Buffalo Airways - April 28, 2020 - Kugaaruk

[J31]

3.1 Findings as to causes and contributing factors
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.

Approaches to airports north of 60°N latitude are not restricted by ground visibility and, as a result, the flight crew continued the approach when the reported visibility was ¼ statute mile, which is lower than the published advisory visibility of 1¾ statute miles for this approach.

The flight crew believed that the lack of an approach ban permitted a landing, and landed at Kugaaruk Airport even though the reported ground visibility was below the minimum aerodrome operating visibility.

The offset approach, the crosswind component from the left, and the moving-runway illusion created by the blowing snow, all contributed to the aircraft’s alignment with the right side of the runway.

The aircraft touched down near the right edge of the runway and, when the right landing gear impacted the deeper snow along the runway edge, the aircraft veered to the right and departed the runway surface.

The snow depth adjacent to the runway was allowed to exceed the limits dictated by the airport operator’s Winter Maintenance Plan. Consequently, the aircraft sustained additional damage when it departed the runway surface.

3.2 Findings as to risk

These are conditions, unsafe acts or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.

If snow clearing operations do not maintain the depth of snow buildup adjacent to the runway within prescribed limits, there is a risk that an aircraft could collide with the accumulated snow due to the reduced effective runway width.

Until Transport Canada simplifies (Recommendation A20-01) and enforces (Recommendation A20-02) the operating minima for approaches and landings, there remains a risk that flight crews will initiate, or continue, approaches in weather conditions that do not permit a safe landing.

4.0 Safety action
4.1 Safety action taken
4.1.1 Buffalo Airways Ltd.

After the occurrence, management at Buffalo Airways Ltd. conducted a survey among its pilots. The survey collected data regarding knowledge and understanding of aerodrome visibility restrictions and how they apply to operations in visibilities of less than ½ statute mile (SM). It revealed that there were misunderstandings: not all pilots realized that, in the absence of a published reduced visibility operations procedure in the Canada Flight Supplement, the minimum visibility for operating at an aerodrome is ½ SM. The visibility is as reported by a weather observer, or, when no weather is reported, it is determined by the pilot-in-command on approach.

Hmm. Been a long time since I have operated in the Arctic. I learned something!

[fish4life]

I think most reputable carriers in the arctic knew that

[valleyboy]

There likely isn't an arctic pilot that has been north of 60N for any length of time who hasn't landed in 1/4 mile vis. Conditions change and the very nature of the arctic usually means very little snow accumulation but there could be considerable drifting.
There seems to be a little "smoke and mirrors" here because to drag and aircraft off the runway there needed to be "hard" snow pack like a runway edge windrow or they simply missed the runway in the first place. It was a lot easier back in the day of centre line dye marker.

Sure they should not have been dicking around in that kind of wx and the short sighted fact that if they had successfully landed they were trapped there. While you can always land and really no one can establish the actual wx at touch down departing is another story and 1/2 mile is law.

Ironically most of the time when I was flying the arctic, in recent years, diversion and over flight due to wx was based on departure restrictions not landing, operationally.

I have no idea of the experience level of this crew and many a "high" time pilot has been caught the same way. It's one of the hard lessons some learn in the arctic. Runway environment is just that and you need your situational awareness before planting those wheels. S & BS in the winter fog in the summer but there is no other place I would rather be flying, especially north of 72N - spectacular !!

I hope "budding" arctic pilots take note of this incident and file it for that day they find themselves dealing with the same decisions.

[Old fella]

There likely isn't an arctic pilot that has been north of 60N for any length of time who hasn't landed in 1/4 mile vis. Conditions change and the very nature of the arctic usually means very little snow accumulation but there could be considerable drifting.
There seems to be a little "smoke and mirrors" here because to drag and aircraft off the runway there needed to be "hard" snow pack like a runway edge windrow or they simply missed the runway in the first place. It was a lot easier back in the day of centre line dye marker.

Sure they should not have been dicking around in that kind of wx and the short sighted fact that if they had successfully landed they were trapped there. While you can always land and really no one can establish the actual wx at touch down departing is another story and 1/2 mile is law.

Ironically most of the time when I was flying the arctic, in recent years, diversion and over flight due to wx was based on departure restrictions not landing, operationally.

I have no idea of the experience level of this crew and many a "high" time pilot has been caught the same way. It's one of the hard lessons some learn in the arctic. Runway environment is just that and you need your situational awareness before planting those wheels. S & BS in the winter fog in the summer but there is no other place I would rather be flying, especially north of 72N - spectacular !!

I hope "budding" arctic pilots take note of this incident and file it for that day they find themselves dealing with the same decisions.

Lots of A100 time matter of fact 4000hrs+ on B90 A-C/A100/200. Nothing at all North of 60 or high Arctic but plenty of small airport stuff though. You are quite correct on drifts vs visibility/departure and I had some challenging episodes but nothing bent.

[bobcaygeon]

3.1 Findings as to causes and contributing factors
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.

Approaches to airports north of 60°N latitude are not restricted by ground visibility and, as a result, the flight crew continued the approach when the reported visibility was ¼ statute mile, which is lower than the published advisory visibility of 1¾ statute miles for this approach.

The flight crew believed that the lack of an approach ban permitted a landing, and landed at Kugaaruk Airport even though the reported ground visibility was below the minimum aerodrome operating visibility.

The offset approach, the crosswind component from the left, and the moving-runway illusion created by the blowing snow, all contributed to the aircraft’s alignment with the right side of the runway.

The aircraft touched down near the right edge of the runway and, when the right landing gear impacted the deeper snow along the runway edge, the aircraft veered to the right and departed the runway surface.

The snow depth adjacent to the runway was allowed to exceed the limits dictated by the airport operator’s Winter Maintenance Plan. Consequently, the aircraft sustained additional damage when it departed the runway surface.

3.2 Findings as to risk

These are conditions, unsafe acts or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.

If snow clearing operations do not maintain the depth of snow buildup adjacent to the runway within prescribed limits, there is a risk that an aircraft could collide with the accumulated snow due to the reduced effective runway width.

Until Transport Canada simplifies (Recommendation A20-01) and enforces (Recommendation A20-02) the operating minima for approaches and landings, there remains a risk that flight crews will initiate, or continue, approaches in weather conditions that do not permit a safe landing.

4.0 Safety action
4.1 Safety action taken
4.1.1 Buffalo Airways Ltd.

After the occurrence, management at Buffalo Airways Ltd. conducted a survey among its pilots. The survey collected data regarding knowledge and understanding of aerodrome visibility restrictions and how they apply to operations in visibilities of less than ½ statute mile (SM). It revealed that there were misunderstandings: not all pilots realized that, in the absence of a published reduced visibility operations procedure in the Canada Flight Supplement, the minimum visibility for operating at an aerodrome is ½ SM. The visibility is as reported by a weather observer, or, when no weather is reported, it is determined by the pilot-in-command on approach.

Hmm. Been a long time since I have operated in the Arctic. I learned something!

The 1/2 SM ground vis for taxi, etc hasn't always existed. Its within the last 10 years. In theory you can land but not taxi to the terminal. We've often been stuck because we can land but not taxi for departure even if we can legally takeoff with a a TO alternate. It's related to ICAO compliance, etc

[BTD]

3.1 Findings as to causes and contributing factors
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.

Approaches to airports north of 60°N latitude are not restricted by ground visibility and, as a result, the flight crew continued the approach when the reported visibility was ¼ statute mile, which is lower than the published advisory visibility of 1¾ statute miles for this approach.

The flight crew believed that the lack of an approach ban permitted a landing, and landed at Kugaaruk Airport even though the reported ground visibility was below the minimum aerodrome operating visibility.

The offset approach, the crosswind component from the left, and the moving-runway illusion created by the blowing snow, all contributed to the aircraft’s alignment with the right side of the runway.

The aircraft touched down near the right edge of the runway and, when the right landing gear impacted the deeper snow along the runway edge, the aircraft veered to the right and departed the runway surface.

The snow depth adjacent to the runway was allowed to exceed the limits dictated by the airport operator’s Winter Maintenance Plan. Consequently, the aircraft sustained additional damage when it departed the runway surface.

3.2 Findings as to risk

These are conditions, unsafe acts or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.

If snow clearing operations do not maintain the depth of snow buildup adjacent to the runway within prescribed limits, there is a risk that an aircraft could collide with the accumulated snow due to the reduced effective runway width.

Until Transport Canada simplifies (Recommendation A20-01) and enforces (Recommendation A20-02) the operating minima for approaches and landings, there remains a risk that flight crews will initiate, or continue, approaches in weather conditions that do not permit a safe landing.

4.0 Safety action
4.1 Safety action taken
4.1.1 Buffalo Airways Ltd.

After the occurrence, management at Buffalo Airways Ltd. conducted a survey among its pilots. The survey collected data regarding knowledge and understanding of aerodrome visibility restrictions and how they apply to operations in visibilities of less than ½ statute mile (SM). It revealed that there were misunderstandings: not all pilots realized that, in the absence of a published reduced visibility operations procedure in the Canada Flight Supplement, the minimum visibility for operating at an aerodrome is ½ SM. The visibility is as reported by a weather observer, or, when no weather is reported, it is determined by the pilot-in-command on approach.

Hmm. Been a long time since I have operated in the Arctic. I learned something!

The 1/2 SM ground vis for taxi, etc hasn't always existed. Its within the last 10 years. In theory you can land but not taxi to the terminal. We've often been stuck because we can land but not taxi for departure even if we can legally takeoff with a a TO alternate. It's related to ICAO compliance, etc

It’s been since about 2005. If you can land you can taxi in. But if the vis is below the aerodrome operating vis you are not allowed to conduct the approach. If it is good enough to start the approach and continue to a landing even if it drops after the FAF you are still authorized to taxi in. That was a rumour that got propagated due to the poor rollout by TC when this all first started.

From the CAP gen.

C.Where the Aerodrome Operating Visibility as set out in subsection (A) is less than the minimum visibility published in the CFS, taxi operations are deemed to be occurring below the published aerodrome operating visibility; except when:

•visibility deteriorates below the published aerodrome operating visibility after the aircraft has commenced taxi for departure (including de-icing stop);

•visibility deteriorates below the published aerodrome operating visibility after the aircraft has landed and is taxiing to the destination on the aerodrome;

•the aircraft is taxiing on the manoeuvring area as authorized by ATC in accordance with the aerodrome’s published operational procedures*;

•the aircraft is taxiing for departure at a site without an active ATC Tower, in accordance with the aerodrome’s operational procedures published pursuant to CAR 602.96(3)(d)*;or

•the aircraft is taxiing on the manoeuvring area for purposes other than take-off or landing as authorized by the Aerodrome Operator in accordance with the aerodrome’s RVOP/LVOP*.

Edited to add further clarification.

D.Where the aerodrome operating visibility as set out in subsection (A) is less than the minimum visibility published in the CFS, a landing is deemed to occur below the published aerodrome operating visibility for the runway of intended use; except where:

•at the time a visibility report is received, the aircraft has passed the FAF inbound or where there is no FAF, the point where the final approach course is intercepted;

•the RVR for the runway of intended landing is varying between distances less than and greater than the minimum RVR and the ground visibility is equal to or greater than the minimum visibility;

•at sites without an active ATCTower, the ground visibility is varying between distances less than and greater than the minimum ground visibility and the RVR is equal to or greater than the minimum visibility; or

•at sites without an active ATCTower, prior to 1,000' above aerodrome elevation the PIC determines that a localized meteorological phenomenon is affecting the ground visibility by observing that the runway of intended landing and the taxi route to the destination on the aerodrome are seen and recognized.

[propfeather]

But if the vis is below the aerodrome operating vis you are not allowed to conduct the approach.

You can in CYBB.

[Commonwealth]

The rules certainly get convoluted. Chew on this one: what if someone is trying to operate at a station where weather info is transmitted by AWOS only? I cannot be alone in my experience where the visibility reported by the AWOS is clearly worse than actual conditions. The rules say that AWOS vis is governing. I am referring to departure when reported vis by AWOS is 3/8 SM, aérodrome operating vis is 1/2 SM and I can count 20 sets of runway lights (RVR 4000 or 3/4 SM at the threshold. Can I legally operate? Should I have someone go unplug the AWOS broadcasting function?

The rules are cloudier than the weather a lot of times.

[notwhoyouthinkIam]

The rules certainly get convoluted. Chew on this one: what if someone is trying to operate at a station where weather info is transmitted by AWOS only? I cannot be alone in my experience where the visibility reported by the AWOS is clearly worse than actual conditions. The rules say that AWOS vis is governing. I am referring to departure when reported vis by AWOS is 3/8 SM, aérodrome operating vis is 1/2 SM and I can count 20 sets of runway lights (RVR 4000 or 3/4 SM at the threshold. Can I legally operate? Should I have someone go unplug the AWOS broadcasting function?

The rules are cloudier than the weather a lot of times.

"The rules are cloudier than the weather a lot of times."

I don't know... it sounds like you know exactly what the rules are, but they don't fit what you want.

[pelmet]

Definitely a challenging landing. In the end, the investigators are not even sure if they landed on the runway. The high snowbanks close to the runway are a good reminder that arctic airports should be treated like third world airports as the snow clearing maintenance is not reliable in many places. Poor snow clearing, broken machinery, CARS operator not reporting to work so you have to call your own agent to get the weather, are examples of the kinds of things you can expect to encounter. I remember encountering much worse than reported conditions in one location on a nice weather day in the spring, making a takeoff illegal.

That being said, it can still be useful to see if you can call ahead and get a runway condition report in conditions like the ones encountered by this King Air crew. Perhaps something can be set up for a good look at the runway as the aircraft is approaching to see if there are any snowdrifts. And that blowing snow in the Arctic seems to create a lot of hard pack snow, not the nice fluffy drifts one frequently sees down south. That is why snow for igloos is easy to find up there and hard to find down here. You walk on it and it squeaks under your boots.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfD11omFQ88