How to crash an airplane

[pdw]

Beyond a 60 degree impact angle the chances of surviving the crash becomes nil.

We've all by now seen a youtube of the Stinson at Bruce Meadows Utah (June 30 2012 climbout accident ) ... the one Avweb narrates is good ... about them riding it in, which "may have been the only option left". At the density altitude of "9067ft (6K actual) is visibly also faster groundspeed at stallspeed than at sea level, ... there gradually sinking/arriving nosehigh at full throttle in the mature stand of spruce.

[ahramin]

An excellent example pdw. I doubt they would have got out of it had they stalled it in at treetop height.

Flyinthebug I'm sorry to say I'm not very familiar with your accident. I have seen the pictures. I understand that it was a serious and lasting event for you. How high off the ground were you when the aircraft stalled?

[flyinthebug]

An excellent example pdw. I doubt they would have got out of it had they stalled it in at treetop height.

Flyinthebug I'm sorry to say I'm not very familiar with your accident. I have seen the pictures. I understand that it was a serious and lasting event for you. How high off the ground were you when the aircraft stalled?

Tree tops. Around 30-35 feet.

[flyinthebug]

However, we do have the PIC on the board. Giving us details could prevent a future accident if so inclined.

How does a pilot try to explain running out of fuel? Before I even attempt to "explain" the many links in the chain that led up to the event, you have to understand that *I* accept full responsibility for the situation I put myself in...BUT I do have reasons why it occurred.

Arrived at camp on May 11th hired as Chief Pilot for the operator...ice was still on the bay so I couldnt start training any one until that melted off. On the morning of May 14th, it had cleared out. The owner called the AMO and said we were ready for one of the Beavers. He drove me to xxx to pick it up.

We met with the AMO owner and an engineer that had just completed an inspection on the aircraft. I asked him if she had an rigging issues or "quirks" when flying and he assured me she was a straight machine and well rigged. I was told and reassured that the aircraft just had its fuel gauges recalibrated and they were quote "spot on". I cant remember the exact readings but something to the affect of half fronts half centre, and empty rear. Plenty of fuel for the 7 min flight to the lodge (and subsequent 5 take offs and landings back at the lodge).

As we were dragging the aircraft from the hanger down to the water base, I asked the AMO owner again, I just want to ensure my fuel load as I never trust gauges in any aircraft. Once again I was assured that the aircraft had just been run up and "some fresh fuel" was put in that morning. And this is where I made my 1st major mistake....I trusted what I was told. What I SHOULD have done is ask the AMO owner to have an apprentice go get me 10 gals of gas in 2 jerry cans OR a rubber hose that I could cut and check my fuel levels myself. Under almost any other circumstances I would have done that...but for some reason I trusted these people after sharing an hour of coffee and stories with them... and they were very friendly and seemed very knowledgable as well. ( as anyone knows that has flown a DHC -2. -3, or -6 there is no way to check fuel levels without adding fuel or using a hose to feed down the neck. I however chose to accept the word of the AMO owner and the air service owner who also assured me those gauges are accurate in that machine. Not wanting to look like an asshole by not believing both the AMO owner and my boss, I carried on with launching the aircraft.

It was difficult to start, especially after just being run up and warmed up. This was surprising to me, but I attributed it to the fact she had sat outside all winter and maybe some old gas mixed in with the new gas and still felt ok about things. I had a little voice in the back of my head telling me...get some gas or at least a hose...and confirm. Sadly, again, I didn't want to look like a jack ass by questioning these knowledgeable people...and it was my 1st day flying for the company...so pissing off his friends at the AMO was not a priority for me.

Took off from xxx airport (water) and had a beautiful, uneventful flight back to the lodge and landed without incident.

We had trips to do later that day and camps to open, so my boss asked me to knock off my 5 take offs and landings so I was current again and could also begin training the other pilots. After landing at camp, I taxied to position to take off on the 1st of 5 touch and goes. (now fully confident that the AMO guys and owner were telling me the truth...and after all, why wouldn't they tell me the truth? No one wants to send a pilot out with no fuel, so I began to feel comfortable with what I was seeing on my fuel gauges.)

I took off and about 350-375 feet she coughed and quit. Panic set in initially...but then my training kicked in. Set my glide at 102 MPH and started frantically trying a restart, switched tanks, wobble pump going 100 mph and even tried shooting raw fuel from the primer into the engine hoping for a spark to ignite it. Once I knew that wasn't happening, I started looking for a soft place to set her down. That soft place didn't exist...just spring hardwoods and rocks as potential landing areas. I had very little time to react. By this time I was down to 200+- feet and the "impossble turn" would have been just that had I tried it I would have died forsure.

As my floats started to skip off the tree tops that is when I pulled the yoke into my chest to slow my forward momentum as much as possible....last memory I have is the aircraft stalled, left wing dropped, and then everything went into slow motion. I watched the wing wrap around the tree and slowly start to buckle and then watched it rip off my plane. Then I was suddenly and violently thrown left then right, hit my head and was an unconscious pax for the rest of the flight.

A Cessna float pilot was the first to find me and guided the helicopter to my position. 22 broken bones, eye popped outta my head, closed head injury, and into a coma for 4 days. The hospital called my family and told them to get to xxx asap as I wasn't expected to make it through the night.

Now what can we learn from my mistake?...Its very simple...no matter how much or how little experience you have, or how much you feel you trust people around you, when it comes to confirming fuel loads, there is NO wiggle room. If I had it to do over, of course I would have made them bring me 10 gals of fuel or a hose to check my fuel load. I failed to do this as a brand new CP, new company, new AMO and they all seemed like they had been friends for years...so why rock their boat and why would they give me false information? Of course they didn't do it on purpose and they believed what they were telling me. So the only person I have to blame is myself! I knew better. I knew the unreliability of the DHC2 fuel gauges. Yet I still somehow thought all was well.

As an FYI, I spent my entire career flying heavy on fuel on almost every flight I would have 100-150 lbs of granny gas and even encouraged my young crews to do the same. I as a DFO was more than happy to kick 100 lbs of freight off a flight if it meant they could take more gas. I was a strong proponent of flying heavy on fuel and still am to this day (even moreso now). My best advice to avoid this happening to anyone else is simply check your fuel load and do not EVER take the word of colleagues or peers. I know they had good and honest intentions to speed up the process of me getting back to camp and start working. Had I done what I have done for the previous 24 years as a pilot and taken 10 extra minutes and CONFIRMED my fuel load, I would still be flying and still be loving my job. Instead I lost my medical (double vision from the right eye popping out of socket, badly broken arm that only has 35 degrees range of motion and a bunch of pins, rods, screws and plates holding it all back together) and my career with one bad decision.

I am ashamed to admit that I did what I chastised others for in the past and ran out of fuel. It was so unbelievable to me that I asked them to please check the cam drum for failure or some other obscure but possible explanation for why I was fuel starved. Sadly the answer was simple...there was no fuel in any of the 3 tanks.

I don't know if this will help anyone or not pelmet...but if one pilot reads my words and the reason(s) that led up to my accident, maybe he will remember to stick a hose down the neck or add 10-15 gals just to be safe until he can load up all 3 tanks and then manage his fuel for the rest of the season based on that one fill of all 3 tanks.

I did a video on youtube back in 2012. It was more geared towards people who suffer from PTSD and I do tell my story of my engine failure and crash. Due to my position in the industry, my boss asked me to take it down...so I did. NOT because he didn't want me to discuss my crash, but moreso because he didn't want me to go through the ridicule I would go through by publicly admitting to such a STUPID mistake that almost killed me. As I said, I am ashamed and embarrassed that I would allow myself to succumb to pressure from the operator and the AMO...and if it could happen to me at that stage of my career (5K plus hours TT, 1600 in a DHC2 everywhere from the west coast to N. Ont and holding positions as Chief Pilot, Director of Flight Ops, and training Capt on PA31 and King Airs). Hell the year before my crash I was in charge of training for the Beechcraft program at xxx and taught all 100/200 ground schools. So to say im embarrassed is an understatement.

There were many links in the chain of events that led up to my accident. I couldn't possibly explain it to anyone here in text as it was far more complicated than I am able to express in this forum. Suffice it to say, never ever ever trust anyone but yourself when it comes to your fuel load. Don't take the fuellers word for it at the FBO, get out and check! The only way YOU can be 100% certain of your fuel load, is if YOU check it yourself and confirm it. I wasn't smart that day and it cost me my career and almost my life.

Yes I screwed up. In a big way. I hope no one else ever makes the same mistake(s) I did.

Fly safe all.

PS...In regards to what TC told me about surviving an un survivable accident...they distinctly said that they had been keeping records of this nature since 1994...pre cars. I have no idea where to find these stats and they were only verbally shared with me by these two inspectors that visited me in ICU at the hospital. That's all I know about that.

[PilotDAR]

FTB, that was a sobering account, and I very appreciate your presenting it for everyone's collective benefit.

I certainly have empathy for the "depending upon others" and fuel indications. It can be awkward to double think the AMO guy who tells you it's fine. I was flight testing a completely rebuilt 182 amphib, with a completely new JPI EDM 930 fuel quantity system, which I had participated in calibrating, and "knew" to be right on. I had landed with 3/8 quantity indicating on both sides, which sounded right for the flight I had done. I had to demo the plane to it's new owner, so I added 3 hours fuel for three hours intended flying, with the 3/8ths as my reserve.

I flew the 3 hours with the owner, and landed home. The next day, the AMO guys told me that I'd "cut it really close". They found only 8 liters of fuel aboard after my flight. I was safe, but mortified. I devoted a lot of effort after that watching the fuel indications of that system. They were wrong! And this was a brand new, STC'd system, with new senders, and all the calibrations done. It has never been dependable to within 1/4 tank since. I would have thought that for more than $6000, I'd have accurate quantity indications.

After that, a lot of my training with the owner focused on forced approaches. In that plane (Aerocet 3500 amphibs, wing extensions, STOL kit, and 3350 gross weight, the suitable glide speed was 80 knots. From that speed, a silky smooth power off landing could be made every time.

Landing [crashing] in trees, into rocks, or totally unsuitable terrain, is hard to say fly it in or stall it in - there's no right answer. The aircraft will no longer be in control before it stops, you're just along for the ride.

That said, when a suitable landing surface is available, which includes a water landing in a land plane, I would rather fly it on under control, than stall it on. Maintain control as long as you can. The greater time and distance you can apply to stopping the plane, the lesser the forces.

I was one of the group who pulled my quite dead friend from his C 150, following a stall/spin on final. The coroner told us that he had stopped in excess of 200G's. I figure that the plane when from 70MPH or so to zero in less than a foot (judging by the marks in the ground), and flipped over. Where he hit was entirely suitable for a damage free rollout, if his angle of arrival was small.

Chances of survival are inversely proportional to angle of arrival (trees and rocks notwithstanding). Angle of arrival is kept small by maintaining flying speed, lift and control as long as possible.

[Rookie50]

Wow, Fly. Am deeply moved by your story, as a newbie. (700TT). Tough, tough scenario. Again I am sorry you paid such a heavy price. Thanks for sharing. Trust, but verify.

[CpnCrunch]

FTB, there have been lots of more experienced pilots than you who have similar lapses of judgement. The Borek and Air Nootka fatal accidents come to mind - in those cases (IIRC) it was 15000+ hr pilots who were either training captains or former company owners, and they appear to have made inexplicable fatal mistakes and/or lapses in judgement that cost them their lives.

It makes me wonder about people like Cat, Doc & the Colonel who give the impression that only idiots make pilot errors that cause accidents, and that SOPs are for pussies. I now tend to think that anyone could make a similar mistake, and it's only good habits/SOPs/discipline and being paranoid that will help to prevent it. Perhaps those guys are more paranoid and disciplined than the rest of us? I haven't had an accident myself yet, although I don't have very many hours and I don't tend to fly in very challenging conditions.

[Canoehead]

flyinthebug

I've read your story before, and I recall watching the YouTube video.
Re-reading the account today again was very sobering and thought provoking.

Thank-you for sharing; don't ever stop.

CH

[Rookie50]

FTB, there have been lots of more experienced pilots than you who have similar lapses of judgement. The Borek and Air Nootka fatal accidents come to mind - in those cases (IIRC) it was 15000+ hr pilots who were either training captains or former company owners, and they appear to have made inexplicable fatal mistakes and/or lapses in judgement that cost them their lives.

It makes me wonder about people like Cat, Doc & the Colonel who give the impression that only idiots make pilot errors that cause accidents, and that SOPs are for pussies. I now tend to think that anyone could make a similar mistake, and it's only good habits/SOPs/discipline and being paranoid that will help to prevent it. Perhaps those guys are more paranoid and disciplined than the rest of us? I haven't had an accident myself yet, although I don't have very many hours and I don't tend to fly in very challenging conditions.

Rock throwers prepare to let fly, but from this newbies chair it seems the more experience one gets, and the more challenging missions one flies, the narrower, fuzzier and grayer the line gets between a safe outcome and near miss, or actual accident.

[Diadem]

With regards to stalling the plane in, it sounds like it worked out for flyinthebug, so to say that stalling will always have a worse outcome obviously isn't true. However, it sounds from his account like the wing dropping and hitting the trees absorbed a lot of the impact, and I'm not so sure the result would have been as favourable if he had just dropped from 30-35 feet. One of my colleagues died after stalling at low altitude, probably below 50 feet, and in that height the aircraft ended up completely upside-down. Even with some small trees to break the impact it was quite literally unsurvivable. So, while stalling it can result in a survivable crash, I don't think it should be taught as a good idea, because when it goes wrong it goes very wrong.

[Rowdy]

CpnCrunch, Ask any of those three how fortunate they were to have narrowly escaped an accident or incident. I'm sure it's happened, probably more than once. Fate, circumstance or skill.. they can all be mistaken for one and the other. A lot of times, it's as though they just want to spark thought and debate on certain topics.

PilotDAR, I disagree.. it's not so much angle as it is impact force and initial point of contact. Mine was relatively flat and I was fortunate to only succumb to burst fractures in my lower spine and jaw as the speed was lower (slowed up for a turn, flaps down, no evidence of a wing drop). Someone else mentioned it previously. The human body will take a rapid deceleration in a forward movement to a much greater degree then it will a downward force. Lots of testing showcasing this in the automotive world. Barring head injury, post accident fire and drowning.. I'm sure you'll continue to find that regardless of the angle, its usually force (speed at impact) that is the primary factor.

I see it this way, A stall accident will prove generally fatal. Usually associated with a wing drop and incipient spin . Hitting the trees, wings level at the slowest forward speed with a slight nose up attitude (stalled in) will more than likely be more survivable than driving the nose into them at a higher speed.

Diadem, that sounds more like a stall/incipient spin accident that deliberately getting the airplane to the slowest flyable speed possible before impact. Sorry for your loss as well.

FTB, still chilling to read your story. It saddens me that my fathers comments early in my career proved too true and in a way I was not prepared for. 'You will lose friends in this industry'.. and There I was thinking he meant it's hard on relations..

[GyvAir]

Thanks for sharing that, FTB. It takes a lot of guts to recount a tale like that with such frankness, complete with the details of where and how one erred, themselves.

I make my living in the maintenance and overhaul end of this business. When passing off an aircraft to the flight crew, I always try to politely make clear to the pilots that I expect them to do a good pre-flight inspection with the knowledge of what maintenance has taken place influencing the scope of their inspection. At the very least, where practical, a double check of the fuel and oil quantities and the security of the respective caps should be standard practice. I will not take offense to someone double checking my work.

That trust based relationship between those flying the aircraft and those maintaining them can be a bit of a tenuous one to manage properly, requiring thought and effort on both sides. Coming from the maintenance side, I make a conscious effort to ensure both my verbal and non-verbal communications foster that trust, while at the same time giving the pilot space and comfort to ask questions and check on what was done, to their satisfaction, without feeling like they are risking insulting me or stepping on anybody’s toes in doing so. Ideally, there should be no situation like what FTB describes where the worry of getting on one’s wrong side by wanting to verify something as simple as fuel quantities becomes a factor that compromises safety. (Even, or perhaps especially with a new employer) This is perhaps especially important when dealing with new or low time pilots. If a 5000 hour training captain can get caught in this trap of making a poor decision based on worrying about someone else’s feelings, a junior pilot without the experience and accompanying self-confidence is likely to be even more at risk.

In the hangar, I try to stress to apprentices and new AMEs to take pride in their work, but to keep that pride in check when it comes to having their own work checked by another knowledgeable person. Independent checks, where legally required, are a good thing. I don’t think anyone would argue that. An independent check on any completed task certainly can’t hurt either. I’m always thankful to someone pointing out a detail that I’ve missed or something that could be improved on on a job I thought to be completed properly. Sometimes that find came from a more experienced set of eyes looking over my work, sometimes from a junior. If there is someone around with a minute to check your work, why wouldn’t you take advantage? “A fresh set of eyes before it flies” as a long ago mentor used to put it. Anyways, to add to that, I think I will start making a point of encouraging the new guys (and gals) to extend that attitude to their dealings with flight crew as well, when the time comes.

[PilotDAR]

regardless of the angle, its usually force (speed at impact) that is the primary factor.

I think my point was lost. Obstructions aside, the more parallel you are to earth (low/acute angle) the less deceleration in any direction. The design requirements for crash loads offer a hint. CAR 3 = 6G downward, and 9G forward. Part 23 later changed that to 6G downward, and 18G forward. I opine that an 18G downward crash load is probably not survivable, but it sounds like the FAA think that an 18G forward crash load is.

You can impact earth at a greater angle, stop your C 150 from 70+ MPH in less than a foot, and sustain a 200G crash load, as my friend did. Or, you can stop the same plane from +70 MPH, at a lesser angle (very acute) in many hundreds of feet, and we'll probably call that a landing, with nearly no deceleration forces. And those presume the force is always forward.

If you stall, with greatly diminished lift, the plane will now have a large downward component, and it's unlikely you can stop motion in that direction, no matter what you try. You're going to crash with a lesser forward force, but a greater downward force, and I think we're agreeing that the body will suffer more injury from the impact force downward, than forward. If the landing surface is free of obstructions, I will keep the plane flying (no stall, with lift) until surface contact, and after that try to use the aerodynamics to stretch out the deceleration as long as possible in the forward [only] direction.

[7ECA]

There was an article in the November/December issue of Canadian Aviator on this topic, called "How to Crash Safely".

The three pieces of advice were: keep the aircraft upright, keep the aircraft at the lowest possible speed (while still in control), and land as softly as possible (reduce the downward load).

Sounds easy enough, but when shit hits the fan, I can only hope that I have enough time, to react in correct manner...

[GyvAir]

How fast does an aircraft accelerate downwards in an aerodynamic stall?

For this little exercise, I’m going to assume that the rate is the same as the acceleration due to gravitational forces and use this handy online calculator to find out the downward speed of an aircraft stalled at 20 metres above the ground. A reasonable height scenario to stall into the trees from?

http://www.gravitycalc.com/ Result: 22.1520515485 MPH

22 MPH? Doesn’t sound like much. I’m sure I’ve unintentionally left the seat of various motorized toys at speeds much, much higher than that a dozen times or more. I was always fortunate enough to decelerate relatively parallel to the ground, without the aid of a rock, tree or other perpendicular solid object each time.

Anyways, next, using another handy dandy online calculator: http://measurespeed.com/deceleration-calculator.php going from 22 MPH to 0 MPH in 0.1 seconds, the deceleration force associated with arresting the downward component of the velocity is approximately 10G. Well over the 6G figure Pilot DAR mentioned.

My exercise no doubt has many flaws in it. I’m no physicist and it’s been a long time since I cracked a physics textbook. I don’t know how fast an aircraft accelerates downwards in a stall and I don’t know how quickly the seat will come to a stop on impact. 22 MPH = 32.27 feet per second, so 0.1 seconds or less to come to a stop vertically sounds realistic.

[GyvAir]

Thought I'd share this powerpoint on aircraft accident survivability that I came across. About halfway in, there is a chart suggesting human vertical g force tolerance of 15G for 0.1 second - under controlled circumstances.

It also talks about how accidents are classified as having been survivable or not, in terms of impact, egress and post-accident conditions.

http://www.omao.noaa.gov/aviationsafety ... lity-1.pdf

[pelmet]

However, we do have the PIC on the board. Giving us details could prevent a future accident if so inclined.

How does a pilot try to explain running out of fuel? Before I even attempt to "explain" the many links in the chain that led up to the event, you have to understand that *I* accept full responsibility for the situation I put myself in...BUT I do have reasons why it occurred.

Thanks for the detail. This kind of stuff is good for helping prevent future accidents. It is a difficult position to be in where there is no easy way to independently check the fuel level. It also shows how being a bit paranoid about fuel is important. It would be easy for anyone to be caught by this.

I do remember relying 100% on DHC-6 fuel guages which probably were fairly accurate but I was only in one situation where we ran the fuel down low on a training flight. Maybe all the other times we closer to empty than the indication while assuming the guages were accurate. I believe Borek had one case where an engine flamed out on a DHC-6 on floats due to a faulty guage. I know of a case where a turboprop got a low fuel quantity indication due to a faulty guage. The guage initially indicated OK but at an enroute stop it dropped down. The pilot assumed that the dropped down indication was the faulty indication but it had in fact returned to being accurate.

I have seen one other case where a pilot crashed and was seriously injured after assuming that he had enough fuel based on a statement by maintenance.

The statement that the AMO people made to you about "some fresh fuel" without specifics is interesting. It is comparable to an assumption of a statement "good to go" was taken by the other crash pilot to mean that fuel was sufficient despite the statement being only meant about mechanical condition. Do you think there was any attempt to mislead you when they talked about the fuel being added or was it just improper maintenance in the end that led the AMO to believe that the guages were accurate when they were obviously not.

[pdw]

Still on topic "How to ..." :

I have seen one other case where a pilot crashed and was seriously injured after assuming that he had enough fuel based on a statement by maintenance.

In this context, solving the fuel LEVEL problem only officially became a shop's business if asked to repair/replace (gauges senders ), when a work order is made / signed to account for the dollars to do so. The cost of anything electrical could be a real big AME cost sometimes, ... and dipping tanks was necessary, sometimes whether there was a fuel gauge or not; at one time it sounded like a potentially astronomical expense to keep repairing them every time an obvious or suspected misread was encountered.
I was ok with 'partial accuracy' on the Cardinal, as was my Uncle, til one nice Friday where he had flight planned for the cottage and i took it out for a short 30min Falls tour (add warm-up fuel used) ... which was the fuel missing from full after having been topped up that morning. There too, the Mechanic yelled from the hangar 'repairs all done' (he meant for a regular service), and I'd no idea at that point it was there already fueled for the trip (communication fail), ... the Mech goes home early and the Fueler doesn't get the chance either to tell me/him ... so, the PIC and pax after lunch jumps in, master-on etc ..soon airborne for a YQA weekend round-trip for which full tanks (now with the 'missing amount' exception) comfortably/reliably are adequate range. Sunday night , getting dark, ... near Jordan Harbor, 10nm to go ... still on both ... a miss or two / adrenalin starts to flow ... switches left tank to right right ... back and forth ... manages a straight in ... very lucky/tanks dry at ramp ... (never any more discussion about that ... the 'C177 days' / privileges are discretely over ... and only get to hear the 'fuel starvation'/ whole story much later from the pax / a contractor by chance, over a beer).

Edit: The treetop discussion we've been having seems to have isolated one fact in particular, while inevitably stalling fairly soon after entering the trees, maintaining a pre-stall bouyancy as long as possible seems to ensure the steepening downward angle ahead-of 'ground contact' ... at least avoided to a lower height. The Stinson-prop in the video is already chopping trees (airframe starts bending trees) well into the canopy at the point of stall, where speed is arrested heavily as trunks are thicker ... the last bit of height being lost more slowly too while still entangling them with the last remaining forward speed.

A sudden engine off predicament of FTB's description, how far it's possible to maintain pre-stall bouyancy/nose-high deep-enough into trees to minimize impact angle ... with only one shot of a few seconds with 'elevator accuracy' to 'set it up' ... IMO is definitely research material.

[flyinthebug]

Thank you everyone for your comments. I appreciate not being chastised or belittled for telling my story of stupidity, complacency, and the importance of knowing your fuel load.

I want to clarify that I do not advocate for "stalling it in" in most accident scenarios. My situation was unique and under the circumstances I was faced with, I did what I thought gave me some sort of chance of surviving. The numbers about G forces the body can withstand have been clearly shared in this thread, and in most instances, controlled flight to the very last second is likely in your favour. As is not risking the vertical fall from 50 feet that was mentioned by a previous poster as costing his friends life.

Rowdy, your story astounds me as much as mine does you. We are both living on borrowed time, so ill just be thankful for that.

One final thing in answer to pelmet`s last question...

I do not believe for one minute that anyone at the AMO had anything but the best intentions and provided me with what they believed to be valid information. Something was wrong with the fuel gauges...but I know they didn't have a clue for whatever # of possible reasons. I heard a rumour later after my accident that an apprentice actually did the recalibration of the fuel gauges and his work was checked by a licenced AME before being signed off. I am 100% confident that nothing "sinister" occurred here...the fault lies with me. I should have asked for 2 Jerry cans of fuel and then I would have known. DHC2 fuel gauges, although more reliable and accurate than any Cessna product, are still well known as unreliable to anyone with any time on them. A hose or 10 gals of gas and this thread wouldn't exist.

So ultimately pelmet, I don't blame the AMO on any level... I had to power to change history by making a good decision...instead I succumbed to pressure to get er done...and don't piss off the entire AMO and your new boss by acting like an ass by saying something to the effect of " ok, I believe you guys are all professionals and I know you make your living repairing the planes I fly...but despite you reassuring me that I have accurate gauges and plenty of fuel...im still not going to take your word for it, and go get me 10 gals of gas & a hose while your at it" Do you know how unpleasant my summer would have been had I started out being "That guy"??...from this perspective now though, how I wish I had been that guy that day. I could have lived with a few dirty looks throughout the summer.

That's my last comments on this thread. Thanks again for the supportive comments and PMs. It really does help to talk about it with my peers.

Fly safe all!
FTB

[PilotDAR]

There is always a balance between physics and trust in our fellow humans, it is rarely all of one or the other. Unfortunately, it occasionally works out really poorly. We remind ourselves that it could happen to us too, and lucky if we get away with it (I made my mea culpa here last summer).

We can empathize, think of what have learned, and move on with a bit more wisdom.

Thanks FTB, see you on another thread soon....

[GyvAir]

This is an AvWeb reprint of an Aviation Safety magazine article on the subject. It basically agrees with the item ahramin posted, with more focus on mitigation of the impact forces than post-crash survival.

http://www.avweb.com/news/features/The- ... 447-1.html

[PilotDAR]

Great article Gyv, thanks.

The key takeaway for me is: " ....maintain the lowest controllable speed you can manage without increasing your sink rate".

Fly the plane on, and slow as you are doing it, don't drop it on in a stall.

[cgzro]

"That guy"??

First thanks for sharing, its very possible it will prevent another young pilot from the same mistake.

Second its been my experience that double checking does not offend mechanics, on the contrary Ive found the mechanics I deal with expect a double or tripple check and see it as a sign of a careful pilot. I realize its hard to do this when you are young but its important that young pilots reading this thread understand just what PIC means. The buck literally stops with you and a that attitude has to be maintained even under pressure. Trust but verify is an essential skill.

[ahramin]

Actually I often find that double and triple checking still gets a lot of eye rolling in this industry. Even at the airlines the skills demonstrated by not annoying your colleagues are far more highly prized than the ability to insist on double checking something that should be double checked. It's only when you have an accident that the chief pilots change hats and can't believe you put people skills ahead of anything else. Getting along and being popular are sadly still the most important thing to being successful in this industry. Flyinthebug, I'd say you made the same decisions our culture pressures pilots into making every day, you just weren't lucky with it that day. Hopefully your sharing of that helps push a few people in the right direction. I hope people take it to heart and the next time someone is being a pain in the ass consider that discouraging them from being scrupulous about a less important issue discourages them from being scrupulous on other issues.

I looked into survivable / not survivable classification and found that it depends on: horizontal and vertical deceleration, cabin integrity, and seat integrity. If you hit hard, if the cabin comes apart, and or if the seat comes of the rails the accident is less survivable. Not to put too fine a point on it, I wouldn't recommend a technique that resulted in a hit hard enough to be classified as unsurvivable.

This thread was started in the hopes of encouraging students and instructors away from the misguided "stall it in" school of thought. To continue that effort, here's a quote from an old article by Mike Hart reprinted in the latest AvWeb edition (linked to above):

... have all your flaps down before you make contact, maintain the lowest controllable speed you can manage without increasing your sink rate. This will ensure first contact is as gentle as it can be. And whatever you do, do not stall your airplane.

Another point I saw in that article that hit home personally was the importance of securing the aircraft before touchdown. I'm so used to checklists that call for all that stuff afterwards that I'm not sure I would have remembered to do it before the crash. It's got me looking through all the small aircraft emergency checklists I can find trying to figure out what else I have forgotten about small planes.

[pdw]

"That guy" gives pause to contemplate two core themes introduced via this thread: the original 1) "How to crash" when faced with an unexpected forced landing location, and ...

2) any counterproductive circumstance or mindset (ie causal to an ommission / oversight in a preflight check etc. as already discussed above) that has led to a "situation 1":

Actually I often find that double and triple checking still gets a lot of eyes rolling in this industry. Even at the airlines the skills demonstrated by not annoying your colleagues are far more highly prized than the ability to insist on double checking something that should be double checked. It's only when you have an accident that the chief pilots change hats and can't believe you put people skills ahead of anything else. Getting along and being popular are sadly still the most important thing to being successful in this industry.

Recently having observed the 'Killinger theory' in Dr. B.Killinger's "The Respectable Addicts", ... if the attitudes of "getting along and being popular" have produced an adrenalin based working environment (which she has demonstrated can lead into the potentially obsessive / narcissistic thinking found in workoholism) we could be onto something here in this context; perhaps for another thread.