In contrast to the financial impact propaganda put out by ACPA, other expert testimony (some of it commissioned by ACPA but conveniently denied to the membership) says that any career progression will likely be delayed by only 9 months. As you know most people delay their own career progression themselves for much longer than that because they don't want to sit toward the bottom of any airplane list, so getting their faces twisted in such a knot over this is a little much.

The pension plan will be healthier the more people delay retiring by even one year. People who choose to stay will benefit by topping up their pension for the additional time spent on the job (I've been saying this all along for the benefit of newhires who will never get a full pension). And not that anybody really cares, but it will save the company money as well. Money we may be able to negotiate into the pay package directed at those very same starving newhires.

Those are just off the top of my head.

ACPA has done such a good job convincing everybody this is a bad thing that nobody is willing to consider the longterm benefits. You will notice I haven't even mentioned the fact that we won't be discriminated against any longer because of our age. It surprises and disappoints me that nobody seems to care about that, at least not until it actually happens to them.

Rockie,

No one is denying that extending mandatory retirement has some benefits. No one is denying that many of those benefits may prove long term or worth while. No one would deny the pension may be the biggest beneficiary. Everyone agrees with you. That is why you see only a few key issue before the Tribunal.

No one can deny (yeah I know you will until hell freezes over) that the deferred compensation system will be a casualty, unless as the Tribunal puts it, alternatives to preserve the system without mandatory retirement are used.

You see Rockie the Tribunal can not willfully redistribute benefit against the will of the bargaining agent. That is at the sole discretion of the respondents. That is the reason your group is arguing as you are. By claiming redistribution is minimal, nonexistent, fear mongering or what ever other reason you come up with is because you want to convince the Tribunal there is no redistribution therefor the respondents have no need for alternatives. Right? So there we have the strategy.

The problem? There is redistribution and everyone knows it. How much will get transferred to the first 777 CA that stays? Where did it come from?

It is that easy to blow your argument out of the water. Since redistribution exist in this case so does a threat to the deferred compensation system. Unless of course alternatives are used.

What you are really attempting to do is convince the Tribunal to redistribute money in the complainants direction, by arguing redistribution doesn't really exist. Like I said above to Docav8r above. The Tribunal is not stupid. They have seen this type of behavior before. I wonder how the tribunal feels about being asked to redistribute that kind of coin? You know, they hear all these lofty goals about discrimination prevention and then the claimant deliberately spins/omits facts in an effort to access money?

[Rockie]

I think you're reading way too much into that sentence Brick Head. The tribunal also said this:

[47] But the social science evidence regarding mandatory retirement is no longer as
inconclusive as it was when McKinney was decided. The experts who testified in the present case
agreed that the link between mandatory retirement and the benefits that were traditionally
associated with it is not as strong as it was once thought to be. There is no dispute that in
jurisdictions that have abolished mandatory retirement, deferred compensation systems, seniority
and other such socially beneficial systems have survived.

They also don't buy your redistribution of wealth argument:

[139] A delay in career progression would also mean a delay in salary increases. It is not as
ACPA stated, that the over 60 pilots would be taking money out of the younger workers’ pockets
if the age 60 rule was removed. Rather, the younger pilots would take longer to achieve the salary
increases that they desire.

[140] There was no evidence that a delay in the career progression and salary increases of
younger pilots would cause a substantial interference with the rights of these employees. Even if
the delay was double the length calculated by Professor Kesselman, it is hard to see how this
could constitute a substantial interference with the rights of other employees. Furthermore, given
that there are other ways of determining the end dates of pilots’ careers that allow for adequate
planning, the Tribunal finds that accommodating over 60 pilots would not cause such interference
either.

The Tribunal deals with discrimination. Their mandate does not include how we get paid (unless that is also somehow discriminatory). But they did discuss it and rejected it as a factor in this case. I don't see how you think they are directing us to redistribute our pay. We can do whatever we want with it and they don't care as long as it isn't discriminatory as I said. We could change our pay scheme to pay every single pilot exactly the same regardless of seat or aircraft and they will just shrug their shoulders because it doesn't concern them and they are not responsible for it

[DocAV8R]

60 is not the normal age of retirement in Canada. No other airlines 705,704, or 703 force their people to leave at 60. There are more pilots out there than there are in Air Canada. Even the ones at Jazz go to 65. The first Fly Past 60 guys were hoodwinked by a cunning lawyer with errors (a.k.a. lies) in the facts and numbers.

If we ball park the numbers, back in 2005: (You may have better numbers, but here is my estimation)

Jazz 1400
Zoom 300
Air Transat 250
Skyservice 275
Westjet 700
Air Alliance 180
First 125
Bearskin 60
Canjet 100
Kelowna 100
Kenn Borek 126
Central Mountain 100
Perimeter 100 - totaling roughly 3800 pilots,( and haven't counted 25 more 705 airlines, 86 , 704 commuter airlines or hundreds of air taxi airlines.)

[600RVR]

So DOCAV8R,

Why don't you try for a job with one of those companies. With your experience and all you would be a shoe in for sure.

Thats right though you want to go right to the top Making all the big bucks. In the same position you left.

Maybe all these other companies go to 65 because they are way lower paying jobs so these guys have to work longer and still come out with the a pension less than that of AC pilots. Poor us cant live on $120000 plus a year in pension. Tell me in all these companies you listed how many CPTS make while still working what our retired guys make in retirement. Kind of funny when you look at it like that way hey. Our poor retired guys

[Brick Head]

[47] But the social science evidence regarding mandatory retirement is no longer as
inconclusive as it was when McKinney was decided. The experts who testified in the present case agreed that the link between mandatory retirement and the benefits that were traditionally associated with it is not as strong as it was once thought to be. There is no dispute that in jurisdictions that have abolished mandatory retirement, deferred compensation systems, seniority and other such socially beneficial systems have survived.

Rockie buddy...........we just went over this. Paragraph 47 is from the first section of the Oakes test. We have beaten this to death.

WE GET IT READY. THE TRIBUNAL DOES NOT BELIEVE MANDATORY RETIREMENT IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE BENEFIT SYSTEM WHEN ALTERNATIVES CAN EFFECTIVELY PRESERVE THE SYSTEM IN ITS PLACE.

oops. sorry for yelling. decorum. decorum. decorum.

They also don't buy your redistribution of wealth argument.

[139] A delay in career progression would also mean a delay in salary increases. It is not as
ACPA stated, that the over 60 pilots would be taking money out of the younger workers’ pockets
if the age 60 rule was removed. Rather, the younger pilots would take longer to achieve the salary
increases that they desire.

[140] There was no evidence that a delay in the career progression and salary increases of
younger pilots would cause a substantial interference with the rights of these employees. Even if
the delay was double the length calculated by Professor Kesselman, it is hard to see how this
could constitute a substantial interference with the rights of other employees. Furthermore, given
that there are other ways of determining the end dates of pilots’ careers that allow for adequate
planning, the Tribunal finds that accommodating over 60 pilots would not cause such interference
either.

Finally something worthy of discussion.

Read the first four words of paragraph 140.

Your point is well taken. The Tribunal appears to have contradicted itself here doesn't it? How can, alternatives to mandatory retirement to preserve the benefit be justification for not applying section 15(1)c of the CHRA during the Oakes test, the test for which the rulings rational is based, yet 90 paragraphs later we get the above comment?

Seems odd doesn't it. This is why 3 pages ago I said I think this ruling is going to go in the waste basket at the end of the day. At this juncture I don't see how they can rule on Remedy without discrediting their ruling. The only sensible conclusion I can draw is that because there was no financial impact evidence presented they had no idea what numbers we were really talking about. They thought it was minor. This can be handle like the provinces have done. I mean our pay scale is just so steep. Our deferred compensation system is on steroids in comparison to anything else. Not even another airline in Canada.

It makes one wonder if this evidence being in omission may not have been done as part of a larger strategy. That being deliberately helping the Tribunal paint itself into a corner. Any of you been at the hearings want to comment about the tribunals reaction when they saw the financial impact study? Any body look really pissed at ACPA?

If the Tribunal doesn't allow alternatives in the absence of mandatory retirement, they destroy all reasoning within part one of the Oakes test. With that goes the whole ruling. Trash bin.

If they allow alternatives? Nothing happens to the ruling because paragraph 139 and 140 are not pillars upon which the ruling is based as is the Oakes test. However one has to wonder. Yes other jurisdictions are allowing alternatives that preserve the system. But not nearly as severe as would be required here. Makes you wonder if the ruling would have been different had the Tribunal seen the financial impact study doesn't it?

I don't see how you think they are directing us to redistribute our pay.

Great question. The deferred compensation system is not called deferred without reason. The deferred compensation system is based on the idea that you don't get all your money at the beginning. You get it back at the end instead. But no matter when you get the money it is still yours and you are entitled to it. We do this on purpose through the collective bargaining process. We have done it for decades. We, well our predecessors, have been very successful at it. So think about it. What happens when an individual works their whole career, is about to receive their compensation that was deferred, and then the system changes? Redistribution happens.

We can do whatever we want with it and they don't care as long as it isn't discriminatory as I said. We could change our pay scheme to pay every single pilot exactly the same regardless of seat or aircraft and they will just shrug their shoulders because it doesn't concern them and they are not responsible for it

Yes we could. But remember status pay is not a deferred compensation system. It is the opposite. Now think back to the Oakes test that came to the conclusion that alternatives that effectively preserve........in place of mandatory retirement.

Status pay doesn't preserve. It dismantles. Not saying it may not be a viable consideration at the end of the day. Just saying it does not fit the mold of preserving the benefit system.

[Rockie]

Anybody with a half a brain and a little bit of thought would dismiss the ACPA financial impact study for the schlock that it is. The CHRT certainly won't take it seriously.

I do understand what deferred compensation is you know. My point is it doesn't matter. The CHRT is not responsible for making their ruling fit our compensation scheme, so there is no reason to toss out the ruling because of it. It isn't relevant. If our compensation scheme cannot be done without creating some form of discrimination then it is the compensation scheme that would have to go, not the ruling.

But that won't happen because as the evidence shows it would not be effected by getting rid of mandatory retirement anyway. You're building an imaginary world around that one sentence that has no real bearing on the case. It was used to dismiss the compensation scheme as a factor...remember?

[Brick Head]

Anybody with a half a brain and a little bit of thought would dismiss the ACPA financial impact study for the schlock that it is. The CHRT certainly won't take it seriously.

Well apparently I have less than half a brain then. You already admitted you expect a 9 month change in the average age of retirement when people stay past 60. I can go into those graphs and interpolate how much that will cost or benefit individuals at pretty much every seniority range. That sounds like useful information to me when discussing redistribution.

I do understand what deferred compensation is you know. My point is it doesn't matter.

Why did you ask this question then?

I don't see how you think they are directing us to redistribute our pay.

The CHRT is not responsible for making their ruling fit our compensation scheme, so there is no reason to toss out the ruling because of it. It isn't relevant. If our compensation scheme cannot be done without creating some form of discrimination then it is the compensation scheme that would have to go, not the ruling.

So now deferred compensation systems are discriminatory too? Wow and here I thought the Tribunals was saying protect your system with means other than mandatory retirement. That deferred compensation systems have survived the end of mandatory retirement in other jurisdictions that have employed alternatives. I missed the part about our whole system needs to be thrown out. Can you please direct me to that section?

But that won't happen because as the evidence shows it would not be effected by getting rid of mandatory retirement anyway.

Forget your evidence. Forget all the evidence. Just theoretically here. No impact to deferred compensation system if mandatory retirement is ended? (assuming no alternatives are used to protect the system)

Could you explain that one too? I don't see how it is possible. It is like trying to mix oil and water.

Come on admit it. The strategy is, and has always been, to deny impact at all costs, since as we know, the onus is on the respondents to prove harm. The respondents don't prove it? The complainants get the coin. Right? We are not stupid you know. We get the strategy.

You're building an imaginary world around that one sentence that has no real bearing on the case. It was used to dismiss the compensation scheme as a factor...remember?

Perhaps you are correct. But don't you find the contradiction even slightly odd?

Dismissing the compensation scheme as a factor is exactly why it flies in the face of the rational used during the Oakes test. Use alternatives to preserve the deferred compensation system. Right? So which logic is the Tribunal going to follow? The logic of the Oakes test for which the ruling is built? Remember here we are talking about the Oakes test. That test is the very foundation of the ruling and the reason for not applying 15(1)c. They contradict that and the ruling is undone.

So which one are they going to do? Is there a scenario where both can take place? if there is I don't see it.

[BLZD1]

Brick Head,

I hope you have an ear in ACPA!! You make a lot of sense and I am pretty sure most MEC/ LEC members do not understand this stuff as much as you do. Thanks!!

PS thanks to Rockie as well for the great debate as I am learning lots from your points as well!!!

As they say in the UFC, "Lets get it on."

[Rockie]

Well apparently I have less than half a brain then. You already admitted you expect a 9 month change in the average age of retirement when people stay past 60. I can go into those graphs and interpolate how much that will cost or benefit individuals at pretty much every seniority range. That sounds like useful information to me when discussing redistribution.

I got the nine months from expert testimony based on historical data that DOCAV8R posted from another hearing. In that the assumptions behind it are clear and open. Not so with ACPA's financial impact study. They disclosed few of the assumptions they used, but I can tell that they assume everybody would move up the ladder as soon as they were able. You know that rarely happens. It also uses an average retirement age of 63 based on US numbers which are also skewed because it fails to consider the fact many pilots down there have had their pensions destroyed. It also assumes everybody will stay beyond 60 (won't happen). If everybody is staying past 60 then why publish numbers as if they are leaving at 60? That impact study is tailor made using flawed and contradictory assumptions to make it look as bad as possible, and isn't worth the paper it's printed on.

So now deferred compensation systems are discriminatory too?

I didn't say it was. I said "if" to help illustrate the point that it's not our compensation scheme that drives the CHRT. The CHRT doesn't care or have any responsibility to our compensation unless it is discriminatory, which it isn't.

Forget your evidence. Forget all the evidence. Just theoretically here. No impact to deferred compensation system if mandatory retirement is ended? (assuming no alternatives are used to protect the system)

Could you explain that one too? I don't see how it is possible. It is like trying to mix oil and water.

Retiring at 60 will be the individual pilot's choice. If they choose they could go till whatever the upper limit ends up being (my money's on 65 if ACPA ever gets off their ass) then the deferred compensation scheme doesn't change at all. It just runs for a few years longer. Evidence given in the hearing supports this.

Come on admit it. The strategy is, and has always been, to deny impact at all costs, since as we know,

Come on, admit it. The strategy is, and always has been, to wildly exaggerate the impact of ending mandatory retirement to get the pilots all worked up thinking their careers will take a fatal hit.

Dismissing the compensation scheme as a factor is exactly why it flies in the face of the rational used during the Oakes test.

The CHRT doesn't care about our compensation. They care, and only have responsibility for determining if something is discriminatory. They've done that.

[Rockie]

This is one sentence from a gem of a posting on another thread that I thought I would move over here where it belongs.

"What's even more insulting is how you so arrogantly imply that society is on your side, thus vilifying the vast majority of AC pilots who simply wish to align their respective career expectations with those who have come before them."

For the sake of the individual I have posted a link that gives a very concise discription of where Canada is today with regards to mandatory retirement. If I could I would post the very first paragraph which basically addresses this person's woefully misguided assessment of where society stands on this issue.

It says that British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut all have legislation eliminating mandatory retirement. The only jurisdiction that doesn't yet is Canada itself, but that legislation is working its way through parliament as we speak. Only a moron would think it isn't going to happen federally as well.

Does that sound like Canadian society is not interested in eliminating mandatory retirement?

http://www.standardlife.ca/en/pdf/group ... 2007_e.pdf

ywger

Before you display any more glaring ignorance of the facts I encourage you to google "Canadian mandatory retirement" and do some reading. The first page of the search should do it.

[DocAV8R]

SURVEY – AGE 60 RETIREMENT RULE

ACPA COMMITTEE Followed by REPORT/ASSESSMENT

Training Committee

No changes, no effect on Collective Agreement; not affect any part of the Training / Licencing requirements under our C/A.
(G. Bobro, Feb. 17/’06)

Crew Rest Facilities Committee

No apparent problems.
(G. Bobro, March 2/’06)


Training Alternatives Committee


No effect.
(Y. Robichaud, March 3/’06
Subsequent submission by members of Committee, in two parts dealing with their (1) mandate, and
(2) committee members concerns; this committee is still in the research and development phase of
alternative pay methods – as yet, no consensus on whether or not it would be affected by any change to the normal retirement age; committee members identify several areas of personal concerns (see for
ref. CMSC below):
· Article 25 – bidding and working conditions … how to handle the current freezes as pilots enter that working
years; what to do with pilots currently frozen off equipment (Art. 25.06.02 – last 18 or 30 months);
· Benefits packages – insurances, GDIP, EMA … will premiums have to increase (re-work actuarial numbers?), will programs come under greater strain as pilots working population ages beyond 60 … will programs be sustainable?
· Training upgrades and failures – how will “train to standard” in Art. 14.04 be affected? Will pilots working beyong age 60 still have opportunity to upgrade (? Failure rates increase; cost of training? etc.);
· Pilot career progression changes may affect other members interested in retiring at age 60 or earlier.
(March 10/’06)

Pilot Assistance Committee


No significant impact on our resources or programs;
perhaps as pilots age there would be more performance failures (sims, checks, etc.) and perhaps general health problems … hard to quantify.
(A. Graham, March 3/’06)

CMSC

Presently no age restriction in Article 25;
working beyond age 60 - some transition issues that will require modification to Article 25 (not knowing final outcome re: any changes to normal retirement age and/or status restriction):
· Art. 25.06.01 – 18 mth mandatory freeze (equipment/status) prior to normal retirement age (60);
· Art. 25.06.02 – 19-30 mths discretionary freeze (equipment/status) prior to normal retirement age;
· Pilots who have been posted off retired but have not reached their retirement date --- how will they return to active status if they wish to do so (?);
· Pilots that have retired and are allowed to return --- how will they return to active status (?);
· Possible impact on surplus/furloughed pilots not returned (recall protocol agreement);
· Protection for pilots restricted from bidding Capt. pos because of age;
· Crewing formula adjustments to cover older pilot group in senior pos – vacation entitlements, sick days, GDIP, etc.;
· Transition agreement required to alleviate initial impact caused by backfilling positions from above
(reverse order)
(G. Marquis, March 4/’06)


PBS Committee


No problem with the PBS system with pilots flying beyond age 60; unless other countries maintain age 60 restriction (e.g. the U.S.A.) – then possible accommodation will have to be made in bidding system, including factors of overflights and U.S. alternates, skewing senior/junior pilots bidding rights possibly.
(F. Coates, Feb. 14/’06)

Constitution Committee/
Administrative Policy Manual

No effect on Constitution; APM may require updating of Sec. III, subsec. A – Negotiating Policy, 12. “The Association strongly opposes any airline, government agency or person arbitrarily setting a retirement age. The Association will recognize a fixed retirement age only when it has become voluntarily negotiated as part of an agreed pension scheme.”
(P. Carter, Feb. 9/’06)

GDIP Committee

Suggest a full review of the GDIP will be required:
· presently pilots over age 40 are required to have 2 medicals, 4 sims, 3 written exams, an ART session and a
mandated route check per year – will this have to be expanded for 60+ pilots?;
· GDIP schedule of benefits (Art. 26.03.03.03) is built around age 60 retirement rule presently … will have to
be expanded to cover pilots working beyond age 60 and for how long = financial $cost for Company;
· Alternative – separate disability plan for 60+ age pilots, in incremental years, tied to ability/fitness to continue in employment? – or – no GDIP beyond age 60 employment … if become disabled, move into retirement/pension (?);
· Anticipated that there will also be increased usage of sick leave/GDIP by older 60+ age pilots = increased
$costs.
(G. Tarves, Feb. 16/’06)


Human Factors Committee
/PEAC

Fatigue and flight safety concerns expected to increase; e.g. humans sleep less as we age and our ability to adapt to sleep variations decreases as we age – implications to PEAC (more) onerous pairings and FRMS; if U.S. FAA not change, creating pairings that do not fly into U.S. would reduce total pairing quality through the entire schedule, possibly; also, possible negative affect on bidding (PBS) if crews have to be mixed by one under/one over 60 ratio (e.g. India ); sim evaluations/medicals do not specifically test for age related deterioration of cognitive abilities – may have to consider (?);
- research paper attached from the Aerospace Medical Association – The Age 60 Rule … “Upon review of the
existing evidence, the Aerospace Medical Association concludes there is insufficient medical evidence to support restriction of pilot certification based on age alone.”
(D. Tweedlie, Feb. 27, March 2/’06)

Vacation Committee


There would have to be some changes to Vacation section in C/A, and bidding …
examples:
- retiring pilots presently have a minimum number of days to bid, based on the months he will be working
during the year of retirement … will have to transition to a flexible retirement date if allowed to work beyond age 60 (new max.?);
- there may be pressure for increased vacation beyond 25 yrs. service max. at present ($cost);
- GDIP & Vacation has effect on each … more pilots on GDIP = more manual adjustment by Crew Manning;
- working beyond 60 (senior pilot) would mean less vacation time/slots available to junior pilots.
(M. Paquin, Feb. 16/’06)

Insurance Committee


3 areas of concern: ACPA Basis/Optional Life Ins., Extended Mutual Aid (EMA) and Air Canada Benefits:

· Basic & Optional Life Ins. – current premiums are $3 per mth. for $20,000 basic life coverage … if there were
some impact of raising retirement age, could increase premium (to $3.50); for optional life, coverage could be
impacted and could be resolved by creating a new category for age 60-64 (as an est. premium cost - $.42 per $1000; pilots not wishing to pay this premium could opt out);
· EMA – impacted most … our experience is that members in the age 55-59 age group have the highest
experience onto GDIP and we assume same for post-60 pilots group … could put financial strain on the trust
(presently .325% of gross income funds the trust) and expect to be paying out more in EMA benefits due to
a higher retirement age … would have to monitor EMA closely (perhaps exclude age 60-65 pilots from EMA
plan?);
· Air Canada Plans – would probably see some impact of extending benefits coverage beyond age 60 (claims
increase, costs for coverage … but may be offset in other areas such as pension and training).
- for more comprehensive study we would have to bring in an insurance consultant … perhaps from Eckler Partners Ltd. ?
(J. Jackson, March 9/’06)


OSH Committee

Difficult to determine what impact might be of having older pilots in the workplace … would need a risk management study/analysis;
some assumptions can be made re: more years of radiation at high altitudes, fatigue, jetlag, airline food (nutritional factors); look at other high stress and proficiency professions such as medical surgeons [article offered:
Cognitive changes and retirement among senior surgeons, by L.J. Greenfield MD, from June 2002 Bulletin of the ACofS]; we have no immediate accident statistics to use at Air Canada re: older workers or older pilots; only some speculations, comments offered.
(L. Dore, March 4/’06)

Pension Committee (Air Canada
and Former CAIL)


It is the text of our pension plans that currently includes the language for mandatory retirement, which is included by reference in the Collective Agreement (Articles 26.04.01, 26.04.02), by the following provision(s):
“5.1 Normal retirement A Member shall retire from the Company no later than his Normal Retirement Date … “Normal Retirement Date” means the first day of the month immediately following the month the Member attains the Age of 60.”
In our view – there are few negatives, if any, to removing the mandatory retirement provision; allowing a member to continue to work and accrue additional years of pension service may be beneficial to the pension
plan(s) … on an actuarial basis, it may be less expensive for a member to work an additional year(s) and accrue an additional year(s) of service and start his pension at age 61 then it is for him to retire at age 60. In the end, the Registered Plans would be better off if individuals worked past age 60 instead of
collecting a pension benefit at that age (based on the assumption that our plans text remain as is, unchanged except for the requirement to retire immediately upon attaining age 60 … i.e. still able to retire (voluntarily) with full pension at age 60.
*Cost implications – However on a total plan basis, if older members do work past age 60 and they are not immediately replaced by younger workers, the cost of the pension plan(s) as a percentage of payroll will
probably increase, at least for the short term.
*Flexibility – removing the mandatory retirement provision will allow members to decide when the appropriate time is to retire (according to their individual financial and other considerations)
[*opinion from Eckler Partners Ltd., consultants]
(C. Blandford, March 7/’06)

[600RVR]

So DOCAV8R,

Why don't you try for a job with one of those companies. With your experience and all you would be a shoe in for sure.

Thats right though you want to go right to the top Making all the big bucks. In the same position you left.

Maybe all these other companies go to 65 because they are way lower paying jobs so these guys have to work longer and still come out with the a pension less than that of AC pilots. Poor us cant live on $120000 plus a year in pension. Tell me in all these companies you listed how many CPTS make while still working what our retired guys make in retirement. Kind of funny when you look at it like that way hey. Our poor retired guys

Well Docav8r,
How many of these companies have CPT's making what you do as a retired AC pilot? Can't answer that. Thats why they go to 65. And still not get a retirement package like yours. Over $120000 plus. Maybe we should go the the public and see if they feel your discriminated against when they know how much you make in retirement.

[DocAV8R]

I am still in my 40's. Don't make assumptions you cannot prove or support. You act like our UNION spouting rubbish without referring to the facts.

[Brick Head]

Docav8r,

No one said, or is claiming, benefits do not exist by getting rid of mandatory retirement.

What you have successfully pointed out is that there are probably many areas of agreement the parties have. Maybe even a majority. However the areas of agreement are obviously not the point of contention are they?

What you have not done, and continue to refuse to do, is acknowledge or address ways of coping with redistribution.

Here is hoping that we can all come to an agreement that allows those who wish to continue working past 60, the ability to do so. And those who wish to exercise the great benefit of retiring at 60, without negative impact from the change, can do so as well.

Really isn't that a worth while objective?

[Brick Head]

For the sake of the individual I have posted a link that gives a very concise description of where Canada is today with regards to mandatory retirement. If I could I would post the very first paragraph which basically addresses this person's woefully misguided assessment of where society stands on this issue.

It says that British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut all have legislation eliminating mandatory retirement. The only jurisdiction that doesn't yet is Canada itself, but that legislation is working its way through parliament as we speak. Only a moron would think it isn't going to happen federally as well.

Rockie,

You don't seem to grasp that society, the lawmakers and the courts have been employing alternatives, to address competing interests, while navigating their way through the end of mandatory retirement.

I think everyone here gets that mandatory retirement is eventually on the way out. The point of contention is how to equitably do that.