Air Transat Incident

[Jaques Strappe]

I notice many people here are quick to judge airbus. Most of whom don't have any time flying one. You will not find many high time bus drivers condeming the airplane like all the 1500 hr armchair quarter backs do.

As far as comparing to boeing. Don't forget that for years, Boeing had no idea why their 737 would just suddenly roll on its' back with no warning.

[yycflyguy]

Hi all,

This just in...

FAA officials said that the pilots didn't declare an emergency altough Miami was ready to accept the plane (if they had declared an emergency). The crew requested Fort Lauderdale, but was refused this destination because there is no custom offcials there.

Fort Lauderdale (KFLL) is an international airport and has 24 hour customs for both private and airline traffic.

[.......]

Hi all,

The crew requested Fort Lauderdale, but was refused this destination because there is no custom offcials there.

YYCFLYGUY is right... KFLL is an international airport, therefore they have 24 hours customs avail.


I guess AT didn't want bad advertising so they returned to the land of no free speech. Save the company's image and save a few bucks. I just love this industry.

Talk about talking through your hat... Who decided to go back to VRA? The front end crew...that's all! VRA is one of our busiest southern destination, we have maintenance personel there, good representation, long runway (over 10000' long) and virtually no traffic at time of occurence and being at FL350, it takes more or less 30 min. to descend anyway, so what's your point?

[Jim la Jungle]

Ok, let's say that I talked trought my hat. I accept the blame. I've heard recordings of the FAA spokeperson on the radio saying Lauderdale (requested by the crew) didn't have customs at that time. I'm not making this up. Is the FAA lying? I don't know.

Another thing (this is more Vaudevillesque but I'll post it anyway); a pax called a radio station saying that Captain Speaking told the pax that americans weren't cooperative with their situation, and for that matter they turned back to Cuba. Now, what's that all about? A little white lie to lots of customers? BUT I understand this story MAY be distorted.

The papers and television here in Quebec took this opportunity to write or say on tv anti-american comments for not being cooperative enough. Personnally, I don't have all the facts but just some of it.



And my point is...I don't have a point. I just pretend to know the meaning of live. The meanin of life is...

[...]

As far as comparing to boeing. Don't forget that for years, Boeing had no idea why their 737 would just suddenly roll on its' back with no warning.

Sounds like someone I USED to date....

[DA900]

What was his name?

[LoadFactor2]

When the American Airlines A300's vertical stab and rudder broke off, they were BELOW Va, exercising full rudder deflection. What's the point of Va again??? And they blamed the pilot flying for that???

[ice ice baby]

well the initial findings from the TSB are out....and guess what they don't really give much in the way of answers.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is investigating this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Because the investigation is ongoing, the information provided is subject to change as additional facts become available.

The purpose of this communication is to update interested organizations and persons on the factual information gathered to date, to provide information regarding safety-related activities, and to provide information about further investigation activities.

Ce point sur l'enquête est également disponible en français.

Aviation Investigation Update
Loss of Rudder
Airbus 310-308
Air Transat Flight 961
Varadero, Cuba
06 March 2005

Investigation Update Number A05F0047


Investigation Organization
On 06 March 2005, Air Transat Flight 961, an Airbus 310-308, Canadian registration C-GPAT, serial number 597, lost the major part of its rudder while in flight from Varadero, Cuba, to Québec City, Canada. The flight returned to Varadero where an uneventful landing was carried out.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) was notified of the accident at 11001 and responded by deploying two investigators from the Dorval, Canada, regional office and one investigator from the TSB Engineering Laboratory in Ottawa, Canada. Because the event occurred over international waters, Canada, as the State of Registry, is conducting the investigation.

The investigation team is composed of the following five main groups: operational, air traffic control (ATC), human factor, technical, performance, and recorders group. Four subgroups under the technical group have been established; a system group, a structure and maintenance group, a maintenance records group, and a manufacturing group. The Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA) of France, the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States assigned accredited representatives to participate in the investigation. Technical advisors from Airbus, Transport Canada, the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the German Aerospace Center (DLR), and Air Transat are also participating and assisting in the investigation.


Factual Information
The A310-308, operated by Air Transat, was on a charter flight from Varadero, Cuba, to Québec City, Canada, with a crew of 9 and 261 passengers on board. While at an altitude of 35 000 feet, the flight crew heard a loud bang with simultaneous vibrations that lasted a few seconds. The aircraft entered a periodic rolling and yawing motion known as dutch roll that decreased as the aircraft descended to a lower altitude. Once the aircraft reached about 19 000 feet, the flight crew had no indication of any abnormalities from systems monitoring. The flight crew considered landing at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, but elected to return to Varadero where an uneventful landing was carried out. It is only once on the ground that the flight crew noted during a visual inspection that a major part of the rudder was missing. There were no fatalities. One flight attendant sustained minor injuries.

The investigation team observed that only the lower rudder spar and the base rib of the rudder were remaining. Less than five per cent of the total rudder surface actually remained attached to the spar. The rudder is attached to the vertical fin through seven A-frame hinges, numbered one to seven, starting from the bottom. The remaining parts of the rudder were attached to the vertical fin's rear spar by the actuators and the four lower rudder hinges. Hinges five and six were were still in place on the fin spar, but only the attachment fittings of the rudder were attached to them. The rudder position sensor was still attached to the remaining piece of the rudder. Rudder hinge number seven was torn off from the fin spar.

The panels that cover the rudder are made of carbon fibre reinforced plastic (CFRP). The panels were manufactured in 1991 by Soko in Mostar, former Yugoslavia. The rudder panels (serial number 1331) were assembled at Airbus facilities in Stade, Germany, and then installed on the aircraft in 1992. The aircraft had accumulated 49 224 flight hours since manufactured in 1992.

The flight data recorder (FDR), the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and the digital AIDS (aircraft integrated data system) recorder (DAR) were sent to the TSB Engineering Laboratory for downloads of all data recorded to determine the sequence of events and the contributing factors of this event. The work is still in progress.

On 19 March 2005, the vertical tailplane (VTP) and the rudder were transported from Cuba to Bremen, Germany, for further examination. The VTP, to which the rudder is attached, is bolted to the top of the fuselage by six attachment lugs. The VTP was subject to ultrasonic inspection, which revealed delamination damage to the two rear attachment lugs. Loads and aeroelastic models are being formulated to evaluate the noted damage. An elasticity laminate checker (ELCH) test on sample in-service rudders is also in progress to check rudder panels in depth, from the outer skin to the inner skin. This test will provide information on rudder skin and core damage over a sampling, ranging from 13-year-old rudders to more recent rudders. At this time, one test has been carried out on one of the selected rudders, and no discrepancies have been found.

The rudder control systems were checked and tested in Varadero with no anomalies found. The three servo-controls that control rudder movement were inspected and tested at Goodrich facilities in Paris, France, during the second week of April. Rudder servo-control spring rods were also investigated in Airbus facilities in Hamburg, Germany, and no deficiencies were found.

Maintenance and technical records of the aircraft are being reviewed by the maintenance and records group to determine if any past maintenance activities on the aircraft, or if any past reported operational events may have played a role in the detachment of the rudder.


Safety Action Taken
Following the event, a number of actions have been taken. On 17 March 2005, Airbus produced an All Operator Telex (AOT) to verify the structural integrity of the rudder and its attachment by means of a one-time detailed visual inspection and tap test inspection as a precautionary measure. On 18 March 2005, the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) of France issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) that includes mandatory actions and compliance times to perform inspection and apply corrective measures if necessary in accordance with the instructions specified in the Airbus AOT. On 28 March 2005, the FAA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive (AD). All results and feedback from these mandatory inspections are being compiled by Airbus.

Once validated safety deficiencies are identified during the course of an investigation, the Board can, at any time during the investigation, recommend action designed to reduce or eliminate such deficiencies from the transportation system.


Investigation Plan
There is still a considerable amount of work to be done to bring this investigation to a conclusion by the Board. In the following months, further ELCH tests will continue on other rudders of the defined samples to check rudder panels in depth, from outer to inner skin, and to measure rudder structural rigidity. The preparation of the draft report will take months to be completed with emphasis on the analysis of collected factual information gathered by the detailed examination of the failed rudder, the fin box lugs, the AOT and ELCH test results and any appropriate investigation work.

When the investigation team's draft report is complete, it will be reviewed by the Investigation Branch Standards and Performance section, and approved by the Director, Air Investigations. The draft report will then be submitted to the Board for its approval and released as a confidential draft report to designated reviewers. The Board will consider the representations of the designated reviewers, amend the report if required, and issue the final investigation report.

[McKeX]

Load Factor2

It's ironic that you posted about Va with a handle like that.

What you said is a common misconception as to the point of maneuvering speed (Va). Until recently I also thought that if you were below Va that you could exercise full deflection on all controls. In fact my first instructor told me to go up one day and practice maneuvering below Va by reefing the airplane around using full deflection on all the controls.

In actual fact, Va is only a speed where you can fully deflect the elevators and the airplane will stall before it reaches it's maximum structural load limit.

Example, take an aircraft with a structural
load limit of 4 g's,
a Va of 100 kts,
and a stall speed of 50 kts.

if you pull out of a 4 g dive at 100 kts, the load factor is 4. Stall speed is the square root of the load factor x Vs. So stall speed increases to 100 kts and the aircraft stalls before it can exceed the structural load limit.

This is limited entirely to structural load limits in the positive pitch axis. Any movement of the rudder and/or ailerons while at high g's can produce torque on the airframe that it may or may not be able to handle.

As for the rudder, I was talking with a Bombardier engineer about this and he said that the vertical stab has to be strong enough to withstand a single full rudder deflection from neutral to left or right. It does not however have to withstand repeated full rudder deflections from full left to full right. This is how the AA pilots got themselves in trouble.

I still believe that the AA pilots cannot be blamed for that accident though. There is not nearly enough awareness and/or company policy on this issue. Also, there are fundamental flaws in nearly all initial training when it comes to this concept.

[mantogasrsrwy]

Well said Jaques Strappe and McKeX

The following alticle explains the myths about Va

http://www.flyingmag.com/article.asp?ar ... int_page=y

Also, for those that think they can somehow abuse a Boeing more than Airbus and survive it have a look at this article by Boeing. Specifically, the last 2 paragraphs of page 11


http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB001_Use% ... Boeing.pdf

[...]

What was his name?

DA900...why haven't you been returning my calls?

Fine...be that way.

[Donald]

There's also an excellent article on Avweb about the T-34 and it's recent problems. It's related to the discussion about Va and what you can and cannot do. Or I guess what you should and should not do. It's good reading...

http://www.avweb.com/news/columns/182086-1.html

The FARs also address the certification standards for rolling the aircraft, and Va gives full protection for stresses on the wing at Va with full aileron deflection.

But not at 6g in pitch!

Read that again, please, it's critical to what follows.

In other words, you may pull full back at Va, or you can apply full aileron at Va, but you can't do both at once!

The quote is in reference to in-flight breakups of the T-34 used in simulated air combat missions, but it has some use here. Many people are of the opinion that at Va they can "mash" the airplane around with no ill-effect. Sadly, this theory has been proven wrong time and time again.

[bizjet_mania]

Judging from that picture, it looks like it was overstressed. Not sure if all the A310's were from Emirates, but Emirates has an excellent maintenance program. So it must be Air Transats maintenance problem

[172pilot]

if i was in the flight deck, had reports of a loud boom plus vibrations, i'd opt for an american airport that can offer more emergency response equipment. in a situation like this, immigration would be the last thing on my mind.

[chowda]

Don't know if the status of the a/c has changed, but as of a month ago, it was still sitting in Varadero, off in the corner of the ramp. The complete vertical stab was removed, and the mounting area tarped up.

Was kinda surprised to see it still there, and was'nt thrilled to be walking off the same a/c type!

Reason enough to kick start the binge........

[Louis]

Here's another good article on Va: http://www.x-plane.com/myths.html